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JOB R j j j j 3 10.1 IRITICAL ANALYSIS
John 3. Kelly
ABSTRACT
The thesis examines four central propositions of 
theories of job redesign: i) job redesign has abandoned major
tenets of scientific management, ii) job redesign affects job 
attitudes and behaviour via intrinsic motivation, iii) job 
attitudes and behaviour are both influenced by job content 
and co-vary, and iv) job redesign caters for the mutual 
interests of workers and employers. These propositions 
are critically examined firstly through a comparison of the 
three classical job redesign theories - 'Ierzberg?s job 
enrichment, task design theory, and sociotechnical systems 
theory - with scientific management, following which a new 
theory of job redesign is proposed. This postulates affinities 
between job redesign and scientific management; attributes 
performance improvements after job redesign to extrinsic 
mechanisms (pay, contiol, labour elimination, methods 
improvements) for all but a minority of employees; 
postulates attitude - behaviour discrepancies; and claims 
significant economic costs for workers because of job redesign 
such as intensification of labour and loss of jobs. The 
classical and the new theories are tested against cases in the 
literature, and against original case material, and the new 
theory found to have greater explanatory power (of the origin 
mechanisms, and consequences of job redesign) despite a number 
of methodological and concejjtual shortcomings. These short­
comings slightly weaken the value of the theory, but it remains 
worthy of further testing and. refinement. Finally, a number of 
implications of the new theory are drawn out, for the history 
of management practices, for the future of job redesign, and 
for general models of worker behaviour, and further research 
projects are suggested.
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"The understandings of the greater part of men are 
necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The 
man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple 
operations . . has no occasion to exert his under­
standing, or to exercise his invention.......He
naturally loses therefore the habit of such exertion, 
and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it iSj 
possible for a human creature to become.M (Adam Smith)
"Manufacture ....... converts the labourer into a
crippled monstrosity, by forcing his detail dexterity 
at the expense of a world of productive capabilities 
and instincts; ....... " (Karl Marx2 )
"Every day he repeats the same movements with
monstrous regularity ......  He is no longer anything
but an inert piece of machinery, only an external force 
set going which always moves in the same direction and 
in the same way." (Emile Durkhienr*)
“• I —
Part One
INTRODUCTION
- 8 -
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The effects of specialisation of manual labour have 
been the objects of comment and criticism for almost two 
hundred years, as shown by the quotations on the previous 
page, which cover the period from 1776 to 1902. The 
solutions proposed by these three writers were very 
different: Adam Smith recommended a modicum of education
to compensate for the narrowness of industrial work;
Marx argued for the overthrow of the capitalist mode of 
production and for the development of society's productive 
forces under socialism, as the preconditions for the abolition 
of division of labour; Durkheim called for the integration 
of the worker into the group of workers to which he nominally 
belonged, so that he might then perceive the significance of 
his own fractional task.
The concern of this thesis however is a more recent 
critique of specialisation of labour, which has been known 
variously as job enrichment, enlargement, structuring, or 
design The central argument of these various 'schools' 
consists of the view that the organisation of work on the 
basis of what are taken to be scientific management principles, 
such as extreme specialisation of labour, is becoming counter­
productive and is resulting in consequences such as absenteeism, 
dissatisfaction, turnover of 1 do r, low r »oductivity, 
industrial conflict, and even sabotage. However, m e
situation can be remedied by reversing the division of 
labour and enlarging, or enriching jobs. Not only will 
this improve satisfaction, and hence reduce absenteeism 
and turnover, it will also enhance productivity since 
employees will perform at improved levels on jobs that are 
intrinsically interesting and motivating.
In view of the widespread acceptance of division of 
labour as an economic necessity, and its existence in some 
of the industrial countries, for several centuries, it is 
clearly important to examine very carefully claims regarding 
its negative consequences, and suggestions for their amelio­
ration. Whereas earlier critiques, such as those quoted 
from above, have tended to counterpose workers’ psychological 
interests to economic imperatives, the contemporary critics 
have argued it is possible to reconcile the two sets of 
demands. This unusual claim further increases the interest of 
the proposals.
Such proposals can be traced back to two sets of studies 
in the late 1940s. The famous study of the car assembly line 
by Walker Sc Guest argued that job dissatisfaction could be 
ameliorated by increasing the scope of individual jobs so 
that workers could enjoy enhanced variety and autonomy. At 
the same time Walker reported one of the earliest experiments 
in ’job enlargement' in a large machine shop, where several 
different work roles were amalgamated. The second major 
study, by Trist efc al, established 'autonomous' work groups 
in the Durham coal mines within which workers were deployed
- 10-
on various jobs as required.^ Such groups were established 
as part of a socio-technical approach to work organisations.
The next major innovation in this field was Herzberg's 
two-factor theory of job attitudes, in which the causes of 
job satisfaction and motivation were located in job content
Q
(rather than context) . Hence to improve these factors, jobs 
should be 'enriched’ to provide employees with responsibility, 
a sense of achievement, personal growth, and recognition.
Each of these approaches - job enlargement, socio-
technical theory, and job enrichment - continues to be
influential even today, v/ith Herzberg's job enrichment having
exerted perhaps the greatest influence, at least on industrial
psychology and management theory.10 The more well-known cases
11 12of job redesign include those at Volvo , ICI , Philips , 
and AT & TU .
Yet despite the long history of criticism and discussion 
of division of labour, contemporary writers in the job 
redesign field have scaicsLy examined the relationship between 
their own work and ideas and those of their predecessors. 
Indeed, certain themes have been taken for granted, most 
notably the claim to have superceded scientific management.
The other omission in this literature, again surprising in 
view of the persistence and pervasiveness of division of 
labour, is a willingness to adopt a scientifically sceptical 
attitude towards some of its now orthodox claims. As many 
writers and commentators have observed, this field of work 
has been characterised by a remarkable degree of evangelism
-11 -
and partisanship, which seems to have prevented more serious
and sober assessments of what has actually been achieved.
Such assessments are now beginning to emerge, in articles
and books by writers such as Cummings and .olloy, for 
1 5instance . The thrust of their work however is largely 
methodological, and concerned with the design and evaluation 
of changes in division of labour. The present thesis is 
principally concerned with a theoretical examination of job 
redesign, that is both critical and comprehensive. Critical, 
in the sense of being sceptical of received or conventional 
wisdoms, and comprehensive, insofar as it aims to encompass 
the origins, mechanisms an consequences of the redesign of 
jobs.
At the present time, a work that rectifies the omissions 
noted above, and which meets the criteria mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, does not exist, and it is hoped the 
present work goes some way towards meeting these needs. The 
main thrust of this work will be to reject the validity of 
the classical job redesign theories for all but a minority 
of cases, and to replace them with a more adequate theory.
V.'hat it will do is to examine, both theoretically and empirically, 
a number of central propositions of job redesign theory. The 
designation of such propositions as central is, of course, 
an over-simolification since there are several ’theories’ of 
job redesign, and their propositions are not all held in 
common. These theories include those of ’’job enlargement”
(Guest), "job enrichment" (Herzberg), sociotechnical systems
- 12-
(Trist et aL), and the work of Hackman et al., which is 
rather difficult to classify. Despite their variety it is 
possible in my view, to isolate four central, or core, 
propositions:
(1) All the theories have as their strategy a 
reversal of the division of labour, i.e. 
they advocate de-specialisation, and this 
process, it is argued, can result in economic 
and psychological benefits. Hence, it is 
proposed, by implication ( and sometimes 
explicitly) that the traditional benefits
of specialisation can no longer be guaranteed.
More generally, it has been argued that major 
tenets of scientific management have been
invalidated and rendered obsolete by job
. . 16redesign
(2) The process of de-specialisation yields these 
benefits because employees are more highly 
motivated to perform tasks that are ’richer’ in 
variety, autonomy, responsibility etc. Redesign,
in other words, enhances task-centred, or intrinsic, 
motivation, as compared to scientific management 
which focussed on rewards such as pay, that were 
extrinsic to the job itself.
(3) Increased performance by employees is associated 
with, caused by, or leads to, increased job 
satisfaction and ’improved’ attitudes to the job.
- 13-
(4) The process of despecialisation benefits both
workers and employers simultaneously - workers
gain more satisfaction from the performance of
their new tasks, whilst employers gain higher
productivity and quality, and perhaps lower
1 7absenteeism and turnover.
These propositions are central, I would argue, because they 
encapsulate the origins, the processes, or mechanisms, and the 
outcomes of .job redesign. Absent from the list are propositions 
dealing either with the circumstances in which job redesign 
might be applied, or with the effects of individual, psychological 
differences on the processes and outcomes of redesign. These 
latter issues will in fact be discussed, as will others 
referred to earlier in this Introduction, but they do not form 
the principal concerns of the thesis, partly because the 
available evidence is so inadequate, and limits the conclusions 
that might be drawn.
Job redesign, scientific management and specialisation of 
labour.
The significance of the reaction against scientific 
management and specialisation of labour can be judged by 
examining the work of prominent writers in the field of job 
redesign. According to G-uest:
"Basically, job enlargement is an attempt to reverse 
the trend begun many years ago with the spread of 
mass production, increased specialisation of labour, 
the growth of more complex business organisations 
and the influence of the theory of scientific
- 14-
manageraent oe.:un a ha I c e n t u r y  ago by Frederick
Taylor and carried o.i by diibreth and others."”*^
j iq5 ^
In Davis, Canter I: Hoffman oublished a reoort on 
I
methods of job design in industry which confirmed the continued
salience of specialisation of labour and the reliance on
reduction of immediate production costs as a criterion deter-
19raining job design decisions. But with the expansion of job
redesign in the 1960s and ’70s, Davis & Taylor were
writing in 1972, of ’’discontinuities" in job design philosophies,
and of the emergence of new values supporting job design 
20initiatives. Herzberg too sought to distinguish the tenets
and assumptions of his two-factor theory of job attitudes
from industry's prevailing conceptions of man, and he traced
the latter back as far as Taylorism, with its stress on control,
21training, and incentives. Hackman Sc Lawler, proponents of 
the 'Job Characteristic Model' of motivation, have also
commented on the way in which scientific management "simplified,
22specialised, standardised and routinised" jobs, and similar
views can be found in many articles and case studies of job 
23
redesign. Finally, the sociotechnical school of theorists
have explicitly argued that their development of 'autonomous
work groups' contradicts some of the most cherished principles
24.
of scientific management.
In other words, one can find in the job redesign literature
a recurrent theme composed of the view that redesign, as a 
managerial strategy, is contrary to scientific management 
principles, so one can thus speak of a discontinuity in 
•’.v rial orac tice.
-15-
In the thesis I shall attempt to explore tris theme in 
more depth, and one of the first questions that will be asked 
is whether job redesign theorists have in fact understood the 
principles and practice of scientific management. I shall 
also consider whether they have improperly conflated two 
developments which are in fact quite discrete, namely 
specialisation of labour and scientific management. Examination 
of this question will therefore require a detailed reconstruction 
of Taylor’s theory and practice rather than reliance on the 
usual secondhand sources. This work will be directed at the 
first core proposition of the classical theories, but it is 
also intimately connected with the mechanisms of motivation 
posited in the second proposition. For Taylor advanced a 
series of views on worker motivation and performance whose 
influence can still be found in management theory and 
industrial sociology, although they are at variance with 
those of classical job redesign theory.
It may however be asked why I have chosen to compare job 
redesign only with scientific management, and specifically, 
why there is to be no comparison with 'human relations’ 
theory. After all, a number of writers, including Herzberg, 
have argued that job redesign also poses a challenge to human 
relations neglect of work itself as a source of satisfaction2 .^ 
The reasons for my own neglect of human relations theory (apart 
from the usual limitations of space and time) are two-fold : 
first of all, hu -an relations theory has not figured so 
prominently as a pole of opposition in job redesign writings
-1 6-
o onoarei scientific nun-- genent; but secondly, and more
importantly, it is more meaningful to compare scientific 
management with redesign of jobs because the two movements 
have a number of common concerns. Both have focussed on the 
organisation of production and the division of labour; and 
both have entailed fairly clear conceptions of the sources of 
worker motivation as well as satisfaction. Human relations 
theory, on the other hand, has made no specific contribution 
to the organisation of production per se, and it has not always 
been clear whether its contribution was directed to worker 
satisfaction, or whether it also covered motivation. For these 
reasons then, human relations theory will not be considered 
in this work. That is not, of course, to say that a comparison 
of job redesign and human relations would be without interest: 
on the contrary, there is certainly room for a study assessing 
the degree to which individual job enlargement, for instance, 
has abandoned some of the insights of the human relations 
school into social aspects of production.
Intrinsic motivation
Perhaps the clearest illustration of what is meant by 
the term 'intrinsic motivation' comes from Herzberg. In his 
book Motivation to '.York he asked a sample of engineers and 
accountants to describe occasions at work when they felt 
particularly good or bad, and to elaborate both the circumstances 
•nd the meaning of these occasions. Many comments on meaning 
referred to 'psychological rewards' such as. feelings of
- 17-
achievement, recognition, improved status, responsibility etc., 
whilst descriptions of the circumstances associated with these, 
and other rewards, tended to focus on job-related features such 
as advancement, or recognition. Circumstances associated with 
bad feelings, and with lower motivation tended to centre around 
features such as pay, supervision, and company policy. According 
to Herzberg then, performance could be increased by redesigning 
jobs so that they generated rewarding and motivating psychological 
experiences.
For scientific management job performance was a function
both of abilities, and of incentives and controls. More
generally, in manufacturing, it was also a function of the level
of technical organisation of the productive system. As Vroom &
Deci point out the underlying theory of motivation here rests
on a "rather substantial foundation of psychological research 
2 6and theory" . Although it does, as they also point out, have 
limitations. The 1 carrot and stick1 approach to motivation 
also has a long history within management, and despite the 
upswing in popularity of the behavioural sciences that occurred 
in the 1960s, it is by no means clear that the attachment to 
more traditional concepts of motivation underwent a correspond­
ing and, inverse, decline. This emphasis on pay and control 
can be traced back at least as far as Marx, but more recently 
it has been restated by Baldamus, who has argued that the 
wage-effort bargain lies at the heart of employer-worker
relations and of administrative controls within the
. . . 2? organisation
-18-
The point to be made here about the emphasis on intrinsic
motivation is that it poses a challenge to more traditional,
managerial beliefs, as well as to some contemporary industrial
sociology, both of which stress the significance of pay and
controls as factors strongly related to performance and
satisfaction within the organisation. And of the four
propositions of job redesign theory, this one is by far the most
significant, since the others are either derived from it,
or are relatively independent of it. It will be argued,
however, that the emphasis on intrinsic motivation is misplaced,
and that several of the outcomes of job redesign cases can
more adequately be explained in terms of ‘traditional1 pay
and control methods.
Job performance and job attitudes
Despite the persistent failure of industrial psychologists
to discover a high, positive, and general correlation between
job performance and job attitudes, such as job satisfaction,
job redesign theorists have tended towards the view that such
a relationship does exist. Guest, in 1957, described several
case studies in what he called job enlargement, and he
presented the results in terms of economic benefits for the
companies concerned, such as improved product or service
quality, or higher productivity, and psychological benefits
for their employees, such as improved attitudes, increased
28satisfaction or reduced absenteeism . In other words, a 
■elat.i onship was posited between job performance and job 
attitudes. A few years later Herzberg advanced a similar
“ I y"
29argument , whilst sociotechnical systems theorists have long 
held to much the same point of view. The .joint optimisation 
of social and technical systems can improve performance as 
well as creating more satisfying work roles'^.
In numerous case studies the same theme has recurred,
and it has now been enshrined in a standard mode of case
presentation, adopted by British, American, and international 
31institutions . The results of these cases are presented 
under two headings - economic results and human results, and 
the content of these categories conforms to the examples 
given above. The link between performance and attitudes 
has thus become part of the 'official1 theory of redesign 
of jobs. And finally, we should .notice that the most recent 
theory, or model (Hackman Sc lawler's job characteristics 
model) in this field, again incorporates the view that 
attitudes and performance are linked via job content : 
improved job content will improve both of these features.
The job redesign literature is consistent on this theme, 
for one can also find numerous assertions to the effect that 
specialised, monotonous jobs generate both attitudinal 
consequences (job dissatisfaction) as we 1 as behavioural 
outcomes (absenteeism, turnover, low productivity etc).
The difficulty with the notion that job performance and 
job attitudes are positively correlated is, as implied above, 
that it appears to be at odds with the available evidence from 
industrial psychology.
I say appears to be so for two reasons: firstly, since 
aoout 1968 a considerable literature has emerged on individual
-20-
differences in job attitudes, which suggests, amongst other
things, that one can distinguish population subgroups on the 
basis of their attitudes to extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
at work* So for example, it has been shown by various 
researchers that lower status, urban, blue collar workers with 
less attachment to 'the Protestant v/ork ethic, r tend to be 
more concerned with securing extrinsic rewards at work, and 
less concerned about intrinsic rewards, such as having a 
challenging or interesting job, as compared to their higher 
status, rural, white collar counterparts . Thus performance 
and job attitudes may not be related for many of the former 
category of workers - they may perform well for extrinsic 
rewards and still dislike their jobs, whilst a positive 
attitude - performance correlation may exist only for the latter 
category of workers, thought by some writers to constitute a 
minority of the workforce. The second reason for exercising 
caution over the contrast betv/een the findings of industrial 
psychology in general, and job redesign, is that a number of 
industrial psychologists have, in recent years, attempted to 
argue that attitudes and performance do correlate, but only 
under certain conditions, and for certain types of people.
So for instance, it has been suggested that an attitude - 
performance link can be found for employees high in job- 
related abilities, who can exercise control over their levels
3 3of performance, and who value the rewards of high performance' . 
Fe.v such qualifications have been made by theorists of job 
■ is sign., and they have ilso tended to remain rather unaware 
of the evidence in industrial psychology suggesting that overall 
job satisfaction may a? a complex function of attitudes to
“21 “
many features of the industrial (or office) environment.
Once again, the fact t.iafc job redesign theory and 
practice challenges a fairly orthodox view within industrial 
psychology gives it a significance and a degree of relevance 
that extends beyond the confines of the job redesign area.
The mutual interests of workers and employers
The notion that job redesign permits the mutual 
satisfaction of the interests of workers and employers 
follows in fact from the idea that job performance and job 
attitudes are positively correlated, and that both improve 
after job redesign. For if this is the case, then the employees 
obtain psychological rewards accruing from the performance of 
more intrinsically motivating jobs, whilst their performance 
also yields economic benefits for the employer in the way of 
improved productivity or improved product quality. The theme, 
like others to be examined in this thesis, has been rendered 
most explicit by Herzberg, in 'The Motivation to 7/ork ,' but 
it can also be found in other writers.
The chief problem with this argument is that the notion 
mutual benefits cannot be properly assessed until we have 
considered both the benefits as well as the costs of job 
redesign, and until we have also examined the economic gains 
and losses for workers as well as for employers. Although 
the evidence provided in many case studies does not allow 
either a very adequate or an unequivocal -assessment of these 
additional costs and benefits, it does nevertheless permit us 
to draw some preliminary and tentative conclusions and to 
suggest that a number of oe ' :mic costs of job redesign
-22-
I -c: or ■ o r t oaen serious urnores'
The alternative theory of job redesign to be developed 
and examined in this thesis will challenge the classical 
theories on each of these four propositions: It will argue
that there are affinities between job redesign theory and 
practice, and scientific management; that an elaborated 
version of the extrinsic motivational mechanisms of Taylor 
can offer a superior account of job redesign outcomes; that 
job attitudes and behaviour are analytically dissociated; 
and that job redesign entails hitherto neglected costs for 
workers.
This argument has implications not only for the classical 
theories of job redesign, but also, as I have indicated
throughout for a number of areas in industrial psychology,
34such as motivation theory . Going further afield it may
also have implications for work in related fields such as
35worker participation and industrial democracy , studies of 
alienation and job c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ' ^ ,  managerial ideologies^,
'JQ
and division of labour *
Converruy, a number of closely rotated phenomena have
been excluded from consideration, i particular job
39 40rotation" , and group technology . Characteristically, the
former has boe.i introduced to alleviate boredom or
dissatisfaction, and the latter to improve product throughput
ad cut work in progress via the reorganisation of layout.
- 23 ~
Neither, generally speaking, has concentrated on the 
simultaneous improvement of job attitudes and job 
performance, a feature which is one of the hallmarks of 
job redesign.
Research methods
In order to examine the four central propositions 
outlined and discussed above, the thesis employs three 
principal methods: the first is a comparison of the theories,
and in some cases, the practices, of job redesign and 
scientific management; the second is a secondary analysis 
of over seventy cases of job redesign, and a comparison of 
their results against predictions derived from classical 
redesign theories, and from my own theory to be outlined 
in Chapter 5; and the third method is the case study 
approach, in which both the central propositions, described 
above, as well as a number of ancillary propositions, are 
explored through particular cases of job redesign in which 
I was involved. Let us first discuss each of these methods in 
turn, before outlining the structure of the thesis.
The comparison between scientific management and job 
redesign is intended to provide a tentative assessment of 
the first of our four propositions cited above, and the 
rationale for the choice of scientific management has already 
been explained. The second and third methods - a literature 
review, and case studies - are intended to be complementary, 
since each in isolation has its weaknesses. The literature
-24-
review can be used to highlight trends and tendencies which 
seem to be operative across a range of cases, e.g. it may 
suggest, as we shall argue, that there is a positive relation­
ship between the use of pay incentives and the existence of 
productivity increases. As such, the literature review is a 
necessary adjunct to the case study, which may reveal, for 
instance, the significance of pay incentives in a particular 
case, but can tell us nothing about their more general 
significance across a range of cases.
Each of these latter methods does have certain weaknesses 
and limitations which must be acknowledged. The literature 
review is limited by the reliability and validity of the data 
reported in the case studies on which it is based, and more 
v/ill be said about this data in Chapter 6. The case study too 
has its drawbacks: in the cases to be described in the thesis
severe constraints were placed on the kinds of data available 
for collection, as a result of which the cases can at best be 
taken as illustrating the possible validity of certain 
arguments, rather than furnishing strong proof or disproof.
A number of the cases contain no original, attitudinal data 
and this has both limited the range of propositions to which 
the cases are pertinent, as well as having compelled the 
author to make inferences about the meanings and causes of 
behaviour, that are, at the very least, debatable. More 
generally, the case study can only suggest hypotheses about 
processes or mechanisms - it cannot tell us anything about 
their general applicability, and for this latter information
-25-
v/e require m o re co'\' :*•; .e . ' ye rev* nv of ruses. rue absence 
of a single case study combining valid and reliable attitadinal 
and behavioural data collected at different points in time is 
clearly to be regretted, but it is a circumstance attributable, 
in some degree, to the difficulties of an individual researcher 
trying to secure access to a severely limited number of companies, 
some of whom are averse to publicity, in the face of intense 
competition from institutional research teams in the universities 
and in government. This is no doubt a familiar refrain in 
industrial work, but it is true nevertheless.
Structure of the thesis
The thesis as a whole is divided into five parts. In 
this, the first part, the main intention was to describe the 
field of job redesign in very broad terms, and to delineate 
the central propositions that are to be examined in depth.
The second part of the thesis begins this process at the level 
of theory, and by successively investigating Taylorism and 
contemporary theories of job redesign, it aims to lay the 
foundations for a more adequate theory, described in Chapter 5.
In Part3 this new theory is applied uoth to existing cases 
in the literature, as well as to a number of original case 
studies. The Discussion in Part 4 concentrates first of all 
on some of the problems of the new theory, which were revealed 
in Part 3, and then proceeds to discuss some of its broader 
implications. Part 5 summarises all of the main conclusions 
rom the thesis.
This general structure of the thesis also follows the
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sequence of central propositions of classical job redesign 
theories outlined above. In other words, it begins with the 
theoretical and historical origins of job redesign in the work 
of Taylor in Part 2. Part 3 concentrates on the second, 
third and fourth propositions relating to mechanisms of 
motivation and job performance, the job attitudes - performance 
link, and the consequences of job redesign (the mutual benefits 
thesis). The correspondence between this structure and the 
propositions is not exact: mechanisms of motivation and
performance are also discussed in Part 2, for instance.
But even the approximate correspondence which does exist will 
hopefully make the reading of the thesis a somewhat easier 
process.
The detailed structure of the thesis chapters is basically 
as follows: Chapter 2 is devoted fco a study and reconstruction
of scientific management through the writings of its founder, 
F.7. Taylor. It seeks to demonstrate that the scope of 
Taylorism is wider than has often been acknowledged, especially 
by his critics, and that his ideas are more coherent than the 
usual division between his organisational and technical 
contributions would suggest. It is also argued that because 
Taylor's writings are relatively scant, a number of his ideas 
on such themes as motivation, renal -ed in an underdeveloped 
state, and that if these are taken int. > consideration, in 
conjunction with an appreciation of the way in which his ideas 
changed and developed, one can obtain a much fuller and more 
accurate picture of V: t vjo r.y (and, it w ill be argued, the 
practice) of scie tj f■' c management* The detail provided in
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this chapter is necessary, I be ieve, if we are to evaluate 
the relationship between job redesign and scientific, management, 
and to construct a more adequate tneory of job redesign. For 
to do this we must first ensure that we fully understand 
scientific management, and not be content with using second­
hand sources of information.
Chapters 3 and 4 contain presentations and discussions of 
three principal theories, or models, of job redesign: task
design and dimensions theory, Herzberg’s job enrichment, and 
sociotechnical systems theory. The first of these theories 
is, to some degree, an amalgam of the work of Guest, and 
Hackman and Oldham, and is less clearly defined than the other 
two. Each of these discussions aims firstly, to present the 
main features of the theories in question and their develop­
ment over time; secondly, to try and articulate some of 
their underlying assumptions; and thirdly, to draw out some 
of their deficiencies and problems, i.e. to reveal issues 
to which a more adequate theory should direct some attention. 
Each of these discussions also refers at times to cases and 
experiments that were intimately connected with the formulation 
of the theory in question.
It should be noted that each of these chapters contains 
a considerable wealth of detail on a variety of themes. This 
detail in necessary, in my view, to the extent that a number 
of serious and fundamental criticisms will be made of these 
theories, and it is therefore incumbent on me to show their 
justification, but hopefully the mass of detail will not 
euti rely obscure the four central propositions under 
o i scussion throughout the thesis as a whole.
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Chapter 4 also compares the theories of joo redesign and 
scientific management on a number of dimensions and issues, and 
attempts a more precise formulation of their relationship, at 
a general, and theoretical level. It thus goes some way to 
assessing the validity of the first proposition described in 
the Introduction.
The principal object of Chapter 5 is to formulate a new 
theory of job redesign v/nich can encompass the conclusions 
drawn in Chapter 4, as well as the problems noted with the 
existing theories. Before engaging directly in this endeavour 
two possible sources of insigmts are first explored: criticisms
of job redesign from those concerned with workers* interests, 
such as trade unionists and radicals, and theoretical criticisms 
from more academic writers. Some of the insights in this 
literature are used in order to articulate a theory of job 
redesign which offers alternative accounts and explanations 
for each of the four propositions outlined in the Introduction. 
This new theory actually consists not of four, but of six, 
statements. Twocf these cover the first classical proposition, 
on the origins of job redesign; the next three map directly 
onto the remaining three propositions; whilst the final 
statement offers a general characterisation of job redesign as a 
phenomenon.
The next four chapters (6 - 10) examine the applicability 
of the theory to four sets of case studies and experiments.
The first three sets are taken from the existing literature, 
and each chapter aims to compare the explanatory power of the
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new and the classical theories of job redesign for a particular 
category of redesign, fJlhese analyses relate mainly to the 
classical propositions on motivational mechanisms, and the 
attitude-performance link, although there are also discussions 
of the relationship between job redesign practice and scientific 
management. Chapter 9 presents three original case studies, 
one in each of the three categories of job redesign. The 
Lleccano case is reported first of all because it is the most 
detailed. This case is particularly relevant to propositions 
about job redesign-scientific management, and about motivation. 
The Dairy case study is relevant to the mutual interests thesis, 
which has hitherto received little attention, and to questions 
concerning the future of job redesign which are taken up in 
Chapter 12. Finally, the United Glass case examines a neglected 
feature of the origins of job redesign, namely differences in 
managerial attitudes, and relates these to discussions about 
job redesign and labour specialisation. Finally, in this part 
of the thesis Chapter 10 examines the costs and benefits of 
job redesign for the parties involved.
The two penultimate chapters (11 and 12) explore some 
of the problems and limitations of the arguments contained 
in the thesis, and in particular those relating to the 
concepts of effort, intensity, and motivation. Chapter 12 
also addresses itself to some of the assumptions underlying 
the new and the classical theories of job redesign, as well as 
exploring a number of broader issues, such as the history of 
management practices, and the future of job redesign. The 
final chapter (13) summarises the conclusions of the thesis 
as a whole.
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Part Two
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
“3 \ ~
CHAPTER 2 TI-TS THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
TAYLOR'S SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT *
Introduction : Mi.sconce tions of Taylorism
Scientific management, the system of management devised 
by F.W. Taylor has recently begun to re-emerge as a subject 
of debate in academic circles. Many theorists allied to the 
various schools of job redesign have commented unfavourably 
on the fragmentation of industrial and clerical tasks, a 
process which they attribute to the theory and practice of 
Taylor. Thus, for example, the official summary report of 
the Swedish experiments in job redesign (which included the 
famous Saab and Volvo cases) under a heading called "Taylor's 
mistakes" went on to discuss the deleterious psychological 
effects of task specialisation and fragmentation (the terms 
seem to be used interchangeably)1. Peter Drucker, one of 
the most widely read management theorists wrote about these 
'mistakes,' or 'blind spots' as he called them, twenty five 
years ago.
The following editions of Taylor's works have been 
used throughout this essay, and the titles of each 
have been abbreviated, as shown, for the sake of 
convenience.
Notes on Belting (NB) ) in Two papers on Scientific
A Piece Rate System (PRS) ) aanageaent.
London, Routledge, 1919
Shop Management (SM)
Principles of Scientific Management (PSM)
Testimony before the louse Committee (THC)
- all in Scientific Management. New York, Harper, 1947
On the Art of Cutting Metals (ACM) New York, ASME, 1906
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"The first of these blind spots is the belief that 
because we must analyse work into its simplest 
constituent motions we must also organise it as a 
series of individual motions, each if possible
carried out by an individual worker ....  This is
false logic. It confuses a principle of analysis 
with a principle of action.” 2
He then went on to discuss approvingly the early experiments
in "job enlargement" at IBM and at Sears-Roebuck.
The official British organisation responsible for job
redesign in this country has also echoed similar sentiments
to those of its Swedish colleagues. Here, for instance, is
a remark by its Director, Gilbert Jessup:
"Jobs, even today, are designed primarily according 
to the principles of scientific management as laid 
down by Frederick Taylor during the early part of 
this century. This is to say that complex operations 
such as building a car or assembling a T.V. set are 
broken down into numerous small tasks each of which 
can be performed by relatively unskilled labour with 
the minimum of training." 3
If we descend from the institutional to the individual level
we can find further examples of this belief in the connection
between specialisation of labour and Taylorism. I have
already quoted from Guest, an exponent of job enlargement, on
this connection (see Introduction), but the idea can also be
4 5found in the writings of Herzberg, and of Trist, both of
whom are principal representatives of two major schools of job
redesign, job enrichment and sociotechnical systems theory
respectively. And finally, the theme can be found expressed
in many case studies of job redesign, such as those of Hackman
Sc Lawler, b in individual articles,'7 and in textbooks covering
broader topics such as Organisation Development, e.g. French
& Bell.8
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This, however, is only one of a number of misconceptions
of Taylorism that are to be found in the literature of job
redesign and industrial psychology. There also exists the
view that Taylor had no conception of the social dimension 
9
of the workplace , a view reiterated by Aitken, the author
1 0of a full length study of Taylorism ; or the view that
Taylorism consisted solely or essentially, of time and motion
study, an opinion reinforced by the famous remark of Taylor’s 
in which he describes the study of unit times as " by
far the most important element in scientific management.”
(S M, p. 58)11.
Other misconceptions include the ideas that Taylorism
consisted principally of an effort to exert managerial control 
1 2over labour, ' or that he held derogatory views of workers
and that under scientific management workers were reduced
to the status of automata, and were considered too stupid to
1 3grasp the subleties of ’science.’
Finally there is the idea that for Taylor, worker 
motivation was a question which reduced itself, essentially, 
to the issue of pay. Indeed this theme has been enshrined 
in the shorthand term ’rational-economic man' which is generally 
considered as the beginning and end of Taylor's thought on
1.. 4.- 4. , Hmotivation at work.
It should be said finally that it is not only Taylor's 
critics who have misconceptions about scientific management. 
Folker, an industrial engineer, argued that Taylor's principles 
are now outdated, and were suitable only for situations where
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exploitation was accepted.1 More recently, Drucker has 
written a eulogy for Taylorism whose tone contrasts sharply 
with what he wrote twenty five years ago1'7. Taylor, he 
now says, "anticipated practically all of the later research 
of the Human Relations School or of Frederick Herzberg."
Whilst Drucker’s a.tempt to correct misinterpretations of Taylor 
is commendable, his reconstructed Taylor seems as far from the 
reality as do many of the views we have outlined above. Much 
of his quotation and argument is taken from Taylor’s Testimony 
before the House Committee, and since this was, in part, a 
public relations ’exercise’ presenting Taylorism in a 
favourable light, the Testimony, though nevertheless a valid 
and important document, needs to be approached with rather 
more circumspection than is to be found in Drucker*s ’new’ 
account of Taylor.
Each of these ideas about Taylorism can be shown to be 
misconceived either because they are empirically incorrect, 
or because they have overlooked some of the contradictions 
and developments within Taylorism, or because they have emphasised 
only certain aspects of Taylorism and ignored others. And we 
can discover both errors of omission and of commission.
This chapter then will fall into two parts: the first
will consist of a brief 'reconstruction’ of the principal 
features of scientific muiia,ement, whilst the second will explore 
in more depth some of the nisconeoptions that I have identified,
'... ■ in particular those relating to met ’ vati on, division of 
1;hour, and indivj Lism an social influences, "either of
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~h -39 endeavours is in ;'uet as strain : tforward as may at 
first appear since, as 1 shall try to show, Taylor's ideas 
developed and changed over time, and his work as a whole is 
not always consistent. Further, he expressed a variety of 
ideas which remained in an under-developed state throughout 
his writings, and an appreciation of his work must also 
consider the existence and significance of such ideas.
The focus of this chapter will he the theory and practice 
of scientific management or Taylorism (the terms will be used 
here interchangeably despite the somewhat broader connotations 
of the former) as evinced principally in the writings of 
Taylor himself. Since many job redesign writers have 
attributed various (usually undesirable) characteristics to 
Taylorism, it is important to establish their veracity as 
part of, and prelude to, a more comprehensive appraisal of 
current job redesign. It will be taken as given that 
Taylorism has been misunderstood, and our focus will thus be 
on the nature and implications of these misconceptions, rather 
than on their determinants or processes interesting though 
these may undoubtedly be.
The Origins and Substance of Scientific Management
Taylor began his career as a labourer at the Midvale
Steel Works and after a short spell as a clerk, returned
17to the shopfloor os a machinist . He remained in this 
job only a few months before he was promoted to gang boss, 
and it wasn't lonj before he was a a:n promoted - to 
machine shop *'o~eman. ‘it was during this brief period
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'or. the shop floor * tfca" he made a number of observations 
which were to be crucial in the development o.f his system 
of management. First of ail he located the inability of 
managements to raise labour productivity in their ignorance 
of the times in which particular jobs could, and ought to, 
be done; secondly, he became aware of the existence of 
and the rationale for, output restriction by workers; and 
thirdly, he came to believe that existing payment systems 
did not provide sufficient incentive for workers to raise 
output.
Unlike some of his contemporaries, and indeed
descendants, Taylor did not continue to regard output
restriction as 'irrational' but endeavoured to find its
causes. In describing output restriction he used the term
'soldiering* and distinguished two types: 'natural*
soldiering which was apparently innate, and 'systematic
soldiering' which
" results from a careful study on the part
of the workmen of what they think will promote 
their best interests." 18
The cause of this latter (v/hich Taylor considered to be
more serious) lay in the fact that the employers did not
know, and had no means of ascertaining the extent to which
it was possible to raise output, and this deficiency was
based, in its turn on a,
"  profound ignorance of employers and their
foremen as to the time in which various kinds of 
work should be done ". 19
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Til fire existed then no 1 rational’ basis for allocating given 
quantities of work over a certain time period, and employers 
were thus compelled to depend on the goodwill of their work­
force in responding to wage incentives, and on their own 
cunning in cutting piece rates and hence their labour costs 
v/henever there was a transitory, upward, drift in productivity. 
The workers in their turn soon learned the costs of raising 
their outputT such as higher workloads and reduced manning 
levels and thus organised 'restrictive ' practices. Once rate 
cutting had been experienced several times, and restriction 
of output regularly practised, there developed, on.the basis 
of these experiences, a more generalised feeling of antagonism 
between worker and employer^0.
Taylor thus developed what we may call a socio-historical 
theory of output restriction which turned on the economic 
relations between employers and workers, the accumulated and 
generalised experiences of workers, and the inevitable ineffect­
iveness of 'ordinary* systems of management arising from
21managerial ignorance of the shortest possible work times
The fundamental novelty of Taylorism was that it entirely
rejected the approach of 'ordinary management', which linked
22pay to current levels of output, ' but sought instead to 
determine what levels of performance were physically possible, 
and to link pa; to these, rathe" than to existing or previous 
levels. Managements had little or no conception of these 
levels, and even if the workmen did (and Taylor always remained
it on 1 nt), i ti d rect interests to
conceal the fact. The only consequence of disclosing their
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knowledge would be a reduction in piece rates, thereby 
compelling them to work harder for the same pay as before.
But if output could be raised substantially (and Taylor 
believed, initially on the basis of his own experience, that 
it could) then a number of benefits would accrue, the chief 
of which was that the workmen could receive higher wages, at 
the same time as their employers achieved lower labour costs. 
Both sides could then,
M  take their eyes off -he division of the
surplus as the all important matter, and 
together turn their attention towards increasing 
the size of the surplus ” 23
The basis for this transformation of industrial relations 
rested on the willingness of workers to raise output in 
exchange for guaranteed higher earnings, and on the dis­
placement of surplus workers following this increase in 
output.
At the most abstract level Taylor’s answer to the 
lack of knowledge about work times was striking in its 
simplicity: he proposed the application of the methods of
science to the arena of industry. In particular, he 
proposed to measure what workmen actually did, according 
to times taken, and to develop from that basis,
”  this one best method, and best implement
can only be discovered or developed through a 
scientific study and analysis of all of the
methods and implements in use,............
This involves the gradual substitution of 
science for rule of thumb........” 24
The measure -.eat of work was not peculiar to scientific 
25management but as Taylor pointed out, earlier time studies
,26
were neither systematic nor detailed . The ridvale Steel
Works, at which Taylor was employed, certainly held records
of the times in which various different jobs had been completed,
but were these the fastest possible times? And were they
based on the most efficient methods? Taylor was convinced
that neither was the case, and he, therefore, began
systematic time studies of iidvale workers.
In order to answer his questions, he employed two
principles: firstly, in timing any job, he began by
analysing it into constituent, or elementary motions;
and secondly, he sought the quickest time in which the job
could be done, as he thought, consistently and "without
27
harm or injury to the workmen." This work was carried
out by the Rate-.7Ixing Department •, and as the name implies, 
its primary function was to measure and prescribe worker 
performance, and to set levels of incentive pay to induce 
it. As Taylor discovered, however, there was more to rate- 
fixing than the assignment of workloads and pay incentives.
In the production systems where he carried out much of his 
early work, products were manufactured, shaped etc., on 
individual machines, and the condition of the machinery 
was often a crucial factor affecting trie workers’ possible 
output. If it broke down, for instance, wns the worker to 
be penalised for lost production? o- the employer? or both 
of them? So, in 1395 then, Taylor wrote that,
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"  the Rate-Fixing Dept, has shown the necessity
of carefully systematise r " all of the small details 
in the running of each shop; such as the care of 
belting, the proper shape for cutting tools, and 
the dressing, grinding and issuing same, oiling 
machines, issuing orders for work, obtaining 
accurate labour and material returns, and a host 
of other minor methods and processes. These details, 
which are usually regarded as of comparatively 
small importance, are shown by the Rate-fixing Dept, 
to be of paramount importance in obtaining the 
maximum output " 23
This was the case, both because defects in machinery prevented
workers attaining their ’maximum’ output, and also of course,
because they reduced the efficiency of the machinery itself.
Taylor's studies of machinery, as in his 1393 paper on
belting, which originally formed just one part of the
application of science to production soon became an integral
29
part of Taylor’s work
This systemic character of scientific management is
frequently overlooked, and it is not uncommon for it to be
regarded as little more than time study, and wage incentives.
Taylor’s 'technical' developments are either treated as
30
interesting by-products of his main work" , or else ignored 
31altogether . Yet these twin aspects of Taylorism, which 
we may call the 'social' and the 'technical' are interconnected 
in several ways. Both stem from the desire to apply scientific 
method to industrial production, and both have as their 
common objective, "the cutting down of time the minimum
i no
consistent with good work.'- end finally* as Taylor 
argued (above), the application of time study and wage 
incentives in themselves would be insufficient to realise
-44
the greatest possible gains in productivity, unless one also 
standardised the conditions in the shop to facilitate un­
interrupted production.
By 1895, the time of his first important paper, a
number of major features of his system were already clear.
He had argued for the necessity of a separate Department
to engage in time and motion study and to fix wage rates
and had developed what he called the Differential Piece Rate
System. Under this system a rate of pay was set for a
standard level of output, which only 'first class' men would
be likely to attain. The worker who fell short of this
standard, if only by a small amount, received a proportionately
greater cut in pay, whilst the worker who exceeded the standard
33received a proportionately greater rise in earnings . And 
finally, he had argued that the problem of raising productivity 
required an investigation of machinery, as well as of men. This 
was the state of Taylor's 'art' or science in 1895; over the 
next 16 years a number of points were to be added, and there 
would be several changes of emphasis, which we shall briefly 
mention.
In 1903 he produced a very detailed paper entitled 
'Shop Management,' in which he extended some of his earlier 
observations. The worker was now to be assigned a daily 
quota of work by management, art to ensure he performed it, 
a variety of 'functional foremen' would attend to different 
aspects of his work. The emphasis on the payment system 
and on time and motion study as the fundamental tools of
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management in the pursuit of higher productivity, were 
thoroughly overhauled and increased stress placed on
the role of supervision and assignment of work quotas,
■ 4. • 34and on organisation more generally.
The transformation in this book, as compared to previous,
35and to subsequent works, is striking , and later developments 
in Taylor’s thought took the form of changes of emphasis 
rather than radically new departures or insights. Although 
the importance of pay, and of the construction of payment 
systems was downgraded in this book, there were nevertheless, 
detailed recommendations on wages.
Further indication of the importance of organisation 
is revealed by the changed name of the Rate-Fixing Dept. - 
this had now become the Planning Dept., responsible for 
all the major details of the shop. It v/ill be recalled that 
Taylor had commenced experiments on machinery at the same 
time as he began his time and motion studies at the Midvale 
Steel Works, but the most efficient running and standardi­
sation of the machinery was now an integral part of the 
management of the whole shop. For if the workmen were to achieve 
a high level of performance in response to the incentive of 
higher pay and under the direction of the Planning Dept, and 
the foremen, it was necessary to ensure that they were 
provided with the means to work efficiently and without 
interruption.
Thus it was that Taylor undertook to overhaul and to 
standardise the tools and machinery of the shop, and to set
up a special stores dept., responsible for the issuing of 
tools. Equally, it was necessary to ensure the workman knew 
exactly what he had to do each day and hoy/ he was to go 
about doing it. For this Taylor developed firstly, a branch 
of management v/hose duty was to train the workforce in the 
new methods, and secondly, a branch of the Planning Dept, 
whose role it was to issue instruction cards each day to the 
workmen. At the same time the other departments of the 
workshop and other sections of the workmen would be issued 
with routing cards instructing them where to obtain and 
despatch materials. These cards served also to create a
smooth and continuous flow of materials through the shop so
the workmen could proceed to work without interruption 
throughout the whole day.
These developments marked the culmination of the 
development of "scientific management." What began as a
search for ways of raising output through the study of labour
finally resulted in a complete system of management 
comprising the elements described above.
Of Taylor1s later publications, 'The Art of Cutting 
Metals' was read to the ASMS in 1906 and contains many of 
the themes which were fully elaborated in 'Shop Management.' 
There were, however, a number of changes of emphasis. The 
notion of the task idea, that is, the daily allocation to each 
workman of a certain amount of work, was accorded even more 
prominence than previously, and nor was this merely because 
it illustrated the exactitude of scientific management^. The
daily assignment of labour had become ooth the means by which 
management planned and monitored its production, as well as 
the means whereby the workman was able to calculate his 
earnings and adjust his effort accord:ugly. For the latter, 
in other words, it was a form of feedback. Secondly, the 
centrality of the payment system was once more downgraded 
as was illustrated by the facts that very little attention 
was devoted to its description, and the Differential Piece 
Rate, Taylor's own payment system, was not mentioned at all.
Thirdly, there was a far greater emphasis on the
importance of the slide rule, am developed by Carl Barth,
for use in determining the cutting speeds and feed rates of
a machine for a given series of parameters of a piece of
metal. By 1906 Taylor had come to regard it as the quintessential
expression of the substitution of science for tradition and
rule of thumb. But not only did it signify the supersession
of tradition, it also marked a far more significant process.
For 'tradition' and 'science' were seen to be represented by
social groups - tradition by the workmen, science by the
management, and the replacement of one by the other therefore
37indicated the successful outcome of a power struggle * Taylor 
himself never used the term 'power' but the descriptions of 
his first and early attempts to raise output, in the Midvale 
Steel 7/orks, testify to his intuitive unrstanding of the 
realities of power.
A further development appeared in 'The Principles of 
Scientific Ivlaur-gsment, * in which th.yu ■ not only expounded 
the by-now familiar details of soldiering, time and motion
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studies, functional foremen etc., and described the well 
known case studies, such as Schmidt on pig iron shovelling, 
but where he also developed his ideas on the fourth principle 
of scientific management - the’co-operation’ between 
management and workmen. As we have seen, Taylor had long 
ago evolved the material basis of this co-operation in the 
form of a constantly growing mass of wealth in which both 
workmen and employers could receive ever larger amounts of 
wages and of profits. But this in itself was inadequate, 
for not only had there to exist some basis for co-operation, 
but workmen and employers had to overthrow their acquired 
beliefs and perceive there was such a basis. Such was the 
•mental revolution’ described by Taylor, and when describing 
it to the House Committee in 1912 Taylor referred bo it as 
the ’’essence” of scientific management, and sought to
distinguish it from the ’’mechanisms” such as time and motion
3Sstudy, and pay incentives .
7/e have now sketched a brief historical outline of 
the development of Taylorism, and it has hopefully become 
clear that Taylor’s thought did develop and that ideas 
were elaborated and amended throughout his life.
Summary
Let us now, therefore, try and summarise the major 
features of Taylorism, in its most developed form. At the 
most abstract Lvel we car. say that it involved an attempt 
to replace traditional methods of organisation, with methods 
determined by ’scientific’ inquiry, and subjected to 
'scientific' test.
- 49 “
The r> roblem of low, or res trieted, output was seen 
in terms of the poor operation of ail the features of a 
production system - labour, machinery, workflow, etc.,and 
Taylor’s innovations affected such diverse subjects as motor 
belt widths and tension, machine maintenance, work methods, 
division of manual labour, planning of materials flow, tools 
storage and standardisation, workloads, supervision, and 
payment levels, and systems, as part of a systemic approach 
to organisation.
Taylor thus raised productivity both by increasing 
workloads, via incentives and supervisory controls, and by 
the employment of more efficient methods of production and 
working.
His more detailed mechanisms included time and motion 
study, enhancement of the division between execution and 
conception, careful selection and training of workers, and 
specification of workloads and work methods for individual 
workers.
The more abstract features of Taylorism however, such 
as his systematic approach, or his advocacy of ’science’ can 
no longer be identified as specifically Taylorist ideas since 
they are common to almost all approaches to organisations 
and to production. But we can say (and the point is argued 
in more detail elsewhere) that the use of the more specific 
mechanisms identified above is compatible with, and 
constitutive of, Taylorism.
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What v/e shall do now is to focus in more detail on specific 
aspects of Taylorism, and deepen the discussion that has already 
taken place. In this ensuing section v/e shall also enter 
into more detail over some of the debates about Taylorism, 
and take up some of the misconceptions referred to in the 
Introduction.
The Question of Iv-ot ivati on
According to the standard histories of the subject, Taylor 
held a rational-econonic view of worker motivation in which 
the workman, responding to the incentive of money, would 
rationally evaluate the strategies open to him in order to 
maximise his income at minimum cost. The view was articulated 
most clearly in Taylor’s discussions of soldiering where he 
argued that the phenomenon represented a collective form of 
defence against rate cutt'ng. We have noted, however, that 
over a period of time the importance of the payment system 
was lessened in Taylor's mind, and was complemented by a 
series of additional measures, notably the task idea. Indeed, 
at one stage scientific management was referred to as 'task 
management.*
The allocation of a daily quota of work was necessary 
from the point of view of the Planning Dept, so that production 
could be planned at least one day in advance, and all 
arrangements made, in terms of tools, machinery etc. Prom 
the workmen's point of view the daily task was a way of 
telling him what he had to achieve in order to earn the 
standard rate of pay, and was in that sense no different from 
any other pnece rate system. But although introduced for t'nis
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specific purpose, Taylor cane to see that there -ere 
further advantages in this assignment.
"There is no question that the average individual 
accomplishes the most when he either gives himself, 
or someone else assigns him, a definite task, 
namely, a given amount of work which he must do 
within a given time; ....." 39
Here, admittedly in embryonic form, we can see the elements
of a theory of motivation which has now been fully articulated
40into the goal-setting theory of Locke and his associates.
The setting of a goal, which is attainable, yet not too easily 
so, is seen by this group as a central feature of worker 
motivation.
Again, at the end of the day the workman would be 
informed (or v/ould know) what he had achieved, and so the 
task assignment would also
" furnish(es) the workman with a clear
cut standard, by which he can throughout the 
day measure his own progress and the accomplish­
ment of which affords him the greatest satisfac­
tion." 41
Of course, PS!. I was a popular work, written at a time of intense 
union hostility to scientific management, and its content must 
therefore be seen as partly reflecting the pressure on Taylor 
to vindicate his work and to present it in the best possible 
light, nevertheless, one can find references to the importance 
of feedback (as we v/ould now call it) in task performance 
both in his earlier works, a;v' in his correspondence, 
facts which suggest the quotation above does reflect predominantly 
a genuine aspect of scientific management rather than any desire 
to placate hostility. And or.:-* bo un, task performance had
. ^ 9 -
it;intrinsic motivation, '/here repetitive work was being 
done :
’’The higher pressure of the differential rate 
is the stimulant required by the workman to 
maintain a high rate of speed and secure high 
wages while he has the steady swing that belongs 
to work which is repeated over and over again." 42
Like many aspects of Taylor’s thought, this observation of the
rhythm in repetitive work, an observation which anticipates
43the important work of Baldamus on the same subject , remained 
underdeveloped. This was partly because^ there were, as he 
thought more important factors in motivation, but also because 
he himself did not in fact devote much time to the repetitive 
kind of work mentioned here.
With the development of the idea of functional foremen, 
notably in ’Shop Management,’and the consequent proliferation 
of foremen, charge-hands etc., that were to be found in the 
ideal scientific management shop, it was not long before 
Taylor considered the relations between workmen and their 
superiors. Again this was a feature of his system to which 
he devoted little attention except insofar as he repeatedly 
stressed the vital necessity for ’co-operation’ between workmen 
and employers in order to maximise output, and hence increase 
wages and profits. But what wore the consequences of this 
imperative for daily shop floor relations? In the light of 
his experiences of the extort to which workers were prepared 
to struggle in order to resist productivity increases, he 
believed that loss of production could be drasticall5r reduced 
as follows:
» if the superintendents are reasonable men
and listen to and treat with respect what their 
men have to say, there is absolutely no reason 
for labour unions and strikes.” 44
Hence superintendents too had a role in motivating the
workforce to maintain high performance.
He also made much of the fact, particularly in his Testimony, 
that under scientific management a whole range of new jobs 
were created in the Planning Dept., such as the various 
clerks and foremen, and that promotion opportunities for shop 
floor workers were, therefore, increased. As evidence of the 
reality of these openings he claimed that of a certain category 
of machinists at the Bethlehem Steel Works, 95$ had started
A
with the company as yard labourers. Under scientific 
management they had been raised to the highest kind of work 
of which they were capable, a process which Taylor claimed was 
one of the objects of his system. It is not clear, however, 
whether this promotion was to be valued for anything other 
than its financial rewards, for if not, then it simply conforms 
to Taylor’s generally hedonistic view of workers. Finally, v/e 
should not forget the social influences on production which 
Taylor encountered at Hidvale, and elsewhere under the guise 
of the organised restriction of output. Co-operation between the 
workers themselves was thus seen as counter-productive, whereas 
the co-operation proposed by Taylor, between the workers and 
their superiors, was thought to be an ingredient in the 
promotion of productivity.
The role of pay was, nevertheless, vital. Even when a 
daily task was assigned and feedback given, and when all the
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prerequisites for production ha- been arranged by the
Planning Dept., e.g. the proper tools, materials, route cards
etc., and the job supervised by the foremen, all of this
would be to no avail unless a proper rate of pay was given.
There were, contrary to popular opinion, two main reasons
for the centrality of pay. The first was the classic view
of worker motivation rightly attributed to Taylor, in which
money was seen as the major inducement that could be offered
in return for higher effort. There was, however, a second
reason, equally as important as the hedonistic character of
workmen. Taylor remarked on numerous occasions that men
”  v/ould not do an extraordinary day's work for an ordinary
4- 6
day's pay." Within the exchange relationship between capital
and labour such an arrangement would have been categorically- 
rejected by the workers as an injustice. The just treatment 
of the workforce was necessary both to secure their willing 
co-operation in the introduction of scientific management, 
but also (and this was a view stressed in his later works) 
to help bring about the "mental revolution" which comprised, 
the "essence" of it.
This brings us to the final component of Taylor's view 
of motivation. As we have seen, the "mental revolution" 
constituted, in part, a recognition of the material basis for 
a commonality of interest between worker and employer. The use 
of the term "mental revolution" was no mere public relations 
exorcise to ward off hostile comment for its ingredients are 
to bo found even in "A Piece fate J.ystem," written in 1895, 
where he spoke of "the proper mental attitude" on the part
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of the workforce in the 'form of "friendly feeling" rather 
than antagonism. ' This fact suggest" t.iat whilst trade 
union hostility may have stimulated Taylor to develop this 
aspect of his theory, it did not ’implant1 as it were, any­
thing which was not already present, albeit in latent form. 
When we also consider the relative diminution in the 
significance of the choice of payment system throughout 
Taylor’s later works, then v/e may suggest, on the basis of 
these facts, that Taylor's earlier view of labour motivation- 
a classic cash-nexus model- was complemented in his later 
years by a vision of relatively 'unalienated' workers 
deriving satisfaction and motivation from their co-operation 
with management. This is not to say that the cash nexus 
model disappeared, but only that Taylor's mature view 
combined both cash-nexus and more sophisticated notions of 
motivation in a somewhat uneasy alliance. Job redesign 
theorists have largely ignored this later development and 
treated Taylorism as a homogeneous body of ideas based solely 
around the ’cash-nexus.’
Specialisation and Division of labour
During the 1912 U.S. Government investigation into 
Scientific Management, the Chairman, Y/illiam Wilson asked:
"Is not one of the elements of scientific 
management this possibility to divide it 
up so that the workmen will have the same 
operation to perform over and over again?" 48
In this question is expressed the major criticism of
scientific management from the standpoint of the worker (there
is a second item - the intensification of labour - which we
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shall discuss below). Scientific man?- genent, according
to many v/riters, constitutes almost a qualitative
transforraation in the division of labour, as a result of
which the worker is reduced to a condition in which he
exercises little skill, and then, only at the discretion of
the management. As we saw in the Introduction such a view
49is held by writers such as Drucker, Lindholm and Jessup.
The notion that Taylorism entails or necessitates 
specialisation of labour rests on three different arguments:
(i) that Taylor did, in practice, specialise three groups 
of workers - bricklayers, machinists, and supervisors;
(ii) that.he sought to demarcate conception and execution;
(iii) that in his account of time and motion study, Taylor 
insisted on the need to break down work into its smallest 
components.
There is some confusion over the terms specialisation 
and fragmentation of tasks, particularly since the former 
has been used to describe the emergence of occupational 
divisions as well as intra-task divisions. Since, however, 
Taylor worked almost exclusively with employees far below 
the level that would be considered as specialist, we shall 
confine our discussion solely to the proposition that Taylor 
advanced division of labour per se.
The first of the three cr -aments in favour of this 
proposition is that Taylor did in practice specialise three 
categories of worker - machinists, supervisors and bricklayers* 
Although there is an empirics! dofecm with the argument - to
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v/hich we shall return shortly - its principal defect is a
logical one: the fact that Taylor carried out specialisation
of labour does not tell us whether such specialisation is an
integral or a necessary feature of scientific management.
It does not tell us, in other words, whether Taylorism is
the cause of this specialisation, or whether there might be
other causes which lie outside of, or which pre-date, Taylorism.
In fact extensive division of labour v/as already quite
common in those industries which had felt the force of the
Industrial Revolution, such as engineering, cotton and
weaving. Its prevalance had been attributed by Adam Smith to
improvements in speed and dexterity of working, to elimination
or reduction of job changing, and to discoveries of method
improvements, all of which were consequent upon extended
labour division.^ And Charles Babbage later pointed out that
division of labour also allowed the reduction of labour costs
51as skills were divided and thus cheapened.
Taylor replied to the House Committee question on 
specialisation of labour (cited above) by making precisely 
these points:
” Mr. Taylor. Under scientific management precisely 
the same principles of work are used in that respect
as under the other types of management under
scientific management, or any other management, the 
manufacture of shoes is divided into very, very,
many minute parts each one performed by a
different man in a well-run shop.
 this is what takes place under the older types
of management, and that undoubtedly would continue 
under scientific management;....
I think this tendency to training toward specialising 
the work is true of all managements, for the reason 
that a man becomes more productive when working at his 
speciality, " 52
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Taylor therefore dissociated specialisation and scientific
management, by pointing to the existence of specialisation
elsewhere, and to the benefits already reaped from the
principle (as adumbrated by Smith).
The second point to notice about the empirical argument
on Taylorism and specialisation is that it actually overlooks
significant features of the cases on which it is supposedly
based. In the example of the machinists, it is true that
Taylor removed certain parts of their job, such as fetching
supplies and removing finished goods, and assigned them to
other workers, thus leaving the machinists free to continue
53with the most skilled parts of their work. In addition he
also codified the knowledge of the machinists and attempted
to regulate their work in accordance with the principles
thus discovered. Equally, in the case of the bricklayers
(who were actually studied by Gilbreth, although Taylor
thoroughly approved of the work done) the preparatory work
of mixing the appropriate grade of mortar, and of laying
out the bricks ready for immediate use by the bricklayer,
were both separated off and assigned to the skilled worker’s 
54assistants. m  both cases this process was conceptualised 
by contemporaries as well as by more recent writers, as one 
of specialisation: the range and level of skills exercised
by a worker were reduced.
It is Important to notice, however, that this conclusion
is one which reflects a particular view of the process that 
took place, the view of the skilled workers. From their 
standpoint, skills and activities were removed from their
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jobs and transferred either bo un/semi-skilled workers, or 
to new technical and managerial staff. And the public debate 
that occurred in the U.S.A. in the early part of this century, 
over scientific management, also reflected this concern with 
the job of the skilled worker, involving, as it did, the
American Federation of Labour, a largely craft-based union
o , .. 55feaeration.
Yet whilst the perspective, and fate, of the skilled
worker is important, one must recognise that other workers
were involved in the processes described as specialisation,
and from their point of view, the processes, in fact, looked
rather different. In the bricklaying example, ordinary
labourers were assigned the task of sorting out the bricks,
and of laying them out, ready for use. Mortar mixers were
given the responsibility of tempering the mortar so that
bricks could be laid with the minimum effort."^ And in the
machinists’ example, Taylor noted the benefits which accrued
from separating off the tasks of minor repair and maintenance
57and assigning them to day labourers. In both of these cases, 
we can see that a process of specialisation, viewed from one 
standpoint, appears as despecialisation viewed from another.
Of course we cannot say that one view is ’true' as against 
the other, for these two views merely represent two aspects, 
or phases, of a single process, the transfer of work from one 
croup of workers to another. :3ut the revelation of this dual 
aspect of the process shows us the one-sidedness of the 
emoirica1 evidonee 1inking scientific m anagem en t with 
s o o o a 1i satio i of 1abcur.
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Thirdly, or. this first argument, lei us consider the
case of foremen, for in this instance Taylor clearly and
unambiguously recommended the division of their labour into
a series of segmented roles - gang boss, speed boss, route
clerk, time and cost clerk etc. Although Taylor was aware
that by so doing he could obtain the same work with cheaper
labour‘d  the extensiveness of specialisation in this case
was tied to a specific, and peculiar, feature of their work.
This was the tremendous increase in the number and range of
duties which Taylor assigned to management and which arose
out of his analysis of the need for planning, regulation
59and measurement of all aspects of production. Partly
because of this, Taylor argued that suitably qualified labour
would be almost impossible to obtain, and only specialisation
of the foreman's role would allow companies to find, and to
hire, suitable employees. The recognition that this process
of specialisation would permit the hiring of cheaper labour,
or the payment of lower wages, was derived ultimately from
Babbage, but as we have already indicated such a recognition
can accomodate the despecialisation of lower grade workers
at the same time .that it requires the specialisation of more
ski1 1cd workers.
Pinally, on this first argument, it should be pointed
out in two c;ses in \ ved, those of ball
60ri ng inc. unction, nn..i pi a."on shove I ling, Taylor did not 
introduce any further subdivision of labour even though this 
•avo been po ble, » ■: s : ong product lines.
Tills throws further doubt, therefore, on the notion that
labour speo.ialis-rr.vion "/as ■a integral or a necessary feature 
of Taylorism,
The second argument s.. r.e times made in favour of this 
proposition is that Taylor sought to demarcate conception 
and execution, or ’planning1 and ’doing.' The truth of this 
proposition hardly requires documentation, and it was given 
its most pointed expression in 'The Art of Gutting Metals:’ 
where Taylor spoke of the necessity,
"of taking the control of the machine shop 
out of the hands of the many workmen, and placing 
it completely in the hands of the management.” 61
This indeed is one of the features fc- which Taylorism has
become so well known.
It is pertinent to observe here, as was done elsewhere 
in a different context, that much of the conceptual labour 
that was to be divided from executive work was in fact new 
work, previously not carried out by any group of workers.
Time and motion study, and systematic planning and routing 
of materials are the best examples here. A considerable body 
of work remains however, and much of this has to do with the 
codification and systems,tisation of work already performed 
v/ithin the shop. This knowledge was gathered up and, as 
Taylor put it, placed in the hands of management, in the form 
of charts and slide rules thus facilitating their control 
over production.
But there is a fallacy involved in the argument that 
this codification of knowledge and its placement in the hands 
of management entails specialisation. Several writers have 
argued that Taylor trans1erred knowledge from workers to
— b s. -
management, impoverish.!ng the former, and strengthening the 
latter. This view is untenable though because it has a false 
conception of knowledge. It rests on the assumption that 
knowledge is a kind of commodity which can be ’taken’ from 
workers and ’given1 to management, but in reality the 
situation is quite different. Even if management, through 
scientific investigation, accumulates knowledge of production 
which enables it to revise work norms and methods, the workers 
in production still possess the knowledge they have accumulated 
through training and experience. '.7hat changes in the situation 
is not the possession of knowledge, but its monopoly.
Let us turn now to the final argument on Taylorism and
specialisation. Drucker was quoted in the Introduction to
this Chapter as saying that one of Taylor’s mistakes was to
confuse a principle of analysis with a principle of action, i.e.
that as well as subdividing jobs for analysis he s.lso did this 
6 2
in practice. 7/e have examined already the evidence on
Taylor's practice, so we shall focus here on his analysis of
jobs. The most complete description of the method of conducting
time and motion studies is to be found in ’Shop Management,'
In that book Taylor described, how and why, for purposes
of analysis, one should subdivide work into elementary
units. The reasons were twofold: first of all by timing
very short and quick movements Taylor thought that possible
sources of error and interrupt:! on would be minimised, and
6 3the whole procedure be rendered more efficient; J secondly, 
an analysis of work methods would show that some of the
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notions 'na.de were superfluous, and these could be discarded
in the calcu.1 at.i on of the final tine for the job.0 That
Taylor die not intend these elementary motions of work to
be the bases of new, specialised jobs is clear from the
example which he uses, that of shovelling. Time study, he
said, should measure separately the actions of filling the
shovel, and of throwing off the contents.0  ^ Presumably
these elementary motions were not to be performed by two 
different workers!
It is not Taylor then who has confused a principle of
analysis with a principle of action, but a number of his 
critics.
Having now examined each of the three arguments in 
support of the link between Taylorism and labour specialisation, 
there is just one further, and final, point that can be made. 
Taylor did discuss the issue of specialisation and acknow­
ledged the possibility that jobs might be despecialised under 
his system of management:
” When a number of miscellaneous jobs have to
be done day after day, none of which can occupy 
the entire time of a man throughout the whole of
a day In this case a number of these jobs can
be grouped into a daily task which should be 
assigned, if practicable, to one man,.....” 66
He then proceeded to give a number of examples of the kinds
of work where this might be done, but of more importance
than these specif!c instances is the fundamental principle 
which determined them:
"Trie task should call for a large day’s work, 
and the man should be paid more than the 
usual day’s pay." 67
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Faced with a choice between specialising labour, and assigning
a ’large day’s work,1 Taylor preferred the latter. V/hat this
indicates about the status of specialisation within Taylorism
is that it was conceived as a means, and not as an end in its 
68own right, and further, that as a means for achieving the 
objective of maximum labour productivity it was not always 
appropriate.
"The one best way "
Humanistic critics of Taylor, concerned with his 
supposed disdain for the individual worker have raised, in 
particular, the question of work methods as a cardinal 
example of such violation.
According to Friedmann, a particular method of working 
practised by a worker may appear to contain unnecessary motions, 
but in fact these may have some hidden, psychological signi­
ficance. In any case, practised movements constitute "organic 
wholes," and one cannot simply remove certain elements and 
leave behind others.w  Contrary to scientific management, 
which imposes "one best way" of working, regardless of individual 
differences and preferences,
"Industrial psychologists grant the worker
the right and opportunity to adopt another method 
if he prefers it and if he can prove that it is 
equally efficient." (my italics). 70
But what did Taylor actually mean by "the one best way?" The
'one best way’ involved the conscious study of current work
methods, and the elitninatio .si of " false movements, slow
movements and useless movements,” and the subsequent
collection of " the -uickest arid best movements as well
71as the best implements." Taylor then, rejected the 
assumption, and rightly so, that traditional methods of w o r k , 
developed over many years, perhaps over generations, were 
necessarily more efficient, either in human or economic terms, 
than those methods devised after scientific inquiry. The 
major thrust of his method here, as generally was to replace 
tradition, by science, and to render the improvement of 
method a conscious process. The notion of "one best way" 
should not, however, be understood in a static sense.
"This best method becomes standard, and remains
standard  until it is superseded by a quicker
and better series of movements." 72
So although Taylor believed there was "one best way" to do a
job, he recognised that in practice, it might not be attained.
7/as the worker then completely subordinate to the dictates of
"science," or could he be granted some discretion on this
question of work methods?
"If after having tried the new method once any 
workman has a better suggestion to make, of any
kind that suggestion is most welcome to the
management." 73
The principle involved here is similar to the one advocated by 
Friedmann: the worker can alter his methods, if the employer
loses nothing by it (Friedmann), or if the employer gains by 
it (Taylor). In both cases, a concession to the worker’s 
interest was made conditional cn the safety of the employer’s 
interest, although Taylor demanded more on this count than did 
Fried ia n. nd as w shall see, the notion of ’one best w a y ’ 
is far from dead, even in the contemporary literature of job 
redesign.
Taylorism and * indi vidualis . 1
It is often said that Taylor treated the worker as an,
isolated, atomised, individual, and that he had no concept
74
therefore, of the social character of behaviour. This 
error of Taylor's was supposedly corrected by the emphasis 
in 'human relations' theory on social rewards at work, in 
which there was also a corresponding diminution of the 
significance of pay. We have seen above that Taylor did, 
in fact, appreciate the existence, and intensity, of social 
factors on production, or rather, v/e should say, in the
I
restriction of production. This appreciation is the key 
to understanding Taylor's alleged individualism, a feature
which pervades most of his work, in areas such as methods
75
improvement, grievance handling, and work allocation.
Taylor's own much-quoted account of his struggle to end
output restriction at Midvale bears testimony to his
experience, not only of the existence of organised
restriction, but of its strength, or intensity. Not only
were the machinists themselves solidly opposed to any
increase in output, but even workers freshly recruited to
break the machinists' solidarity, quickly succumbed to 
T 6pressure. Taylor experienced at first hand the existence 
of group restriction of output v/hilst he was himself a 
machinist, since, naturally, pressure was brought to bear on 
him by his co-workers to restrict his output to a certain 
level. Such 'systematic soldiering' as Taylor later 
christened the phenomenon, would, in any case, have made a
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great impression on Taylor because of his own Puritan 
background. And he was also aware of the phenomenon else­
where in the USA:
.....hardly a competent workman can be found in a 
large establishment ... who does not devote a 
considerable part of his time to studying just how 
slowly he can work and still convince his employer 
that he is going at a good pace." 77
And as far as the international character of the problem was
concerned, he wrote, in 1 9 1 1 , that,
"Underworking, that is, deliberately working slowly 
so as to avoid doing a full day’s work, soldiering 
as it is called in this country, ’’hanging it out,"
as it is called in England, "ca canae,” as it is 
called in Scotland, is almost universal in industrial 
establishments, ’’ 78
The popular notion that Taylor was unaware of the effects
of social environment and social forces, an omission which
provided the foundation for 'human relations’ theory, is
in fact misconceived. Yet v/e are still entitled to ask why
Taylor believed that the development of the social dimension
of work could only be inimical to production. Was it not
possible for workers, collectively, to raise productivity,
instead of restricting it, and to be paid collectively for
so doing? Taylor, as is known, answered this question in the
negative, since he assumed that any such system v/ould
discriminate unfairly against the more able workmen:
"When a naturally energetic man works for a few days 
beside a lazy one, the logic of the situation is 
unanswerable. "Why should I work hard when that 
lazy fellow gets the same pay that I do and does 
only half as much work?’ " 79
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The result, according to Taylor, was that group wording under
a group payment scheme led to the adoption of a ’slow’ pace
of work. This conclusion is premissed on the existence of
individual differences, and on the belief that workmen have
some notion of a fair, or just, wage-effort bargain. The
latter belief also informed Taylor's conviction that
productivity could not be increased without the award of an
increase in pay. Yet there remains a deficiency in Taylor’s
argument: for if workers could co-operate to protect their
interests against rate-cutting, why could they not also
co-operate to advance their earnings through equitable sharing
of workloads under a system of group payment? At no point
in his writings does Taylor provide an adequate reply to
this contradiction.
Critique of Taylorism
Taylorism, as v/e have seen, has been subjected to a
great variety and intensity of criticism by many writers,
both past and present. It has been labelled as a principal
80
determinant of deskilling and of speed-up and intensification 
81
of labour, accused of seeking to augment managerial control 
32over labour, and held to be completely ideological in
O O
character and devoid of scientific content. These, and other 
criticisms, and particularly those emerging from the work of
Braverman and Friedmann, have been examined in detail elsewhere,
and the same v/ork has also considered the conceptual bases of
84
current and possible critiques." These discussions will not 
therefore be repeated here, but we will summarise the
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conclusions that are most pertinent to job redesign.
7/e have argued that some of the more common criticisms 
of Taylorism are difficult to justify, but the following 
points can be readily substantiated: firstly, Taylor did
undoubtedly raise productivity in part by increasing worker
Q C
levels of effort, and work pace, i.e. he intensified labour
(although he also improved work methods and machine maintenance 
86
and utilisation) ; secondly. Taylorism sought to increase 
managerial control over labour by the individualisation of 
payment levels, training , and work roles, and thus to under­
mine the collective organisation which he saw as inevitably
hostile to managements interests; and thirdly, whilst wage
8*7
increases and promotion opportunities were obtained, so too
88were overall reductions in labour costs and volume of labour.
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Summary
Let us now briefly recapitulate the conclusions from 
the latter sections of this chapter. Although pay rises 
and incentives formed a central part of Taylor’s motivational 
theory and practice, they v/e re complemented by other 
mechanisms - supervisor-worker relations, goals, feedback, 
work rhythm, and promotion prospects - and all of the 
mechanisms were predicated on complete re-organisation of 
work methods, work flow and other features of workshops.
Secondly, specialisation of labour was shown not to be an 
integral or a necessary feature of Taylorism, since empirically 
Taylor despecialised some groups of workers (and specialised 
others), and since the origins of specialisation both pre­
dated, and lay outside of, Taylorism itself. Specialisation 
functioned as a means for achieving the end of increased 
productivity, and was not an end in itself. It was also 
shown that Taylor’s insistence on there being 'one best way’ 
of performing any task neither denied individual variability 
nor ruled out the possibility of methods improvements over 
time. And finally it was shown that Taylor's strong practical 
commitment to individualism was mainly strategic (rather 
than philosophical) in character.
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CHAPTBR 3 THEORIES 0? JOB REDESIGN I :
TASK DESIGN AND DIMENSIONS THEORY
HERZBSRG'S JOB ENRI CLIENT
Introduction : on terminology
The field of job redesign is one in which there abounds 
a plethora of terms and theories. Numerous writers have 
revised, and redefined such terms as job enlargement, and 
job enrichment so as to accord with their own empirical 
findings, and/or theoretical predilections. Yet despite 
such revisions the field remains confused, and at least 
sixteen terms and concepts are currently in use as descriptions 
of what are ostensibly similar processes. To give just a few 
examples, we can find many references to : job enlargement, 
enrichment, extension, restructuring, design and to work 
re-organisation, and work structuring, in addition to 'horizontal' 
and 'vertical' variants of several of these terms.^
Three features of this terminology may be isolated for 
the purposes of criticism. Firstly, much of it is quite clearly 
evaluative, as well as descriptive: making jobs either
'richer' or 'larger' is self-evidently a 'good thing.* And 
not only do such terms positively evaluate the changes they 
denote, but they also assume in advance v/hat has in fact to 
be proved. Many job redesign theorists argue that it is 
worker perceptions of task changes which are crucial in the 
generation of higher motivation and satisfaction, yet the 
terms describe such changes in advance as 'enrichment' etc.
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More recent terminology - such as job design, work 
re-organisation etc* - avoids this problem by virtue of its 
generality but by the same token arguably fails to distinguish 
the supposedly novel features of the current job redesign 
movement from the work study-type orthodoxy which it is 
seeking to challenge.
Secondly, the process of change tends to be treated 
from a particular standpoint - that of the worker whose 
job is most immediately affected, and which is invariably 
de-specialised. Yet it will frequently be found that 
'enrichment1 or redesign for one group of workers involves 
specialisation for another. For instance where inspection, 
supervisory or maintenance duties are transferred to operatives, 
the latter experience a degree of job de-specialisation 
corresponding to the specialisation imposed upon the former. 
This, however, is only a tendency, for as we shall see socio- 
technical systems theory, by focussing on the level of work 
roles, and their re-organisation, is far more capable of 
embracing some of these repercussions of job redesign. Equally, 
it should be noted that there has been some consideration of 
the effects of enhanced worker autonomy on the role of the 
supervisor. Nevertheless the principal focus has been on the 
v/orker experiencing job redesign. The terminology currently 
employed then reflects a number of theoretical suppositions 
about the process of job redesign as I have indicated.
Thirdly, writers do not always differentiate between 
terms and processes, using consistent criteria. Herzberg for 
instance initially characterised job enrichment on the basis
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of its psychological consequences - such as motivation and
satisfaction but he disparaged "job enlargement" because of
inadequate changes in job content - the addition of more
2
"meaningless tasks." It is difficult to see how these
criteria are comparable, or to know the circumstances under
which each is appropriate for use. Or again job enlargement
and enrichment have often been distinguished by claiming the
latter concedes elements of autonomy to workers whilst the 
3
former does not. But empirically even the most ‘minor’ 
changes in job content may, as a consequence, permit the 
exercise of greater autonomy by workers, however unintended.
Already then we have identified a number of implicit 
theoretical suppositions. Let us now turn to review the 
major theories of job redesign. The question immediately 
arises here as to which theories should be included in such 
a review, and which work in this field should be accorded the 
status of a 'theory.' Is "job enlargement" for instance a 
"theory", or merely a set of job redesign principles? Are 
we to include theories of work motivation derived from, and 
current in, general industrial psychology, but which have 
figured less prominently in the field of job redesign, e.g. 
expectancy theory? Clearly a number of decisions, some of 
them arbitrary, some less so, must be made at this juncture.
Historically, two theories can be said without fear of 
contradiction to be major theories in this area insofar as 
they were derived from and/or gave rise to innovations in 
job redesign, namely, ocio-technical systems thoory, and
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Herzberg’s two factor theory of job attitudes, and its corollary,
job enrichment. Many innovations, and many analyses of job
redesign, however, cannot be located unambiguously within
either of these theoretical frameworks and much of the work
4
derived from furrier & Lawrence, exemplifies this point.
It is possible to construct an overall framework within 
which to locate job redesign theories, using the concept of 
the "job." Sociotechnical theory can be said to have stemmed, 
initially, from a concern with the inter-relations betv/een jobs, 
and their amalgamation into work roles. Herzberg*s job enrich­
ment, again, initially, focussed on the psychological structure 
of the job, that is on the factors connected with jobs that were 
associated with motivation, satisfaction and performance, such 
as achievement, recognition or advancement. We can also discern 
within the job redesign literature, a strand of v/ork that has 
concentrated neither on job inter-relations, nor on the 
psychological consequences of job redesign, but rather on the
actual structure of the job itself, and the way in which this
5
might be conceptualised. Historically, this strand has its 
origins in the job enlargement school, with its emphasis on 
task dimensions such as variety, and autonomy.
It should be stressed here that these three levels of 
analysis are far from being exclusive, but relate much more 
to the origins of theoretical currents, and to their dominant, 
present concerns. Thus sociotechnical theorists have laid 
out principles of job redesign, as has Herzberg, whilst task 
design theorists have considered psychological responses to 
changes in job content. Dominant emphases can still, nevertheless,
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be discovered despite the blurring of boundaries.
This theoretical review will unfortunately exclude 
theories of motivation which have made only a minimal impact 
on job redesign. The number of such theories is legion and 
even a cursory review would require the addition of another 
chapter to the thesis.
Each of the three sections of the next two chapters has a 
number of common structural features, as well as a number of 
differences. Each section begins with a discussion of the 
developments of the theory in question, and looks in some 
detail at changes over time in the content, and assumptions 
of the theory. Secondly, each contains a discussion of the 
limitations and problems associated with the theory. Since 
the three theories isolated for discussion have centred on 
different aspects of jobs, it has not been possible to impose 
a uniform structure on this discussion, and the precise points 
that have been made reflect these differences.
A number of common problems and omissions will be taken 
up in more depth in Chapter 4 when we attempt a more systematic 
comparison and evaluation of the three theories. Equally, 
the majority of case studies in the literature will be 
reviewed in Chapters 6,7 and 8 , and the next two chapters will, 
therefore, confine themselves to an examination of those 
cases most intimately associated with the formulation and 
development of each particular theory.
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Development of the ~ r w-pp
As I have already indicated this theory can be traced 
back to the job enlargement school of the 1940s and '50s. The 
term ’’job enlargement” was first coined by Y/alker in the late 
1 9 4 0s to denote a process of reversing the division of labour. 
The first example of such a reversal was recorded at 131,1, 
where three work roles - those of set-up man, inspector, and 
machine operative - were collapsed into one. Employee 
satisfaction and wages were higher, total labour costs 
reduced, and productivity higher, results which were attributed 
to the fact that division of manual labour was subject to 
diminishing returns. It should be noticed that this idea had 
a very specific content in the IBM case: diminishing returns
did not mean, as it was to do la her, increased absenteeism
and turnover and lower morale, but inefficient allocation of
7
work. Much of the machine operatives' time was idle, and 
whilst she was idle, the set-up men were working, and vice 
versa. I\Tot until the study of the assembly line, in 1952, 
was the idea of dissatisfaction added to the list of diminish­
ing returns, and job enlargement (and job rotation) was
advocated as r r: a is )f in n ig satisfaction vrlth work,
by means of ino r or ;o0 "'nr* '"\r o ' •  ^ ~ •* cl ever the speed cf
the line that i ■, th .s re o "* work • ~ t wnc even
thought that tli' enlargement of the worker * s job. to encompass 
5-10 operations, in ; e. : of s • s two, could restore the
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sensa of performing a "w af. eM .job (a term which was left
3a:. r;a aly vague.)
Over the next five years a series of studies wore
conducted, in offices and fact>ries, on a somewhat ad hoc basis.
As yet no consistent redesign principles had been developed,
although the 1957 review by Guest did indicate a few of these,
1 0
albeit indirectly. All of the changes that xvere reported 
involved the addition of different tasks to the existing job, 
in other words variety was increased. A number also attempted 
to create whole jobs by allowing workers to perform all of 
the operations on a particular product. For example, one 
group of workers, previously subdivided into nine subgroups 
on different phases of product assembly, was disbanded, and
11
individual workers each allowed to asse foie the whole product.
The studies also involved the allocation of preparatory duties,
12
e.g. machine set-up, mail reception, and inspection duties. 
Subsequent studies have been conducted along very similar 
lines: assembly lines have been shortened, or abolished and
workers allowed to assemble a larger number of components, 
and sometimes to check the quality of their own work. 7/hi 1st 
in offices, a division of labour between processes, such as 
mail reception, letter writing, filing etc., has been replaced 
by a divi jion between groups of customers, so that, each wo ’ker 
now performs all of the r -1event operations for a particular 
* rou > of custom ers. " >rts ' ti v >ly a-i he *etic
pragmatic changes arc a a fact ~a-. ram, and in mo . • Lions 
■ i u ciously on a ’tic »5 : 1 iriohta tion,
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in :io c vay, I '11, Texas In ; n h  t! tin •'
(f or details of t nor-se cnoe 3 , xe0 f h- ps .6/- , , ) .
Becau ?e this cat ;ory ox chan ;es has jo the ris< ; ly
to a limited •: tent it is not sur ’isin to 'li ' that it is
quite heterogeneous. Some r .’cent attempts have be on made
however to put both these and * jot enrichment * type innovations
onto a firmer, conceptual bo sis, most notably in the work of
Hackman, Lawler and Oldham.1 ^  Their .vork is based largely
on the study by Turner and Lawrence, in which the authors
developed and tested a checklist of job attributes (The
x 1 4
Requisite Task Attributes Indore, RTA). These attributes 
were drawn, according to the authors, from a survey of the 
literature, and fro 1 own empirical studies in a variety
of organisations, and si:-: of them were adapted by Hackman et al 
these being: variety, autonomy, task identity (wholeness),
feedback, dealing with others, friendship opportunities. The 
latter two dimensions were added for specific purposes in a 
particular study, and the more elaborated model has dropped 
them, and added one more, labelled task significance - the 
extent to which a task cent 1 -ute3 to ’the lives of other oeoole 
Those dimensions wore then ky-xfchesisel to lead to such outcomes 
as high quality work, low s' sente s.: turnover, and hi ~he *
satisfaction, vi: viiat c m  • cni: od ’’critical psychological
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iriili , only for those a. ■ ■ g-ru- v/i ‘.k 1 Tier mods. ’ ^  ^
Th -■ link betwe sn this wo *k, ' t i ■ j n3 . r ■ ■ ?nt
studies can easily be seen, wi i._ the inclusion in the former
of th i limensions of va ’i y, utonomy, ta sk ' I uitity.
The concept 3 ' variety how ve.r .v . used by 'iackraan of al, , in
connection with skills, no', simply tacks, and that of autonomy
wag used to denote control ov.r all aspects of a job, and not
simply its pace (as was intended by 7/a Ik or <l Guest). The
specification of employees witi higher needs as the 'target
population' was a response both to the work of Turner & Lawrence,
16
and to that of Hulin & Blood. These researchers claimed to 
have shown the existence of significant differences in job 
attitudes between urban and rural-origin workers, in urban and 
rural plants, with rural workers expressing 'higher needs' - 
for job variety, challenge etc., than their urban counter­
parts. And interestingly enough, the original, and now classic, 
assembly-line study by walker . Guest involved many workers who 
had no previous industrial experience but had come from rural 
environments.
Criticisms and limitations of tack de sign theory
The Hackman, Oldham and Lawler work has been used to 
inform a number of job changes, as we shall see below, and in 
r viewing the existing case studies an attempt will be made to 
evalu fce its > ■ lictive value. ?or tin it, ? lumber of
shortcomings of their work should bo mentioned. firstly 
insofar as it hypothesises higher metivati a id performance 
folloving appropriate job changes only for employees with
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* need sir . ;' ' f i t he u '.l ' -i n conserv: fcive ■ , •.
1 study o y do tyro ve ot al. , Co.: :> astance found that oar tain
employees who had boon very gu *ded in their response to the
: - jobs, were subs eq'u atly fated an m o v e  ' ; that
17they could take more rose one::, hi iity. The o rococo of 
implementation and th< - red *si -nod jobs may in
themselves help to foster appropriate psychological reactions.
In any case, the job motivation-performan.ee link may be
1 ftmediated by factors other than 'need strength.' Agersnap et al.,
showed that two groups of workers on similar jobs had vory
different reactions to job redesign according to their degree
of hostility towards, and suspicion of, management.
Hackman and Oldham have themselves accepted that their
stress on high need strength employees was too much, and claim
now that whilst such employees do show positive responses to
’job enrichment,' so too do ’lower need strength’ employees,
although the responses are weaker, and the correlations between
19joo change and behaviour outcomes, lower.
Secondly, it should be noted that even employees with 
high need satisfaction may not respond positively to job 
redesign because their needs are satisfied by other means. In 
a study at British Rail, the author encountered employees who 
were relatively content with j ■ ;h y perceived as adequate, 
not because they lacked ’hipier needs’ but beeonce they
satisfied throe needs through other nunui, ..rack us local politics,
, . , . ,20
' ■ • : rra d o unxo n w o rk„
Thirdly, the Hackman et al. work is entirely lacking in
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any dimension of time: jobs perceived as motivating at one
point in time, may not be seen that way after a number of
months or years because of onoloyee e r :>oct.ntions of career
advancement, as Benze * has und.^ And : a. ■r.o1.,/ jobs
perceived to bo relatively low on * co re dimensions * nay be
tolerated and performed well because they are seen as
necessary steps on the path to more interesting work in the
future, through career advancement. Cases of this type were
22
also encountered in the B.R. study.
fourthly, the Hackman et al work is ambivalent, or 
perhaps we should say silent, on the question as to whether 
lower needs must be satisfied before higher needs can come 
into play.
And fifthly, we should notice the practical limita.tions
of the Hackman et al model:
"  the job characteristics model is designed to
apply only to jobs that are carried out more or 
less independently by individuals. It offers no 
explicit guidance for the effective design of
work for interacting teams -.....” 23
Finally, it should be pointed out that there is some evidence
(little as yet) suggesting that the relationships posited by
Hackman et al. between the various components of their model
may not hold up under all circumstances,^
There have, of course, been -numerous criticisms of "job
ilarg mentM as a whole, notably by writers of differing
■■ i.r.l pers isions. iorzb , stance, spoke of
job enlargement as a
” Cooks tour" in which individuals have snippets
•of different activities, urr ; any moan * •: yfu
o-'uise ....." 25
-87-
and later ac; being trie addition of "... another meaningless
2 (Stask to the existing one." Whilst Davis, writing from 
within the sociotechnical framework also equated "job
enlargement" with the addition of "more of the same dehumanising 
"27tasks. There is some validity in these criticisms, for as
we saw, job enlargement was not until recently, placed on a 
proper theoretical footing, and clear recommendations for job 
redesign failed to emerge. This fact makes it quite probable 
that certain cases of 'job enlargement' did involve the simple 
addition of different tasks in a pragmatic manner. Nevertheless, 
we also saw that a number of redesign, principles had begun to 
emerge in the early work - variety, task identity, some degree 
of autonomy - and from this point of view the charges of Davis 
and Herzberg seem exaggerated and unwarranted. Their criticisms 
in any case, rest on a contradiction, for as Herzberg argues 
the point about job redesign is not whether the task is 
interesting (or dehumanising etc.), not, what the employee 
(or Herzberg) thinks about the job, but whether it leads to 
higher motivation.20
Job 'enlargement' has also been criticised by Hulin &
Blood on the grounds that supporting case studies contained 
deficiencies such as absence of control groups, absence of
OQ
statistics, and confusion between cause and correlation.
Whilst some of these criticisms are justified, the authors
actually argued for a job enlargement - individual differences 
model compatible with that of Hackman et al.
The question of individual difTerences
Neither sociotechnical systems theory, to be discussed in 
Chapter 4, nor Herzberg's theory, to be examined in the ensuing 
section, have said very much on the question of individual 
differences in response to job redesign. This area has been 
theorised and debated principally by writers working within a 
task dimensional framework, such as Hackman and Oldham. Clearly, 
this area can be seen as part of a broader discussion within 
industrial psychology on the nature of individual differences, 
but we shall concentrate here on the variables, such as growth 
need strength, and to a lesser degree, Protestant work ethic, 
that have been singled out by job redesign theorists.
The claim about the significance of such differences was 
eventually proposed in a sophisticated form by Hulin and Blood 
who suggested that some workers were not interested in job 
content, but in wages (these being described as alienated 
from middle class work norms), and v/ere therefore unlikely to
O A
respond to job redesign.
The earliest studies which examined these individual
31 32differences were conducted by Kilbridge, MacKinney et al.,
and Kennedy & O'Neil.^ Kilbridge found that a majority of
workers on a paced assembly line preferred to be paced, rather
than pace themselves, but whether this indicates a genuine
preference, conservative bias, or a process of adaptation is
extremely unclear. MacKinney et al. simply reviewed evidence
on this question and concluded that since there was data to 
suggest arguments for and against specialisation, that no
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general conclusions cculd be drawn, Kennedy Sc 0*Neil examined 
job attitudes as a function of job content using car assembly 
workers and utility men, and found differences in some groups, 
but not in others. Overall they argued job content was only 
one of a number of determinants of job attitudes.
But we are justified in asking how such studies relate to 
change situations - what do they tell us, if anything, about 
the way workers might respond to job enlargement? The study 
by Conant and Kilbridge attempted to answer this question. ^
A group of 61 workers had their job of water-pump assembly 
reorganised from a six-man progressive assembly line (with 
mechanised pacing) onto individual assembly, 46 operatives 
said that, overall, they liked the individual, bench assembly,
11 were neutral, and only 4 disliked it. At the same time, 
however, 30 workers also said that liked the mechanised line 
(16 were neutral, and 15 disliked it). In other words, at_ least 
15 workers (25/S) said they liked both methods of working, and 
fortunately the study provided some of the reasons for this 
absence of a straightforward preference. Most liked features 
of individual working were: self-pacing (48), quality control
(53), and individual incentive (53), with the absence of social 
interaction (28) and the inadequate learning time (23) being 
the most disliked features. As one v/ould expect, the line v/as 
liked because of the easier learning and greater opportunities 
for social interaction, but opinion was divided on questions 
such as specialisation, lack of sub-assembly completion, and 
mechanised pacing. Indeed, at least 11, and possibly as many 
as 24 workers liked both the self pacing on the bench and the
- 90
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workers enjoyed the variety of v/ork on the bench, but 32 
expressed a liking for specialisation on the line, so that 
at lonot 18 (ant perh- p” as many as 32) 1' ;*ed both.
In conclusion, it appears then that some workers adopted 
different frameworks and values for different typos of job: 
specialisation may have been acceptable because it was easy, 
there v/as rhythm to the v/ork, and it required relatively 
little effort. On th ■ hand, an enlarged job may have
been judged against different criteria; such as variety, 
autonomy, responsibility etc. That this means is that we 
cannot infer the absence of the latter framework from the 
presence of the former, for significant sections of workers, 
a conclusion supported by evidence from a number of change 
situations.
On the broader question of individual differences, 15
workers (out of a total of 61) i.e. 25,3 were hostile or
indifferent to the job changes with 75." being in favour.
These figures do not accord with the more widespread view,
held in Britain, that perhaps only 20.' of the workforce is
interested in job content, :.r ? would be 1' holy to show a
35
favourable response to Tj • t. 1 This conclusion
(which has also been drawn in .Vr-;r:i or.) i based on attitude 
surveys of job saticfac ti on, and the binding that between 
10 and 20,3 of a local or national workforce is ‘ iis.wvti^fial,
mechanised pacing of the 
nbo-1 bocause of tho h nr 1 
find complex attitudes on
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is by now wo2 ' ;t? i ; . ; ■. ° iu wo a.a legitimately • x Jstion
the infereno that bocau*.: - ''ho remaining 30 - 90," express job
satisfaction ,-r. an attitude survey, they are therefore
uninterested in job content. The study by Conant and PCilbridge
showed clearly that some workers use different criteria to
37evaluate different jobs, whilst work by den Hertog, and by
Cotgrove,^® has shown that in the course of job changes workers
may also change their evaluative criteria. Structural changes
in job content, work organisation etc. may, in themselves help
generate attitude change, and we cannot therefore argue from
the existence of negative attitudes against such change. To
do so is to take a static view of attitudes, which fails to
appreciate their dynamic interaction with the environment, both
physical and social.
The work of Hackman and Oldham is generally thought to
have placed the discussion of individual differences onto a new
level of sophistication, by means of a battery of measures of
39job perceptions, attitudes, and need strength. Interestingly
enough this work has demonstrated only the relative insignificance
of individual differences in need strength. The study of
thirteen different jobs in a telephone company revealed that
the mean score on a twelve item, seven—point scale (0—7) of
need strength was 6*01, well above the mid point, and very close
40
to the uppe” limit. Despite this fact certain differences in 
a ”titude ani behaviour, as function, of task dimensions, ltd
emerge in the V;uly. Level of intrinsic motivation, quality
of performance, job involvement, and a variety of specific
items of i sfactions all correlated more highly with
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raotivating job content for higher need employees, as compared 
to those less affected by such needs. nevertheless, two 
points should be noted: firstly, the correlations were not
significantly different for the two groups of employees on 
all items, and general job satisfaction, taking personal 
responsibility, quantity and effectiveness of work, and 
absenteeism are all examples of this. Secondly, 21 of the 
22 correlations were in the same direction, so the relation­
ship between job content, and attitudes and behaviours was 
positive for most items, and for most employees. Individual 
differences in need strength did not affect the direction of 
the relationships, but only their strength, and then only in 
eight cases out of 22. The evidence then hardly warrants 
the conclusions that individual differences, of the sort looked
at, were of major significance, and this point seems to have
41been accepted oy Hackman and Oldham in a later paper.
What they concluded therefore was, not that job redesign 
might be appropriate for some, though not all employees, but 
rather that v/hilst appropriate for the majority, some employees 
would respond less enthusiastically than others. This conclusion 
of course must be given some qualification, as Hackman et al.
only examined some individual differences: they did not, for
42
instance, examine measures o' personality. All that can be 
said then is that differences between individuals on a variable- 
higher-need strength - thoe^ht to be salient turned out to 
affect only the intensity but not the direction, of the 
hypothesised job perceptions - job behaviour relationship.
Summary and conclusions
The early job enlargement writers focussed their 
attention on the dimensions of jobs thought to be related to 
improved performance and satisfaction, dimensions such as 
variety, and control of v/ork pace. Later v/riters in the 
task dimensions tradition, such as Hackman et al. have both 
elaborated the number of dimensions salient to these outcomes, 
and have conceptualised the nature of individual differences 
in response to job redesign along the dimension of 'growth 
need strength.1
This review of the task dimensions approach sought, first 
of all to defend the approach against a number of unwarranted 
criticisms by Herzberg, Davis and others. At the same time 
it endeavoured to point out some of the problems with the 
approach, such as its inadequate conception of individual 
differences; its notion of population sub-groups, rather 
than different frames of reference adopted by individuals 
in different situations; its lack of attention to time 
perspectives, and to the notion of careers; its lack of 
attention to social dimensions of work; and the relation­
ship between the notions of individual differences and the
1^" 3data from which they supposedly derive.
At a more general level however, the work of this 
school has clarified considerably those job characteristics 
which ought to be manipulated in a job redesign exercise, 
and it thus has a substantial heuristic value. And despite 
the problems and limitations to be found ;in the discussions
individual differences, writers in this ’school’ have 
least tried to advance beyond the alleged universalism 
Herzberg, and sociotechnical systems’ theorists.
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Development of the the
Herzberg’s two-factor theory of job attitudes had its
origins in a review of job satisfaction studies published 
44.in 1957. The literature appeared to offer contradictory
findings on every question, but Herzberg and his co-workers
suggested a possible resolution. They argued that the
results obtained in the studies varied according to whether
the subjects were being asked about their job likes, or
about their dislikes, and conducted their own research to
test this hypothesis. The original pilot study spanned a
considerable range of occupations, but on finding professional
workers to be more fluent and articulate, the final study
used a sample of 203 engineers and accountants from the 
45Pittsburgh area. The basic interview question asked them 
to "think of a time when you felt exceptionally good or
exceptionally bad about your job, " and the nature and
meaning of the events mentioned were explored in a series
of further questions. The replies were then subjected to
content analysis and out c ^ this procedure emerged the most
original innovation in "or- - org’s theory* He suggested that,
whereas previously any jet factor, such, as recognition, pay,
conlitions etc., had been assumed to" act on a continuum,
fro..: high sat ir feet; on h ;; to high dissatic f- :*tion, his
own findings suggested the: ' f- teem wore bipolar. One
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: t cf fi.ct o r s i, c: 11 ' I h; f; ;t >r i, . •. pay, m * i 'Vi ' n,
.rorh condition.;, : ".ijsatn :• faction when absent, but
./hen present only removed this : jsat:] ^faction* The £oueration 
of - tisfaction t >< f was th >du.ct of another, d ; "V rent
set of factors, c .11 d 'v t . is : ’/hen s m t  th -g
created satisfaction hut v/han absent, employees lacked 
feelings of satisfaction bub did not experience feelings of 
dissatisfaction.
In full, Herzberg et al. isolated sixteen first level 
factors - situations or events - and twelve second level 
factors - meanings attached to events, but the motivator - 
hygiene dichotomy has usually been taken to cover ten first 
level factors. The motivators were given as: achievement,
recognition, v/ork itself, responsibility and advancement, 
whilst the hygiene situations/events were: company policy 
and administration, salary, supervision - technical, supervision 
- social aspects and working conditions. The labels 
’motivator* and ’hygiene* were assigned because the former 
set of factors seemed to revolve around an employee's work 
and its performance - job contout - whereas the latter 
appeared to be loo-:ted in the environment, or the context 
of v/ork. These two sets of factors were associated not only 
with good and bad fceilings respectively, but also, according 
to Herzberg, v/i t *formance, bsenteeism. food
f ngs v/ • re 1 i t ’good* jo; 'formalice.
Herzberg then proceeded to draw the conclusions on 
which his strategy of job enrichment is based. Since the
- 9 7  -
majority Ox .lygiene facto ms v ' rr- well catered for in most 
in 1ustrial establishes- Mr, ~r a n : alnoo, us korzborg had 
shown, those could not, ' ho ; rate s; ; *ti
Good performance etc., it -‘Milowed th:*f the route to increased 
productivity and e ffici ■ . La; thro jh the *? Ltors*1
Only by attending to the content of work, rather than its 
context, could these goals be achieved.
Further developments: from -Motivation to fork, to '.York and
the Nature of fan.
A number of assumptions of two factor theory, implicit
in Motivation to ’.York, were rendered far more explicit in
47’York and the iTatur of Man, ostensibly an attempt to 
generalise the earlier findings into a more far-reaching 
theoretical form. The most striking feature of this book 
v/as its overt adoption of a need-hierarchy theory as the 
underpinning, and explanation, of two-factor theory. 
According to this view man has a dual character; on the 
one side (his 'Adam* nature) a desire to avoid pain (broadly 
defined); on the other , a need to achieve psychological 
growth. This dual character corresponds to the distinction 
between hygiene and motivator factors respectively, and may 
be seen as an attempt to transform a contingent, socio- 
P sy c ho logical theory :1 to surely psycl 1 ; ical view 
do riving necessarily from *human nature.” At this level of
abstraction the theory i.s ooj *ciion foie, if platitudinous,
although when cast into th-' u-uld of a 'need, * or * human
9
•uxors’ theory it :! • of a. •; ■ . the : trjrfVM' * urM
s nor toon i ngs ap plicabl o to . ; ' e or.v o ** that kind, such as
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Maslow's need-hierarchy.^8 In other words, the origins
of the 'needs’ are difficult to specify, it is difficult
to see how one could test such a theory, given its
vagueness, and high level of abstraction, and it would seem,
on the face of it, difficult to cope with individual
49differences in expressed preferences.
Herzberg's answer to these questions takes us to a 
consideration of a second major feature of this work, 
namely the resort to psychologistic explanations. In 
'Motivation to Work' we were offered a structural account 
of occupational differences in job attitudes - manual workers 
had less experience of motivators as compared with professional 
workers - although we were assured the motivator-hygiene 
dichotomy would nevertheless be found among such workers.
By 1966 this view had changed substantially.
"A hygiene seeker is not merely a victim of 
circumstances, but is motivated in the 
direction of temporary satisfaction. It is 
not that his job offers little opportunity 
for self-actualisation; rather, it is that 
his needs lie predominantly in another
direction, that of satisfying avoidance needs....
his resultant chronic dissatisfaction is an 
illness of motivation." 50
The contrast between the two explanations is striking -
the former stressed structural and environmental features -
whilst the latter, although not explicitly abandoning these
views, inserted a strongly argued psychological intermediary.
That the transition between the two works was not a simple
sociological-psychological shift, was indicated by the
explanations given for a number of hygiene-motivation reversals
I-99-
a loriii women. These wore relate ! to feelings of insecurity
_ _ . . . . , 51derived from worang m  a male-aommatea society.
Nevertheless, there was much greater stress on the psychological
link between behaviour and the environment in the later work,
and there v/as also a recognition of individual differences
in motivation, even if the explanation, couched as it v/as in
52
terms of pathology, left something to be desired.
Associated with the shift to psychologism was an
increased stress on individualism, at the ontological plane.
In theory, one could have argued, as Batsone has done, that
the attitudes elicited by Herzberg in his original study were
5 3an outcome, at least in part, of social relations. Herzberg, 
however, relegated social relations to the category of. a
54hygiene factor - capable only of alleviating dissatisfaction.
Although arguably a reaction against "human relations theory,"
this view also rested on a more profound substrate. Social
relations were seen by Herzberg as a "factor" existing
independently of individuals, in the same way that salaries,
jobs, and working conditions were independent of them. They
existed "out there," in the environment, and v/ere in no way
a part of individuals themselves. The complement to this
view of social relations was that of the isolated individual:
"The primal fact is that each human being is 
separate, distinct, and a unique individual.....
There is no organic connection between individuals 
after the umbilical cord is cut; all connections 
become the inventions and delusions of man." 55
And not only was individualism a biological fact, it was a
5 &psychological and social value.
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Herzberg's lack of attention to trades unions is thus partly
due to this profound individualism, and indeed, insofar as
they assert collective, as against individual rights, trades
unions must figure as villains in the Weltanschauung
57of Herzberg. and his associates. In a recent publication
the logic of this position has been drawn out in relation
to socio-technical systems theory, which v/as criticised on
the grounds that it sought to impose "the tyranny of the
" 58
group over the individual. And Herzberg also observed, 
quite correctly, that socio-technical theory also laid very 
great stress on the integration of individuals into a group, 
possibly even to the exclusion of changes in job content 
(see Chap. 4).
Finally, we should notice the assumption, common to all
theories of job redesign, and to Taylorism, that the interests
of workers and their employers can be harmonised. The basis
on which Herzberg proposed to achieve this, was also common
to all these theories. Changes in job content will lead to
higher productivity, and lower turnover and absenteeism for
employers, and,
"To the individual, an understanding of the forces 
that lead to improved morale would bring greater 
happiness and greater self-realisation." 59
The employer gains economically, the employee gains psychol­
ogically.
Criticisms an:] limitations of the theory.
It ie now eighteen years since these conclusions were 
first published, and they have given rise to an immense
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amount of research and a considerable degree of controversy.
Three major criticisms have been made, each of which has
differing implications, both for the theory, and its
accompanying strategy. Firstly, it has been claimed by
several researchers that Herzberg's conclusions are
artefactual, that is they result from features of the method
of content analysis which he employed. Studies using
different methods have tended not to reproduce the
motivation-hygiene dichotomy.^0 Secondly, it has been
61
pointed out by King, and by Y/all & Stephenson, that there 
are in fact five possible interpretations of the two factor 
theory, for two of which there is no empirical support.
‘A third possibility is supposedly artefactual, whilst the 
remainder have yet to be adequately tested. These conclusions 
have also been reproduced, and accepted, by Miner Sc Dachler 
in their contribution to the Annual Review of Psychology,
1973. Indeed they went as far as to suggest the two-factor
S’ p
theory should be either modified or else"  laid to rest."
Thirdly, Vroom suggested that whilst the bipolarity 
discovered by Herzberg was a genuine, rather than an arte­
factual, phenomenon, its basis did not lie in the distinction 
between job content and job context. Rather it reflected the 
fact that people tended to lay the blame for dissatisfaction 
at the feet of others - company or supervisors - whilst 
claiming their own activities as the source of satisfying
63
experiences. Wall k Stephenson investigated this idea and
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claimed that these were differences between people in the
64
direction predicted by Vroom.
The second criticism leaves open the validity of 
Herzberg*s theory, since evidence might in fact support the 
untested versions of the theory. The first and third 
arguments would tend to suggest that the content/context 
distinction is invalid and hence, by implication, that an 
enrichment strategy focussed chiefly on job content may 
not be the most effective, as Herzberg would suggest. It 
would follow from these views that either job content ior 
context could be associated with job satisfaction and 
motivation, and hence with performance, and we shall 
consider these possibilities when looking at the case 
studies baned on Herzberg*s theory.
There are three further points which also merit 
examination since they have implications for the strategy 
of job enrichment. The first centres on the role of salary, 
which according to Herzberg functioned as a more potent 
cause of dissatisfaction in conjunction with other hygiene 
factors, than the motivators combined, but nevertheless it 
occurred as often in the genesis of good feelings, as of bad.
On one interpretation of Herzberg, it would seem therefore to 
pose problems. Herzberg*s own solution is far from convincing, 
consisting of the view that since salary was mentioned three 
times as often for long, as opposed to short-time span 
situations/events associated with *bad* feelings, one can 
therefore say it is a more potent (in the long run) source 
of dissatisfaction,  ^ The dc ta, however, v/ould also fit the
-103-
view that over the short £r long terra salary can be a source 
°t' both satisfaction and dissatisfaction. This problem of 
salary was encountered once more when Herzberg attempted to 
explain the apparent efficacy of wage incentives in raising 
productivity. On this question he developed two arguments 
in a very ad hoc manner. First of all he contended that 
salary schemes such as the Scanlon plan, or the partici­
pation and pay scheme of the Lincoln Electric Company 
derived their benefit from the motivators of responsibility 
and recognition associated with participation in company 
affairs. In other words, the pay increases were not in 
themselves responsible for attitudinal or behavioural
u 66changes.
This interpretation is in fact quite incompatible with 
Herzberg's own theory, according to which company policy 
and administration is a major hygiene factor, incapable of 
acting other than to mitigate dissatisfaction. One can only 
assume that the desire to downgrade the significance of pay
£rj
has marred Herzberg*s judgement. His second argument on 
the question of pay was premissed on the pervasiveness of 
output restriction so that what pay increases, or 
incentives did was to return output back to the "norm" 
(defined presumably by the employers). Nevertheless, he 
went on to assure us that,
"The improvement produced under these circum­
stances is actually far less than one could 
obtain were motivators to be introduced." 68
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Contrary then to some of the more popular misconceptions 
about Herzberg*s attitude to pay, namely that he ignores it, 
or treats it as a factor which must be satisfied prior to 
motivational change, he does in fact accept that where 
there is restriction of output, pay can serve to raise it.
And since he admits that such restriction is practised on 
"an enormous scale," it would follow that pay increases 
can be effective on a similar scale.
The second point concerns the occupational bias of 
Herzberg*s findings. It is well known of course, that his 
original conclusions derived from engineers and accountants, 
two groups of professional workers who presumably held 
attitudes towards their work that are rather different from, 
let us say, factory operatives. A number of indications that 
this was so are to be found in Herzberg's book. For instance, 
at one point he noted that,
"Workers complained of too little work more than 
of too much." 69
The final point is the conceptual, and empirical, conflation 
of motivation and satisfaction. It will be recalled that 
Herzberg attempted to assess the correlates of good and bad 
feelings at work, yet he was quite clear that,
"To industry, the payoff for a study of job attitudes 
would be in increased productivity, decreased turnover, 
decreased absenteeism, and smoother working relations." 70
How, we may ask, did he arrive at a prediction of these
behavioural outcomes from a study of attitudes? What he
n01 v/as study company records in order to obtain
data on the sort of variables just mentioned. He relied
-T05-
inroad on ■••v-gj vis1 -' t.r . ctivo r 3port >. 73.- of the
reports of events -on a ■.-. •; : with goo ?. fooling3 also contained 
reference to corf-....’.uu.' • ? * ‘e 1 3 , ouch as increased effort
whilst 43'ij of bad feeling events rosuited in effects, such 
as reduced performance. Apart from the obvious problems of 
memory failings, and the halo effect, we are not told precisely 
what the effects actually comprised. The implication of this 
section in Herzberg*s book is that all the effects were in 
the anticipated direction, that is good and bad feelings were 
linked with high and low performance respectively, but in the 
absence of data this view can only remain at the level of 
implication. The strategy of job enrichment was predi­
cated on the idea that there was such a link between job 
content, satisfaction, and motivation, although as we shall 
see in our case studies the question, in practice, is rather 
more complex. With regard to turnover, a similar pattern 
of results was obtained (but more details were given). In 
general however, the logical problem with these data is 
that since so few instances of dissatisfaction with motivators, 
and satisfaction with hygienes were actually reported, their 
effects on performance mid turnover could not reasonably 
have been aso-'as eed. Ine would thus require far more data 
e 4-Vi-i o orw»4- a -■ Pn■■'•fs " ’ing able to state so firmly* that
r* relation between motivators and high 
j_ 1 valene3 anI co0 r 0 3 rf0 rmanee.
• , in oth - ■’ words, that j oh 
!- ' • by 7 3 rzb • g * •: • .> spone ant s , will
o.t thus sort l:\Lore
there is s. positive
p 0 r formanoe, ; - a 
*r+-j. u c an -■ i *1
necessarily correlate with motivation, nor indeed, that 
motivation will correlate with performance (since there 
may be technical obstacles for instance, to performance).
Summary and Conclusions
The two-factor theory of job attitudes v/as described, 
and further developments in Herzberg*s thought were outlined 
and criticised. In particular it was observed that his 
conceptualisation of "the hygiene seeker" took on a much 
more psychological character in his later work. Three 
common criticisms of the theory were discussed: artefacts,
ambiguity, and the psychological basis of the content/context 
distinction. Each v/as assessed and the implications for 
job redesign v/ere considered. Next the adequacy of the 
theory v/as assessed in the light of Herzberg*s own data, and 
the possibility of misinterpretation of the effects of pay 
was noted. The occupational bias in Herzberg*s data was 
discussed, and it v/as also pointed out that Herzberg had 
tended to conflate the concepts of motivation and satisfaction.
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In t reduction
Sociotechnical systems theory possesses a number of 
features which set it•apart from the theories of job redesign 
reviewed in the previous chapter. To begin with there are, 
as noted previously, only two major, published reviews of the 
theory, each written from a rather different perspective, 
and each, in certain respects, inadequate,^ This contrasts 
with the situation regarding task dimensions and job enrich­
ment theory, where there have been many criticisms and 
appraisals by a large number of writers. There is, in other 
words, a much more attenuated body of work on sociotechnical 
systems theory from which to develop, and on which to build, 
further criticisms.
Secondly, there is a much more direct relationship 
between the concepts of sociotechnical theory and the series 
of practical innovations associated with it, as compared with 
the theory of job enrichment (developed out of a survey of 
job attitudes) and the later task dimension theory (which 
v/as refined using co " ’iv : from a crass-ssetional
study of j >bs by Tu nier n  Lawrence),
tudies c o n d u c t \ y  nreminent
e t o c m c •' l :\Q'j ' ■ re v.' cnor o ■ coo.-: - .....
uinly longe * the : article, typical sf .. • ...io
iu.rmess j or ‘-as.. j . n’ ' ther: a far greater woo
-113-
of material on which to draw in the construction of critiques 
of sociotechnical theory. Because there has been so little 
critical material published about the theory, because of 
the close relation between the theory and practice, and because 
this practice has been extremely well documented, it has been 
decided to go further in the discussion of socio-technical 
theory as compared with job enrichment and task dimension 
theories, and to begin the development of a number of alternative 
concepts more appropriate for understanding sociotechnical 
practice. This procedure will, to some degree, anticipate a 
number of the themes to be more fully elaborated in Chapter 5, 
and conversely, the discussion later on will build on the 
conclusions drawn in the examination of sociotechnical theory 
and practice. Whilst arguably interrupting the flov/ of the 
text, this procedure does have the advantage of providing 
some empirical basis for the later discussion which would 
otherwise have little basis, and which would, therefore, be 
inserted into the text, 'out of the blue.'
What will be attempted in the present chapter therefore, 
in addition to an examination of the development of the theory, 
is a detailed and systematic appraisal of the major concepts 
of sociotechnical systems theory in the light of the job 
redesign cases from which they are supposedly derived (at least 
in part), and which they are supposed to underpin.
14-
Tho nr:.,jor concepts o" so:::; i/, unlc" . . >r,v
Sociotechnical theory v.- originated by Trist and 
Bamforth (1951)^ shortly p.fher the Second 7orld War in a 
paper on the effects of mechanisation in British coal mines*
The authors argued that a production system could not be 
seen either as a technical system - plant and machinery - 
or as a social system - social relations and work organisation 
- but had to be seen in terms of both of these concepts. A 
production system in other words, was a sociotechnical system. 
The argument was based on the fact that mechanisation in the 
coal mines had disrupted the previous organisation of work - 
the hand got system - in which a small team of two or three 
miners performed all of the tasks necessary for the extraction 
of coal. This disruption of what was considered to be a 
psychologically ‘effective* mode of organisation was said 
to emanate from the perception of the production system as 
purely technical in character, when in fact it ought to have 
been seen as socio-technical.
Prom this analysis followed the proposition that effective 
performance, defined usually in terms of output, absenteeism, 
morale etc., was a function of matching, or jointly optimising 
the social and the technical systems. If one system, e.g. 
the technical, were maximised at the expense of the other 
then the result would be, not maximum performance, but sub- 
optimum performance, as in ’• •- rls
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The analysis of V. :oal mines also suggested that the 
technical system, or the to f.nol~ -y, need not determine, in 
simple fashion, the organisation of work. Indeed, organisa­
tional choice v/as said to he possible and for a given
3
technology several social systems were possible.
The form of work organisation employed in the coal mining, 
and in subsequent studies, v/as that of the autonomous work 
group. This v/as a group of multi-skilled workers which 
possessed all of the skills essential for the performance 
of a particular, 'whole' task, and which decided on its own 
allocation of labour, and sometimes on other matters, such as 
internal leadership.
In view of the obvious prominence of the notions of social 
and technical systems it is perhaps surprising to discover 
that only one attempt has been made to produce a detailed 
characterisation of these terms.^ Most accounts adopt a rather 
crude working definition of the social system as comprising 
work or occupational roles, and worker inter-relations, and 
the technological system as the machinery and its spatio- 
temporal layout.''’ There has been a suggestion, and some 
disagreement, as to whether a third dimension -the economic 
system - should also be included, on the grounds that a 
production system must also satisfy financial, as well as
social and technical, requirements if it is to be effective
6 7
in attaining its goals. Both Emery and Trist ot al. argued
;• inst this view, claim! ; that t ie economic dimension could 
best be underetool as a measure of the effectiveness of the 
other two.
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Thsse two systems, the social, and the technical, were 
thought to interact, creating ’forces’ which then had 
psychological effects on individual workers. The socio­
technical system could be designed so that these ’forces’ 
induced task perfor.Tian.ee, or, on the other hand, induced 
avoidance.
These various principles can be briefly illustrated 
in the two early, and classic, case studies. In the Durham 
Coal Mines the introduction of new technology was associated 
with the break-up of small, skilled workgroups and the
Q
introduction of a series of specialised work roles. The 
problems of co-ordination between the different roles, and 
shifts was attributed to a socio-technical mismatch. The 
researchers therefore helped create ’autonomous’ (or composite) 
groups which combined all the skills required for coal
9
extraction and which regulated many of their own activities.
In the Indian weaving shed study Rice also diagnosed a
social/technical mismatch for whilst the technology demanded
worker interdependence (so as to ensure maximum machine
utilisation), the workers themselves v/ere organised into
1 0independent work roles. Rice’s solution v/as therefore to 
create work groups based on interdependent roles: although
each worker might then ordinarily perform one task, he was 
to be responsible for all of the activities of the group.
Since the completion of those studies two main theoretical 
developments have occurred: firstly, Emery attempted to
specify the precise determinants of psychological reactions
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in employment, by examining task structures (in a rather 
rudimentary way), and by drawing on the concept of alienation 
to which autonomous work groups were seen as a potential 
corrective;^ and secondly, Emery, Thorsrud & Trist 
developed a list of job redesign principles, and of employees’
psychological needs, in the context of the Norwegian studies
, . 12 on 3 0b redesign.
Responsible Autonomy and Autonomous Work Groups
In the Durham mining study Trist et al. characterised
1 3the hand got system as one based on 'responsible autonomy.' 
The workers controlled their own task pace and their 
internal division of labour, performed a 'whole' task, 
exercised a multiplicity of skills and selected themselves 
into work teams. The mechanisation of cutting and hewing 
temporarily eliminated much of this autonomy: tasks were
divided and individuals specialised, although movement 
between work teams and faces was still under the control 
of the men through their union lodge. The self selection, 
known as cavilling, not only allowed men to move between 
teams, bub more importantly it randomised the distribution 
of coal faces between work teams so that good and bad faces 
would be more evenly shared out, and hence earnings equitably 
distributed over the long term.^ Not surprisingly, as 
Trist et al. reported, the better workers tended to cluster 
together in order to maximise their earnings. The cavilling 
system would not necessarily result in the highest possible 
output of coal, and nor was it intended to.^
The creation of autonomous, or composite, work groups 
was based on the assignment of responsibility for a complete 
cycle of mining activity to the group. What did autonomy 
mean in practice? It meant that all members of the group 
were responsible for all of its tasks, a responsibility 
that was reinforced by the provision of a common paynote,
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and by training in the requisite skills. These developments 
went some way to reversing the specialisation and isolation 
of labour that accompanied mechanisation and the creation 
of separate pay systems, but there v/as a drawback. According 
to the researchers the system of cavilling was ’out of 
place’, and 'dysfunctional' under mechanisation, resulting 
in ’sub-optimum deployment of experience.’^  For with the 
advent of mechanisation on a large scale, it becomes extremely 
costly to allow the machinery to stand idle, or to be under­
utilised. The system of cavilling created work teams unequal 
in ability - some would extract close to the maximum value 
out of the machines, but others would obtain much less. Given 
the costs of idle machine time, it became imperative to 
replace cavilling by ’planning.’ V/ithin the plans devised 
by management and unions, the men would then have their say.
Let us turn to another example, the case of the wire­
drawing mill of Christiania Spigerverk. The production 
system here consisted of a dozen or so benches, 10-12 m. in 
length, each manned by one worker. Their task was to weld 
together bundles of wire, connect them onto one end of the 
bench, and set the motor running so that the v/ire was drawn 
along the bench, and stretched. The researchers proposed 
that the workers should collectively take responsibility 
for all of the benches - this would enable the men to 
allocate labour as and when required (much of their time 
was spent in inactivity) and would also facilitate increased 
social interaction. The stress of coping with wire breakages
might also be reduced, since it would be shared among the 
whole group. Once again however, there was a drawback: 
the researchers insisted there had to be less men than the 
number of benches,
"Otherwise it is difficult to see how they would 
make effective use of the time saved and it was 
considered that it would be difficult to break 
the old system of one man, one machine," 17
During the first phase of the experiment reduced manning
was rejected, only to then be accepted during the second
phase.
Finally, Rice's work in India involved the destruction
of the indigenous factory culture in which it was customary,
because of the climate, for workers to deputise for co-
1 8workers whilst they went outside to cool off or relax.
These three studies indicate the necessity (in sociotechnical 
terms) for the prefixing of 'responsible' before the word 
autonomy, for where autonomy clashed with the employer's 
economic demands (as in Durham and India), or was giving 
them no advantage (as in Norway) it was curtailed. In all 
cases economic imperatives were uppermost, and demanded an 
end to cavilling, a reduction in manning, and an end to 
traditional work organisation. These tendencies do not in 
fact conflict with sociotechnical theory: for although
it is the stated intention to jointly optimise social and 
technical systems, it is also assumed either that men have 
a need to get their job done (Rice) or that tasks can be 
structured so as to induce performance (Trist, Emery).
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And at a more general level we should also recall the broader
object of sociotechnical theorists - to maximise machine
utilisation (Trist), or as Rice put it, as usual more
19brusquely, to ’keep the machines running.’
The broader objective may be seen by considering briefly
the actual practice of the sociotechnical researchers. In the
cases which they reported their work consisted of the radical
transformation of social (rather than sociotechnical) systems
which were incompatible with the demands of production.
Por Rice the problem was twofold: on the one hand the indigenous
factory culture, with its norms of slow working, long meal
20
breaks etc. was inadequate; on the other hand, the 
village culture, with its norms of sociability could be used
to underpin the destruction of the factory culture. In
Trist *s case the existing social system in the mine v/as
personally, as well as economically unsatisfactory, and the
old work tradition was very recent: there was therefore
much less destruction required than in one case of Rice.
And in the cases of the Norsk Hydro and Christiania plants
in Norway, the projects consisted of replacing individualised
work roles with multiple-task roles. Nevertheless, the
general conclusions were very similar: with the growth of
capital-intensive, rather than labour-intensive: industry,
21
it became imperative to ’keep the machines running.1
I would like to suggest however a different interpretation 
of the sociotechnical emphasis on autonomous work groups and 
’responsible autonomy.' Let us first of all recall the
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industries in which their research has been concentrated: 
coal raining, textiles, fertilisers, papermaking, wiredrawing, 
light assembly, and public transport. With the exception 
of assembly work, these processes have one feature in 
common, that of high process uncertainty. Continual 
and unpredictable variation occurs either in the raw 
material itself (mining, textiles, wire-drawing, public 
transport) or in the production process (chemicals, fertilisers, 
paper-making). Of course in a statistical sense this 
variation may be relatively predictable, but what cannot be 
predicted with any degree of accuracy are the short term 
and momentary changes in the production process which require 
swift intervention by operatives for their correction.
Such short run unpredictability is more characteristic of 
chemical process production - as in fertilisers, paper- 
making - or of production with inherently unpredictable 
raw materials - coal, textiles, or wiredrawing - or of 
production with fluctuating workloads - public transport, 
than it is of assembly work, or indeed of much engineering, 
manufacturing, or clerical work. And it is in the former 
type of case that sociotechnical work on job redesign has 
been concentrated. Of course, other sociotechnical 
work, on organisational power for instance, may not be 
amenable to this type of analysis: we are concerned for
the present however with the major work of sociotechnical 
theory in the field of job redesign.
The creation of autonomous work groups is intended to 
allow such "variances," as they are called, to be controlled
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as near to their point of occurence as possible, this being 
deemed both efficient, for the company, and satisfying 
for its employees. I would suggest that the existence of 
variance (or 'uncertainty') in these cases renders the 
precise allocation of workloads on an individual basis very 
difficult. Some workers may be compelled to work extremely 
hard, whilst others are 'relaxing:' precise specification 
of duties, in the style of F.W. Taylor may thus be 
unworkable (see Chap. 2). The solution, discovered by the 
sociotechnical researchers is to effect a transition from 
the individual to the group as the crucial unit of analysis 
and action, for variances in production can then be evenly 
distributed among its members. This of course is what 
happened in the Wire Drawing Mill referred to above, but 
that alone is insufficient from the standpoint of the 
employer. Consider the situation pictorially:
Figure 1 Effective working time with different
modes of work organisation
Full Time ________________________________________________
working 
day
One man 
one job
Full Time
working 
day
- Group 
working
 —  —  —     — _____________________
A B C D  E F G - 8  workers
Employees
Effective working time of employees A-G
B C D E
Employees
F G -8 workers
-124-
With one man-one job, any general increase in labour
productivity is limited by the effective working time of
employee E: he can spend only another tiny proportion
of the working day engaged in labour before he has reached
its limit. Group working transcends this barrier by
creating a situation where workloads can be equitably
shared, and where a much greater general increase in
productivity is possible. Group working creates the
possibility of higher effort levels, but this possibility
must be transformed into actuality by other mechanisms, to
which we shall turn in a moment. More generally then it
can be said that despite critical references to the
'machine theory of organisation,' and to scientific manage- 
23ment, the achievement of sociotechnical theory has been 
to discover the limiting conditions - high product or 
process uncertainty - beyond v/hich certain tenets of 
scientific management cease to be economically effective 
(see also Chap. 2). It has not discovered any general 
inapplicability of scientific management principles, such 
as the individualisation of workloads, because of its, 
apparently, fortuitious concentration of research in a 
particular type of industry. Yet in this type of industry 
we have discerned an economic rationale for autonomous work 
groups that is present to a much lesser degree, if at all, 
in other sections of industry. The specification of this 
rationale as economic is important, for there does exist an 
argument that there is a technological basis for socio-
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technical practice, which we shall examine under the heading
of'Organisational Choice.’
Having said this, it might appear that the one case,
referred to above, which did not pass beyond these limiting
conditions of product or process uncertainty would seem to
refute the judgement just made. In this case a very 'stable’
production process, based on specialisation of labour,
precise allocation of function, and individual piecework
(based on MTM), was transformed into a group working
situation in which operators performed between two and four
25
different operations in the week. During the first five 
months the operators adhered firmly to the pre-experimental 
norm of output, and there was comparatively little rotation 
between jobs. This is not surprising given the relative 
infrequency of 'variations' that were so much sought after 
by the sociotechnical workers. Finally, on a day when the 
group leaders ''forgot" to correct for absenteeism, collective 
output remained the same, as the workers coped with the 
additional workload. From then on, productivity climbed 
steadily reaching a level 20~o higher than the pre- 
experimental norm. What does this experiment demonstrate? 
Given the lack of 'variations,' and, apparently, of line- 
balancing problems, it does not in fact show the inadequacy 
of one man: one job, and the superiority of group working.
The problem here was to break through a social, worker- 
imposed barrier, not a technical, or organisational barrier 
(as in the Durham and Indian studies), and several studies
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have shown that a variety of techniques, productivity bargain­
ing, for instance, has been used successfully to raise output
26
under such conditions* The break up of output restriction
cannot therefore be attributed to any intrinsic feature, or
inherent superiority, of the socio-technical approach.
'Joint Optimisation1 as Intensification of Labour
Later work in the sociotechnical school has employed
the concept of ’joint optimisation' to characterise the
conclusions from socio-technical practice. Although both
Rice and Trist Sc Bamforth acknowledged the first step in 
27the argument - that one could not discuss the social and 
technical systems in isolation since they were mutually
interactive - it was not until the publication of Trist*s
28study in 1963 that the next step was added. For effective 
industrial performance it was necessary to jointly optimise 
the socio-technical system, rather than to optimise one, 
let us say the technical system, and therefore sub-optimise 
the other. This conclusion was presented as both result 
and description of the early Tavistock work, and has since 
come to be widely accepted both inside and outside the 
Tavistock. But what did Rice and Trist actually do in their 
studies. Did they jointly optimise socio-technical systems? 
The answer, I would suggest, is that they did not. In 
both cases the researchers faced a technological innovation 
which had failed to fulfill its promise: their problem was
actually conceptualised as the bringing into line of 
recalcitrant social systems. Rice was very clear on this 
point:
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flThe effective employment and development of a 
machine technology demand an appropriate work
organisation  (The workers) must
behave in such a way that machine performance
is maximised rather than their own....
machines have already become dominant and 
demand the active development of an appropriate 
'culture' where none exists" 29
This emphasis on machine utilisation and the costs of
machine downtime is also to be found in Trist et a l . ^  and
31Emery & Thorsrud. But if social and technical systems 
were not jointly optimised in these studies, v/hat did in 
fact take place? I would suggest that the actual practice 
in these cases can best be described as intensification of 
labour, that is, an increase in workloads, and/or a faster 
pace of working.
It was argued in the previous section that the achieve­
ment of socio-technical theory was to have discovered, albeit 
implicitly, the limiting conditions beyond which certain 
principles of scientific management ceased to be economically 
viable. The manifestation of this was the transition from 
the individual to the group as the unit of job design, a 
process which permitted a theoretical equalisation of 
workloads. The second phase of this process is intensification 
of labour - the raising of workloads, and/or adoption of a 
faster pace of work. In connection with this analysis two 
questions immediately arise: firstly, v/hat evidence is
there for such intensification of labour? And secondly, 
what are the mechanisms by which the process is brought about? 
In the first of Rice's innovations betv/een 6.2 and 8.3
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workers were theoretically required for 64 looms (the
variations reflect different grades of yarn), but in practice
32
there were seven workers in each group. Consequently
when coarse yarn was being employed, and loom stoppage
increased in frequency, even management had to admit their
33figures were too ’tight* and required upward revision.'
In the second case, with manning reduced by 50%
"....  there were many complaints of tiredness
caused by so much extra walking ....  At all
conferences they said that they worked much 
harder than in the other sheds.” 34
The same was true of the Durham coalmining study:
"The team delegate later expressed the view 
that their higher income had been due not 
so much to the nature of the face or the 
coal ...., as to the fact that they had 
been working hard and, principally, to the 
greater co-operation they were able to achieve 
with the composite work method and the 
advantage it gave in the way of task 
continuity." 35
And what was ’task continuity?’
"No man was ever out of a job. If he finished 
his hewing or pulling before others he would
join and help them, or go on to some other
job which was to follow." 36
In the second phase of the wire drawing mill project five
workers carried out all of the work previously done by six,
an extra workload of 20% for each man; output on panel
assembly (which was labour intensive) rose by 20%;
at Norsk Hydro a plant which theoretically (according to
scientific management theory) required 94 people for its
operation, in fact ran with only 56; the additional duties
for the operatives included those of the foremen and
-1 29-
char gehands (13 eliminated), maintenance workers (4 eliminated),
cleaners (all 12 eliminated). In addition, the number of
37required operatives was cut from 43 to 40. In the fourth
Norwegian case, the Hunsfos pulp and paper mill, the major 
economic benefit was in terms of product quality, rather 
than output, whilst in the van Beinum case no changes in
O Q
work organisation v/ere actually initiated. And in the
final, and most recent sociotechnical case study the
workers disclaimed any feelings of tiredness, although
it does appear there was increased output on the part of
the experimental groups, and this is difficult to attribute
39to anything other than increased effort expenditure.
These facts lend support to the view advanced above 
that in practice ’joint optimisation’ of the social and 
technical systems, is best understood as intensification of 
labour. The process has two phases - in the first workload 
inequalities are ironed out by assigning formal responsibility 
for all tasks to all members of the group. The second phase 
is then built on these averaged theoretical workloads, and 
consists of raising effective working time (task continuity) 
and/or the pace of working. The technical system, according 
to conventional interpretations of that term, has not been 
altered in any of these cases as part of a socio-technical 
intervention. Rather, it has been taken as given and the 
objective of all the cases has been to create a work 
organisation that would extract the maximum use and value 
from the existing machinery (Rice, Trist) and from the
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labour force (Rice, Trist, Emery & Thorsrud).
Has this relative neglect of the technical system, and 
of its design, derived from the particular situations in 
which the sociotechnical researchers found themselves, such 
that one could conceive of genuine socio-technical design?
Or do these workers believe they have in fact carried out 
socio-technical design. The first I believe is nearer the 
truth, and Herbst in fact argued as long ago as 1966 that 
the Tavistock studies had taken the technical system as 
g i v e n . I n  future, both the available technical and social 
system choices must be listed since technical designs 
invariably embody certain assumptions about human and social 
systems, and one of the best examples of such socio-technical 
design is thought to be the Volvo Kalmar plant in Sweden, 
discussed elsewhere.^'
Worker motivation, task performance, and the question 
of pay.
Having established the phenomenon of labour intensification,
we must now consider the mechanisms responsible for bringing
it about, in each of the main sociotechnical case studies.
According to Trist et al. there were four 'bases' for
composite, or autonomous working: composite work method,
4-2workmen, workgroups, and payment system. Composite 
workmen were trained in a variety of skills so they were able 
to perform tasks as they arose; their workgroups were 
self-selected, thus facilitating efficient deployment of
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labour, and the men were paid on a group basis. Composite
work method was the result:
" oncoming men take up the cycle at the point
left by the previous shift. .7hen the main task
of their own shift is completed they redeploy to 
carry on with the next, " 43
Effective working time was increased, as we showed earlier.
Of these four features of composite working, the first one,
work method, or task continuity as it was called was thought
44to be "essential.” Whilst pay was clearly important, it
was but one part of,
"A comprehensive agreement which commits a corporate 
group to an overall task, legitimates motivation 
to improve performance and releases ability to 
learn." 45
This deprecation of the significance of pay was also evident 
in the Trist and Bamforth paper, where they discussed the 
"displacement” of psychological and sociological problems 
onto economic struggles, and thence onto worker-manager 
relations. Questions of pay were thus seen as the phenomenal 
form of expression of more basic, and latent, conflicts.^
The relative significance of pay, and of other factors 
in the work situation, for industrial conflict and performance, 
cannot be assessed in such a brief space, but we can add two 
critical remarks about the Trist et al. assertions. On 
conventional longwalls, as the authors rightly point out, 
the existence of different pay criteria meant that for any
47group of specialised workers certain tasks went unrewarded. 
Ivlinor maintenance, for exarnole, if not the responsibility of 
Group A, would not be carried out by them since it would only
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c o n s u m e  t i m e  w i t h o u t  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  y i e l d i n g  a f i n a n c i a l
re.vard, T h e  e f f e c t  of  the ’c o m p o s i t e *  a g r e e m e n t  w a s  to e x t e n d
t h e  ' c a s h  n e x u s '  to a l l  t a s k s  f o r  a l l  g r o u p s .  E v e r y  t a s k  n e c e s s a r y
f o r  t h e  e x t r a c t i o n  o f  c o a l  c o n t r i b u t e d  to t h e  f i n a l  l e v e l
o f  pay, a nd  w a s  t h u s ,  i n d i r e c t l y  a s s i g n e d  a f i n a n c i a l  
Aft
reward. But was pay so important that its extension
over all tasks for all workers could have such positive
effects on performance?
The second point is that under the conventional
longwalls pay bargaining had been 'rampant':
".... . any request to do anything additional is
regarded as exploitation unless separately 
rewarded." 49
And v/hat was the nature of the situation prior to mechanisation,
with the hand got systems? Each marrow group negotiated its
own contract with the colliery management, and given the
known variability of coal seams, such negotiations would
have taken place at quite frequent intervals. And in view
of the fairly direct relationship Between physical effort
and output, the nature of the seam, and the price per unit
output would both have been issues of great concern to the 
50m a r r o w  group. I n  o t h e r  v/ords w e  c a n  s a y  t h e r e  w a s  a 
t r a d i t i o n  of b a r g a i n i n g  i n  w h i c h  p a y  figured as a major 
e l e m e n t ,  b o t h  i n  t h e  h a n d - g o t  a n d  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n a l  l o n g w a l l  
s y s t e m s ,  a n d  it w o u l d  be  s u r p r i s i n g  if  t he  e f f e c t s  o f  s u c h  
a t r a d i t i o n  c o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  ' o v e r c o m e '  s o  r a p i d l y  w i t h  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  c o m p o s i t e  g r o u p s .
The s t u d y  b y  d i c e  u n d e r p l a y e d  t he  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  p a y
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to a n  e v e n  g r e a t e r  e x t e n t  t h a n  t h a t  o f  T r i s t .  A l t h o u g h  t he
m e m b e r s  of  t h e  r e o r g a n i s e d  w e a v i n g  g r o u p s  r e c e i v e d  i n c r e a s e s
i n  b a s i c  pay (pe* m o n t h )  r a n g i n g  f r o m  n i l  ( f o r  n e w  entrants)
up to 4-4;o, Rice wrote:
"It was concluded t h a t  t he  first spontaneous acceptance 
of the new system and the subsequent determination 
to make it work were due primarily to the workers’ 
intuitive acceptance of it as one which would provide 
them with the security and protection of small group 
membership which they had lost by leaving their 
villages and their families to enter industry." 51
More decision-making over labour allocation for instance,
was assigned to work groups, each worker was to perform a
greater variety of tasks, and he would belong to a group
which was itself responsible for a whole, and’meaningful'
task. The behaviour of the weaving groups showed variations
however that were quite independent of these features, but
which did correlate with changes in pay levels and supervisory
controls. Before reorganisation only one-third of the
workers were on piece wages (8 weavers and 2 jobbers per
group of 30 workers) whilst the remaining ten occupational
52
groups were paid time wages. At 85/S loom efficiency a
certain sum was paid to the weavers and jobbers, and
variations around this figure resulted in proportionate
gains and losses in pay. After reorganisation, all workers
w e r e  t r a n s f e r r e d  to a n  i n c e n t i v e  p a y m e n t  s y s t e m ,  a n d  on
a c h i e v e m e n t  of  t h e  8 5 %  n o r m ,  a l l  w o u l d  r e c e i v e  a " s m a l l  
5 3
r i s e  i n  p a y . "  ' T h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e s e  i n c e n t i v e s  o n  
p e r f o r m a n c e  w e r e  p r e d i c t a b l e  w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  to c h a n g e d  
w o r k  m e t h o d s  and w o r k  o r g a n i s a t i o n :  a v e r a g e  l o o m  e f f i c i e n c y
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rose from below 80% to almost 90% as workers sought to
• . 5 4i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  e a r n i n g s .
The reorganisation was followed up for six months, during
which time efficiency was mostly stable, at about 9 0 - 9 3 and
damage at 24/S. During November, eight months after the start
of the experiment, efficiency began to fall, reaching 77/S.
The workers protested that the quality of the yarn v/as poor
and thus giving rise to more stoppages, too many in fact for
them to cope with. They first requested extra help, and when
this was turned down, asked for compensation for loss of 
55earnings. According to Rice, the first request signified
a 'task-centred1 orientation on the part of the workers, but
we are asked to believe that when the request failed, the
workers then 'produced' a cash-centred orientation. V/as their
acceptance of the reorganisation not so thorough-going after
all? Or were their attitudes contradictory, a mixture of
'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' orientations? A far more
parsimonious interpretation is available: the workers' requests
for extra help, and extra cash, were not 'separate* requests
but two sides of the same coin, that coin being the wage- 
56effort bargain. Perceiving an upward drift in effort 
relative to pay, they first tried to realign the two through 
effort reduction, that is, by asking for higher manning. When 
this failed they approached the problem from the other end
a n d  a s k e d  f o r  m o r e  pay.
T h e r e  w a s  of c o u r s e  a s e c o n d  e x p e r i m e n t  i n v o l v i n g  
n o n - a u t o m a t i c  l o o m s ,  i n  w h i c h  t he  c h a n g e s  i n t r o d u c e d  w e r e  
r a t h e r  s i m i l a r .  T h e y  c o n s i s t e d  of t h e  c r e a t i o n  of a  group
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of workers (eleven instead of twenty-two) responsible for 
40 looms, in which the weavers' duties were now divided up 
amon; front, back and smash-tent workers. All workers 
(instead of just the weavers) went onto piece rates, and 
bonuses were paid on a composite output and quality index. 
Efficiency was raised from between 40 and 60v$ to 85/S, 70fo 
being the level beyond which bonus was paid, whilst damage 
fell from 20';$ to 5m. In explaining these results Rice 
entirely abandoned any notions of the importance of individual 
job content, for although,
" the weavers performed an integrated 'whole'
task - the conversion of yarn to cloth." 57
"The amount of time they spent outside the shed 
suggested that the workers derived no more than 
a very moderate satisfaction from the efficient 
performance of their tasks." 58
Therefore,
"The immediate practical result of the experiment
has been to demonstrate that ....  the breakdown
of the 'whole' task of weaving into component 
operations, each performed by,.a different 
worker, and the reintegration of the workers 
into an internally structured work-group that 
performs the whole task on a group of looms, 
can be accomplished in one process .... " 59
This is a very clear statement of the Durkheimian analysis
of division of labour, mentioned elsewhere.^ Many of the
results of this case, for example reduced costs, derive
quite directly from the 507$ reduction of manning levels,
and more significantly, from the furtherance of the division
of labour, and the introduction of output and quality
bonuses for all workers.
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The arguments advanced in connection with these early
case studies can also be applied to the innovations in Norway,
and in the USA. In the wire drawing mill, and the panel
assembly cases output v/as not increased until management
took advantage of fortuitous absenteeism to ’allow' the
groups to cope with their workloads at lower levels of
manning. Since both groups were paid under a group
incentive system the effect of the managerial oversight 
was to allow higher individual earnings for greater effort,
and the wage-effort levels consequently stabilised at the
new levels. In the Hunsf)s pulp and paper mill, the main
problem was that of product quality, and the reorganisation
of work both allowed workers to take more decisions affecting
quality, and also gave them an incentive in the form of a
bonus tied to quality improvements. The Norsk Hydro
fertiliser plant is difficult to discuss because although
improved productivity (by comparison with other plants) was
achieved by setting lower manning levels, the company tried
61
to attract a highly motivated and able workforce.
The most recent case, in the USA, illustrates once more
the saliency of earnings and effort, compared with job 
62content. In this study two autonomous work groups were 
established in the mine by voluntary participation and 
selection, and after two years operation (in the case of one 
group, fifteen months in the other), the autonomous groups 
showed higher levels o f  output per day, and lower absenteeism 
and accident rates. A  number o f  factors however complicate
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the conventional analyses. Firstly, as the authors admit, the 
workers on one of the autonomous groups were ’’very experienced
miners,” and thus capable of achieving higher rates of
^ 3output. But secondly, and more importantly, work in the 
autonomous groups was paid automatically at the top rates of 
pay (all the miners were paid time-wages), and of the 29 
reasons given by the 24 men who formed the first autonomous 
group, the most common, mentioned by 7 men, was pay. The 
attitudes of workers in the non autonomous groups appeared 
to show a similar concern with wages and effort: in September
1974 the union local (admittedly on a low turnout) voted to 
create a second autonomous group, i.e. to extend the 
experiment. In August 1975, the same local on a higher poll, 
voted to curtail it, as the renegotiated union-management 
contract had raised the proportion of workers on top rate 
to higher levels. It appears workers then preferred to stay 
on their old jobs at top pay, rather than move to the 
autonomous section for no financial gain.
The evidence in these cases is not unequivocal, since 
many other changes took place in addition to changes in pay 
levels and incentives. It is theoretically possible then 
that the payment changes did not cause the performance 
changes, but resulted from them, and that performance 
improvements stemmed from other factors, such as increased 
job challenge. This interpretation cannot, because of the 
n a t u r e  of the evidence, be r u l e d  out, but the interpretation 
b a s e d  o n  p a y m e n t  c h a n g e s  is m o r e  p l a u s i b l e ,  f o r  a number
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of reasons. Firstly, it accords v/ith our existing knowledge 
of the effects of introducing pay incentives. But secondly 
it is also consistent with the fact that the workers1 
themselves in these case studies, manifested a concern f o r  
wages and effort.
1 O r g a n i s e . t i o n a l  C h o i c e *  .....  o r  1 O n e  B e s t  W a y ?  '
T h e  d i s c o v e r y  o f  1 o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  c h o i c e '  a n d  t he  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
o f  v/ork o r g a n i s a t i o n  is o f t e n  t h o u g h t  o f  a s  o n e  o f  t h e  
' h a l l m a r k s '  of  s o c i o - t e c h n i c a l  t h e o r y .  T h e  r e p o r t  o f  
t h e  D u r h a m  m i n i n g  s t u d i e s  c a r r i e d  t h e  p h r a s e  a s  i t s  t i t l e ,  
a n d  t he  i d e a  is  i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s o c i o - t e c h n i c a l  
p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  b e s t  e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e  is a  f u n c t i o n ,  
n o t  o f  t e c h n i c a l ,  o r  s o c i a l  m a x i m i s a t i o n ,  b u t  o f  j o i n t  
s o c i a l  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  o p t i m i s a t i o n .  It w a s  r e n d e r e d  e x p l i c i t  
b y  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  ' open' ( r a t h e r  t h a n  ' c l o s e d ' )  s y s t e m s  
t h e o r y ,  a n d  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  v i e w  w a s  t h a t  s y s t e m s  
p o s s e s s e d  t h e  p r o p e r t y  of  'e q u i f i n a l i t y 1 - a  ' s t e a d y  s t a t e *  
m a y  be  r e a c h e d  f r o m  d i f f e r e n t  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t s  a n d  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  w a y s ,  h e n c e  t h e r e  e x i s t s  ' o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  c h o i c e , '^  
T h e  p r i n c i p l e  v/as a g a i n  r e a f f i r m e d  i n  t h e  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  
N o r w e g i a n  c a s e  s t u d i e s .
But a question mark can be placed against the meaning 
of the phrase 'organisational choice1 - choice with respect 
to what criterion? Does it mean that, theoretically, 
assuming no economic constraints, several forms of work
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organisation are possible for a given technology, and that
each could achieve the economic objectives of the enterprise?
Or does it perhaps mean that whilst several forms are
possiblet some are more effective than others? This ambiguity
65
has been expressed by Susman and also by Hunt:
".....since tasks vary, there can exist no one 
best way of organising . . . .  (and the coal 
mining study was a . . . .demonstration of 
different, but all successful, spontaneous, 
organisational task-shift rotation systems in 
British coal mines  u
"It does not follow from this, of course, that for 
a given set of tasks or a particular task 
environment, some organisational forms may not 
be better than others. It is by no means clear, 
for instance, from the example just cited that 
each of the three task-shift rotation systems ... 
was equally 'good1 from all stand points. It can 
only be claimed that each was 'successful'." 66
To describe both conventional and composite longwalls as
'successful' surely misses the whole point of Trist's book.
The studies which he conducted showed that under all
conditions observed composite longwalls performed better
than conventional longwalls on all measurement criteria.
Whilst Trist et al. hesitated to describe composite working
as the 'one best way' of organising longwall technology,
claiming merely that it was 'better adapted,' their
recommendation for composite, or autonomous groups, has
been gradually transformed into a universal prescription,
not least by Trist himself.
An explanation of this ambiguity in the sociotechnical 
work can however be offered. 1’he Durham coal mine and 
Indian textile studies were interpreted as supporting the 
principle of 'organisational choice' against the supposed,
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techno logic ally determined one best way of Taylor, wnich 
consisted of specialisation of labour, and one man: one
job allocations. And tne Norwegian work was thought to have 
confirmed the principle once again (or four times again).
But if we examine the studies we find, as we have noted 
above, that composite, or autonomous group working has 
consistently been found superior to one man : one job 
allocation, and it was suggested that the achievement of 
sociotechnical theory was to have shown the limiting conditions 
(product and/or process uncertainty) beyond which group 
working was superior to individualised work roles. We may 
now take this suggestion one step further: within the
limitations of current technology and scientific knowledge, 
the sociotechnical workers have discovered the best way 
(economically, that is) of organising work in certain kinds of 
technology. This is not to say they have found 'the best way' 
for all time: technological or scientific developments may
overturn their work, but that is true of any theory. But there 
is nothing in any of the sociotechnical studies to suggest that 
several work organisations are equally effective, both 
economically and psychologically, for a given technology. Their 
research findings all point in the direction of a hierarchy of 
effectiveness, with autonomous, or composite groups, as the 
most effective form of organisation for technologies which 
entail product or process uncertainty. The content of 
Taylor's theory - one man : one job - has been abandoned, but 
the form - one best way - has been retained.
- 141-
Suurii2ry an : con; liiuf ons : sociotechnical systems theory
(1) The studies of dice and Trist (and to some degree
the dorwe clan v/ork) were interpreted at a general 
level in terms of social system adaptation to 
technological change, a process which despite
the commitment to v/ork group autonomy, often 
involved a severe curtailment of worker autonomy - 
over job rotation in India, over cavilling in the 
Durham coal mines, and over manning levels in 
the Norwegian wire drawing mill - and a subsequent 
subordination of work autonomy to economic 
imperatives. The technical system was thus taken 
as given.
(2) It was suggested that the sociotechnical studies 
could be seen as attempts to transcend the 
limitations of one man: one job allocation
in order to maxirnise utilisation of machinery 
and of labour. The achievement of the research 
was to locate (implicitly) the limiting conditions 
(product or process uncertainty) beyond which one 
man : one job allocations became less effective 
than group working.
(3) The joint optimisation of sociotechnica1 systems 
was reinterpreted, in the light of the case studies, 
as a form of intensification of labour. The 
phenomenon proceeded in two phases: (a) group
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resoonsibility for a set of tasks theoretically 
av-':raged and equalised individual workloads as a 
precondition for, (b) a general raising of work­
loads. Both forms of labour intensification - 
higher workloads, and faster pace of working - 
were seen to have occurred in the sociotechnical 
case studies.
(4) It was argued that the significance of pay 
incentives, as a mechanism of labour intensification, 
had been greatly under-estimated in the socio­
technical writings, and that changes in output
and product quality could be accounted for more 
plausibly and parsimoniously by reference to 
changes in pay incentives (and in some cases, in 
supervision)•
(5) It v/as suggested that although, at a theoretical 
level, some sociotechnical workers have counterposed 
'organisational choice' to the 'machine theory of 
organisation' with its 'one best way,' others
have argued for autonomous work groups as if these 
comprised simply a new 'one best way.' In practice, 
it v/as argued that sociotechnical research had 
demonstrated the superior effectiveness of one 
particular for:: of work organisation - autonomous 
v/ork groups. Although the content of one aspect 
of Taylorism - one man : one job - has been
me best v/ay - remains.
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;jummary of conclusions: theories of Taylorism and 
.job redesign
The main comparative conclusions on these theories 
can be summarised fairly briefly. Job 'enrichment' and task 
design theories have both lost sight of the socio-historical 
and economic theory of output ’restriction1 advanced by 
Taylor, and reiterated by a number of industrial sociologists
(although Herzberg did acknowledge a subsidiary role for pay
. 67
rises). In its place they have put a theory focussing on 
division of labour and job content, areas which received 
inadequate attention from Taylor. Consequently the mechanism 
of job redesign is fundamentally quite simple, whereas Taylor 
advocated a variety of mechanisms, predominantly extrinsic 
in character, although he also acknowledged ’’intrinsic” 
factors in work motivation. On the other hand, socio­
technical systems theory perceived production shortfalls as 
consequences of organisational failures, which themselves had 
social, psychological, and economic consequences. It should
be acknowledged however that a number of .job redesign theorists
6fthave recently begun to reflect on the significance of pay.
Taylorism also placed some emphasis on promotion 
opportunities, a point neglected by task design theory but 
not by job enrichment and sociotechnical theory.
Where Taylorism sought to reconcile employer and 
worker interests at economic and psychological levels, 
job redesign theories (with the exception of sociotechnical 
theory) have established a disjuncture between these levels, 
and concentrated on the latter.
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Whilst job redesign has reversed several divisions of 
labour, v/e saw that Taylorism v/as not necessarily incompatible 
with these processes since specialisation was not one of its 
integral components. Again, job redesign has often sought 
to enhance workers control over immediate aspects of production, 
but since control should not be seen as a zero-sum concept, 
this process could occur simultaneously with an increase in 
managerial control at higher levels. Finally, the 
individualism of Taylor has been continued by task design 
and job 'enrichment* theories, although abandoned by socio­
technical theory in the face of new, and different economic 
and technological conditions.
Several conclusions can also be drawn at a more general 
level: firstly, it cannot be maintained that job redesign
theories have a simple and single relationship to Taylorism, 
since there are striking differences between them; secondly, 
it cannot be argued that any job redesign theory has abandoned, 
or overthrown, Taylorism, in any overall sense. Indeed all 
of them have preserved elements of Taylor's theories. Herzberg's 
job 'enrichment' has retained both the individualism, and the 
stress on promotion opportunities; task design theory has 
sought to reduce work role inter-dependencies; and socio­
technical systems theory has retained, at a formal level, the 
notion of there being one best way of organising v/ork, as well 
as an emphasis on the role of payment systems and levels.
This is not to deny that elements of Taylorism have 
been abandoned. All theories of job redesign have failed
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to indicate the rational basis underlying output restriction; 
some have paid insufficient attention to the role of pay 
in motivation; and some have not looked at jobs, and 
promotion prospects, over a period of time.
Fourthly, it should be acknowledged that in their stress 
on job, or intrinsic, motivation, and on reversal of division 
of labour, all three theories of redesign have gone much 
further than Taylor, although they are not advocating themes 
that were totally absent from Taylorism. Socio-technical 
systems theory should be singled out here since it has tried 
to incorporate features of technology and organisation into 
a broad theory of job redesign and organisation of work roles.
It cannot be 3aid, finally, that only the more 
inadequate (theoretically or practically) features of 
Taylorism have been allowed to lapse into oblivion, and the 
more valid insights retained in job redesign theory. For 
Taylor*s important insistence on the role of pay in industrial 
motivation, and his attempt to adumbrate a rational basis for 
output restriction have both been echoed by a number of 
significant, contemporary writings in industrial sociology 
(see next chapter).
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T0.7AR.0o A 'iMRORY OR JOB RBD2SIG1T
Introduc tion
In Chapter 4, on seeiotechnical systems theory, it was 
argued that the major propositions of the theory were 
inadequate to account for the actual events and outcomes 
in the case studies from which they were supposedly derived. 
In terms of developing a general mqhrOi erf job redesign, two 
ideas presented in the chapter are of considerable signi­
ficance. The first is the concept of intensification of 
labour, and the second is the notion of the wage-effort 
bargain and the saliency of pay rises and pay incentives. 
Both of these themes will be expanded in the latter section 
of this chapter and combined with conclusions and insights 
taken from earlier chapters. This section v/ill attempt 
the construction of an alternative theory of job redesign, 
and will thus bear directly on the four issues to which 
this thesis is addressed, namely the origins of job redesign, 
work motivation, the attitude - performance relationship, 
and the consequences of job redesign. The literature review 
and case studies (Chaos.6,7 ,8,9, ) will thus be able to 
assess not only the adequacy of existing theories, but of 
the • Iternative to be developed in the present chapter.
The soure s tor inch an alternative are various: 
incongruities and problems in the exi -.ting literature and 
theories; insights taken from industrial sociology, and
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P-ivlo ri sm t and •: ovelopments in case studies in which
i h';vo been involved. All of these sources will be
nursued, and discussed, more extensively below. But the
search for an alternative theory of job redesign also has
a more profound origin. That origin is a basic scepticism
about the possibilities of ameliorating work conditions
and job attitudes in our society. Job redesign challenges
such a view and holds out the possibility of significant
changes and * improvements' in attitudes to work. Further
than this, it suggests that the goals or interests of
workers and employers can be reconciled to a significant
degree, and divisions of labour reduced. Such a view is
contrary to what has been described as the more 'stoic,
bleak, and pessimistic’ position of Baldamus, centred around
1
worker-employer conflict and the wage-effort bargain. The 
optimism exuded by job redesign theorists has not gone 
unchallenged, and many writers, some from within trade union 
movements, have sought to produce criticisms and critiques 
of its theory and practice. In principle such works ought 
to prove a rich source of ideas that could be used to develop 
an alternative theory, and it is for this reason that the 
first section will examine them in some detail.
Broadly speaking, two sorts of criticism have been made. 
The first set, which I have called 'radical' criticism, seeks 
to defend the view that job redesign is either not in the 
int-° rests of workers, or Is actually contrary to those 
interests. Tni ■ +:y:r. of criticism of particular relevance
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to the fourth issue raised in Chapter 1 as a central concern 
of this thesis* The second type of criticism I have called 
’theoretical,’ and consists in part of an attempt to 
reinterpret the findings of job redesign practice in ways 
that are at variance with majo^ aspects of .job redesign 
theory. This type of criticism bears particularly on two 
further issues identified in Chapter 1, the mechanisms of 
motivation, and the attj.tude-perfonnance link. A second 
type of theoretical criticism can be found in some recent 
French industrial sociology where it has been argued that 
job redesign is in fact a contemporary form of Taylorism, 
rather than its negation. This argument, of course, bears 
directly on the first proposition identified in Chapter 1. 
The distinction between radical and theoretical criticism 
is not intended to suggest that the former has nothing to 
say on theory, v/hilst the latter is inspired by political 
conservatism. There is, almost inevitably, some overlap, 
but not so much as to render the distinction either meaning­
less or invalid.
Radical criticism of job redesign
The notation ’radical* refers to critics writing from 
a trade union or other pro-worker standpoint. This section 
will cover articles from a number of different sources: 
academic journals, such as Sociological Review and 
International Labour hovlew; trade union and labour 
magazines, such as the A m ■' v*l c an Fed e ra t i oni s t (journal
S.
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of the APL - CIO) and i/ionthly Labour Review; a.nd radical
journals, such as New Left Rev lev/ and Review of Radical
Political Economics. In addition a number of well-known
books have been referred to, for example those by Bravertnan,
Pox and Gorz. It should be noted however that no complete
survey of trade union journals in the U.K., U.S.A., Prance,
or elsewhere has been undertaken, since it was not the
object of this section to summarise trade union opinion.
Rather I have tended to rely on a number of well-known
2
statements of national union federation positions.
This section will nevertheless indicate the range and 
content of radical criticism. The selection is representa­
tive of the most well-known of such criticisms of job 
redesign, but in the absence of any systematic survey of 
trade union opinion, it cannot be seen as necessarily 
representative of trade union attitudes as such.
There also exists criticism of job redesign in the 
literature of management, and in fact the major articles 
to be discussed under the heading of theoretical criticism 
originally appeared in management periodicals. These 
articles however were not concerned to examine job redesign 
in terms of whether it benefits management, but sought 
rather to challenge the theory of redesign. 7/hilst there 
may be material asserting that management gains little 
from job redesign, I have not encountered any such 
literature.
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Broadly speaking radical criticisms of job redesign 
may be divided into four categories: the first claims
that job redesign is limited in scope, trivial in application, 
or both; the second argues that whilst job redesign may 
appear to be concerned with job satisfaction and so on, in 
reality it is a means for raising profits, reducing costs 
etc.; the third group of criticisms focuses on the supposed 
negative consequences of job redesign and the fourth argues 
that job redesign can best be seen as a new form of control 
over labour. These types of criticism are by no means 
exclusive, either in theory or practice, but they are analyti­
cally separate, and will be treated as such.
Limited nature and scope
A number of writers have described many of the changes 
introduced under the rubric of job redesign as ’trivial,' 
or minimal. Braverman,^ and Zimbalist,^ indeed refer to 
job redesign as a ’cosmetic* : a change designed to appear 
dramatic but which is in fact insignificant according to 
some criteria. A similar point is made by Nichols and 
Beynon, writing in the field of industrial sociology, who 
quote one worker in their study as saying that job redesign 
simply involved ’’moving from one boring, monotonous job 
to another boring, monotonous job." And Dickson, in a 
critical study of technology and its social context referred 
to job redesign as the concession of "insignificant decisions." ^
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\ i; o: fcri v3e criticisms presuppose some notion of significant, 
or meanin. :ful change , ana presuppose, furthermore that this 
notion is an appropriate standard by which to judge the 
results of job redesign. The notion in question, for all 
these writers, is the abolition of the mental-manual 
division of labour, and against this criterion job redesign 
probably would seem trivial in the sense intended. But 
even "trivial” changes (assuming them for the moment to be 
such) may have very real, and not so "trivial" consequences 
as we shall see later, and insofar as this type of criticism 
discourages any further analysis of the phenomenon of 
redesign, it is destructive and contributes little to our 
und e rs t and ing.
A more elaborated version of the triviality argument,
7 8 9advanced by writers such as Banks, Braverman, Cooley,
10 11 12 13
Barbash, Elliott, Hales, Hughes & Gregory, is that
it ignores or minimises the question of power and authority.
Were such issues to be considered, the argument runs, job
redesign would soon be exposed as a means for securing or
augmenting the power and authority of managers against those
of the workers. Equally, it would be seen that the changes
in control and autonomy arising out of job redesign were
relatively minor in comparison with the enduring distribution
of power. It is in fact true that most theories of job
redesign have paid little attention to this problem,
although a numoer of case studies, such as that of Trist 
1 a
et al. 1 indicate very clearly tne way in which worker
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control could, be subordinated to managerial interest.
V/hilst the Question of changing forms of control is
important for understanding certain forms of job redesign
(such as individual assembly) and certain outcomes (improved
quality of product, for instance) this is by no means
generally true. In any case, although such critics have
pointed to an omission in the job redesign literature they
have not clearly spelled out the way in which theories of
job redesign might be altered by its consideration, or
the manner in which power and authority relations operate
under job redesign.^
Another approach to the critique of job redesign is
to minimise its significance, not, as above, by pointing
out its * cosmetic character,1 but by elucidating the
limited circumstances under which it could, in fact, be
applied. Presumably then, if the technique can only be
applied very rarely, we can absolve ourselves of the
necessity to pay it any serious attention. Levitan &
16Johnston are the foremost exponents of this mode of 
criticism, pointing out, for instance, that manufacturing 
industry, source of many job redesign innovations, is in 
decline, that there are economic constraints on the reversal 
of the division of labour and that certain technologies 
and products may not be conducive to the application of 
job redesign. Some of th se points are, in fact, incorrect: 
job redesign has been widely applied in offices, as we shall 
see, and given the relative absence of technology, its
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application there is considerably easier than in industry.
Tievertheless Levitan Tc Johnson fail to specify (not 
surprisingly) the sort of technology in which job redesign 
could not be applied, an omission due to the fact that no 
such tecnology has been shown to exist.^
economic limits to job enrichment have been raised
18 19by many writers, such as Gomberg, Friedmann, and
20
Braverman. That reversal of division of labour is subject
21to diminishing returns beyond some point is indisputable,
but when we consider, for instance, that one survey reported
55^ of jobs in 1200 U.S. manufacturing companies to have
cycle times of five minutes or less, it seems difficult to
22
describe this as a serious limit on job redesign.
It has also been suggested that few workers are
interested in job redesign, or that job redesign only
23v/orks where the employees have ’positive attitudes.’
The latter point, of course, begs the question of whether 
the introduction and discussion of job redesign may not, 
in itself change attitudes - a comment which applies with 
equal force to the first point (above) and which has 
been pursued in more detail above (Chap. 3). There is a 
complement to the triviality argument, proposed by
o  a q  r
Zimbalist, and more explicitly, by Bosquet, ■ which errs 
in the opposite direction. According to these writers 
job redesign contains an inherent dynamic towards increased 
autonomy and participation, and is thus potentially 
subversive of ihc objectives it was designed originally to 
achieve.
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This view arisen out of a misunderstanding of the 
notion of 'autonomy,' and of its false equation with an 
embryonic form of workers' control. Workers are granted 
autonomy only in the sense that they are allowed to make 
certain decisions about their immediate work* At the same 
time this autonomy is limited insofar as the decision - 
making criteria are imposed by management, and reflect 
their own interests, and not necessarily those of the 
workers involved. There is also, in these writers, a 
tendency to conflate redesign and participation: job
redesign may involve decision-making on specific issues 
according to specified criteria, but participation can be 
seen as a more open-ended process in which ideas are proposed 
and discussed, and where the 'structure' is much looser 
and less constraining than job redesign.^0 Finally, Bosquet's 
positive evaluation of job redesign stems from an overly 
negative description of the factory, pre-redesign, as a 
'prison,' or a 'barracks,' containing 'despotic power.'
Appearance and reality
Despite the rhetoric about job satisfaction, quality 
of work life, work humanisation etc., job redesign is'in 
reality,' a managerial strategy to raise profits and reduce 
costs. This is the conclusion advanced by writers such as
Rasmus,^  Hales,2^ Banks,^  Hughes & Gregory,^ Rosenhead,^'
32Blackler & Brown, or alternatively, job redesign is
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mot ivated, not by an abstract desire to provide satisfaction 
for employees, but to reduce turnover, and hence training 
costs, for the company. The rhetoric of job redesign 
is therefore a ’con,* a mystification, or an ideology which 
obscures its true purpose. This argument is in fact linked 
to the view that job redesign per se is trivial in its 
consequences for workers, for if the talk of job satisfaction 
and so on in simply, or largely, rhetoric, then it follows 
that job satisfaction is not substantially increased, and 
job content not dramatically altered.
This thesis sounds, and is written as quite radical: 
it attempts to counterpose the true purpose of job redesign 
to its stated objective, that is, to demystify the latter.^
The first problem with it however is that it is almost 
impossible to discover any statement in the literature to 
the effect that job redesign is chiefly or exclusively 
about job satisfaction. From Herzberg onwards, job redesign 
theorists have openly proclaimed that their techniques would 
simultaneously benefit both workers and employers, and the 
theme is to be found in the writings of the sociotechnical 
and task design schools, as well as in numerous case studies.^ 
There is, in fact, nothing here to ’demystify* - it is all 
out in the open. Because the radicals' argument is so far 
off beam here, the .result is that they do not in fact 
confront the central problem: does job redesign benefit
both workers and employers, and j.f so, how? 7/here this 
problem is recognised, as by Rasmus for instance,^ it is
-1 60-
usually solved by an appeal to the triviality argument-
showing that workers get little out of job redesign - and
by a presentation of ‘the facts' about productivity increases
etc. - proving that employers derive enormous benefits.
In this v/ay the unequal, or asymmetrical division of
37benefits is preserved.
But a more serious deficiency of this approach is
that it sets up a false problem - a disjuncture between
intention and action - and provides a worthless solution.
This disjuncture, does not in fact exist, hence the false
nature of the problem. More sophisticated advocates of
this approach claim that the subjects of interest to employers
and employees are not only different, but exclusive. Employers
are concerned with costs, productivity etc., whilst workers
38are concerned about such values as growth etc.
It is almost certainly true that employers will, in 
practice, tend to subordinate ’humanistic' values to hard, 
economic criteria (at least where they conflict), and it is 
equally true that until recently many cases of job redesign 
employed rather crude criteria of employee attitudes and 
interests, such as job satisfaction measures. But whilst 
these points are valid, there is a danger in drawing too 
sha.rp a distinction between worker and employer interests. 
Consider for example, the issue of productivity which seems 
at face value a clear instance of a 'managerial' criterion.
It can be argued here that workers also have an interest 
in raising productivity since this will permit the negotiation
-161-
of higher earnings, and thus result in increased living 
standards. There may he more scope for disagreement over 
methods by which productivity is to be raised, whether 
through increased labour intensity, more efficient work 
methods, or the use of machinery, and over the distribution 
of the benefits. But to label productivity per se as a 
managerial criterion seems unwarranted, (see also Chap. 2 
above for more on this point).
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The negative consequences of .job redesign
The list of such consequences is very extensive indeed, 
and includes such items as : reduced promotion opportunities, 
reduced supervisory and maintenance staff, increased work­
loads, the creation of a dual labour market, redundancies, 
job insecurity, deskillation, increased exploitation, 
inequitable pay rises, prevention or inhibition of trade
unionism, division of the v/orkforce, and destruction of
39the seniority principle. Rather than comment in detail 
on all of these points, I shall try to distinguish those
consequences which are necessary features of job redesign
from those v/hich are contingent on particular conditions
or circumstances. Elliott, Zimbalist, and Rasmus have all
argued that opposition to unionisation is a significant
factor in job redesign schemes, a conclusion based on a
false identification of job redesign with the virulent anti-
40
unionism of Herzberg and Myers. In fact, as we shall see
below, the majority of such schemes have occurred in
unionised plants, and anti-unionism is not therefore a
41necessary feature of them. A similar argument applies
to pay rises: in the majority of cases they have been
given, and there is in fact an increasing trend in this 
4 2
direction.
Destruction of the seniority principle of promotion, 
discussed by Daniel, Rasmus and Tchobanian,  ^is again 
not an inevitable consequence of job redesign: some theories of
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mot ivation do, nevertheless contain a threat of this sort,
insofar as they argue that pay and promotion should be tied
closely to performance. Younger, and faster,workers inav
therefore receive promotion in preference to older workers,
44
hence the fears about a dual labour market. Equally, it
has been argued by Banks, Hughes & Gregory, Nichols & Beynon,
45Rasmus, and Tchobanian that job redesign may result in
increased workloads, and hence higher effort levels, a
point that will be taken up below in some detail.
A number of general observations can be made about these
points since at this stage we are not yet in a position to
evaluate them in detail. Firstly, some of the observations
are undoubtedly correct: the analysis (in Chapter 4) of
sociotechnical systems theory suggested that increased
workloads (or intensification of labour) was a necessary
aspect of sociotechnical practice. Secondly, the critics
who have raised this, and other points have unfortunately
not linked their points, with sufficient precision to an
overall theory of job redesign. It is thus difficult to
know which of these negative consequences, if any, are
inherent in job redesign, and which of them contingent on
situational characteristics. Thirdly, there has been a
tendency in this literature to talk about job redesign in
general, and to pay little attention to the different forms
4 6
which the phenomenon might take. Negative consequences
that are necessary features of one form may only be contingent 
aspects of another.
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Control over labour
Finally, several writers have argued that job redesign 
should be seen as being predominantly a strategy for
enhancing, or restoring, control over labour, a view taken
4 7 48 49 50by Gorz, Friedmann, Rasmus and '//edderburn. Traditional
strategies of control, such as direct supervision are said
to be failing, a fact evidenced by the increased militancy
and struggles of labour, and thus new, and more sophisticated
strategies are required. Gorz indeed suggests that the
success of job redesign in showing the possibility of "workers'
control of technology and work organisation," proves the
redundancy of supervisors, foremen etc., except for purposes
51of authoritarian control.
In fact, job redesign has rarely been implemented in a 
strife-torn plant (as Gorz later conceded), and many of the 
cases, as v/e shall see, have involved women, traditionally 
a less militant section of the labour force. More seriously 
however this type of critique appears to elevate control 
over labour to an end in itself when it is surely more 
accurate to say that labour control is but a pre-requisite, 
albeit an essential one, for attaining economic objectives, 
such as profitability, efficiency etc.
* * * * ■ ■ *
Radical criticism of job redesign has offered a number 
of potentially useful insights and observations into the
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phenomenon despite having also made frequent unwarranted 
assertions, and having failed to distinguish its different 
forms. The claim that job redesign theorists have neglected 
its implications for power and authority, is a useful one 
insofar as it alerts us to the possibility that there may 
be more involved than a simple increase in worker ’’autonomy.” 
Nevertheless, underlying all the deficiencies of the radical 
criticism is a failure to explicate a coherent and adequate 
theory of job redesign. Without such a theory, or at least 
a model, it is impossible to tell, for instance, whether 
higher workloads are a necessary or a contingent feature of 
redesign.
Some attempts have in fact been made recently to 
challenge job redesign at a more explicit theoretical level, 
and it is to this criticism that we now turn.
Theoretical criticism of job redesign.
Broadly speaking four types of criticism have been made: 
the first asserts that surveys of job attitudes show there 
is no widespread interest in, or desire for, job redesign; 
the second, which is really an extension of the first, claims 
that there are satisfactions to be had from repetitive work, 
contrary to the views of job redesign theorists; the third 
criticises the motivation theory which lies at the core of 
job redesign, and proffers alternative explanations for the 
various economic outcomes; whilst the fourth has reconceptual­
ised job redesign as a form of Taylorism.
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The first two sets of criticism have already been
dealt with, under the heading of 'Individual Differences’
(see Chapter 3), and I will only repeat the main points
here, before commenting on some recent work * The argument
that workers are satisfied with their present jobs tells
us nothing about their likely response to redesigned jobs,
and specifically, we cannot infer that they do not want, or
would not respond favourably to such jobs, for a number of
reasons. Firstly, it appears that workers do ’adapt’ their
expectations to what is available on the market, or in a
plant, so that if the availability of redesigned jobs
increased, it is possible that expectations could rise 
5?
accordingly. Secondly, whilst it is true that there are
specific satisfactions to be had from repetitive work, as
51 54 5^Baldamus, Smith & Lem, and Turner & Miclette'' have
shown, this in no way excludes the possibility that workers
would not respond positively to jobs which, though not
repetitive, offered different sorts of satisfaction. Indeed
a proportion of workers in the Conant & Kilbridge study
expressed a liking both for paced, assembly line work
(because it was easy etc.), and for individual, bench work
56
(because of the autonomy and variety; . We cannot assume
then that workers hold a single, and coherent set of values
57
with regard to jobs,
The third type of criticism strikes at the heart of 
job enrichment, and therefore 'recan res more detailed
58 59 60
consideration. Parke 2c Tausky, Fein, and Locke have
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all suggested that whilst job redesign "works," in the sense 
that it does lead to higher productivity, product quality 
etc., this is not for the reasons given by the conventional 
theories, but for altogether more traditional reasons, such 
as pay incentives and supervisory control. As Parke & Tausky 
have put it:
"To presume that the average employee without 
prodding by rewards and penalties, will 
spontaneously and consistently exhibit work 
effort directed toward organisational goals 
is utopian." 6.1
and in a later article they wrote that,
" in job enrichment programs, work standards
and accountability are characteristically
designed into the situation .....  When such is
the case, to hold the job requires that the
scheduled, specified tasks be accomplished....
Given accountability, only one assumption need 
be introduced, namely, that the benefits of 
the current job are salient to the worker; no 
further assumptions about higher order needs 
are required." 62
These are the three elements of the Parke & Tausky interpre­
tation: specified workloads, pay,and supervisory controls.
To illustrate the operation of these principles they refer 
to a number of cases: quality improvements by clerks at
A.T.& T. were attributed to better accountability, rather 
than more 'autonomy* for the clerks. The improved performance 
of janitors at Texas Instruments was explained, not in terms 
of Herzbergian motivators, but of the large pay increase 
and the tighter control exercised by management. Quality 
improvements at Motorola, Maytag, Corning Glass, and Donnelly 
Mirrors were attributed, not to employee responsibility, but
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to better accountability. And finally improved performance 
at Gaines Pet Poods was explained, not by the autonomy 
inherent in the new work groups, but by the group pressure 
exerted on group members to reduce absenteeism.
A similar series of arguments were advanced a number 
of years earlier, by Pein, and reiterated approvingly by
63
Gomberg. Whilst pointing to the efficacy of pay 
incentives, as at Texas Instruments, Pein also pointed out 
that employees at Gaines Pet Poods, for instance, were 
highly selected. 625 applications were received for jobs 
in the new plant, and only 63 were accepted, whilst at 
Texas Instruments, the wording of the advertisements, and 
the rates of pay, were such, according to Pein, as to attract 
more highly motivated and skilled employees. This argument 
clearly limits the general applicability of job redesign 
findings, but there is no reason to suppose the majority 
of cases are of this type, since few have been conducted in 
green-field sites,
Parke and Tausky’s work was written as a theoretical 
critique of job redesign: they sought to attack 'need.1
theory, and to substitute expectancy theory which postulates 
that people have preferences (rather than needs), that they 
have expectancies of various behaviours, and of their 
consequences, and that behaviour is a function of preferences 
and expecta.ncies. Since then, most people want money, and 
perceive that working hard and well brings money, then to 
that extent they will tend to work hard. Shorn of the
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language of expectancy theory, this view could be seen as a 
contemporary restatement of Taylor's theory of motivation 
with a processual supplement in which pay, the reward for 
work, was an important element, in addition to managerial 
controls.
Fein, on the other hand, was more explicit about the 
content rather than the process, of motivation: job content
was only one of a number of elements determining 'the will to 
work,1 others being pay, job security, and the absence of 
restrictive rules and regulations. At a more general level, 
workers are satisfied to the extent that they can exercise 
choice - over what job to take, and over its content and 
conditions once taken. In a later article, the importance of 
pay was given a meaning aside from that of its purchasing 
powrer:
"V/hen management establishes a job enrichment 
program to involve its employees in job 
improvements, it violates a basic principle 
of job evaluation. Employees are encouraged 
to work at higher skill levels than those 
for which the job was evaluated." 64
The arguments about pay, control and work standards 
are essential for understanding several forms of job 
redesign, as we shall show in the next chapters. But they 
are only three components of a theory of job redesign, for 
a substantial minority of cases have not involved pay rises, 
whilst a greater number have, seemingly, not instituted
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ne.v forms of control. This should not however detract from 
the Parke 5c Tausky work, for it is an important beginning 
in the construction of a theory of job redesign, a task 
which forms the principal object of the next section of 
this chapter.^ Prior to that however we must consider the 
final theoretical criticism of job redesign, namely that it 
constitutes a contemporary form of Taylorism.
A number of French writers have addressed themselves 
to this problem of the relationship between Taylorism and 
job redesign, specifically to try and understand why 
contemporary capitalists have been able to reverse so 
dramatically such integral features of production as 
division of labour, hierarchical control, managerial 
authority etc. Since these are the only major contemporary 
analyses of the relationship between these two ’schools’ of 
management, it is important to examine them in some detail.
Palloix has argued that contemporary job redesign 
initiatives cannot be seen as a genuine rejection of 
Taylorist and ’Fordist’ methods of organisation.^ Taylorism 
he takes to consist of the principles of: separation of
execution and conception, specialisation of labour and 
time study; whilst Ford adapted these principles, adding 
two of his own: the introduction of the flowline principle,
and the use of a day wage (instead of piece rates). Job 
redesign does not call the division of manual and mental 
labour into question, "because it builds into the function­
ing of the small work groups the fact that they are a
-171-
subordinate part of the collective workers." As for ’semi- 
autonomous work groups,* the work of Bernoux & Duffier is 
used to show that, despite their introduction, the 
experience of exploitation remains unchanged, and even in 
the Volvo/Saab experiments the continued existence of 
contralised, managerial control, signifies the persistence,
rrj
not the abandonment, of Fordism. What Palloix is saying 
then is that whatever the significance of changes in job 
content, capital remains in control, and workers are 
subordinate to its objectives. This is a pity because in 
the earlier part of his article Palloix has formally outlined 
the Marxist theory of surplus value, of necessary and surplus 
labour time, and has explicated the concepts of relative 
and absolute surplus value. He then proceeded to examine 
various methods of raising productivity, such as increasing 
v/orkloads (intensification of labour), and one would thus 
have expected a much more profound and thorough analysis 
of job redesign than has actually been given. Indeed, there 
seems to be a complete disjuncture between the early, 
theoretical part of his article, and the later, more concrete 
section. His observation on the Kalmar project is one that 
I would accept, but the discussion of Taylorism is flawed 
by an inadequate conceptualisation, despite reference to the 
more sophisticated work of Itontmollin. There is in fact, 
as v/e have established, far more to Taylorism than special­
isation of labour and time study, a point of which montrnollin 
b8
is aware, (s •. Chap. 2).
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analysis, attempted to prove that job redesign was 
a no7/ form of Taylorism, by drawing out the general principles 
of both innovations, and comparing them. Taylorism he 
characterised in terms of: division of labour between
execution and conception, rationality, order and harmony, 
individualism, and productivity. To his credit he recognised 
that horizontal division of labour was not an integral
feature of Taylorism - ”  pour Taylor la parcellisation
des taches, le travail en miettes , n fest pas essential 
a 1* O.S.T." Although a common 'symbol* of Taylorism,
"... c'est un symbole inexact quant a son ideologie." The 
search for and belief in, the ’one best way' was seen to 
be the highest expression of Taylor's rationalism. If we 
turn to job redesign, what do we find? There is a similar 
concern for productivity, and for order and harmony.
"Les nouvelles formes d 'organisation du travail, 
de meme que les anciennes, ne peuvent s'accomoder 
1'existence de contradictions, de luttes et de conflits... 
II peut y avoir raalentendu, non opposition." *
Collective bargaining, or rather negotiation, was accepted,
in contrast to Taylor, but " ....  elle conserve un objectif
d 'explication, non de compromis," - "it serves as a vehicle 
for (managerial) communication and not for bargaining." As 
regards division of labour, job redesign (anti-Taylorism) 
rejects horizontal division of labour, which is not in any 
or--, ; fund - mental to Taylorism, but accepts the execution/
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coneoption distinction, which is. Rationality too 
characterises the contemporary movement, which can be seen as 
a socio-psychological supplement to Taylorist ergonomics, 
and finally, productivity is a goal common to both.
There are a number of inaccuracies in Montmollin's 
account, although none of them serious. He writes, for 
instance, that in Taylor's view of conflict,
"Tout conflit, toute contradiction procedent 
de I 1ignorance qui ne sait pas raisonner 
clairement, ou de l'aveugleraent coupable de 
ceux quiegarent leurs passions." **
In fact Taylor adhered to a rational-economic theory of 
conflict, based on separate interests, as we saw above. 
However, let us consider the substance of Montmollin's 
argument. At the level of abstraction at which he is 
dealing,
"The new forms of work organisation, as with the old, 
cannot accomodate the existence of contradictions, 
struggle and conflict There is only misunder­
standing, not opposition."
(My translation).
"All conflict, all contradiction is the result of 
ignorance, of not thinking clearly, or of the 
inexcusable blindness of those swayed by emotion."
(My translation).
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fiink ‘•'.’■lost - y;-V- ; -r • L st-.uto -y, or
tcco \y, la cmy ;* ; ; • - .•■•••■ " ■:• Tya. ’ . All w  ; "•?a] al
- . ■.■;/ accept .? :  t h e  ' vr • ' ’ ' v i a . o :  o : ‘ : . .o u r ,  c o c k s
orb r and ., ■ i /'fy, and ' ' 5 tic. ’
In short then these foetuses r c ’ go abstract that they do
not distinguish Taylor*' sn $.no' job redesign, because they
cannot distinguish any t >cry >f n: lagament from any other.
Llontmollin*s conclusion, that,
”A.lf exception, importante, des recherches sur 
les groupes semi autonomies, 1' anti-taylorisme est 
un neo-taylorismo” (V/ith the important exception 
of research on semi autonomous groups, anti­
taylorism is in fact a neo-taylorism.”)
reflects far more on his method of analysis than on the content
of its subject matter. The exceptions to this judgement are
worthy of notice: both Taylorism and the theories of job
redesign are individualistic, and both accept, to a large
degree the continued separation of execution and conception,
in its major aspects. It is not true however that such
theories cannot account for conflict: they all proffer ideas
on this point, and although these may well be inadequate, it
is unfair on Taylor to place him alongside such views, given
the greater sophistication of his own.
A more empirical approach has been adopted by both
Chc.ve, ^  and Pignon and Querzola.^ Chave examined four
cases of job redesign and related developments in each to
his conception of Taylc ’ism. Phi ; t >ok bo e ;ist of
principles: con rol of labour, knowledge, time,
.1 r pv g e , and inc. i '■/'< hi a i.i *y t"’ or o d r-: r*- ;, '•''• '"'cur
C" no ; of .i ob redesign affected these di monsi or a very
hi ■-••■ntly leading Chuve bo crmb.iio that it was difficult
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to say w h e t h e r  j o b  redesign as a whole was, o r  was n o t ,
’n e o - T a y l o r i s t . 1 T h e  same criticism c a n  b e  m a d e  o f  t h i s  
w o r k  w h i c h  w a s  d i r e c t e d  at that of  M o n t m o l l i n ,  n a m e l y  
t h a t  it  c o n c e p t u a l i s e d  Taylorism at  s u c h  a n  a b s t r a c t  l e v e l  
t h a t  it  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to d i s t i n g u i s h  it f r o m  a n y  o t h e r  
g e n e r a l  p h i l o s o p h y ,  or  s y s t e m ,  of  m a n a g e m e n t .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
b y  f o c u s s i n g  m a i n l y  o n  the d i m e n s i o n  of  c o n t r o l ,  it  t e n d e d  
to  o m i t  s o m e  o f  T a y l o r ' s  m o r e  s p e c i f i c  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  s u c h  
a s  h i s  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t i m e  a n d  m o t i o n  s t u d y .
T h e  w o r k  o f  P i g n o n  a n d  Q u e r z o l a  c o n s i s t e d  o f  a  r e ­
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t w o  c a s e  s t u d i e s ,  t h o s e  o f  A . T .  &  T, a n d  
D o n n e l l y  M i r r o r s ,  T h e  p r i n c i p a l  p o i n t  o f  i n t e r e s t  i n  
t h i s  w o r k  w a s  t h e  a u t h o r s ’ s t r e s s  o n  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  
e x a m i n i n g  c h a n g i n g  f o r m s  of  c o n t r o l .  T h u s ,  i n  t h e  A . T .  &  T. 
c a s e  t h e y  n o t e d  ( s e e  a l s o  a b o v e )  t h a t  w h i l s t  d i r e c t  
s u p e r v i s o r y  c o n t r o l  w a s  e l i m i n a t e d  f o r  a  n u m b e r  o f  w o r k e r s ,  
t h i s  d i d  n o t  s i g n i f y  a n  a b s o l u t e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  c o n t r o l ,  
b e c a u s e  t h e  w o r k e r s  w e r e  a l l o w e d  to  c o n s u l t  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  
t h e i r  c l i e n t s ,  so  t h a t  c u s t o m e r  c o m p l a i n t s  c a m e  to f u n c t i o n  
a s  a n e w  c o n t r o l  m e c h a n i s m .
T h e  m o s t  r e c e n t  w o r k  o n  t h i s  s u b j e c t  c o m e s  f r o m  C o r i a t ,
71w h o  h a s  p r o d u c e d  a n  e x t r e m e l y  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  e s s a y .  T h e  
f o c u s  o f  t h e  e s s a y  w a s  the a s s e m b l y  l i n e  a n d  t h e  c h a n g e s  
t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  i n t r o d u c e d  into i t s  o r g a n i s a t i o n  b y  a n u m b e r  
o f  F r e n c h  m a n u f a c t u r e r s .  After t r a c i n g  t h e  o r i g i n s  o f  t h e  
a s s e m b l y  l i n e  to t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  H e n r y  F o r d ,  a n d  to t h e  
n e c e s s i t y  to i n c r e a s e  economic e f f i c i e n c y ,  a s  w e l l  a s  c o n t r o l
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o v e r  l a b o u r ,  C o r i a t  then posed r/nc q u e s t i o n  a s  to  w h y  
m a n u f a c t u r e r s  h a v e  been able, i n  r e c e n t  t i m e s ,  to s h o r t e n  
o r  e v e n  a b o l i s h  a s s e m b l y  l i n e s .  C l a s s i c a l l y ,  s u c h  m e a s u r e s  
w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  e x p e c t e d  to r e d u c e  e f f i c i e n c y  a n d  i n c r e a s e  
l a b o u r  c o s t s ,  b u t  t h e y  a p p e a r  to h a v e  h a d  the o p p o s i t e  
r e s u l t s .  C o r i a t fs a n s w e r  w a s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  one t h a t  w i l l  
b e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  t h e s i s :  t h e  a s s e m b l y  l i n e  i s  a n
e f f i c i e n t  f o r m  o f  w o r k  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  g i v e n  a d e q u a t e  m a t e r i a l s  
s u p p l y ,  c o n t i n u o u s  w o r k  f l o w ,  a n d  n e a r  e q u a l  w o r k  s t a t i o n  
t i m e s .  W h e r e  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  c a n n o t  b e  m e t  s u f f i c i e n t l y ,  
w a i t i n g  t i m e  a n d  b a l a n c e - d e l a y  t i m e  r e s u l t s .  R e d u c i n g  o r  
a b o l i s h i n g  t h e  a s s e m b l y  l i n e  e l i m i n a t e s  o r  r e d u c e s  t h i s  
n o n - p r o d u c t i v e  t i m e  a n d  t h u s  r a i s e s  e f f i c i e n c y .  A n d  o n  t h e  
i s s u e  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  l a b o u r ,  C o r i a t  n o t e s  t h a t  e m p i r i c a l l y ,  
t h e  r e l a x a t i o n  of c o n t r o l  t h r o u g h  p a c e d ,  i n t e r - d e p e n d e n t  
w o r k  is  o f t e n  c o m p l e m e n t e d  b y  a n  i n c r e a s e  in  c e n t r a l i s e d  
c o n t r o l  a n d / o r  b y  the s e t t i n g  o f  w o r k  s t a n d a r d s .  T h i s  f o r m  
o f  j o b  r e d e s i g n  c a n  t h u s  b e  s e e n  a s  a  f o r m  of  T a y l o r i s m .
S i n c e  a s i m i l a r  a r g u m e n t  v/ill b e  d e v e l o p e d  l a t e r  i n  t h e  
t h e s i s  ( t h o u g h  b a s e d  o n  a m u c h  f u l l e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of 
T a y l o r i s m ) , I s h a l l  s i m p l y  n o t e  h e r e  o n e  o f  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  
o f  C o r i a t ' s  w o r k ,  w h i c h  i s  i t s  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o n  t h e  a s s e m b l y  
l i n e .  O t h e r  f o r m s  o f  w o r k ,  a n d  o f  j o b  r e d e s i g n  w e r e  n o t  
e x a m i n e d ,  a n d  t h i s  o m i s s i o n  is  s i g n i f i c a n t  b e c a u s e  i t  w i l l  
be  a r g u e d  l a t e r  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  j o b  r e d e s i g n ,  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  of  work organisation h a v e  d i f f e r i n g  r e l a t i o n ­
ships w i t h  Taylorism, a conclusion that m a y  be a v o i d e d  o r
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overlooked by focussing on only one type of work organisation 
such as the assembly line.
Overall then, French industrial sociologists have 
offered a number of very pertinent, and useful insights into 
the specific relationship between Taylorism and job redesign. 
These include the notion that both can be seen as concerned 
with mechanisms of control over labour, and that both are 
concerned with the efficient use of time in flowlines. 
Methodologically, the French work, despite several limitations 
and misconceptions, referred to above, has shown the potential 
value of using Taylorism as an analytic tool in the appraisal 
of job redesign.
Towards a theory of job redesign
This section will attempt to develop a general theory 
of job redesign, a task that will proceed in a number of 
stages. The subject matter of the theory will be as 
indicated in the four propositions outlined in the 
Introduction to the thesis, covering the origins, mechanisms, 
and consequences of job redesign. In the penultimate 
chapter a number of additional issues will be indicated to 
which any general theory ought also to address itself. The 
limitations of space, as well as of the data available, will 
not permit them to be examined in detail here. This section 
will begin with a brief discussion of some recent, and 
pertinent, work in industrial sociology. The four ensuing
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parts of this section will then take up the propositions
discussed in the Introduction.
At a very general level job redesign theories were said
to have posed a challenge to theories and perspectives which
heavily emphasised the role and the significance of financial
rewards in work motivation. Theoretically, Baldamus has
argued that industrial administration hinges on the control
of effort and wages, and that the wage-effort bargain lies
72
at the heart of employer-worker relations. In this
perspective, workers are seen as attempting to maximise their
rewards (wages) relative to their costs (effort). Employee
job performance is seen not as a reward but a cost, a view
at variance with much job redesign theory. This view has
73
been restated by Westergaard more recently, and has also
been supported empirically by the work of Goldthorpe et al.
which showed the pervasiveness of an 'instrumental orientation1
to work, although there are a number of problems with this 
74evidence.
Research into the consequences of payments systems,
75such as the classic studies by Roy, and the more recent 
76
work by Klein, again serves to reinforce the contention of
Baldamus that, at least under certain conditions, many
workers strive to increase their wage-effort ratio.
Correspondingly, the two major, recent reviews of the
efficacy of pay incentives for raising performance, concluded
that under certain conditions, they could indeed have this 
77effect. And it has recently been argued by Ackroyd that
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studies such as Gouldner’s 1'.Yildcat Strike,1 classically
taken to have shown the limitations of an economic model
of behaviour, can in fact be interpreted quite adequately
79and plausibly in economic terms. A similar argument was,
80 81 
of course, advanced by Carey,  ^ and by Sykes, with regard
to the 1 Hawthorne Studies.1
There is then a current of literature (reviewed here 
very selectively) which suggests that economically based 
models of industrial behaviour are of continuing relevance, 
and that studies critical of this type of model can them­
selves be interpreted within it. This general perspective 
will inform the theory of job redesign now to be elaborated.
In the Introduction to the thesis, four issues were isolated 
for examination, namely the relation between job redesign 
and scientific management, and the practical origins of 
redesign; intrinsic motivation - or the mechanism of redesign; 
the relation between job performance and job attitudes; 
and the consequences of redesign with regard to worker 
and employer interests. Let us now turn to the first 
issue.
Job redesign, scientific management and 
division of labour
In discussing the ’origins1 of job redesign in 
Chapter 1, I wrote in a theoretical and historical sense 
of its relationship with scientific management and this 
was summarised in Chapter 4. Yet there is a second sense
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in which one can use the notion of origins, and that is to
denote the specific problems or issues which gave rise to
the implementation of job redesign within a particular
plant or company. Such problems or issues may include absenteeism,
production scheduling, or industrial conflict, to give just
a few instances, and it is this second usage of origins on
which we shall now concentrate.
There is a conventional, potted history of job redesign 
v/hich runs roughly as follows: enhanced division of labour
initially brought many benefits, such as increased product­
ivity, but as jobs became smaller in scope, and as 
educational levels, and standards, and workers* aspirations 
rose, then a number of dysfunctional' consequences were 
increasingly manifest. Absenteeism, turnover, poor 
performance, and even disputes v/ere taken as the behavioural 
responses to impoverished jobs, and thought to be associated 
with low morale. The remedy for these problems followed 
clearly from the diagnosis: jobs had to be redesigned
to allow the enjoyment of variety and 'wholeness,' and 
the exercise of autonomy and responsibility.
This view does have an element of truth as shown
most strikingly in published reports from the Volvo
company in Sweden where it seems high labour turnover
and recruitment problems played a key role in decisions
82
to embark on work reorganisation.
Nevertheless, partial truth must not be taken for 
the whole truth, and problems of morale and personnel
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have by no means inspired all, or even a majority of job
redesign cases, a fact that emerges from the available
evidence on this question. In the Work Research Unit
Report of 111 cases of 'work restructuring’ (some of which
are nothing to do with v/ork restructuring, and which have
been excluded) absenteeism, turnover, morale and motivation
problems were given as reasons for change 46 times, in 39
8 3
cases (178 reasons for change were given altogether).
The Birchall & Wild report provided data on the motivations
04*
behind 31 cases, 35 reasons being given in all. Only 14
of them (40% of reasons, 26% of cases) referred to
absenteeism, turnover, low morale, or poor social relations.
The ’Work in America* report gave 48 reasons for 29 cases,
nineteen of which (40% of all reasons and 42% of cases)
referred to absenteeism, turnover or morale.^ Schoderbek,
in 1969 used a postal questionnaire, to elicit reasons for
innovation from firms that had used job 1 enlargement,' and
found that of the 86 reasons given, by 41 firms, only 30
(35%) referred to a desire to enrich jobs or ameliorate
8 6
personnel problems such as low morale. These, and other
findings have recently been summarised by Wild & Birchall,
who showed that the prevalence of personnel problems as a
factor in job redesign exercises was between 26% and 42% of
87
all reasons given. Much more common among the list of 
problems were productivity, product quality, and costs, 
between 13% and 56% of all reasons given, in different studies.
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There are, however, a number of problems with this type 
of data which must be raised before it can be properly 
evaluated. Firstly, the postal surveys of companies, e.g. 
by Schoderbek, have typically elicited rather low response 
rates, in the order of 4 0-55 f^ » and it is therefore difficult 
to know how representative the samples are. Secondly, and 
more seriously, even if the samples were representative, 
there may exist different motivations and reasons for change 
among different sections of management, and it thus becomes 
important to know which managerial specialist completed the 
survey in each case. Indeed one of the case studies in 
Chapter 9 will examine this question in some depth, and 
illustrate the existence of multiple motives in job redesign.
Of course these are not the only reasons underlying 
job redesign innovations: manufacturers of domestic
appliances have been adversely affected by competition, and 
have found the inflexibilities of the assembly line very 
costly when switching product runs. 1Individual’ assembly 
can avoid some of these problems by permitting the
88
production of a variety of products simultaneously. Again, 
other companies have been moved to action by the need to 
reduce costs, to which end, work has been pushed further 
down the hierarchy to cheaper labour, and the more expensive 
workers eliminated.
Discussions of the assembly Line, of specialisation, 
and their problems are by no means a recent phenomena,
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reflecting awareness of ’blue collar blues,’ ' but have a 
much more longer economic background going back to the 
1950s.
Progressive assembly lines are designed around a series
of work stations, and in order for the flow of production
to be continuous it is necessary that workloads at the
stations should be evenly balanced. This is not simply a
technical problem for inequalities in work rate also reflect
differences in ability, motivation, and training, but
nevertheless, from 1955 onwards, it was the technical aspects
of inefficiency which received the most attention. Salveson’s
paper, in 1955, is generally acknowledged as the first major
statement, and attempted solution of the ’assembly-line
balancing problem' and it will be recalled that it was also
at this time that the first experiments in job ’enlargement’
90
were conducted. Since 1955 a series of reports on this
problem have appeared, and it has been categorised into 
91
three areas: the first is the balancing, or balance-delay
problem which arises owing to the difficulty of equalising 
cycle times for all workers on a line so that unoccupied 
time is at a minimum. The problem of course is complicated 
by differences between employees (indicated above), and by 
fluctuations in rate of working. Secondly, there is non­
productive time, consumed in handling materials and products, 
in order to pass them down the line. And thirdly, there is 
waiting time due to interruptions in supplies, machine
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breakdown etc., a problem magnified in its effect by the 
work role interdependencies on which the assembly line is 
constructed. Although this debate has now ventured into 
complex mathematical solutions, early results and discussions 
did suggest that balance delay and non-productive time 
declined, relative to productive work time, as work cycle 
length increased. There was, in other words, an economic 
argument, internal to assembly line structure and functioning 
(i.e. leaving aside ‘personnel* considerations) for increased 
cycle times.
More generally, specialisation of labour in other 
spheres can and has been taken too far, a fact recognised not 
only by job redesign theorists, but by work study specialists 
as well. Currie, for instance, author of a standard text on 
the subject has written that, unoccupied time in the working 
day,
"Prom the point of view of management, however,.... 
is wholly undesirable, representing as it does an 
imbalance in the use of labour or labour/machine 
resources. Since production plans should normally 
be based on the best possible use of labour, every 
opportunity should therefore be taken to reduce U T 
to a minimum." 92
And there follow various recommendations as to how this may 
be achieved, including, for instance,
"Workers do other work during the machine controlled 
part of the cycle ..... such as cleaning." 93
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And this example has been put to use in several cases of
job redesign as we shall see. Equally, Barnes, author of
another standard text on time and motion study, acknowledged
that although,
n  there are many situations today in which
labour effectiveness can be increased and unit 
and total costs reduced by division of labour.” 94
nevertheless, a reversal of division of labour may be equally
effective under certain (unspecified) conditions.
The separation between academic disciplines, of work
study, industrial and production engineering etc., and
industrial social science has allowed these discussions of
economic problems of specialisation and job redesign to be
conducted in almost complete isolation from each other,
95
although there are a few exceptions. It is also worth 
pointing out, in this respect, that the first (and many of 
the subsequent) report(s) on work restructuring at Philips, 
by van Beek, began v/ith a detailed analysis of the kinds of 
problems afflicting the assembly-line, that was very similar 
to the discussion presented above. It did, not, then, begin 
with personnel problems, although absenteeism reduction was 
seen to be an outcome of assembly line reorganisation.
We find then that debates in the psychological sphere 
on ’blue collar blues,' and fragmentation of jobs, have 
their parallel in the ’economic sphere.' Reorganisation of 
assembly lines can also be seen to have emerged in response 
to problems of assembly-line balancing, and other inefficiencies, 
whilst reorganisation of other types of work may be seen as
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a n  a t t e m p t  to m i n i m i s e  u n o c c u p i e d  t i m e .  A n d  it w i l l  b e  
r e c a l l e d  t h a t  t h e  s o c i o t e c h n i c a l  s t u d i e s  r e v i e w e d  i n  C h a p t e r  
4 w e r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  e f f o r t s  to r e m o v e  o b s t a c l e s  to 
e f f i c i e n t  u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  l a b o u r  u n d e r  c e r t a i n  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
c o n d i t i o n s .
S u c h  c h a n g e s  i n  w o r k  o r g a n i s a t i o n  a p p e a r  to  b e  ’r a d i c a l 1
t o  j o b  r e d e s i g n  t h e o r i s t s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  a l m o s t  e x c l u s i v e
f o c u s  o n  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o u r  a s  the t u r n i n g  p o i n t  o f  t h e i r
a c t i v i t y ,  b u t  w h e n  o ne  p u t s  e n h a n c e d  d i v i s i o n  i n  i t s  p r o p e r
p e r s p e c t i v e ,  a n d  s e e s  it s i m p l y  a s  a  m e t h o d  ( a l b e i t  a  v e r y
p o w e r f u l  o n e )  f o r  r a i s i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  r e d u c i n g  c o s t s  e t c . ,
t h e n  a  d i f f e r e n t  p i c t u r e  e m e r g e s .  W e  s a w  e a r l i e r  t h a t
e n h a n c e d  d i v i s i o n  of  l a b o u r  w a s  n o t  a n  i n t e g r a l  f e a t u r e  o f
T a y l o r i s m ,  a n d  t h a t  w i t h i n  T a y l o r i s m  a s  a w h o l e  it w a s
s u b o r d i n a t e d  t o  o b j e c t i v e s  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e .
U n d e r  d i f f e r e n t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  r e v e r s a l  o f  d i v i s i o n  of  l a b o u r  
m i g h t  b e  e q u a l l y  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e i r  a c h i e v e m e n t .  P r o d u c t i v i t y
i n c r e a s e ,  c o s t  r e d u c t i o n ,  a n d  q u a l i t y  i m p r o v e m e n t  a r e
p r e c i s e l y  t h e  s o r t s  o f  o b j e c t i v e s  t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  s h o w n  b y
s u r v e y s  o f  c o m p a n i e s  to be s a l i e n t  i n  t h e  u s e  o f  j o b
r e d e s i g n .  A n d  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s ,  as  w e  h a v e  s e e n ,  h a v e  a l s o  b e e n
r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .
N o n e  o f  t h i s  is to s a y  tha t  j o b  r e d e s i g n  i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  
w h e n  v i e w e d  a g a i n s t  a  b a c k g r o u n d  of  c o n s t a n t  o b j e c t i v e s  ( b u t  
m o r e  w i l l  b e  said o n  t h i s  t h e m e  i n  l a t e r  s e c t i o n s ) ,  o r  t h a t  
t h e  d e o a t e s  on job attitudes a n d  m o r a l e ,  b l u e  c o l l a r  b l u e s  
etc., are merely epiphenomenal reflections o f  ’basic
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economic1 trends and issues. Such a view would, of itself, 
be too crude. But it would be equally unwarranted to argue 
that the psychological level of 'reality' had determined 
the economic, or again to say that the two levels of debate 
and activity were independent.
This latter view would seem to be discredited by 
virtue of their contiguity in time, and by their inter­
mingling in some of the job redesign literature. It has 
already been observed that economic problems of production 
appeared to predominate amongst reasons given for embarking 
on schemes of job redesign, although the evidence here 
should be treated with caution. One could also argue, 
more generally, that, at least in the manufacturing sector, 
economic concerns such as efficiency, profitability, costs, 
etc., are of prime concern for employers and that employee 
attitudes and morale must be placed in the context of 
adequate economic performance. It seems plausible to argue 
therefore that whilst there may have been reciprocal 
influence between the economic and psychological levels 
and concerns, the greater influence would have been exerted 
by the former on the latter rather than vice versa. The 
implications of this argument for the historical significance 
of job redesign will be treated in the penultimate chapter, 
but further implications will be drawn in the next section, 
on the mechanisms of job redesign.
Intrinsic motivation
In the analysis of the m a j o r  s o c i o t echnical case studies
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(Chap. 4), job redesign was characterised, at a general level, 
as a form of intensification of labour* In other words, 
workloads and/or work rates are increased. The term 
1 intensification1 does not indicate the mechanisms responsible 
for whatever benefits emerge except insofar as they arise 
from the more efficient use of labour, rather than the 
introduction of new machinery, the adoption of improved 
work methods, or the use of additional labour or man-hours.
Two mechanisms were indicated in the analysis of the socio- 
technical studies: one was the displacement of labour and
the consequent raising of workloads, whilst the other was 
the use of pay rises and incentives. Both mechanisms were 
prominent features of the theory and practice of scientific 
management (see Chap. 2), and their combined operation was 
shov/n to offer a more plausible and adequate account of the 
studies in Chapter 4* Insofar as labour displacement entails, 
ceteris paribus, higher effort levels for those employees 
remaining on a particular job(s), these two mechanisms, of 
displacement, and pay rises and incentives reflect the twin 
poles of the wage-effort nexus, referred to earlier.
As we shall see hov/ever these two mechanisms in them­
selves, will not provide a general account of job redesign 
outcomes such as productivity and quality improvements.
They will not account for quality improvements (unless 
quality bonuses are provided), and nor can they accomodate 
those cases in which no payment or manning changes have 
occurred. To cope with these issues, two further mechanisms
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are proposed, and a limitation is placed on the applicability 
of the theory. It should also be noted that, at this stage, 
we are concerned with explaining only economic outcomes, 
and not changes in attitudes, absenteeism, or turnover - 
these will be referred to in the next section.
The two further mechanisms are firstly, that of increased 
accountability for performance, i.e. an enhancement of one 
form of control over labour; and secondly, stemming from the 
discussion of assembly-line inefficiencies in the previous 
section, the mechanism of work methods improvements, i.e. 
reduced waiting time, unproductive time etc. Again, both 
of these mechanisms have their theoretical origins in 
scientific management. Increased accountability has been 
alluded to in a number of case studies, such as those
96
reported by Guest but has not been conceived of, except 
by Fein, and by Parke & Tausky, as playing a major role in 
the genesis of the observed economic outcomes. Yet, as we 
shall see, mechanisms of accountability have been established 
in many cases of job redesign.
The mechanism labelled work methods improvements derives 
from the discussion of assembly—line inefficiencies, and 
although referred to in one or two case studies, it has 
generally been neglected by theorists in this area. We shall 
see however that it is of considerable significance.
The limitation on the scope of this theory derives from 
earlier discussions of individual differences in job attitudes
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and orientations to work, which suggested that sections of 
the labour force may hold, in some contexts, an "intrinsic" 
orientation to work and may experience greater motivation 
and satisfaction after job redesign (Chap. 3). Equally, 
there are, as we shall see, cases where none of the four 
mechanisms postulated above can be shown to have been 
operative. How then are we to account for performance 
improvements here? The individual difference literature 
can provide one possible solution. This literature has 
sometimes been used to suggest that segments of the labour 
force, varying in size from 20% to 80%, would not be 
responsive to job redesign. But it was shown that this 
notion was inadequate as people use different evaluative
97frameworks at different times, or even for different jobs.
I would now like to suggest a further amendment to this 
literature. Different sectors of the labour force may all 
respond, more or less positively to job redesign, but for 
different reasons, as some writers have suggested. For workers 
in the majority of cases, it will be argued, the attractions 
of job redesign may lie in its implications for the wage- 
effort bargain. Other workers however may respond to job 
redesign in the manner posited by job redesign theory, i.e. 
they may raise their performance on an ‘improved’ job, and 
derive satisfaction from this performance, regardless 
of changes (or their absence) in extrinsic rewards and controls.
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But instead of simply seeing these interests as differing 
requirements of work, I would go further and suggest that 
they also indicate, and are associated with, different 
mechanisms of improved performance. A single-mechanism 
theory, based on intrinsic motivation, is inadequate here, 
but what is being argued is not that the 'classical1 
theories of job redesign are inadequate per se and need 
replacing, but rather that they are adequate only for a 
small minority of the working population. For the majority 
one requires a theory of the form that has been sketched 
out above.
This theory of different mechanisms for different 
sectors of the workforce is not, of course, very parsimonious. 
But we saw, in Chapter 4, that in trying to account for 
certain attitudes and behaviours in the sociotechnical 
case studies, writers such as Rice had to resort to ad hoc 
additions to their theory of intrinsic motivation. The 
substitution, in that context, of a theory centred on the 
wage-effort bargain, and labour displacement, was dictated, 
in part, by the demands of parsimony. Yet paradoxically 
the general theory of job redesign offered here has emerged 
as less parsimonious than those currently in existence.
This general theory does however have a number of 
advantages over its rivals: firstly, it incorporates the
literature on individual psychological differences into a 
general theory of job redesign by relating these differences 
to the actual mechanisms of redesign itself. Such differences 
are no longer seen simply as moderators of the job content -
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job attitudes and behaviour link, as in task design theory. 
Secondly, this general theory also succeeds in tying a 
phenomenon largely studied by industrial psychologists 
to some of the, very different, findings and concepts of 
industrial sociologists reviewed above. This latter work, 
with its emphasis on extrinsic orientations, and the cash 
nexus, has seemed strange in comparison with the stress 
laid by job redesign theorists on the growth of demands for 
more challenging and interesting work, and the possibilities 
of raising performance v/ithout the 'carrot and stick.'
Thirdly, the emphasis on pay as a motivator and the 
acknowledgement of the role of intrinsic motivation 
constitutes a more adequate accomodation of these mechanisms 
than is to be found either in Herzberg or sociotechnical 
systems theory where pay incentives were acknowledged but 
not properly integrated into the respective theories.
And finally, the theory can, in principle ( as we shall 
see) account for both individual and group job redesign, in 
contrast with the classical theories which tended to focus 
on one or the other.
It might of course, be objected, that evidence on the
efficacy of financial incentives is far from unequivocal,
especially if one examines some of the more rigorous
98
psychological, laboratory studies. Even though many of
these studies have suggested pay rises and incentives can 
improve performance, where pay is conti ngcnt upon, performance, 
their theoretical significance must be questioned, for a
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number of reasons. Firstly, they have often employed 
university students, who have had, on average, fewer 
dependants and domestic commitments as compared with the 
working population, and whose attitudes to financial rewards 
may have been correspondingly different. Secondly, the ’tasks’ 
in these studies have typically been of short duration - 
measured in hours or days, rather than years - so there may 
have been little scope for the development of social attitudes 
and norms surrounding pay. But thirdly, and most seriously, 
such studies have invariably (though not always) failed to 
simulate the employment relationship itself, in which a 
worker sells his capacities for work in return for a wage, 
with all that can imply in terms of attitudes to performance 
and rewards. For these reasons, such studies cannot be 
assumed to have generalisable implications for ’real life’ 
situations, and they have not therefore been reviewed in 
detail.
However two major reviews which have combined both
laboratory and field studies have suggested that under
certain conditions increases in financial rewards, either
99directly or through incentives, can raise performance.
Equally, Lindholm studied the effects of changes in payment 
systems across a range of companies over a period of years, 
in S w e d e n . A l t h o u g h  his findings are subject to the 
usual qualification in this a.rea that one often doesn’t know 
about simultaneous changes in plant organisation, supervision, 
work methods etc. which might be equally significant in 
performance changes, they are nevertheless suggestive.
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The total sample of plants was 73, and of those which 
replaced piecework with flat-rates, i.e. abolished incentives, 
productivity fell on average by 15-25%. Those however which 
reduced the incentive component of earnings by moving from 
piecework to flat rates plus incentives experienced productivity 
increases of 5-10%. Those companies which introduced an 
incentive where none had previously existed, i.e. moved from flat 
rates to flat rates plus incentives, experienced productivity 
increases averaging 25-35%. In other words, the most 
dramatic effects were produced by the introduction or abolition 
of incentives, although there would appear to be a supple­
mentary negative effect on productivity associated with 
piecework.
These findings, as well as the conclusions of the Lawler 
and Marriott reviews reinforce those obtained from case 
studies which have documented both the incentive and dis­
incentive (output Restriction') effects of incentive or 
piecework pay s y s t e m s W h a t  all of this literature has 
not indicated so clearly are the contingencies affecting the 
operation of pay incentives, or the precise mechanisms 
involved in pay incentives. It is possible for instance 
that incentives act indirectly on performance via work 
methods, or improved supervision, as Marriott has suggested.
In this thesis we shall principally be concerned with the 
effects o^ p->y rises a .id j nco.it ives on productivity, rather 
than with the two latter points, on contingencies and 
mechanisms.
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But do the above arguments mean that the notions of 
job autonomy, responsibility, variety etc. are of no 
concern to workers and are simply not required in a theory 
of job redesign? No, it does not. What I have sought to 
offer so far is a general theory of economic improvements 
in cases of job redesign, i.e. changes in productivity, 
quality, costs etc. When we turn to examine job attitudes 
in the next section, I will suggest that changes in job 
content are of some importance.
Job attitudes and job performance
One of the central propositions of all theories of
job redesign is that improvement in job content in certain
specified ways will enhance both employee performance (via
motivation) and job satisfaction. Although it is not
alv/ays clear whether satisfaction derives from performance
or vice versa, it is clear that job performance and job
satisfaction (more broadly, job attitudes) are both expected
to improve. This being so, there arises the problem of how
to explain those cases where job performance has changed,
102
but attitudes, or satisfaction have not, and those where 
attitudes, or satisfaction have improved, but performance 
has stayed c o n s t a n t . J o b  redesign theorists have tended 
to adopt a rathe.r ad hoc approach to this kind of problem. 
Locke et al . for in stance invok >eci; 1 reasons for such 
deviant findings: performance and attitudes improved
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initially, performance partly because of ’technical’ factors, 
such as better organisation of work, but when expected pay 
increases failed to materialise, disappointment set in.
Prank & Hackman, on the other hand, confronted with no improve­
ment in job satisfaction as a result of their changes, explain 
this by reference to unchanged job perceptions, but their 
report indicates that simple intensification of labour did 
take p l a c e , ( s t o c k  classification, checking and verification 
work was transferred to ’experimental1 employees) and that 
presumably, therefore, productivity did increase.
But, more generally, what sorts of explanation are 
possible for these attitude-behaviour discrepancies? First 
of all employees may have little opportunity to improve 
performance, perhaps because of technological constraints, 
despite improvements in attitude. This however does not 
apply to any of the cases referred to in the foot notes. 
Secondly, employees' attitude change may only be reflected 
in improved quality rather than output, as suggested by 
Lawler, since performing more work may not yield the psycholo­
gical rewards to be gained by performing better quality work. 
Lawler suggests this ’model' does accord with the facts, and 
a review of ten job 'enlargement' cases showed increases in 
product quality in all of them, but increases in productivity, 
in only four cases. In fact, had Lawler read his cases more 
carefully, he would have seen that productivity increased in 
3-11 of the cases, with one exception, ; hat being a study of 
supervisors, whose productivity is in any case difficult to
measure accurately.1 '^ Thirdly, it may be suggested that 
some improvements in job performance undoubtedly derive 
from the myriad of ‘technical’ improvements associated 
with some of these schemes, a suggestion made recently by 
Locke et all^Tausky & Parke1,°and Susman.108 The problem 
with this view is that unless the general efficacy of such 
'technical' improvements is clearly specified, then 
explanations of this sort will tend to remain at the level 
of post hoc accounts of awkward results. Fourthly, we must
consider the utility of expectancy theory, a view argued for
109 110by a variety of authors, such as Wilson, Guest & Fatchett,
111 112 
Lawler, and Tausky & Parke. According to this view,
employees have different preferences, different notions
about effort-performance, and performance-reward links, and
different abilities and perceptions of their roles. Some
may be uninterested in job redesign, but respond to increased
pay or control, and vice versa. How then can this theory
explain attitude-behaviour discrepancies? Improved attitudes
without changed behaviours and productivity rises, at one
level, present no problem: employees behave in a v/ay that
satisfies their needs, regardless of whatever their employers
may think. And improved performance without improved
attitudes follows from the idea that attitude change, e.g.
increased satisfaction, is dependent (though not necessarily
so) on rewarded performance.
This theory, it must be said, is quite persuasive, and 
plausible, but it does encounter, for our present purposes,
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two difficulties. First of all, as is known, it is a process, 
rather than a content theory of motivation. What this means 
in terms of explanation of job redesign outcomes is that 
any such explanations must be wholly circular. For instance, 
the absence of improved performance in the Christiania 
Spigerverk study could be ’explained1 by saying that workers 
did not value the rewards that would be thus obtained (although 
it's far more likely they were apprehensive about the costs 
entailed). And how do we know they didn't value such rewards? 
Because their behaviour remained unchanged. What is required 
therefore is an independent specification of valued rewards, 
of the content of motivation, an exercise which implicitly 
points up the limitations of expectancy theory. Secondly, 
expectancy theory would have difficulty accounting for a case 
of improved productivity through more efficient methods where 
there also occurred an increase in job satisfaction. For 
according to expectancy theory, satisfaction is contingent 
upon performance, which in turn is a function of effort, 
and yet here we have a type of case where there is no increase 
in effort, but there is nevertheless an improvement in 
attitudes. Any general theory of job redesign must be able 
to account for such cases.
The final possible explanation for attitude-performance
discrepancies lies in the realm of measurement. It has been
noted by a number of writers that the terms satisfaction and 
performance have been conceptualised and measured in very
different ways. Some studies have used objective performance
measures, whilst others have used ratings. Again there exist
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u i fferent concepts of satisfaction - should it be seen as
an absolute phenomenon, or as a function of the difference
113between expectations and perceived ’reality.'? If
expectations are considered important, then it is possible
th t the same absolute score on a simple satisfaction
11 4
scale such as the JDI or the V/OS, may indicate different
levels of satisfaction because of simultaneous changes in
perceived reality and expectations.
V/hilst it is undoubtedly true that existing measures
of satisfaction, of job attitudes more broadly, and of
performance, are likely to contain deficiencies, it is
worth pointing out that this type of argument has been in
circulation for a considerable period of time and that more
recent studies show no signs of higher correlations than
earlier studies using (presumably) less rigorous measuring 
11 5
instruments. It seems unlikely therefore that attitude-
perforraance discrepancies can be laid wholly at the door of 
measurement, and as Vroom suggests, what is required is 
fresh conceptualisation.
Before embarking on this task it is worth briefly 
indicating the kinds of attitude-performance relationships 
that have been found in the general literature of industrial 
psychology, outside of the specific job redesign area. The 
earliest review was that of Brayfield & Crockett, in 1955.
On the relationships prevailing for individuals, they 
repented that only two out of fifteen correlations reached 
statistical significance, and an equally bleak picture held
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for group analyses. In 1964 Vroora undertook a similar
review, and concluded that the median satisfaction-
periorraance relationship across 20 studies spanning the
period 1945-63 was r =» 0.14 (statistically non-significant).
The correlation rose slightly to r = 0.22 if studies v/hich
failed to use objective performance data were excluded,
117but even this result did not reach significance. Vroom's
conclusion has been widely reported, and accepted, and can
be found in standard textbooks of industrial psychology,
118 119 
such as Blum & Naylor, and Tiffin & McCormick.
It is nevertheless the case, that many studies have 
shown positive (albeit small) correlations between satisfaction 
and performance, and whilst one can legitimately reject the 
notion of a general relationship, there may be circumstances 
under which the phenomena do correlate, as studies of job 
redesign have shown (see the ensuing chapters).
The cases of attitude behaviour discrepancy need not, 
and should not, be treated as deviant departures from the 
norm of congruence. And so long as they are treated as 
deviant they will continue to generate a variety of ad hoc 
amendments to the basic theory of job content - motivation - 
performance - satisfaction. The real problem, I would 
suggest, is that the basic theory is inadequate, and on 
the basis of the so-called deviant cases a more plausible 
alternative can be proposed. The alternative is a dualistic 
mechanism theory, whose basic postulate is that job satis­
faction ant job performance are generated by different 
, 120
mechanisms. Job satisfaction may result from job redesign
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that is, from increased autonomy, variety, responsibility 
etc. But improved job performance is a function of one 
or more of the following mechanisms: pay rises, pay incentives,
managerial control, neogotiated higher workloads and/or 
performance standards, and more efficient methods and 
organisation of work, except that is for 'intrinsically 
motivated' workers. Normally, the two sets of mechanisms 
operate simultaneously, thus giving rise to the idea that 
there is a logical, or a necessary connection, between 
satisfaction, and performance. But in the 'deviant* cases 
what we see is not so much the operation of abnormal factors, 
but the normal operation of only one of the mechanisms 
described above, independently of the other. Their independent 
operation, usually concealed by simultaneity, is revealed 
in the deviant case.
This theory of twin mechanisms has at least three
advantages over its orthodox rivals; firstly, it can
explain more plausibly, the deviant cases of attitude -
behaviour discrepancy, by postulating separate mechanisms for
each; secondly, it accords with the vast literature on
correlational studies of job satisfaction and job performance
which have shown an exceedingly low correlation between the
two, even for employees performing "motivating jobs" (in
1 21terms of job content); “ and thirdly, it accords with the 
fact, shown by Conant & Ki1br'nge, Daniel, Goldthorpe, 
and others, that workers have contradictory attitudes towards 
work, being oriented both towards pay, security etc., on the 
one hand and expressing preferences for variety, autonomy
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etc. on the other. The orientation towards pay ensures
its continued efficacy as a means for raising productivity, 
whilst the simultaneous liking for variety etc. makes it 
likely there will be a favourable response to job changes 
along these dimensions.
It is worth pointing out that a similar notion of
twin mechanisms governing behaviour and attitudes has been
12 3advanced in the field of absenteeism by Nicholson.
The distinction between job performance and job 
attitudes parallels that between motivation and satisfaction, 
although the two are not synonymous. We saw earlier that 
one of the problems with Herzberg's theory, in particular, 
was its failure to distinguish these concepts analytically 
and empirically. What has been suggested above, and with 
reference to case studies, is that employees can be 
"motivated" to perform at higher levels but that this does 
not necessarily mean they will show higher levels of job 
satisfaction. Indeed behaviour and satisfaction levels 
can change quite independently. Job satisfaction has been 
shown to be related (albeit to Small degrees) with a wide 
range of features of the work situation, but the suggestion 
made above is that job performance is under the control 
of a much narrower range of features.
The principal difficulty with this idea of dua.'L- 
mechanisms is the lack of specification of their content.
The previous section has hyp thesised mechanisms governing 
job performance, but what are the factors governing job 
satisfaction and job attitudes? If we turn to the literature
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for suggestions or guidance, v/e find little of value. 
Empirical studies of job satisfaction have demonstrated a 
remarkably wide range of variables affecting it, and 
Vroom argued in his 1964 review that job satisfaction 
appeared to be correlated with high pay, good promotion 
opportunities, considerative and participative supervision,
opportunities for social interaction, task variety and task
. 124autonomy.
Herzberg has attempted,to distinguish motivating and 
hygiene factors in the v/ork situation, but there are 
problems with his specific theory, as we saw in Chapter 3. 
More recently, a number of v/riters have abandoned content 
theories of attitudes and performance, and sought to develop 
process models, e.g. expectancy theory (see above). Whilst 
this is an understandable and useful development, it doesn't 
help in the construction of a content-theory of attitude 
determinants. All that can be said therefore is that the 
range of factors determining attitudes is greater than the 
range determining performance; that the performance 
determinants are those cited in the previous section; and 
that determinants of attitudes may be located in a variety 
of organisational and individual features. Because of 
these dual mechanisms, we would therefore predict attitude- 
behaviour discrepancies. It still remains for us (or others) 
to specify the conditions under which attitudes and behaviours 
do or do not correlate.
-204-
To some degree these discussions of motivation and 
satisfaction have remained at a rather abstract level, but 
for the moment (and indeed for the next few chapters), 
these rather crude formulations will suffice for our 
analytical purposes. In Chapter 11, some of the conceptual 
problems hitherto avoided will be looked at in more depth.
The mutual interests of workers and employers
Another distinguishing feature of all theories of job 
redesign is the proposition that one and the same set of
changes in job content v/ill simultaneously benefit both
1 25
workers and employers. Workers will derive more satis­
faction from the performance of more varied, responsible, and 
autonomous jobs, whilst employers v/ill derive the benefits 
of increased output, and/or productivity, quality etc.
In this way job redesign caters for the mutual interests 
of workers and employers (see Chaps. 3-4). Methodologically, 
it has already been suggested that the validity of this 
proposition cannot be assessed until we have also considered
whether job redesign brings any costs for any of the parties 
126involved. The ansv/er given to this question, on the
basis of an analysis of the sociotechnical case studies, 
was that job redesign does entail costs for workers, under 
certain conditions. And at a geiieral level it follows from 
the chr.rac berisation of job redesign as intensj fication of
t iat the ■ is, first of all, an increase.' expenditure
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of e.:':'ort per unit time. Insofar as effort can be seen as a 
cost of employment, for the worker, to be set against wages, 
we can suggest that this is a cost inherent in job redesign. 
But effort and wages are related, conceptually, and it may 
be that increased effort receives increased pay with no 
net effect on the wage-effort level. We also saw, under 
certain conditions, particularly where output was technolo­
gically - determined to a high degree, that successful job 
redesign was associated with a loss of jobs (Chap. 4).
In other words, we can suggest that job redesign entails, 
generally speaking (and more will be said of the exceptions 
in later chapters) an increased expenditure of effort, and 
that this may be associated with loss of jobs. If this 
proves to be the case, then we must re-evaluate the claim 
of job redesign theories to be of mutual benefit to both 
employers and workers.
V-20 6-
Summary of the theory
The theory of job redesign advanced in this chapter
may be summarised in the following postulates:
1. It may be seen, at a general level, as a form of 
intensification of labour.
2. Job redesign, a process entailing reversal of division 
of labour, emerged at least in part as a response to 
inefficiencies in production processes.
3. Because of its general character and the mechanisms 
employed, job redesign cannot be said to have ‘abandoned’ 
scientific management.
4. The mechanisms of job redesign, for the majority 
(extrinsically-oriented) of the work force, were 
postulated as: pay rises and incentives; displacement
of labour and setting of new performance standards; 
enhanced accountability and control; use of work and 
methods study. For intrinsically oriented employees
it was argued that the propositions of current job 
redesign theories were adequate.
5. It was suggested that the above mechanisms principally 
affected employee job performance, but that job attitudes 
and satisfaction were a function of a wider range of 
variables, including the new job content. Hence,
performano•? and attitudes eou 1 d change independent 1 y .
This distinction between concepts parallels the distinction 
between motivation (to perform) and satisfaction.
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6. Job red--sign entails trie cost, for workers, of increased 
effort expenditure (which may be counterbalanced by 
hi.'her wages) and may also result in loss of jobs.
Hence it may be inaccurate to say it caters for the 
mutual interests of workers and employers.
The first postulate indicates the general character of 
the phenomenon of job redesign; the second and third 
postulates denote the origins of job redesign, empirically 
and theoretically; the fourth and fifth postulates identify 
the mechanisms of job redesign, and the relationship between 
job attitudes and performance; and the sixth postulate refers 
to the consequences of job redesign. These postulates 
therefore map directly onto the four central propositions 
of classical job redesign theory outlined in Chapter 1, 
covering its origins, mechanisms, and consequences. The 
•core' postulate is number (4) - on the mechanisms of job
redesign, because from this postulate follow three others.
If the mechanisms are as described, then under certain 
conditions, employees will suffer consequences such as job 
losses and increased effort expenditure (postulate (6) ).
For the same reason, it follows that job redesign cannot 
be said unequivocally to have abandoned Taylorism (postulate (3) ), 
and it follows that it may be seen as intensification of 
labour (postulate (1) ). The remaining postulates are, 
relatively speaking, more indeprment,
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14. Trist, E.L. et al., 1963. See also Chapter 4 on
’Responsible Autonomy.'
15. This criticism does not apply to the excellent, if 
slightly one sided article by Pignon, D. & Querzola, J. 
1976 who analyse the A.T. & f. case studies as new 
forms of control, rather than the abandonment of 
control.
"The employees are no longer confronted with 
the boss as the person they are responsible 
to but rather with their customers and with 
the market.
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17.
18.
19.
20. 
2 1.
22.
23.
This labour reorganisation can be formally 
analysed as a 1democratisation' that 
leaves the domination of capital over 
labour to be exercised through the 
mediation of the capitalist commodity 
market.” (p. 75).
This is an adequate explanation for product quality 
improvements, but (a) it seems more difficult to 
explain productivity increases with this model, and 
(b) many cases of job redesign involve no such 
’reinsertion of the job into the process of commodity 
exchange.’ cf. also Brighton Labour Process Group,
1977.
Levitan & Johnston, op. cit. S ee also Berg, I. 1976; 
and Pox, A. 1974, p. 119.
Anderson, J.W. 1970 has shown both that job redesign 
has been applied in services, heavy assembly, light 
assembly, and process industry, and has also documented 
some of the variations in form according to technology.
Gomberg, W. 1973.
Priedmann, G. 1961. Chaps* 6 & 7.
Braverman, 1974.
Lindholm, R. et al. 1975. See p. 52 ff.
Lehman, M. 1969; also Kilbridge, 1961; Wild, 1974.
cf. Levitan & Johnston, op. cit. c_f. also Gorz, A. 
1976B who writes that,
"... the formula has succeeded insofar as it 
has been limited to groups of workers v/ith 
a ’positive attitude* towards work. No 
combative, unsubmissive, politicised working 
class has ever been won over by the amelioration - 
however genuine - of work conditions and climate 
made possible by job recomposition .... ” (p.59).
Notice the false equation here between the absence of 
'positive attitudes' and the presence of 'militant' 
attitudes: no middle ground is allowed in Gorz's
black-and-white formulation. It might be more accurate 
to say that job redesign can succeed except where the 
workers are militant etc., and that positive o_r 
indifferent attitudes are sufficient for its efficacy.
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Arguments about the disinterest of workers in job 
enrichment, on the grounds that they express 'job 
satisfaction' on questionnaires, have appeared 
frequently in two of the U.S.A.'s leading labour 
journals, Monthly Labour Review and the American 
Federationist. cf. for instance, Brooks, T. 1972; 
Chapman, W. 1974; Quinn, R.P. & de Mandilovitch, M.S. 
1974; Wool, H. 1973; Kaplan, H.R. 1973. 3ome of 
these writings have drawn on Dubin, R. 1956, a study 
whose methodology has been properly criticised by 
Mann, M. 1973, PP. 26-8. Por the converse argument, 
see Shepard, J.M. 1969, who tries to argue for a 
causal relationship between these variables on the 
basis of correlations, and Sheppard, H.L. & Herrick, N.Q. 
1972.
24. Zimbalist, 1975.
25. Bosquet, M. 1972. This argument was attacked empirically 
by Nichols, (op. cit.), and it has also been made 
recently by Zimbalist, who, with more perceptiveness 
than Bosquet suggests that job redesign may be either 
"cosmetic” £r potentially subversive of managerial 
strategy. Unfortunately, Zimbalist offers no clue as
to which forms of job redesign, under what conditions, 
are likely to result in these respective outcomes. A 
similar over estimation of the significance of job 
redesign is to be found in Gorz, A. 1976A who suggests 
that job redesign shov/s "there is no technical need 
to turn workers into unskilled robots. Indeed the work 
process can be so organised that it is simultaneously a 
process of continuous apprenticeship." (p. 172).
26. See for instance Wall, T.D. & Lischeron, J. 1977, esp.
Chaps. 7 and 8.
27. Rasmus, J. 1974.
28. Hales, 1974A. Hales conceptualises this appearance-
reality contradiction in terms of a 'false praxis' - 
workers appear to exercise 'autonomy,' but this autonomy 
is in fact subordinate to an external, instrumental logic. 
This notion seems only to tell us that under capitalism, 
employers' strategies serve their own interests first, 
rather than those of their workers, an insight that can 
hardly be considered a revelation. What Hales fails to
do is to indicate the ways in which 'false praxis' 
may be turned to workers' advantage, as at Christiania 
Spigerverk, or the ways in which it differs from more 
conventional job redesign. See also Wood, S.J. Sc 
Kelly, J.H. 1978 for more on this point. In a slightly 
later article, 19743.
Hales has in fact suggested, (a) that the answer to his 
question is no, because (b) workers can turn such schemes 
to their advantage.
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29. Banks, T. op. cit. Banks article at least has the merit 
of placing this argument in an interesting perspective, 
in the form of a rhetorical question, viz. would 
managements be so keen on job redesign if job satisfaction 
rose whilst productivity fell?
30. Hughes & Gregory, 1973, cf. also Hughes & Gregory, D.
1978. The main thrust of these papers is, however, to 
argue against the Herzbergian separation of job content 
and context, and to reassert the saliency of the latter, 
given shift working, accident rates, seasonal unemploy­
ment, technological change etc. cf. also Hughes, J.
& Gregory, D. 1974. The content/context separation has 
been strongly attacked by Winpisinger, op. cit., who 
asserts that,
"If you want to enrich the job, enrich the 
paycheck."
His view is an extension of Hughes & Gregory which 
seriously minimises the significance of division of 
labour.
31. Rosenhead, J. et al. This is one of the clearest
expressions of the reality/ appearance contradiction 
argument, which contains, in fact, no analysis of 
job redesign per se, apart from the (incorrect) idea 
that "its a con." A similar problematic was adopted 
by V/achtel, H. 1974, who states the 'problem1 as 
being 'who gets rich from job enrichment,' answering 
that management secures productivity increases etc.
Having answered his 'question,' he then assumes that
it excludes the possibility of workers also benefitting.
32. Blackler & Brown, 1978.
33. The other explanation of this sort currently in vogue,
is that since employers would never grant concessions
to workers without reason, then (a) either they must 
be motivated economically, by problems of turnover, 
absenteeism etc., in which case 'enrichment' for
the workers is a secondary consideration, and thus 
relatively insignificant from the workers’ standpoint, 
or (b) on the same assumption, and accepting that job 
redesign is not 'trivial' but in some cases substantial, 
then this can only be because of working class 
pressure, or militancy. In fact the discovery of 
productivity increases etc. from job redesign tells us 
nothing about the possible benefits for the workforce, 
whilst, on the second theme the number of job redesign 
schemes initiated in response to worker discontent 
(narrowly defined) as conflict, etc. is negligible,
(see below). And even on a broader definition of 
'discontent' using turnover and absenteeism figures, 
several surveys have suggested these problems lie
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behind only a minority of innovations. cf. Butteriss, M.
& Murdoch, R.D. 1975, where only 44 of 178 reasons given 
for undertaking such projects relate to turnover, 
absenteeism, and morale, and only 15, to industrial 
relations problems. These figures represent less than 
30, out of 111 cases.
On argument (b), above, see Wachtel, op. cit., Rasmus, 
op. cit., and Friedman , A. 1977A.
34. Another variant of the argument is that whilst managers
stress the 'enrichment’ effects of their schemes, 
workers and trade unions respond primarily to the wage- 
effort features, cjf. Roberts, G. & Y/edderburn, D. 1974; 
Daniel, W.W. 1970, has suggested workers have instrumental 
and intrinsic orientations in different contexts, but his 
figures have been righdy criticised by Whelan, C.T. 1976.
The argument is nevertheless important and will be
deployed, in modified form, below.
35. See Chaps. 3 and 4 above.
36. Rasmus, op. cit.
37. A kind of 'indeterminacy' argument has been made by
a number of writers: Gorz, 1976c, Friedmann, A. 1977A,B
and Fleet, K. 1974 - which consists of the view that the 
outcomes of job redesign depend on who introduces them, 
and the extent to which the workers struggle over their 
introduction.
38. Blackler, F.H.M. & Brown, C.A. 1975, 1976, 1978.
M o r r o w ,  A. & Thayer, F.C. 1977, have taken this theme 
one step further by arguiqg that 'humanistic' and 
'materialistic' criteria are empirically incompatible.
39. Tchobanian, R. 1975; Delaraotte, Y. & Walker, K. 1973; 
Kinnersly, P. 1973, pp. 39-41; Elliott, D. 1977;
Rasmus, Banks, Roberts & Wedderburn, Elliott, Hales, 
op. cit; Hull, D. 1978A, B.
40. Elliott, Zimbalist, Rasmus, all op. cit., For Herzberg, F,
see 1959, p. 117; Myers, S. 1970, Chaps. 3,5.
41• cf. below, Chap. 6.
42. ibid.
43. All op. cit.
44. e.g. Piore, M.J. 1975.
45. All op. cit.
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4 6 . Democracy at '.York. 1977, Chap. 3 does try to do this.
47. Gorz, A. 1976A.
48. Friedmann, A. 1977 A,B.
49. Rasmus, op. cit.
50. Wedderburn, D. 1977.
51. Gorz, 1976 A, p. 172 et ff.
52. cf. Kornhauser, A. 1965.
53. Baldarnus, W. 1961
54. Smith, P.O. & Lem, C. 1955.
55. Turner, A.N. Sc Miclette, A.L. 1962.
56. Conant, E.H. Sc Kilbridge, M.D. 1965. See also above,
Chap. 3.
57. For further attitude surveys which seek to ’refute'
job redesign, see Imberman, A.A. 1973; Reif, V/. Sc 
Luthans, F. 1972; Scott, R.D. 1973.
58. Parke, E.L. Sc Tausky, C. 1975; Tausky, C. Sc Parke, E.L.
1976.
59. Fein, M. 1974; Fein, M. 1976.
60. Locke, E .A . S irota, D. Sc Wolfson, A.D. 1976.
61. Parke Sc Tausky, 1975, p. 13.
62. Tausky Sc Parke, 1976, p. 561 .
6 3 . Gomberg, op. cit.
6 4 . Fein, (1976) p. 485.
6 5 . It is worth pointing out that the ideas on pay
and control and their application to job redesign,
were in the process of formulation at the time of
reading the works of Parke, Tausky Sc Fein. I did
not, therefore, simply take their ideas and build 
my own work on them.
66. Palloix, C. 1976.
67. Bernoux, P. Sc Duffier, J. 1974.
68. i.iontmollin, M. de. 197A .
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69. Chave, D. 1976.
70. P i g n o n ,  D. &  Q u e r z o i a ,  J. 1976.
71. Coriat, B. 1977.
72. Baldamus (1961).
7 3. Westergaard, J. 1970.
74. Goldthorpe, J. et al. 1968.
75. Roy, D. 1952.
76. Klein, L. 1964.
77. Lawler 111, E.E. 1971; Marriott, R.M. 1968. See also 
Lindholra, R. 1972.
78. Gouldner, 1955.
79. Ackroyd, S. 1974.
80. Carey, A. 1967.
81. Sykes, A.J.M. 1965.
82. See for example, Lindholm, R. & Norstedt, J .P .  1975.
83. Butteriss, M. & Murdoch, R.D. 1975.
84. Birchall, D. & Wild, R. 1973.
85. Work in America. 1972.
86. Schoderbek, P . D .  1968; also Reif et al., 1974.
87. Wild, R. & Birchall, D. 1975.
8®* £*-• Novara, P. 1973. Also the case study reported
below, Chap. 9.
89. cf. Gooding, J. July, 1970.
90. Salveson, M. 1955.
91. cf. Kilbridge, 1,1. 1961 ; Kilbridge, I,I. & Webster, L. 1961. 
Wild, R. 1975; v a n  Seek, H.G. 1964; Wild, R. 1972.
92. Currie, R.M. 1972, pp. 209-10.
93. ibid., p. 211
94. Barnes, R.M. 19b'-'. p. '75.
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103.
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Tuggle, G. Feb. 1969; also Folker, 1973, Scheips, 1972. 
Guest, R.H. 1957.
Conant, E.H. & Kilbridge, M.D. 1965; Cotgrove et al.,
1971 .
For a recent example of this genre see Ter borg, J.R.
& Miller, I.E. 1978 and references therein, and for 
an older, and now outdated review see Opsahl, R.L.
& Dunnette, M.D. 1966.
See Lawler (1973) and Marriott, 1968.
Lindholm (1972).
See Klein (1964), Roy, 1952. Also Cunnison, S. 1966; 
Lupton, 1963.
e.g. Kuriloff, A.H. 1963; Locke et al., 1976 and some 
of the cases in Paul, W. & Robertson, K. 1969; Ford, R.N. 
1969, the customer complaints clerks study, experimental 
group II; Anon.
Experiments to improve the quality of working life in the 
Netherlands. 1975, Post Office case; Penzer, W. 1973, 
in which attitudes improved, and then deteriorated whilst 
output also improved, and then remained constant;
Case in WRU Report 2, op. cit. ’Paper, printing and 
publishing, No. 5.1
e.g. the Christiania Spigerverk study, 1st phase, in 
Emery, F.E. & Thorsrud, E. 1975; the Internal Revenue 
Service study, in Rush, H. 1971, where attitudes 
improved, but production fell, and quality improved; 
the study by Powell, R.M. & Schlacter, J.L. 1971 where 
an increase in autonomy for v/orkers yielded no economic 
benefits.
Frank, L. 3c Hackman, J.R. 1975.
Lawler, E.E. 1970, claims there was no productivity 
increases in studies by Biggane & Stewart, Conant & 
Kilbridge, Davis & Valfer, Guest, Marks, and Walker.
For evidence that there were such increases, see 
Biggane, J.F. 3c Stewart, P.A. 1963, pp. 17 (sec.2),
22, 25; Guest, R.H. 1957, p. 15, and for a report 
on Marks, ibid., "Thus, according to Dr. A.R.N. Marks,
who made the study, ....  there was improvement in
both quality and productivity." (p. 13); Valker, C.R. 
1950, in whc ch it is made clear that many workers were 
eliminated, and labour costs reduced. And Conant, E.H.
3c Kilbridge, M.D. 1965, where it is made clear that
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111 . 
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113.
114.
115.
11 6 .
117.
118. 
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1 20.
ur.:: t production time fell, and labour costs were 
cut, i.e. production measured over time, or money, 
increased•
There seemed to be no increase in productivity in 
Davis & Valfer, so in Lawler's 10 cases : 10 quality 
improvements, 9 productivity improvements - not an 
astounding difference! It should be noted that Lawler 
possibly conflates higher productivity and greater 
effort, and if he is referring to increased production 
through increased effort, the situation i_s a little 
different. The cases by Biggane & Stewart, and Conant
6 Kilbridge, obtained increased output by more efficient 
methods but even on this interpretation of Lawler's 
words, we still obtain 10 quality improvements and
7 increases in production via effort - once more, not 
a remarisble difference!
Locke et al., 1976.
Tausky & Parke, 1976.
Locke et al., op. cit., Tausky & Parke, ibid.
Susman, G. 1976, p. 35.
Wilson, N.B. 1973.
Guest, D. & Patchett, D. 1974, Chap. 3. also Guest, D. 
1976.
Lawler, S.ID. 111. 1971, Chap. 6.
Tausky & Parke, op. cit.
cf. Locke, E. 1969; Brayfield, A.H. & Crockett, Y/.H.
1956; Robinson, J.P. et al. 1969; Blum, M. & Naylor, J.C. 
1968, Chap. 12; Vroom, V.H. 1964, esp. Pt.3;
Warr, P.B. & Wall, T.D. 1975, Chap. 1.
See Cross, D. 1973.
cf. Schwab, D. & Cummings, L. 1970;
Slocum, J .W . 1970.
Brayfield & Crockett, op. cit.
Vroom, 1964.
Blum & Naylor, 1968.
Tiffin, E.J. > UcCormick, J. 1975.
A dual mechanism model has a "I so been suggested by 
Vroom, op. cit. and by Lawler, i.E. 1973. Vroom 
suggests that job satisfaction results from the 
provision of valued rewards, job performance from 
the existence, an-.! perception, of the nerformance- 
reward link.
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123.
124.
125.
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See Vroom, ibid., Chap. 6. And a recent study using 
two moderator variables still discovered satisfaction 
performance correlations of the order 0.3 or less.
See Jacobs, R. & Solomon, T. 1977.
Conant Sc Kilbridge, 1965; Daniel, 7/.W. 1970; 
Goldthorpe, J.H. et al. 1968, pp. 20-24, 25-29.
Nicholson, N. et al. 1976.
Vroom, 1964, Chap. 5.
See Chap. 12 (below), and Lawler, E.E. Sc Hackman, J.R. 
1971 .
Democracy at Work. 1977, p. 45 makes a similar point.
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P a r t  T h r e e
A P P L I C A T I O N S  O P  T H E  T H E O R Y
CASE.S IN TKB LITERATURE 
VERTICAL ROLE INTEGRATION
Introduction
The object of this chapter is to compare the theory 
described in the previous chapter, as well as the conventional 
theories of job redesign against the data that is available 
from case studies and experiments in the literature. The 
first section discusses some of the limitations of the 'typical' 
case study, whilst the second discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of previous reviews of the literature. The 
nature of the present review is then briefly described, and 
two problems, relating to outcome measures, and the criteria 
for distinguishing different categories of job redesign, 
are presented and considered, before the review proper.
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;u.re , •.:i • ■ . of e a;.-;;, of the 1 orthcv• ox *
study
The production of an ostensibly comprehensive review 
of case studies of job redesign is an endeavour that is 
confronted almost immediately with a number of serious 
difficulties. The literature itself cannot be taken at 
face value as a reliable guide to the actual nature, and 
extent, of job redesign exercises, for a number of reasons.
To begin with, there is evidence, in a number of case 
studies, that earlier job redesign exercises may have gone 
unrecognised as such because of the absence, or the 
inadequate diffusion, of a language and theory with which 
to describe them. Secondly, a certain amount of job redesign 
may result from the processes of mechanisation, and automation, 
both of which have been in progress, in the UK, for at least 
150 years. Thirdly, certain cases may not be reported at 
all, except in internal company publications, for a variety 
of reasons: to avoid undesirable publicity, to prevent
knowledge of failures, or to inhibit the ’goldfish-bowl* 
effect.
There is also a certain ambiguity over the contemporary 
use of the term job redesign, as has been indicated above 
(Chapter 3) so that, for example, it is sometimes confused 
with what we might call participation in management. Although 
t is may well alter a worker’s job content, it typically does 
so only for a small minority of workers, and then, only at 
occasional intervals, not on an ongoing basis. There are
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. . -,.;n ; -0 - believing that thirteen of the 111 exercises
re 'orted in the V/ork Research Unit Report No. 2 are cases 
of this type, rather than of job redesign defined as 
despecialisation of labour.1
The problem, generally speaking, of the possibly 
unrepresentative nature of the literature could only be 
solved satisfactorily through a review of almost all the 
literature of industrial psychology and sociology, in 
conjunction with a survey of the job design activities of 
a large sample of companies. The altogether less satisfactory 
alternative, to be adopted in this report, is to assume 
because there is data available on over 170 cases of job 
redesign, that such cases are reasonably representative of 
the universe of the phenomenon. In other words, it will be 
assumed that all known forms of job redesign are represented 
in the literature. It will not, however, be assumed that 
the literary distribution of these forms conforms to the 
actual distribution except for the U.S.A. and the U.K., 
where data is available on a large number of cases. As 
regards rfalse* cases of job redesign, arising from 
confusions with other phenomena, this need present no serious 
problems, in view of the definition of the distinguishing 
feature of the phenomenon given above: that of despocial-
isation of labour.
A review of this sort Is also confronted however with 
* specific problem, one which relates to -..'hat we may 
e-;. Li the theoretical structure of the typical case study.
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The reviews by the Work Research Unit, and by the authors
of Work in America,  ^ contain abstracts of over one hundred
and thirty case studies in which information is presented
under a series of headings. The location of the innovation,
the year of its inception, and the number of employees
affected, are the first three items. Next, v/e are told the
’p.roblem(s)' which gave rise to the case, and the technique
used to solve them. Typical problems include absenteeism,
low productivity, and high costs, and equally typical
solutions, job enlargement, group working etc. Then follow
the results: human results, which include attitude changes,
and changes in behaviour such as absence, quitting, grievances;
and economic results, which usually cover such items as
improvements in productivity, product quality, and costs of
production. The review by Birchall & Wild covers all of the
above categories, but also describes the initial job, before
its change, changes made in the payment level or system,
and the kind of preparation, e.g. brainstorming, consultation,
4
entered into before change implementation. Of course v/e are 
talking here about abstracts of case studies, and the cases 
themselves may well (and do in fact) contain more information 
than is to be found in the abstracts. But what the abstracts 
represent is a selection of the information deemed most 
relevant for an understanding of the innovation and its outcomes.
Given that this information has been selected, we 
must ask v/hat criteria have informed the process, and 
whether such criteria do in fact generate data adequate for 
an understanding of the processes of interest. In this
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context, two features of the case abstracts are of striking 
significance for an understanding of the underlying 
theoretical criteria, or assumptions. Under the heading 
'technique used' is invariably to be found a description 
of changes in job content, such as increased variety, 
responsibility, autonomy etc. Very rarely indeed is any 
other 'technique' mentioned. This omission is both 
predictable and at the same time, curious: predictable
because it signifies the assumption underlying the abstracts 
(as well as many of the more detailed case studies), that 
since changed job content changes, in turn, worker motivation, 
and hence performance, that this information alone is adequate 
for an understanding of the 'economic and human results;' 
but curious, insofar as writers on job redesign frequently 
complain that it is difficult to draw inferences about causal 
connections because changes in job content are typically 
accompanied by a host of other changes in the work place.^
In fairness it should be stressed that some writers, e.g. 
Bir'chall & Wild, are aware of the importance of other issues, 
such as payment, which figures as one of their case study 
categories. Having said that it should, in turn, be noticed, 
that they provide information under the heading of payment 
in only ten out of ninety cases.
The second feature we should notice about the abstracts 
(and about many of the case studies) is their division of 
results into the economic and the human, and the assumption 
often made about this division, that it corresponds more or 
less, to the interests of employers and employees respectively.
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* human' results typically refer to improved attitudes, fewer 
grievances, better industrial relations etc,, whilst 'economic* 
results refer to absenteeism, turnover, production costs and 
so on. In both cases, an abstraction has been made from a 
process, or a phenomenon, which, in reality, has both human and 
economic aspects that are inextricably linked. Consider for 
instance, the oft reported result that employees may accept 
more responsibilities without at the same time requesting a 
pay rise. In this type of case, the employer's unit labour 
costs will be lowered, and the employees may be more satisfied. 
But the economic interests of the employees have been adversely 
affected here insofar as the employer has effected a shift 
in the wage-effort balance in his own favour.
The economic/human divorce could however, have a second 
justification, although it is not the one provided by job 
redesign theorists. It was suggested that the 'economic' 
and 'psychological' outcomes of job redesign could be traced 
to different mechanisms: higher productivity and product
quality were postulated as the results of changes in 
payment levels and systems, supervisory, and other, control 
mechanisms, changed work methods, or of negotiated higher 
workloads. Changes in attitude and job satisfaction on the 
other hand, were postulated as being in part, the results of 
changed job content, in the direction of increased variety, 
au t onomy etc.
The conclusion from this introductory section may then, 
b- stated as foil r.vs: tue difficulties involved in drav/inv
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valid conclusions from the case studies of job redesign, 
reported in the literature, are compounded by the fact that 
both case abstracts, and to a lesser degree, the studies, 
present information in accordance with certain theoretical 
presuppositions. This means that the data which would be 
required to test alternative hypotheses, of the sort advanced 
here, is often omitted. Fortunately, data of the sort 
required to test our hypotheses has been provided in some 
cases (approximately half), but the reporting of outcomes is, 
generally speaking, so inadequate that it will only be possible 
to test these hypotheses for changes in labour productivity. 
Other criteria, notably product quality, absenteeism rates, 
and turnover of labour, are reported so infrequently, that 
discussions of these outcomes can at most be tentative.
Previous reviews of the job redesign literature
The previous section of this chapter dealt v/ith some
of the problems inherent in case studies and case abstracts
of job redesign. The case study approach, used quite
frequently in job redesign, also has other problems, and
it is to these that we now turn. There have been comparatively
few reviews of the job redesign literature, and the first of
6
them, published exactly ten years ago by Hulin & Blood, was 
discussed in Chapter 3. Their principal conclusion was that 
job enlargement could not be assumed as universally efficacious 
because of individual differences in employee attitudes,
although some studies did appear to provide support for job 
enlargement.
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The next major review was by Pierce Sc Dunham, in 
1976 in which the authors sought to advance the utility 
of ’’task design” as an overall concept, embracing several 
different types of activity. Unfortunately, the authors 
reviewed only a very small number of post - 1968, 
experimental and case studies, including those by Ford,
Maher Sc Overbagh, Weed, Hackman et al., and Maher. Many 
of the remaining studies were concerned with individual 
differences and other moderator variables. From this 
review the authors concluded (among other things) that 
”Affectional and motivational responses appear to be more 
strongly related to task design than are behavioural 
responses.” (p. 87). A number of studies however, e.g.
Locke et al., Umstot et al., have suggested the very 
opposite, as have more recent reviews (see below). These 
diametrically opposed views may well be due in part to 
these (inevitable) omissions from the Pierce & Dunham 
review, but they also stem from a failure to examine certain 
findings e.g. Ford, with a sufficient degree of rigour.
One problem with both of these reviews was their 
failure to examine in depth the external validity of their 
case studies, i.e. the extent to which the relationships 
found, between job content and performance say, may be 
contingent on features of the organisation or its context, 
such as supervision, payment systems, technology etc.
Because many case studies do not supply material of this
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kind, this sort of question is difficult to answer, but
attempts have been made recently by Cummings et al.,^ and
9
by Srivastva et al. Another, and even more important 
question, concerns the internal validity of the cases, i.e. 
were the observed changes in attitudes and behaviours 
actually due to the changes in job content, or did they have 
other causes? Again, Cummings et al., in a number of reviews, 
have attempted a systematic evaluation of methodological 
shortcomings in job redesign studies.
The conclusions from these reviews can be stated 
basically as follows: the internal validity of attitudinal
findings was deemed to be significantly weaker than 
performance findings, insofar as the former were more 
amenable to interpretation in terms of mortality (loss of 
subjects from the groups over time), selection-interaction 
(differential attitude change being a response to some 
factor other than changed job content), and other factors. 
Secondly, and despite this difference, both the performance 
and the attitudinal outcomes were subject to a number of 
validity threats, such that neither could be accepted 
without caution, however plausible they might be. The 
possibility remains, in other words, that both sets of 
findings may be artefactual or due to factors other than 
job content and that even if valid, the findings may be 
it on other factors such i - worker participation 
in joo redesign.
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The work of Cummings et al. is significantly superior 
to that of Hulin & Blood, and of Pierce Dunham, not least 
because it adopts a far less negative approach to the 
existing literature than do the former authors. It also 
has the advantage of being far more systematic. Nevertheless 
it does have problems: firstly, although valuable as a guide
to problems inherent in the literature it seems to adopt 
the approach that the job redesign theses are true until 
proved false. The effect of this position is that plausible 
alternative explanations (of the type advanced here) are 
neither articulated, considered, nor seriously assessed. 
Indeed, the book by Curnraings and Molloy contains sections 
on sociotechnical theory, and job 'enrichment* which are 
almost wholly uncritical.
Secondly, no attempt was made to examine the outcomes 
of job redesign beyond the level of 'increased/decreased 
no change,1 i.e. no quantitative findings were presented and 
discussed. Thirdly, the reviews of studies are far from 
exhaustive, and cover, in all, only 44 cases. Some of 
the omissions undoubtedly stem from the poor methodologies 
employed in many of the cases, but even several cases with 
methodologies of at least comparable rigour to those
included seem also to have been overlooked, e.g. den Plertog,^
11 12 13 14
Cotgrove, Emery & Thorsrud, Bryan, ' Archer, and
15Janson.
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The present review
The present review will attempt to incorporate 
some of the better points of previous reviews, but it 
will also try to go beyond them and engage in a 
systematic comparison of different theories. The purpose 
of this review will also be rather different from previous 
reviews in that its focus will be less on the validity of 
the findings on outcome variables, and more on the validity 
of job redesign theories as such.
The spirit of the review will be very much that of 
Cummings et al insofar as it entails the belief that the 
numerous limitations of the job redesign literature need 
to be taken into account whilst at the same time avoiding 
the 'trap* of rejecting almost the whole literature. The 
present review will concentrate on the methodologically 
more rigorous studies, though not exclusively, but it 
should be stressed that the level of rigor in this field 
as a whole is far from high. Consequently, any conclusions 
that are drawn from this review can only be tentative, first 
hypotheses, and must be subjected to further, and more 
critical test. In addition, the problems cited at the 
beginning of this chapter should also be borne in mind: 
namely, that some cases of job redesign may not have been
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reported, for various reasons, which therefore brings 
into question the representativeness of the literature.
In addition, the content of many cases that are reported 
leaves much to be desired. Information about job losses, 
wage rates, promotions etc. may be omitted, again for a 
variety of reasons. Detailed information on non- productive 
time, idle time etc. of the sort that would be obtained by 
work study practitioners involved in job redesign is 
another type of data that is frequently absent from case 
reports. This is not to say that such omissions are 
intentional, for as we shall see in Chapter 9 different 
sections of management may hold very different viev/s of 
job redesign, and have correspondingly different ideas 
about what is important to report. It therefore becomes of 
interest to know the managerial origins of job redesign 
information, so that any such omissions can be remedied.
Two issues remain to be considered before we can 
start the review proper: the first is the type of outcome
criteria that will be examined, and the second concerns 
the way in which the literature will be divided.
Outcome criteria
It was stated above that adequate data was only available 
for the outcome of "productive ty," and we must now indicate 
more concretely how this term, is to be defined and assessed.
At the most general level, productivity is a measure of the
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rn•„ : of out outs to inputs for a production (of goods, or
services) system.^ Job redesign however is concerned with 
the organisation of labour and although it may also involve
the increased utilisation of machinery, of capital, there
are many situations where this is not the case. How then 
do we measure the input of labour? It can be done either 
in terms of time, or of money, or both, but in view of the 
relative poverty of the data on wages and salaries, the time 
measure will be used here. In other words we shall use as
our index of labour, the man-hour which is the conventional
measure in this field, and is the term used for the labour 
input of one man working for one hour. Productivity will 
be deemed to have increased where the ratio of output to 
man-hours has increased, which it may do in a number of 
ways. For instance, with constant output, the same men may 
each work fewer hours, or fewer men, each the same hours.
In some cases of job redesign increases in productivity 
(as defined here) have had to be calculated from data on 
changes in.the size of the labour force relative to output. 
In other cases, where a productivity increase of 'X'% has 
been reported, this has been taken at face value. Few 
cases have explicitly employed a cost-based measure of 
productivity, and we have also assumed therefore that, 
unless indicated to the contrary, the time, or man-hour, 
system has been used. All of v-se assumptions are open 
to question, and because of this no great reliance will 
be placed on overall trends or levels of productivity 
fi pares.
—  2 3 2~
The next question concerns the labour which must be 
included in our measure - is it that of the v/orkers whose 
jobs are changed? or do we also consider supervisors, 
maintenance workers etc., whose jobs may also be affected?
And if different groups of workers are to be used in 
different cases, e.g. production workers only, in some 
instances; production workers and their supervisors in 
others, does this mean that the data are no longer comparable? 
Neither of these questions poses a serious problem for the 
analysis, for although different groups of workers will be 
compared, some of which are more heterogeneous than others, 
we shall in all cases be reducing different types of labour 
to the same unit, the man-hour. As for the question of 
which labour to include in the analysis, we shall feature 
only those categories of worker whose jobs are despecialised 
in the process of job redesign. Other workers, such as 
maintenance men, or quality control inspectors, may be 
affected by job redesign indirectly, but unless these effects 
take the form of despecialisation of labour we shall exclude 
them. To some extent such a procedure is unjustified 
because job redesign may have repercussions far beyond the 
boundaries of the department to which it was confined, but 
there simply does not exist any means for conceptualising, 
let alone, measuring such effects, and they are invariably 
not reported in case studies: hence their exclusion.
There also exists, in a number of cases, data on 
improvements in product quality, and on job satisfaction.
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tjob attitudes, labour turnover end absenteeism. ’//here it 
is available, data on quality improvements, i.e. reject 
rates, scrap rates, or error rates, v/iil be used, as too 
will reliable and valid data on job attitudes, although 
unfortunately data of this kind does not exist in large 
quantity.
Categories of job redesign
The conventional distinctions between job 1 enlargement,* 
job ’enrichment' and autonomous group working have already 
been discussed (above, Chap. 3) and their inadequacies 
indicated. The difficulties involved in distinguishing the 
addition of similar tasks (job 'enlargement') from different 
tasks (job 'enrichment') were explored, and related to 
problems of measuring job content. The horizontal/vertical 
distinction was also objected to, on the grounds that the 
horizontal dimension (addition of similar, production tasks) 
could often entail the vertical dimension (decision-making).
There are, of course, other possible bases for 
distinctions: origins of the redesign, mechanisms involved,
whether the change creates individual or group jobs. Each 
of these criteria can separate case studies into several 
groups, but they all have problems. For example, an 
individual vs. group working distinction would assign to 
different categories, assembly Line reorganisations which 
in one case reduced a flowline to only two persons, and 
which in another case created individual units. But it is
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far r'rem clear that these two changes involve radically 
different mechanisms.
The distinction to be used in the present review 
employs the category of work roles, and rests on the 
following assumption. In a service or production 
organisation, the main products and materials flow 
sequentially through a series of (more or less) interde­
pendent work roles for processing. Attached to this 
horizontal organisation of roles are a number of offshoots, 
of vertically organised roles responsible for occasional 
interventions in, or receipts from, the major flow of v/ork.
These vertically organised sections are responsible for 
such functions as maintenance, repair, materials supply 
and collection, cleaning, inspection and supervision. It should 
be noted however that some of these functions may be designed 
into the main flow of work, such as brief, quality checks, 
and the distinction between the two sets of roles is not 
absolute. The vertically organised (or ancillary) roles 
typically enjoy either lower or higher rewards and status 
than the horizontally organised roles, i.e. they tend to 
differ in these respects.
We can now draw a more rigorous distinction between 
different types of job redesign, all of which entail the 
amalgamation of different, hitherto separate, work roles.
The first category involves the addition of vertical roles 
to an existing role (I). The second category involves 
the addition of horizontal roles to an orating role (II).
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tnirc c-.te ;ory involves the additi on of both vertical 
hori cental roles to an existing role (III). There are 
tnree points to be noted about these distinctions: firstly,
although, as will be seen, they correspond (approximately) 
to the three traditional categories of job redesign, the 
correspondence is by no means an exact one. In any case the 
distinctions are based on a rather more clear cut criterion 
than has hitherto been suggested. Secondly, the use of work 
role as the principal criterion entails no judgement as to 
whether this role will ’enrich’ its incumbent or in any 
other way contribute to his satisfaction. It also entails 
no judgement about the nature of the additional role(s). 
It/they may be either higher or lower in prestige, status, 
rewards etc. than the role currently occupied. Thirdly, 
this set of distinctions can be applied to any part of an 
organisation in which there are products or materials being 
processed in some v/ay by workers, and where there may also 
be vertically organised roles. Thus, cleaners may experience 
job redesign through the addition of supervisory duties, 
although in a larger context, the cleaning role may itself 
be considered as a vertical one.
The first type of job redesign (I), which we may call 
vertical role integration can be illustrated in offices, 
by the amalgamation of the roles of clerk and quality 
control] er, and in factories, by the combine t > ;>n of roles 
such as production, machine set-up, and simple maintenance 
(?..; happened in th ' reo; : 1 by 7/a,1ker - see Chapter 3)»
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The second type of redesign (II) invariably affects 
a flow-line system of work, and mo.y be called reorganisation 
of flow lines. Typically, a sequential, or horizontal series 
of work roles in product manufacture or assembly, or 
document processing, is contracted, or abolished, and 
replaced either by a shorter chain of work roles, or by 
individual work stations.
The third type of redesign (III) involving the 
combined amalgamation of horizontal and vertical roles, 
typically creats flexible work groups, in which labour is 
allocated between jobs as and when required.
Our primary distinction between categories is predicated 
on the notion of work roles, but as we shall see in this, 
and the ensuing chapters, these categories also involve 
different mechanisms for increasing performance. In addition 
they will be seen to enjoy differing relationships with 
scientific management, and to entail different consequences 
for the workers involved.
Cases and experiments in job redesign - some 
general points.
The theory of job redesign put forward in the previous 
chapter specified five mechanisms by v/hich productivity 
might be raised, product quality improved and labour intensified, 
under job redesign. These were: pay rises and incentives,
elimination of labour and raising of :• rforraance standards, 
enhanced accountability and. control, work methods improve­
ments, and employee intrinoio motive t io.r.
•
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a general level we can ascertain whether two of these 
mechanisms are at all relevant by examining their incidence 
among cases and experiments in the field, where upon we 
find the following:
TABLE 1 Incidence of Pay Rises and Labour Elimination
in cases of job redesign
A B
I Uf f ' i:j
A
v  u n
B
Yes 58 27 Yes 78 38
No 33 14 No 39 19
Don't
Know 103 42
Don't 
Know 77 26
TOTAL 194 83 194 83
N.B. Column A lists information for all known 
cases of job redesign for which at least 
one written reference is available* 17
Column B lists information only for cases 
where the magnitude of any increase in
1 Rproductivity is actually known.
Column A includes all cases in Column B.
Had these figures shown that pay rises were rarely given, 
or labour rarely eliminated (i.e. transferred, resigned, 
or made redundant), then 7/e could say immediately that our 
theory was implausible. But as ms i !:e rs stand, such a view 
cannot be maintained. If we leave aside, for the moment,
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oases where charges in pay levels and labour volume are 
unknown, then it appears that pay rises and labour 
elimination figured in 60-66‘3 of all known cases of job 
redesign, and in the same proportion of cases with known 
productivity increases. At the very least then it must be 
said that the prevalence of these phenomena hardly merits 
their diminutive treatment by theorists in the area.
If we examine the distribution of these two phenomena 
across the three categories of job redesign outlined above, 
then we find the following:
TABLB 2 Distribution of cases with pay rises and labour
elimination across different categories of 
job redesign. 19
Categories
Pay rises given I II III
Yes 6 0 21
No 8 3 3
Don’t know 12 24 6
TOTALS 26 27 30
r~\CO1
Labour eliminated 
Yes 11 13 14
No 8 3 8
Don't know 7 11 8
I TOTALS 26 27 30 = 83I
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*r»■ ••■; 0r* course difficult to :i nterpret because
.. • v .> I’-r ’1 numbers of C'-nos in. which information is
iI -.::<:.o , but •! oo ': •;o this it can still be seen that in 
■•12. three categories the elimination of labour is a signi- 
f j it phenomenon, albeit perhaps to differing degrees, 
v/hilst the same appears to be true, possibly to a lesser 
extent, for pay rises. And the intercategory differences 
in pay rises are certainly striking.
These two phenomena are also significantly inter­
related, as the followin ■ table shows. Onco again however 
it should be noted that information is available here on 
only 73 of the 194 known cases, and on only 32 of the 83 
cases with known productivity outcomes (these latter figures 
are shown in brackets):
TABLE 3 Relationships between nay rises and labour 
elimination in cases of job redesign. 20
Pay
raised
Yes
Bo
Totals
Labour eliminated 
Yes No Totals
32 (17) 11 (6) 43 (23)
10 ( 4) 20 (5) 30 ( 9)
42 (21) 31 (11) 73 (32)
major figures X  - 17.04, df = 1, p<.001
Fi gures in 1 < • *a c kets o •» .08 ( Fisher test)
'his inter-;:’ 1 a tionshit • tv/e i p iy ri s s a id L; >itr el 1 mi
rr 11 on will a s ■ reoui r some ■ insi deration and iiscussion
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Cksos and experiments in .job redesign
The following literature review, as already indicated 
will be concerned principally with theoretical explanations 
of changes (or their absence) in job performance as a 
result of job redesign, although other outcomes, such as 
quality improvements, or attitude changes, will be 
considered v/here possible. The review will not therefore 
examine the large correlational literature on job content 
and job attitudes. Despite the undoubted interest and 
importance of this literature, it cannot answer questions 
about causal relationships, nor about changes in job 
performance.
The review will be organised under the headings of the 
three categories already mentioned. Under each of these 
categories, several of the major, and more rigorous case 
studies and experiments will first be discussed, and the 
problems, and limitations of the conventional theories of 
job redesign will be indicated. At the same time attempts 
will be made to show how the theory of job redesign 
described in the previous chapter may be used both to 
explain the performance outcomes in these cases as well 
as to integrate seemingly discrepant data. The next section 
will briefly discuss improvements in product, or service 
quality, and the possible explanations for these. The 
final section of each category discussion will then pursue 
the relationship between the work reviewed, and the theory 
and practice of scientific m:mrcement.
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Cat c,gory I
Vertical role integration ^
Case studies and exoeriments^
We shall begin with a discussion of several cases 
involving blue collar workers because although they have 
methodological deficiencies, they can also provide 
illustrations in support of the theory outlined previously.
We shall then proceed to examine some of the better, white 
collar cases.
The earliest example of this type of case was 
reported by Walker in 1950 (57). The division of labour 
in a number of machine shops was reorganised so that the 
machine operatives no longer simply fed the machine, 
turned it on, and picked up the output. They were also 
assigned the tasks of setting up the machine, of carrying 
out minor maintenance duties, and of inspecting the products. 
In this situation, division of labour had been taken to the 
point where none of these groups of workers had, or could 
be guaranteed, a ’full' workload (in Taylor’s sense) and 
the division was thus counter-productive. Each group of 
workers could only carry out their work whilst at least one 
of the others was idle, and this inefficiency was transcended 
by assigning all duties to the operative. At the same time 
35 setters and checkers were eliminated. And because so 
much labour v/as eliminated higher wages could be paid at 
the same time as total labour costs fell, according to the 
classic Taylorian formula. A similar case woo .reported by
Po • - >3 (13), which also entailed labour elimination.
In both of these cases it might be argued that higher 
productivity arose from increased motivation due to the 
variety and responsibility involved in the new jobs, and 
that the elimination of labour v/as a consequence, or by­
product of this. But why did the employees accept the new 
jobs in the first place? And why did this result in 
increased output per man, rather than (as some writers 
have suggested it should), increased product quality? In 
the absence of attitude surveys of the employees no 
definitive answers can be given. But it can be suggested 
that in both cases employees accepted higher levels of 
effort expenditure in return for higher wages. The 
elimination of labour was based on this "agreement” and was 
not reported as following, some time later, the redesign 
of jobs. Rather the redesign of jobs resulted in the 
elimination of labour, which served, at the same time to 
"enforce" higher, individual workloads, since the total
volume of work to be done had now to be performed by fewer
workers.
There are other cases that have involved labour 
elimination, but where it would seem difficult to defend a 
theory of motivation and performance based on job content.
Rush, for instance, describes a case in which the operatives
of twi ting frames, ii i.bre glass manufactur< were *assi 
t h ■' j oh frame cleaning (23). The assignment is unlikely
to m vo boon eagerly accepted by the workers since, as Rush 
•'tes, the job of frame cleaning was ’unskilled, disliked,
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lirty, boring, low status and low paid.* Yet the fact 
remains that this work, performed by 28 cleaners was 
assigned in toto to the 92 frame operatives and the whole 
process was achieved without a pay rise. The fact that 
the plant had no recognised trade union may be relevant 
here in accounting for the absence of any apparent benefits 
for the frame operatives, and one can only suggest that 
management simply exercised its uncontested authority' to 
effect this change, or else convinced the workers of the 
economic necessity for such changes, or both. Certainly, 
the intrinsic merits of the job would not account for its 
acceptance, a.nd performance, by the workforce. The other 
alternative explanation is that insofar as the job of frame 
twisting, as with that of machine operative in Walker’s case 
study, involves a considerable amount of 'machine minding,1 
operatives may have welcomed any extra duties because they 
helped pass the time. This appeared to be the case, to some 
degree, in the study by Cotgrove which suggested that the 
increased effort necessitated by job redesign was 
appreciated because it helped speed the passage of time (3)* 
In this study, involving over two thousand employees 
in a British textile plant, loom operatives v/ere assigned 
a number of minor maintenance duties, to be carried out 
either before the machines started up, or when they had 
broken down. In other words, portions of unoccupied time 
within the operative's working day were filled up, and 
(the other side of the coir;), she m- i nt e nance labour force 
was reduced by 14-15;^. th., s ‘ een done, th same
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(approximate) level of output would have been obtained with 
the same volume of labour: the productivity of labour would
not, in other words, have increased, and the same point 
holds true for the previous cases. Again, we must ask why 
did employees accept these arrangements and agree to perform 
extra duties? It was not because the duties were more 
highly motivating, for in this case the extra duties were 
negotiated between unions and management, and accepted by 
unions and workforce in advance. The inducement to accept 
these arrangements was an increase irr pay of approximately 
£3 per week, on average.
It may be more useful then to interpret these kinds 
of cases in terms of negotiated changes in the v/age-effort 
bargain. Employees put out higher levels of effort in 
return for higher earnings, and labour productivity is 
enhanced by labour elimination. The Rush case is an 
exception here, but we have already noted that job redesign 
theories could not account for these outcomes either.
All of these cases have involved blue collar workers, 
and two of the mechanisms postulated in the theory described 
previously, viz. pay rises, and labour elimination and 
raised individual workloads. There is little evidence to 
suggest the existence of specific work methods improvements 
in this category of job redesign, (apart from the case 
reported by Weed, and by Rush, in which cleaners were 
supplied with improved materials and appliances), so what 
productivity outcomes have been achieved in the absence of 
these mechanisms among blue collar workers? Without labour
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elimination or pay rises, or the introduction of pay 
incentives, we find only small or non-existent increases in 
productivity in situations where increased effort expenditure 
could, in principle, have increased output: Agersnap et al.,
0% (1); Paul & Robertson (toolsetters case), 3.9% (17);
Wyatt & Fraser, 3-4% (26). The one blue collar case which 
deviates from this pattern was written' up by Hill and 
reported a productivity increase of 20% (7)* But this 
increase derived both from the delegation of extra duties 
(in this case, maintenance work) to operatives, as well 
as from a variety of technical suggestions advanced by 
the employees. It is impossible therefore to disentangle 
the effects of these two factors.
Let us turn now to studies of white collar workers.
As with the blue collar cases reported above, many of 
these suffer from the absence of control groups, and the 
failure to employ measures of job attitudes. But this is 
by no means universally true, as shown in the study by 
Locke et al. (11). This study explicitly set out to 
investigate the mechanisms of job redesign, the role of 
pay increases, and the relation between attitudes and 
behaviour. As such, it provides one of the closest 
approximations in the literature to a test of our theory. 
Three different types of job change were introduced (each 
with matched control groups) in the clerical section of a 
local government agency involving respectively, increa.sed 
control over labour allocation, and task variety; increased 
deci ?;.i on-making, liasiori, and control of work scheduling;
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::v; increase I '/ '-rioty and reduced external control* A job 
attitude ouost:: onnaire was administered both before, and 
si v months after the start of the change programme. The 
results are summarised below:
TABLE 4 Results of the study by Locke et al. (1976)
Measure Experimental
Groups
(N-46)
Control
Groups
(n -49)
Productivity i 23% + 2%
Absenteeism - 5% i 7%
Turnover - 6% f 20%
Complaints and
disciplinary
actions 0 4
Attitudes no change no change
The changes in productivity were attributed by Locke et al. 
to improved utilisation of labour (employees moved from job to 
job as required), elimination of unnecessary procedures, more 
feedback on performance, and, in one group, inter-individual 
competition.
The lack of improvement in attitudes was attributed to 
the disappointment at the absence of anticipated pay rises, 
which the authors argued was the main reason employees 
sought higher-grade • nd more challenging work. The
stray thus confirms a nu\i '• of the pro nos:: t? ons of our 
thenry,
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The existence of attitude-perforrnance discrepancies
22h'ialso been revealed in studies by Umstot et al and 
Paul .1 Robertson on v/hite collar workers (16). These 
studies involved the delegation of higher administrative 
and managerial duties, including scope of decision-making, 
to groups such as sales representatives, design engineers, 
experimental officers, draughtsmen, and foremen. They used 
the Job Reaction Survey, J.R.S., a measure designed by 
Herzberg himself to tap employee job perceptions along the 
‘motivator1 dimensions. Scores on this scale can range from 
0 to 80, and the results for sales representatives are 
shov/n below.
TABLE 5 J.R.S. Results for sales representatives
from Paul & Robertson (1970)
Pre-job Post- 
changes changes
(N 15) Experimental group 50.1 55• 4
(N r 23) Control group 51*8 52.0
This difference is very small indeed and assuming a 
standard deviation of only 2 or 3 points, is unlikely to 
be statistically significant. Although quantitative 
performance data are unavailable for the other four groups 
in the study, ratings by superiors, and other indices, 
suggest there were definite performance improvements in all 
cases. 7/ith one exception - that of the desi gn engineers -
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the results, in all probability, show no statistical
differences in attitudes between experimental and control 
groups after job redesign. In other words performance 
effects may appear quite independently of attitudinal 
change in the cases reported here perhaps because job 
attitudes v/ere favourable at the outset. Job redesign 
may therefore have 'allowed1 the emergence of behaviours 
for which there existed previously no adequate outlet, 
rather than being the cause or effect of those behaviours 
as postulated by Herzberg, and Hackman et al.
Pay levels and systems, and volume of labour remained 
unchanged throughout all of these studies, and there was 
little systematic evidence of work methods improvements.
The explanation of changes in job performance may therefore 
require some resort to one or other of the 'classical' 
theories of job redesign, with their stress on intrinsic 
motivation, especially in view of the highly skilled (and 
probably motivated) nature of the employees in these studies
The study by Morse & Relmer also failed to discover any 
simple correlation between job performance and overall job 
satisfaction, following an increase in autonomy for clerical 
workers (13).
TABLE 6 Results of the study by Morse & Reimer
Experimental 
Pre-change Post-change
Mean
scores
Index of productivity 
Overall job satisfact­
ion.
Peelings of self 
ac tualisation
48.6 58. 6*
on 5 
point
3.1b 3.19
scale. 2.43 2.57*
* Significant at p < .05 1-tailed t-test
2*1 9
laboj 1 c -nt :• ;11 group is a slight misnomer here, since 
zr.ls group experi enced a reduclion in autonomy, rather than 
• situation of no change. The assessment of 'feelings of 
self-actualisation* was also somewhat misleading since 
four of the five items on this scale simply tapped job 
perceptions, whilst only one - on the challenge in the job - 
invited any kind of evaluation, and it was perhaps not 
surprising that the changes occurred in the directions they 
did.
The study also showed however that a reduction in 
employee control over their immediate work could yield a 
productivity increase. In addition, some (unknown) portion 
of the 21% productivity increase in the experimental group 
was due to work methods improvements suggested by the 
employees.
The classic study by Pord at A.T. & T. should also be 
described here (29). 120 clerical workers (70% of whom
were college graduates) were involved in the study. Two 
groups, (total N -= 36) were allowed to sign the letters 
they wrote, to choose the form of the letter, to dispense 
with external verification, and were to be held responsible 
for the quality of their work (previously, supervisors 
had been responsible). Three groups (N ^59) acted as 
controls. Employees were asked to fill out the Herzberg 
J.R.S. (see above), and performance was measured by a 
Customer Service Index (C.S.I.), a combi id measure of 
work speed and quality.
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;ie.•,u Its are s h o w n  b e1 o w :
TABLE 7 Results of the study by Pord (1969)
Groups
Customer 
service index
i
J.R.S. scores
April Sept. March Sept.
(
!Exoerimental ( 
| (
I
I I
33 88 
40 94
39 55 
46 48
i (  i n  
<
iControl ( IV 
(
( v  —
.
.
52 73 41 37 
42 76 42 43 
50 78 43 41 
-------------------------------------I
Throughout this period there seems to have been a general 
increase in work volume, since all groups showed improved 
rates of performance, with the experimental groups both 
improving their C.S.I. scores by a greater margin than the 
control groups. And if we look at the J.R.S. scores we can 
see that the control groups showed (in all probability) no 
significant differences. But then nor did one of the 
experimental groups (group II), and yet their C.S.I. score 
rose to the highest level of all five groups in the study. 
Again we see there is no simple correlation between 
performance and job perceptions.
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No pay rises were given in this study, and labour was 
not eliminated, but one of our postulated mechanisms did 
change. Formal accountability for job performance was 
vested in the clerks themselves, rather than their 
supervisors, and deviations from required performance 
standards would thus have been brought more directly to the 
clerks' notice than before. This may well account for 
improved performance by the experimental groups.
The classical theories of job redesign would have 
difficulties with all of these cases, Locke et al., Paul &: 
Robertson, Morse & Reimer, and Pord. The principal task 
design theorists, Hackman, Lawler and Oldham have postulated 
i) that it is perceived rather than actual job content which 
is motivating, and ii) that jobs must be changed on each of 
the dimensions of autonomy, variety and task significance 
for improved motivation. All of the above cases showed 
instances of performance improvements in the absence of 
changed job attitudes and perceptions, and showed instances 
of similar improvements with changes only in autonomy and 
variety. This latter point contradicts the conclusions of 
Lawler et al. who introduced (perceived) minor changes into 
the jobs of telephonists, and found no changes in job 
satisfaction, motivation, or in productivity. They thus 
conciuded the Hackman et al. propositions (above) were 
supported, although as we have shown several studies contradict 
this view.
Equally, if one examines the Herzberq postulate of 
increased satisfaction, motivation era perfo"mance as a result
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of " iob enr.i moment," then the occurence of performance 
imorovements in the absence of changes in satisfaction, 
ana .job perceptions must indicate a deficiency in the theory. 
The importance of pay increases need not contradict job 
'enrichment' theory since (a) Herzberg did not deny their 
efficacy (though he thought it limited), and (b) he could 
argue that workers responding to pay increases were 
motivationally "sick," and hence outside the scope of his 
theory. We shall see however, when comparing productivity 
increases, with and without pay rises, that no significant 
difference can be seen, and this fact must surely contradict 
Herzberg's view,
Sociotechnical systems theory cannot be considered, 
in its present form, to apply to the cases of job redesign 
in this category. It was designed to account for problems, 
forms, and outcomes of group working, whereas the cases in 
this category have all involved largely independent, individual 
work roles. There is of course a more recent strand of
development within the sociotechnical 'school' which has
\
explicated a set of dimensions along which jobs should be 
changed in order to improve motivation and satisfaction. As 
indicated elsewhere however it has not been made clear whether 
performance improvements require changes on all of these 
dimensions, or whether it is sufficient merely to change 
some of them. Certainly the former view would seem to be 
contradicted by some of the findings reported above.
There are of course studies which do appear to be 
consistent with classical theories of .1 ob redesign and the
“2 :■ 3 '
study by Janrson is typical {b). A group of production typists 
was responsible for typing olocru of information onto computer 
tapes. After some analysis of their own and various ancillary 
operations, it was decided to allow them to dispense with 
supervisory verification of their work, and to correct their 
own mistakes. They were also allowed to change their own 
computer tapes - a job previously carried out by supervisors, 
and were assigned responsibility for a particular group of 
companies, thus permitting easier identification of the 
source of errors. Number of blocks typed per hour rose from 
70 to 85 in the experimental group, but remained at 68 in the 
control group, whilst the number of errors per week fell from 
15-20 to less than 5, the figure for the control group again 
remaining constant. Scores on the Job Reaction Survey are 
shown below:
TABLE 8 J.R.S. Scores for employees in the study
by Janson (1971)
Sept. 1969 March 1970
Experimental
group 50 60 N - 40
Control
group 53 47 N - 40
Similar results were obtained in another study reported 
by the same author, and in studies by Bryan (2), Gorman & 
Molloy (6), Kraft (9), Maher d Ovarbagh (12). and Randall (20). 
3 everal of these cases d^d rut . 'lise control groups
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however, although all of thorn r .• ported improvements either 
in perforrricance or product qual:i ty. In some cases, e.g.
Gorman & wiolloy, Maher & Overbagh, higher wages were 
paid for the new jobs, and indeed in the former case employees 
were so concerned to maintain their level of earnings that 
they strongly resisted the introduction of a group bonus scheme, 
fearing that an influx of new employees would lower their 
earnings. The other cases however conform to the predicted 
job redesign pattern - changed job content was followed by 
improved performance and attitudes. In the next section we 
examine, very briefly, improvements in product quality. The 
following section v/ill then examine this type of job redesign 
at a more general level, and the final section will assess 
its relation to scientific management.
Quality improvements
Several of the case studies discussed above reported 
improvements in product quality, or reductions in error 
rates. The majority of these were not subjected to tests 
of statistical significance, although if the figures are 
taken at face value, then some of them certainly appear to 
have been significant. The data reported by Pord indicated 
both work quality, and quantity and suggested there was an 
improvement in the experimental, as compared with the control 
groups. A case study of inspectors by . ohe r & Overbagh in 
which inspectors were assigned more autonomy and responsibility, 
showed a reduction in defective p '■ a o t , after 9 months, from
7 to 2.5,’j. although no control group was used, Paul & 
Robertson carried out a study of tool setters in which the 
men were given responsibility for product quality,from a 
particular group of machines, and for ensuring proper use 
of machinery. Although there were other factors involved 
with the rate of rejects, and the control group was inadequate, 
the figures showed no improvement in the scrap proportion 
after five months, A study by Janson yielded rather 
different results: a group of production typists was allowed
to verify its own work, change their tapes, and was given 
quicker feedback on performance. After six months, errors 
per week fell from 15-20 in the experimental group, to less 
than 5» whilst the control group remained at the same level,
15-20 per week.
Clearly many other factors may have been responsible 
for these improvements in quality apart from those posited 
by theories of job redesign. It is interesting to note, 
for instance, that work quality and quantity improvements 
were found in the control as well as the experimental groups, 
in the study by Pord, and it would seem therefore that these 
outcomes are subject to many influences. But in the studies 
cited above, as well as in others, one point is worthy of note. 
Employees were often given more direct and/or more precise 
feedback on their performance: it may be the case that this
was motjvating in, and of itself, but it is also possible 
that feedback "merely” facilitated the performance of 
employees who wore already motivated to perform well. All 
of the cases (but one) involved wh i t collar, clc'-icnl workers,
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i certainly in the Porn :>fcudy, a high proportion (70.*') 
o t h o s e  v/ere college graduates whom one might expect to 
hold more intrinsically-centred orientations to work.
Theories of job redesign which stress the importance 
of intrinsic motivation may therefore provide an explanation 
for some of these quality improvement data.
General points and issues
Data on changes in productivity exists in 26 cases of
category I job redesign. If we examine the incidence of 
pay rises and labour elimination - two of the principal
mechanisms referred to in the theory presented here - we
2'3
find the following:
TABLE i9 Relationships between nay rises and labour
elimination in cases of vertical role
integration.
Labour 
! eliminated
No labour 
eliminated IDon’t know
Pay rises given 5 0 1
Numbers |
[cases No pay rises given 1 5 2
1
Don’t know 5 3 4
N - 26
7/hat this tells us is that at loar>t tv"•ive (almost half) of
these 2b cases entailed thf? provision f ny rises and/or
the elimination of labour. Given the .1•. number of ’Don’t
knows’ in the table it is .difficult to indicate ti\e extensive
-2 57
— no33 tv/o : mnisms. A] i we can say, so far, is
t thoi r occurrence in almost 50 .> of the cases with 
reasonably reliable productivity data gives us some confidence 
in their significance.
However if we look at the magnitude of productivity 
increase according to the presence or absence of these two 
mechanisms, we find the following:
TABLE 1Q Median productivity increases as a function of 
pay rises and labour elimination in cases of 
vertical role integration.24
N N
Labour eliminated 49.5% 11 Pay rise 22.0% 6
No labour eliminated 2.0% 8 No pay rise 18.3% 8
Don’t know 15.0% 7 Don’t know 13.5% 12
19.3% 26 19.3% 2b
U - 2, p <  .001 (one tailed) U - 11, p i .054
Clearly, labour elimination appears to be associated with 
significantly higher degrees of productivity increase than in 
its absence, but the same does not seem to hold to the same 
extent for pay rises. This however does not mean that pay 
rises should be seen as ineffective, for our theory does not 
stipulate that pay rises are the only mechanism at work under 
job redesign. For certain groups of employees, redesigned 
jobs may in themselves motivate the workers in Question to 
iii'her and/or better Quality performance. If !.Vi:; is the case, 
n the ef fects of p-v r* ;:c-3 overall may be masked.
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0'i teyor.y I
Jo-, redesign and scientific management
The following table lists the duties that have been 
assigned to workers in cases of category I job redesign:
TABLE 11 Additional duties assigned to workers in
cases of vertical role integration
Answer clients' queries 
Maintenance
Machine set-up/tool setting
Paperwork/documentation
Cleaning
Materials supply
Inspection/testing 
Work scheduling 
Responsibility/accountability 
Participation in decision­
making
Sign letters 
Labour allocation 
Authority for decision­
making
These duties can be broadly divided into two sets: the
first set includes work traditionally carried out by 
manual or lower-grade clerical workers, and is listed in 
the lefthand column; the righthand column, on the other 
hand, lists duties which have more commonly been performed 
by supervisors and managers, i.e. by those with authority 
over manual and clerical workers.
The rationale for the combination of various manual 
or' clerical work roles is that savings in labour costs can 
be realised since each of these ro-i°s, in itself, is 
insufficient to occupy a worker for th - ;uration of the 
working day. Taylor himself recogn.i the existence of
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such fractional work rol-’.s, and i ronically, the example he 
gave was that of cleaning and maintenance, suggesting that 
the two could, under certain conditions, be combined.
Cleaning work has in fact been assigned to machine operatives 
in two cases of job redesign, although in general the extra 
duties assigned usually required more, not less skill than 
current duties. If we understand that Taylor sought to 
assign maximum workloads to as cheap a degree of labour as 
possible (rather than to maximise division of labour), then 
the relocation of maintenance, inspection etc. can be seen 
as a development that is quite in line with Taylorist principles.
McBeath was more explicit about the affinity between job 
redesign and scientific management, v/hen reporting a case 
in which welders lost some of their simpler duties to a new 
grade of assistant welder, while simultaneously acquiring 
some of the work previously undertaken by supervision:
"Strictly speaking, this regrouping of work may be 
considered as "deskilling" some jobs. However, 
the deskilled work did not require higher skills 
anyway ....." (p. 123).
Indeed it ma,y be considered as deskilling, and the way one
considers the process depends very much- on the standpoint
from which it is viewed, that of the worker losing duties,
or of the worker who acquires them in a process of ’enrichment.’
If we examine the second type of labour transferred 
down the status hierarchy, namely ’managerial1 labour, then 
we can say that this violates the separation of execution 
and conception argued for by Taylor. In this regard only
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may vertical role integration be said to have transcended 
Taylorism. The abandonment of the Taylorist principle here 
is clearly of some significance, but it should not be over­
estimated. The overall division of managerial and non- 
managerial labour persists despite the introduction of job 
redesign, and it may be that this abiding division can 
only be transformed by mechanisms of participation and 
representation, rather than job redesign (see also Chapter 5, 
on power and control).
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,1u-/.r^ ry of cone ln'~: 0^3
,Ve have seen in this analysis of category I job 
redesign, vertical role integration, that,
(a) productivity has been increased, to a considerable
degree, in proportion to the volume of labour 
eliminated, and that in the absence of such 
elimination, increases in output have been of 
small magnitude.
(b) where moderate productivity increases have been 
obtained in the absence of labour elimination, 
these could be attributed either to the effect 
of pay rises, or to technical suggestions 
advanced by employees, or could, alternatively, 
be construed as the outcomes arising from the 
behaviour of intrinsically motivated employees
acting in accordance with job redesign theory.
(c) pay rises were associated with labour elimination
(and their absence with its absence), and may be 
a means both for raising effort expenditure and 
for securing acceptance of job reductions.
(d) there were several cases of independent 
variations in job performance, and job attitudes 
and satisfaction, thus suggesting they need not 
be associated as theories of job redesign 
predict, air also confirming the dual-mechanism 
theory of job attitudes and job performance.
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vo) approximately h n l t h e  cases of productivity
increases may have involved no pay rises or 
labour elimination, and to explain these 
outcomes, as well as improvements in product 
or service quality, one may need to employ 
one or more of the conventional theories of 
job redesign,
(f) the relationship between category I redesign
and Taylorism was said to depend on the type 
of labour that was added to existing work roles. 
Where the labour was predominantly manual in 
character, then the activity was seen as being 
consistent with the Taylorist objective of 
achieving 'a full day’s work,1 and was thought 
not to have violated any of its other precepts. 
On the other hand where workers were permitted 
to perform ’managerial1 functions, then this 
type of exercise was seen as a violation of 
the Taylorist desire to divorce managerial and 
’manual’ labour.
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factors.
6. Hulin, C. & Blood, M.R. 1968.
7. Pierce, J.L. & Dunham, R.B. 1976.
8. Cummings, T.G. 8c Molloy, E.S. 1976; Cummings, T.G. et al.
1977; Cummings, T.G. & Salipante, P.P. 1976.
9. Srivastva, S. et al. 1975.
10. den Hertog, P. 1974.
11. Cotgrove, S. et al. 1971.
12. Emery, P.E. & Thorsrud, E. 1975-
13. Bryan, E.J. 1975.
14. Archer, J.T. 1975.
15. Janson, R. 1971.
16. cjf. Paraday, J.E. 1971, and contributions in Dunlop, J.T.
Sc Diatchenko, V.P. 1964.
17. The 194 cases of job redesign referred to here are listed 
under the headings of Categories, I, II, III, and ’mixed,* 
at the end of this, and of the next two chapters. Each
case has been assigned an index number, which will be
used throughout the next three chapters.
18. The 83 cases of job redesign with known productivity
outcomes are listed under category headings I, II, III
at the ends of this, and the next two chapters.
19. The 83 cases here correspond t j those In the previous
footnote.
20. Case index numbers are as foil ws: 2,3,6,7,10,14,16,17, 
18,19,22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 31, 41, <2, 43, 44, 45, 52, 57,
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115, 116, 117 - 19, 120, 122, 124, 125, 128, 131-2,
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164, 165, 168, 174, 176-7, 179-81, 185, 189-91.
21. Case index numbers 1-26.
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Category I :
V e r t ica 1 role inte ration
Cases and experiments with known productivity outcomes 
(N - 26)
1. Agersnap, P. et al. 1974. (N. Foss Electric).
2. Bryan, E.J., 1975.
3. Cotgrove, S. et al. 1971.
4.-5.Davis, L.E. Sc Valfer, E.3. 1965.
6. Goman, L. & Molloy, E. 1972, Chap. 6.
7. Hill, P. 1971, pp. 117-18.
8. Janson, R. 1971 (Typists).
9. Kraft, W.P., 1971.
10. Lawler 111, E.E., Hackman, J.R. & Kaufman, S. 1973.
11. Locke, E. et al. 1976. (Group B)
12. Maher, J. Sc Overbagh, W.N.,1971
13. Morse, N. Sc Reimer, E. 1970.
14. Novara, P. 1973; Butera, P., 1975; Anon. Job 
enrichment at Olivetti. 1974; Spooner, P. 1975.
15. Anon. Experiments to improve the quality of working
life in the Netherlands. 1975 (Philips case).
16-17.Paul, W.J. 8c Robertson, K.B. 1969. (Sales reps; tool- 
setters)
18. Powers, J.E. 1972; Anon. Transition to more meaningful 
work, in Davis, L.E. & Cherns, A.B., 1975.
19. Powell, R.M. Sc Schlacter, J.L., 1971.
20. Randall R 1973. Janson, R. 1975. Hackman, J.R. et al.
1975. ’
21. Robey, D. 1974.
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ka.m, H. 1971; (Texas Instruments, PPG; Monsanto 
Agriculture); V/eed, 1971.
9 3. Cork Research Unit, Peat. 2, 1975, p. 25.
:3. 7/yatt, 3. A Fraser, J.A. 1928.
Cases with inadequate, or without, quantitative results.
(N =. 32) ........~      ’ .....
27. Alderfer, C.P. 1976.
28. den Hertog, F. , 1974, pp. 25-27.
29. Ford, R.N. 1969, Chap. 2; 1973.
30. Foulkes, F.K. 1969. pp. 145-6.
31. Gooding, J. Sept. 1970, (Corning Glass).
32. Greenblatt, A.D. 1973.
33. Hackman, J.R. 1975.
34. Herzberg, F. & Rafalko, E.A. 1975.
35. Hill, P. 1971, pp. 131-32.
36. Jacobs, C. 1975
37. Jenkins, D. 1974. (Barry Corporation).
38-9. Lindholm, R. & Norstedt, J.P. 1975 (Two cases - pp. 39-41;
41-43).
40. McBeath, G. 1974, pp. 122-3.
41. McDavid, I. 1975, Case V
42-5. Paul, W. & Robertson, K.B. 1970. (Design engineers 
E.G.’s, Draughtsmen, Foremen).
4 6 . Randall, R. 1973.
47-3. Rush, H. 1971. (Arapahoe/Monsanto Textiles).
49. 3jrota, D. 1973A.
50. Sirota, D. 197 3 3 (Case 3).
'•1 • Girota, D. 3 .VolPson, A.D. 1972. (Case 1).
T O L.x. 1)73, ( on Coraino, Mercury House, J. Tat ton,
.Vi--; c tricity Cenerr- ti ny ->oard, Swedish State Power Board).
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37. 7/alker,
58. 7/eir,
... 1950.
197oA (Scottish !c Mov/castle ^reweries).
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Gass studies and experiments
One of the most detailed studies in this category was 
reported by Conant Sc Kilbridge. They took a 6-man line, 
assembling domestic appliances, and transformed it into 
five individual work stations at which each operator 
performed the task previously divided between himself and 
his five co-workers^1 \  Unit production time was said to 
be 1.77 minutes and this time was divided as follows:
TABLE 12 Production times on flow lines and individual
work stations
Actual unit production time 
Non-productive time 
Balance delay time
Average Total production time
6 man line
1 .39 mins. 
0.30 rains. 
0.08 rains.
1 .77
Individual
assembly
1.39 mins. 
0.10 mins. 
0.00 mins.
1 .49
In other words, 21.5# of 'working time,' (0.38 mins.), i.e. 
non-break time, was being spent 'idly,' or on tasks, such 
as product handling, and tool setting, which were not 
strictly necessary or desirable. The effect of the switch
to individual assembly was to eliminate entirely the small
-269-
arnount of balance-delay time, since worker inter-dependenci es 
had been removed, and to cut by two-thirds non-productive 
time. Total production time was therefore cut by 15.8/a, 
and labour costs were reduced from $19,900 to $16,762, i.e. 
one of the six workers was eliminated, so the 6-man line 
was replaced by 5 individual work stations.
What happened then to production volume? Assuming 
for the moment, a continuous working day of 8 hours, i.e.
480 minutes, output per day per man = 480/1.77 r 271 units, 
and output per line - 271 x 6 - 1626 units. On individual 
assembly, output per man per day = 480/1.49 = 322, and 
output per day, for five men, r 322 x 5 = 1610 units.
Total production with the five work stations was, therefore, 
more or less the same as with the six-man flow line, and 
this increase in productivity of 20% was achieved in two ways. 
Non-productive time was replaced by productive time, whilst 
balance-delay time, previously spent 'idly,1 was also 
consumed productively. The first change need involve no 
increase in effort on the part of the workers, since it merely 
substitutes one set of activities for another, whilst the 
second change involves a direct increase in effort expenditure. 
On the figures given, the former change accounted for some 
7 0 j of the productivity increase, the latter 30%, i.e. 14% 
and 6% productivity increases respectively. The former 
change requires no further explanation, but what of the 
letter? No pay increase war -iven in this case, and the 
>-t by Conant K1.3 b ^  dge merely states that management
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:1-:: t caoifcalise on t'r • extra time ’liberated’ by 
■;ho job changes. Nor does trie attitude data give us much 
clue either, for a substantial minority of workers liked 
both bench and line work, whilst most of the grievances 
about bench work focussed on changes in the wage-effort 
bargain. It should be recalled however that the workers 
were paid by incentives and the removal of constraints 
inherent in the assembly line may have allowed employees 
to achieve more easily desired levels of earnings.
Product quality also improved in this case, with rejects 
falling from 2.9 to 1.4$ of the total production. Job 
redesign theorists might argue this reflects the increased 
responsibility which the employees took for their work, but 
it could also be explained by reference to the fact that on 
the assembly line (v/hich was mechanically paced) operators 
frequently had little time to correct defects, and the 
control inspectors were few in number. Individual working 
allowed the precise assignment of responsibility for defects,
i.e. accountability was individualised and augmented.
In a similar case reported by Biggane & Stewart ^0)^ 
Quality testing was originally carried out by one member 
of a five man assembly line, and feedback of results would 
therefore have been fairly quick, and to that extent, arguably 
effective. Under job redesign the flow line was replaced 
by individual assembly station a at which operators (fewer 
in number) assembled and tested the whole product. Cycle 
time increased from 0.33 ms. to approxiirr tely 1.5 ms.
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The individualisation of work made accountability much easier 
to operate, and it was reinforced by requiring each operator 
to stamp his product with a personal identification mark. 
Rejects fell from 5% of total production to 0.5j, a much 
greater fall than in the Conant Kilbridge study where 
accountability was high, but not reinforced by personal 
stigmata. The same volume of production was achieved with 
three individual stations as had been obtained from a five 
man line (including one relief man), and workers continued 
to be paid incentives.
Wild, (82,83) reported two cases which also illustrate 
the two mechanisms of method improvements and intensification 
of labour referred to above. In the first case, involving 
the assembly of floor sweepers, an 8-station flow line was 
replaced by two-station lines, as a result of which balancing 
losses fell from 3% to 2yo of total work time, whilst cycle 
time rose from 35-45 secs., to 2-4 minutes. There would also 
have been a reduction in non-productive motions, such as 
product handling in this case, but no figures were given. 
Again by reducing worker inter-dependencies, certain barriers 
to higher performance were removed, and the second case was 
similar.
Another study was reported by van Gils (80), but this 
was in the white collar sector. The overall job was to 
prepare materials for a computer, and the material in 
question passed through a flow line organisation made up of 
clerical groups, punching groups, control punching group,
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ta: uIt.ting group» cleric I : 'o.ip, correcting group and 
final tabulating grouo. After reorganisation each worker 
performed a variety of operations instead of just one. An 
attitude survey administered after the changes had been 
introduced found that 88,3 of the 60 employees preferred the 
new organisation of work, and that they scored significantly 
higher than a control group on both intrinsic and general 
job satisfaction. An index of productivity showed the 
following results over a three month period:
TABLE 13 Results of the study by van Gils (1969)
Oct Nov Dec
Experimental group 110 116 122
Control group 100 100 104
Similar findings were obtained in a case by Kraft & 
Williams^°\ in the Deposit Accounting Division of a 
New York bank.
Both of these cases, but in particular the van Gils 
case, might suggest that improved job attitudes and job 
satisfaction are necessarily and intimately connected with 
improvements in job performance. But one can find cases 
here, as in the previous category, where job performance 
changed whilst attitudes remained constant. Gallegos & 
Phelan^0) studied blue collar workers in the Pacific 
Telephone Company. In the first study the experimental
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group of wire-connectors was allowed to perform a 'whole* 
job, and was provided with appropriate training. After 
eight months the output of the 26 experimental workers had 
increased by 50'/o compared with that of the control group, 
but job satisfaction (measured by the J.D.I.) showed no 
significant change. In a second experiment, using a test- 
retest design, similar job changes with nine workers also 
failed to elicit any increase in job satisfaction. Customer 
complaints - a crude measure of performance quality - did 
however decline.
It is possible then for job performance to improve 
whilst attitudes are constant, and it is therefore impossible 
to explain the performance changes by means of attitude 
changes. Other explanations can however be offered: in
the first case, the experimental employees were supplied with 
information on promotion prospects, whilst in the second, the 
employees were actually upgraded and received an appropriate 
pay increase. One can thus argue that the possibility or 
the actuality of a pay increase could have accounted for 
improved job performance.
Questions arising from the cases: mechanisms of 
productivity increases
.In each of the coses described a certain portion of the 
increased productivity (70d in the Conant Sc Kilbridge study)
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cnr : attributed to the substitution of productive time and •
proiuc tive labour for time and labour previously consumed in 
product handling etc. Yet there remains a portion of the 
increase which is not due to such methods improvements, and 
there also remains to be explained the improvements in 
product quality that are typically reported.
Let us first of all then consider productivity increases. 
In discussing job redesign of type II, it should be borne in 
mind that duties are not taken from workers of higher grades, 
and that the changes made are, by some standards, far from 
momentous. In the Biggane & Stewart study, cycle time was 
increased from 0.33 mins. to 1.5 mins; in the Conant & 
Kilbridge study, from 0.78 to 3*15 mins; in the Y/ild study, 
from 35-45 secs, to 2.4 mins. Assuming an effective daily 
working time of six hours, the same operation will still be 
repeated to a considerable degree, between one and two 
hundred times daily. On the other hand, it could be said 
the difference is very large - of the order of several hundred 
per cent, but considerable repetition does remain.
Secondly, v/e know that in several cases the workers 
involved were paid some form of incentive or pay rise, either 
in addition to a flat rate, or as a straight piecework 
payment. To be precise, in seven cases whose payment 
systems are known, three involved individual bonuses, one 
a group bonus, and another was an individual piecework 
syw ten. The median productivity increase in these cases 
'■''"r 37 ' \ but in two other cares with flat rate payment
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svrtens nroductivity increases of 2g and O.'j respectively
w~r ) recorded. ^  In none of these cases were incentives
i n : " winced, although the basis of their payment (individual or
group) did change in two of them. We also know that changes
of this sort (type II) have been introduced in several
cases (Wild, Biggane & Stewart, Conant & Kilbridge) to
reduce balancing losses, and increase labour utilisation.
If these points are combined, it could then be argued that 
under flow line organisation workers are sometimes obstructed 
in their efforts to earn money by 'balancing losses' and 
idle time (due to poor materials supply for instance). Under 
individual assembly, materials supply must be considerably 
improved for there is now a whole series of individual benches 
to be supplied with parts, rather than the starting point of 
one flow line, as previously. We could therefore argue that 
the elimination of balancing losses, and the improvement in 
materials supply, in conjunction with the existence of pay 
incentives, enable workers to increase their output in 
pursuit of earnings. Despecialisation of labour could thus 
be seen as a facilitating mechanism, rather than the cause, 
per se, of output increases.
Some indirect evidence that this may be the case is
provided by the findings in a number of studies. Thornely 
(72)Sc Valentine^ 7 investigated worker perceptions of their jobs, 
pre- and post-change, and found that workers on flow-lines 
■: unit; assembly did differ in their perceptions of variety 
and uae o-r abilities on the job. Thus it might seem that
- 2 7 6 -
sinze mere were perceptual changes on two job dimensions, 
t h e m  was some support for job redesign theory, a la 
Hackman et al. But against this should be set the fact 
that perceptions on other dimensions - learning, autonomy, 
future opportunities, task identity showed no such 
differences. How are we to evaluate the theory? I v/ould 
suggest that if we examine other attitude changes we can find 
some clue to this question. The two groups differed 
significantly in their appreciation of the effects of others' 
mistakes on their own work (seen to be less in unit assembly), 
and of the existence of 'starting and finishing in the job' 
(again, there was seen to be less on unit assembly). These 
perceptions are as one would expect in a situation where 
balance-delay time was eliminated, along with worker inter­
dependencies ; whilst, at the same time, only two of the job 
perception statements on which one would expect unit-flow 
line differences on the basis of Hackman et al., in fact 
show such differences.
(78-9)
If we consider the work of Tuggle a similar
argument can be made. On the flow line, balancing losses 
and worker inter-dependencies necessarily inhibit some 
workers from functioning at their optimum, or preferred 
pace. In the situation described by Tuggle, the workers 
on unit assembly were not only released from such inhibitions, 
but also had before them the incentive provided by a job 
and f . eh system. Once standard output had been attained,
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they v/ere free to leave off work and spend the remainder 
of the day in the recreation room.
Finally, in the Biggane & Stewart case, we were told 
that even before job enlargement workers were performing at 
135?o of standard performance, under a system of pay incentives 
(whether bonuses or piece rates, we were not told). In 
this situation then there appeared to have been no significant 
lack of motivation, pre-job redesign, whilst in the other 
cases, cited above, other sources of motivation, such as 
earnings and job quitting, could be identified, in contrast 
v/ith those postulated by job redesign theorists.
The third point we should consider in trying to explain 
the observed increases in productivity is the psychological 
effect of reduced, or eliminated, balance delay time, and 
waiting time. We saw from the Thornely & Valentine survey 
that workers in that situation recognised the reduction of 
'starting and finishing in the job.1 In other words, 
uninterrupted production runs were presumably longer. Next, 
it should be recalled that in the cases on which we have data, 
cycle times after redesign were always less than four 
minutes, anti operations were repeated at least 100 times 
daily. Finally, we should recollect the work of Baldamus 
on traction and repetitive work, the feeling of being pulled 
alon~ by the job in a steady rhythm. Such traction, Baldamus 
argued was not p -enent in jobs where there were frequent 
interrupti ons or r r- rated, sudden movements• We may therefore
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suggest, combining these pieces of information, that one 
effect of the transition to individual, or unit assembly, 
would be an increase in traction, a phenomenon associated, 
according to Baldamus, with higher production.
Finally, we should consider the role of labour 
elimination in securing productivity increases. Under 
category I job redesign, the volume of work to be performed 
was generally constant, and the process of redesign or 
despecialisation simply redistributed work loads among the 
workforce, a process which in itself, yields no economic 
benefit to management. Such benefits as were obtained 
derived either from eliminating certain grades of worker, 
or of raising average workloads following redistribution.
In either case the ’enriched1 workers must expend more 
effort if more output is to result. This is not the case, 
as we have seen, with category II redesign, whose two 
components have opposite effects on effort expenditure 
vis-a-vis productivity. The elimination of non-productive 
time means that more output can be produced in the same 
time v/ith the same degree of effort, but the corresponding 
attempt to reduce balance delay and waiting time marks an 
attempt to raise productivity by an intensification of 
labour, that is, by an increase in effort expenditure. 
.'Whatever combination of these strategies is employed, the 
net effect is that greater output ca.n be obtained from the
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snme number of v/orke.rs, or alternatively, that the same 
output can be delivered by fewer workers. Here, as with 
category I redesign, the elimination of labour depends 
to some degree on the state of the mar ket , and on whether 
production is stagnant or expanding. The type of labour 
eliminated is different however in the two cases: under
category II, we are dealing solely with production workers, 
under category I v/ith production and ancillary workers, 
and even if work volume is rising, certain ancillary 
functions may still be eliminated in category I, e.g. 
verification clerks in Janson, and the workers transferred 
elsewhere.
The findings in these various studies might, of course, 
be interpreted within the framework provided by one of the 
classical job redesign theories. The work of Hackman et al. 
specified particular task dimensions, such as variety, 
autonomy, and task 'wholeness,’ whose presence would generate 
improvements in job performance• Equally, Herzberg's theory 
might possibly explain some of the findings reported.
Y/hatever the merits of these theories, both are inadequate 
in the face of two salient features of the -cases reviewed. 
Firstly, neither could cope with the direct effects of flow 
line restructuring on such items as balance-delay time, or 
non-p • : uetive time. Secondly, neither could accomodate 
satun: e loril.y th • operation, and the effects, of pay
rises and incentives.
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In conclusion then we could argue that job redesign 
of type II increases work cycle time, and work traction, 
reduces non-productive time and enables workers on pay 
incentives to control their work pace and volume, and to 
raise their output more effectively than can be done on 
progressive flow lines*
Quality improvements
The cases which we have considered under category II 
have sometimes required workers to assume a degree of 
responsibility for the products or services in whose 
production they are engaged. This responsibility has either 
taken a 'formal' character, with workers carrying out no 
tests as such, but only being held accountable for the 
results of the tests carried out by other personnel. 
Alternatively, simple quality testing previously performed 
by one or more members of a flow line work team has been 
assigned to all individuals. On the other hand, there are 
cases where workers have not been granted even formal 
responsibility for product quality, or for quality testing. 
In terms of Hackman & Lawler's dimensions, the latter type 
of case should result in a much lower score on the job 
dimension of feedback, as well as slightly reducing the 
skill variety score, and we would therefore predict a lower
ft o
o o.t cunLxty imp rov ..-ion. Equally
accoun
idv.-i r work is essential to enable employees to experience
□onsibility ad a sense of achievement, as well as
ec ignition.
TABLE 14 Median ^age reduction in errors/defects after
reorganisation of flow lines 1
N
Where workers responsible for 
quality testing 8
U - 9
Where workers not responsible for 
quality testing 50.0% 4
ns
The difference predicted by Hackman and Herzberg is not 
borne out by these figures, but more striking than the 
(non-significant) 25% difference in product quality is the 
50%) improvement found even in the absence of worker 
responsibility for testing. How then are we to explain 
this improvement? Sirota has clearly specified the 
advantages of individual working, in this respect:
"First, management found it was much easier to 
identify the source of quality problems when 
they occurred because they knew which employee
had built which mechanism. It is interesting 
that while Job enrichment is often seen as an 
aspect of 'soft1 management, the fact is that 
traditional 'hard' management practitioners 
have so designed work that it is often 
impossible to find out who did what, and who 
is responsible for what. In other words, the 
extreme fragmentation of Jobs has served to 
violate basic and sound management oninoiples 
regardi * ' • acc ■ - g . "  2
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Similar points regarding the greater ease of assigning 
responsibility have also been made by Guest, and Biggane & 
Stewart, and indeed, worker accountability was accentuated 
in the latter case by means of a personal stamp, used to 
mark finished products.
Scientific management and reorganisation 
of flow lines
s
Certain French writers, as we saw in C h a p t e r h a v e  
attempted to characterise the practice of job redesign as 
a form of neo-Taylorism, a blanket conclusion which 
completely overlooks the very important differences in the 
forms of job redesign. The present category, of reorgani­
sation of flow lines, is the only one of our three categories 
which could merit the description of neo-Taylorism. The use 
of the prefix ’neo-' is, of course, intended to denote that 
in some way the current practice of job redesign differs 
from the classical principles and practice of scientific 
management, but I would like to suggest that category II 
redesign differs in no fundamental respect from any of these 
principles, and is in fact an example of the most thorough 
and consistent application of Taylorism. This can be seen 
most clearly in the individualism inherent in category II 
redesign: work teams were often broken up (sometimes this
v/as a cause of dissatisfaction among the workers) into 
individual units, and inter-depniencies were reduced or 
eliminated as much as possible. This individualisation
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■' the production process simultaneously increased managerial 
control over labour by ; casing the ‘visibility’ of the 
worker and his products, and allowing the exercise of very 
precise accountability. Typically, redesign of this kind 
has been associated with the use of individual incentives 
(in four cases, and a group incentive in a fifth, flat rate 
payments were known to have been used in two cases), again 
a practice strongly recommended by Taylor. Fourthly, the 
use of method study to eliminate non-productive and 
unoccupied time was wholly characteristic of Taylor’s desire 
to improve the efficiency of work methods, and to maximise 
effective working time within the v/orking day. Several 
components of Taylorism can therefore be seen at work in 
category II redesign.
In two respects however category II redesign may be 
thought to have violated Taylorist principles: firstly,
on the grounds that whereas Taylor sought to advance 
specialisation of labour, job redesign seeks precisely the 
opposite, namely to despecialise. And secondly, whereas 
Taylor sought to separate production and non-production 
labour, this category of job redesign, in some cases, 
unites them. On the question of specialisation it has 
already been established, first of all that Taylor regarded 
it as a means for achieving other objectives, in particular 
maximum intensity of labour. That this was the case was 
indicated by the fact that Taylor acknowledged there may
-284-
r s  t::ies be justification for 'job enlargement,' notably 
where this v/a. the only means in which a full day's work 
could, be assigned. But secondly, it was pointed out that 
v/hilst Taylorism may have appeared as specialisation of 
labour from the standpoint of the skilled worker, it 
assumed an altogether different appearance when looked at 
from the perspective of the semi- or un-skilled worker, 
typically the focus of category II redesign. In a number 
of cases reported by Taylor such workers performed the 
duties previously carried out by their skilled co-workers, 
and to that extent experienced a measure of job redesign.
On the question of quality control and inspection, 
in no case has the worker been assigned final responsibility 
for product quality, and, as we have seen, workers have 
been held accountable for their work. There are, of course, 
cases which violate the principle of separating conception 
and execution, where for instance, workers may be assigned 
formal, and final responsibility for their work. Such cases 
have been reported by Janson, and by Guest, but precisely 
because they have involved reorganisation of both production 
and ancillary labour, we would regard them as admixtures 
of job redesign types I and II, rather than deviant, and 
pure forms of type II.
o: conclus.ions on Gateeory II 
-••o" ".n'isvtion of flow lines
(■'!) I significant proportion of the improvement in 
procuctivjty under this category could be
explained by the substitution of productive 
for non-productive time, as a result of 
flow line reduction or elimination.
(b) Increases in productivity over and above 
these levels were attributed to the operation 
of pay incentives, such that workers, 
particularly on individual roles, could 
better control their output, and hence their 
earnings. In addition, there may well have 
been increases in productivity derived from 
labour elimination and raised workloads, 
although this was less clear.
(c) Quality improvements were attributed to the 
greater case of accountability by management 
and supervision.
(d) In a number of cases changes in job attitudes 
did not appear in the ways predicted by job 
redesign theories, although performance 
improvements were invariably found. Once 
again this reinforces the notion of job 
attitudes and behaviour as being under the 
control of separate mechanisms.
(e) This type of job redesign was analysed as a 
pure form o" Taylorism because of its use 
of individualised work roles; its attempt 
to increase accountability of labour; its 
use of pay incentives; and its use of
m ;thod study to raise productivity.
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1. Case index numbers are as follows: 60, 61, 67-71, 
73, 75, 76, 73, 96.
2. Sirota, D. 1973A, p. 13.
3. Case index numbers 59-62, 73-9, 82.
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8 CASUS JU THE literature 
F L E X I B L E  V/ORK G R O U P S
V/e come finally to the third category of job redesign, 
flexible work groups, in which a series of v/ork roles are 
collapsed, and the duties they entailed, formally assigned 
to a group of workers. Of course, this does not necessarily 
imply that specialisation of function is abolished, but it 
does in fact imply that it is no longer so rigid. Inequalities 
in workload can be evened out by an appropriate reallocation 
of group labour, after which workers may then return to their 
specialised roles. Labour intensification proceeds in this 
category of redesign through the 2-phase mechanism of 
flexibility, and the principle by which this operates has been 
illustrated in Chapter 4, in the discussion of socio- 
technical theory.
V/e can compare median productivity increases in cases 
with varying degrees of labour elimination to ascertain the 
general significance of this phenomenon:
TAELS 15 Median productivity increases in cases of
flexible v/ork groups as a function of 
labour elimination. 1
N
Labour elimination
No 1 cboa r e lirn in a tio .
D o n ’t k n o w
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mv-j., ; - nee in striking, and statistically significant, 
n.. • • j y though much reduced, tendency is evident in
the y : ;ures for pay rises. However the difference here is 
not statistically significant, although it should be noticed 
that a large number of cases, at least 66.9 have involved the 
provision of pay rises, either directly, or via the use of 
incentives, (see Table 2 above).
TABLE 16 Median productivity increases in cases of 
flexible work groups as a function of 
pay rises. 2
N
Pay rise given 24.0$ 21 U = 29.5
No pay rise given 25.0$ 3 ns
Don’t know 12.0$ 6
Case studies and experiments
Let us therefore examine some cases in detail so that 
we can then try to analyse the mechanisms at work. V/e have 
already discussed the case studies conducted by Trist, Rice 
et al., within the framework of sociotechnical theory, and 
will not repeat these descriptions here. It should simply 
be recalled that the analysis of those cases suggested the 
imoortaiice of pay rises and incentives, and of labour 
intensj fication and elimination, in accounting for 
perfd’^ 'ance improvements.
_o 0 1  _— C  / 1
Anot-.o” v! ill -known case is that of the General Pet 
Poods Pant, resorted on by Walton, and by Schrank. The 
General Pet Poods company was about to open a new plant, 
in a green field site in the U.S.A., at the time of the 
redesign project ^^0)^ Labour for the plant was recruited, 
and highly selected: of 1200 applicants for the jobs
available, only 63 were selected, of whom all were high 
school graduates.^ The new plant was technologically 
superior to existing plant and was expected to increase 
output substantially. In addition, however, the company 
decided to opt for a group working scheme. The work of 
processing had traditionally been divided into the roles 
of: unloading raw materials, storage, removal from storage,
mixing preparatory to processing, and production. Whilst the 
output end had been divided into the jobs of packaging, 
warehousing, and shipping. It was decided to amalgamate 
these work roles into two sets - a processing, and a 
packaging set, and place each under the jurisdiction of 
a flexible and autonomous team. The team would allocate 
labour as required, maintain production standards, and 
carry out maintenance, cleaning, and quality control duties. 
According to Walton, the operators much preferred this 
arrangement, and were less frequently bored compared with 
their counterparts in the older plant. Indices of satisfaction, 
such nr turnover a no absenteeism, were below the industry 
' v -o, and production averaged over four tons per man per 
d o y , com pared with !- ton per man per day in the old plant.
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: Lmorov at was due bo the more advanced technology, 
; not all. According to orthodox industrial engineering, 
based on precise allocation of function, 110 men were required 
for the Topeka plant. In fact, it was eventually staffed by 
72, a reduction attributed by Walton to 'team work, and the 
elimination of indirect labour.*
(123)
In a study of a textile plant , Janson reported that
the company was experiencing problems of inappropriate 
incentives, over-specialisation, and lack of overall goal 
commitment. The seven job grades were subsequently 
collapsed into four, with a utility worker taking over three, 
formerly separate, functions, and all workers being charged 
with responsibility for another function. All workers were 
paid on a group incentive, whereas formerly only the weavers 
had received any incentive, other workers being in receipt 
of flat rates. The team also elected its own 'leader,' and 
met once weekly to discuss production problems. As a result 
of these changes, loom efficiency (actual output as a rSage of 
theoretically possible output) rose by 5%, and poor quality 
material fell from 3.'; of total production to 0.2/S. The 
results were taken as confirmation of 'the five principles 
of job design’ adumbrated by Janson: variety, task identity,
client relationships, feedback, and vertical loading.
n'>ther case study^  conducted in an aluminium
Cc sting t in the U.S.A., v/as instigated on a much more
art: cm.intoi theorofcicaf b'-sis - a mixture of Uerzbergian 
an.: soc i o - technical theory. Under the old organisation of
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casting , 
operating, and 
truck driving and inspection.
” Phe main change in organisation was to form the 
jobs into a team; it involved the men’s rotating 
and learning each other’s jobs. The men would 
train each other on the jobs during regular 
working hours and would be paid an increment when 
they passed a theoretical and a practical test for 
each new occupation. This rotational system would 
allow the men to change jobs as decided among 
themselves in order to meet production needs as 
decided in the team.” 4
The changes were instigated in order to try and cope with
violent fluctuations in v/orkloads which necessitated equally
'violent' changes in manning levels, a procedure made
difficult by the insistence of the men on higher payment for
any extra duties undertaken. Over the duration of the
experiment, a period of 13 months, productivity rose by 12$,
7$ of which was attributed to the changes described.
Questions arising from the cases : the role of 
labour elimination
As in the cases of vertical role integration two questions 
arise here: firstly, if labour elimination is crucial in
securing productivity increases, what factors are responsible 
for such increases in the absence of labour elimination? And 
secondly, is labour elimination a mechanism responsible for 
rais'n- productivity, or a consequence of a productivity 
incr'1 which is itself due to other factors? There is, of 
course, a banger here in.assuming the efficacy of labour
v, . there were three groups of jobs: metal
furnaceman, and metal pouring; saw and shear
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: notion -id directing one's attention to explaining
■ Its. But ti saliency of labour elimination
hcc been shown already, both generally, across 30 cases in
this category, as well as in the more detailed accounts 
provided in this chapter, and in chapter four. Theoretically 
the notion that labour elimination can- raise labour 
productivity does make sense, and the questions being asked 
are of the form 'Are there problems with this explanation,
and if so, what are they?'
There are eight cases in which labour was not eliminated,
and for which we also have data on productivity. In one of
them, the data was invalid since it measured sales performance, 
an index which could have changed for a variety of reasons,
such as different pricing policies, sales concentration on
, (1 2 1) _ ,
more expensive items etc. In a second case, so many
other changes were introduced simultaneously, and the results
were taken after such a long interval of time, that the
results cannot be taken at face validity. This then leaves
( 1 1 T 1 8 )us with six cases, reported by Emery & Thorsrud, ' ,
Trist et al., ^^6) ^rcher, ^  ^ ^  Lindholm & Norstedt, ^  
and Rice,^1^1  ^ whose median productivity increase was 12.0% 
and four of which have already been discussed, in Chapter 4.
In the first of these, the study at Christiania Spigerverk, 
the work of wire-drawing was conducted at separate benches 
by individual workers, each of whom was responsible for 
1 on i ng the drawer, monitoring its progress, and rectifying 
any defects. It was proposed that a group of workers should
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take responsibility for a group of machines, and that labour 
should be eliminated. But why was labour elimination so 
vital in this case? The reasons were twofold, one social, 
the other technical. Socially, the strategy proposed by 
the authors involved only the first phase of what must, if it 
is to be effective, be a two-phase process. In other words, 
it sought to iron out inequalities in workloads, but it 
could only raise the average workload by eliminating 
labour. The reason why this was so brings us to the technical 
necessity for labour elimination. In certain cases of 
category III redesign, the production system may be working 
well below capacity, and be prevented from achieving capacity 
only, or largely, because of the inefficient distribution of 
workloads. Once this problem has been remedied (the first 
phase referred to above), production may increase under the 
impact of other forces and incentives. In the present case, 
of Christiania Spigerverk, it is clear that the situation 
was different, in that the production system was working 
near to capacity and machine downtime was fairly low. Thus 
whatever the incentives in operation, the system was working, 
in a technical sense, close to its limits, and the Emery 2c 
Thorsrud analysis amounted, in effect, to the assertion that 
the department was overmanned.
The study at Volvo (the Torslanda plant) was similar 
to nhe wire drawing case, insofar as the press shop was
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1 r. r.-. ly automated, and operator interventions were relatively 
few. Their role, in other words, was to monitor the machinery 
and carry out minor repairs. In both cases, Volvo and 
C:. ris tiania Spigerverk, labour productivity was not increased 
as a result of job redesign.5
In the Trist, and Rice studies, in the Durham coal mines 
and Indian textile mills respectively we find a different 
situation to the one described above. Although both production 
systems were highly mechanised, the role of labour was far 
more significant than in our two previous cases, for different 
reasons. In coal mining, only part of the cycle of coal 
getting was mechanised, and several aspects, such as filling, 
and stonework were labour intensive. In textiles, production 
runs could be as short as 20 minutes, after which the machinery 
would have to be emptied, and reloaded with yarn. Since each 
weaver was responsible for between 20 and 48 looms, there 
were clearly times when looms would be standing idle awaiting 
reloading. In both cases uneven distribution of workloads 
between different jobs restricted the performance of the 
technical system, as we have argued in Chapter 4, when 
discussing sociotechnical theory. In both cases, a theoretical 
averaging of workloads was followed by the raising of this 
average all round, the latter process being predicated upon 
the extension of pay incentives to all workers (in the Rice 
study) or to all jobs (in the Trist study).
In these- cases labour orndyotivlty could be raised 
withoat labour elimination because workers could influence 
production levels, and because the technical systems were
-2 97-
operating some way below the! r capacity.
The study (by Emery L Thorsrud) of the Fabrication
Dept., has also been discussed, in Chapter 4, and we will 
only repeat here the conclusion drawn there:
"Given the lack of 'variations,1 and, apparently, 
of line-balancing problems, it (the study - JK) 
does not in fact show the inadequacy of one man: 
one job, and the superiority of group working.
The problem was to break through a social, worker- 
imposed barrier, not a technical, or organisational
barrier, and several studies have shown that a
variety of techniques, productivity bargaining for 
instance, has been used successfully to raise out­
put under such conditions."
Finally, we come to the study by Archer, of the aluminium
casting plant, described above. There is a problem in
discussing this case since it is unclear (a) whether labour
was eliminated from the casting department, and (b) whether,
if it was, this was included in the assessment of the
productivity increase. In addition, the description of the
production process was inadequate to allow an assessment of
the relative contributions of machinery and labour to
productivity. Nevertheless, since it appears that labour
was not eliminated, the small productivity increase, 7%,
is not surprising, and is compatible with conclusions drawn
from the studies we have just reviewed.
These few studies then, suggest that productivity may 
be increased in the absence of labour elimination where a 
production system is working some degree below capacity, 
and where operator interventri ons can raise productivity.
On the other hand, where a system is working close to 
capacity, and where operator interventions cannot affect
■— 2 Q R —c.jo
productivity, increased i -x ib : .1 -,y of labour per se cannot 
b ? expected to raise productivity without labour elimination.
It follows therefore that for production systems operating 
close to their technical limit and -where operator inter­
ventions cannot raise productivity, the elimination of 
labour is a major factor in securing higher productivity. 
Schematically, we could suggest that, from the standpoint of 
productivity, the intensification of labour necessitates the 
elimination of labour. On the other hand, in production 
systems operating below capacity and where productivity can 
be increased by operator interventions, increased flexibility 
of labour, in conjunction with other incentives, may them­
selves raise productivity, and thus permit the elimination 
of labour.
The role of pay rises and incentives
In discussing these other incentives, it was suggested 
that pay rises, or the introduction of financial incentives, 
had been undervalued in the sociotechnical case studies.
In twelve cases for which we have information, pay incentives 
were introduced in two, whilst the remainder showed a transition 
from individual to group-based incentives, in line with the 
introduction of flexible work groups.^ 7/e also saw that 
median productivity increases were no higher in cases with 
pay rises (N -21) as compared to those without (li - 3) - 24.0/S 
as compared to 25.0,5 and that the difference here was not 
statistically significant, a finding which I am unable to
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explain. The question we should then ask is how were 
productivity rises obtained in these latter three cases.
The study by Locke et al., ^ ^ ^  involved job redesign 
of types I and III and has been described in Chapter 6. In 
the type III redesign, the employees were divided into 
teams and allowed to plan and allocate the various operations 
under their jurisdiction, as well as carrying out duties 
previously performed by a higher grade of labour (mail 
classification). The productivity of the control group rose 
by but that of the experimental group increased by A-2%.
How far was this attributable to improved job content, and 
attitudes to work? Although the data on attitudes were 
not separated for different groups in the study, there was 
almost certainly no significant change in job attitudes.
Both this effect, and the large productivity improvements, 
were attributed by the authors to anticipated pay rises, 
and to increased intensity of labour arising out of 
flexibility.
The second and third cases were reported by Rush, and
/ <| i \
were conducted in the U.S. Internal Revenue Service .
Work motivation scores and group production rates were 
as follows:
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TA.JL3 17 Results of the study by Rush (1971)
fl
ri Eg
£2
Grouo production 
rates
Pre-experimental 
Post-experimental
1.53
1.60
1 .25 
0.85
1.00 
0.54
1.42
0.85
'.York motivation 
scores
Pre-experimental 
Post-experimental
3. 7
3. 8
3. 7 
3. 4
3. 4 
3. 6
3. 7 
3. 4
Group error rates
1st half of 
experiment 
2nd half of 
experiment
.34
.44
.87
.90
.89
.76
.78
. .72
E - Experimental 
group
C - Control 
group
Unfortunately no information was provided on the content of 
the work motivation survey, which makes discussion of its 
significance somewhat difficult. Nevertheless it can be 
seen that for group I there was a correlation between work
motivation and production, but not for group II. In the
latter case production fell for experimental and control 
grouas, whilst work motive hion rose in the former group, and
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:'o 1: only in the latter. If we compare motivation and work 
lU'iity, i.e. error rates, it is also clear from the table 
that these phenomena can move in unrelated directions. There 
may v/ell be individual differences within these groups, such 
that work motivation scores, for some employees, did relate 
to performance, hut at the group level this was not so clearly 
the case. Rush attributed the confusing results to a variety 
of factors - inadequate changes in job content, insufficient 
attention to hygiene factors, and lack of interest on the part 
of the, mostly female, workforce in job content - but the 
information provided in the study simply does not alio?/ any 
adequate explanation of the findings.
Thus in the few cases without pay rises or incentives, 
inconsistent results have been obtained: performance improved
among some groups, but not others, v/hilst attitudes changed 
in some, but not all, cases.
Finally, let us consider, for individual cases, the 
evidence relating to theories of job redesign. According to 
the work of Herzberg, Hackman et al., and the socio-technical 
theorists, changes in job content should improve worker 
motivation and in turn lead to improved performance and 
job attitudes, or satisfaction. The studies by Locke et al., 
and by Rush, have already been discussed (above), and it was 
clear that in those cases there was no clear relation 
between work performance on the one hand, and job satisfaction 
or motivation on the other. Squally, during the first phase 
of the Christiania Spigerverk wire-drawing study, the attitudes
—  30?  —
'ive ?roup irs from scepticism to being 'positive,’
'in : f-> ::tio.' 'vv' ex?res~e:: with the faster passage of time
and i ncreased s :»5 i a 1 contact. Productivity, nevertheless, did 
not increase. In the study at the Aluminium Casting Plant by 
Archer, the Herzbergian J.R.S. was administered to workers 
both before and after a series of job changes, but statistical 
analysis revealed no significant difference between pre- and 
post-change scores. Again, despite this fact, the majority 
of workers were in favour of continuing the scheme, and 
productivity did increase by 7%. In a study by Kuriloff, 
which involved a large number of changes over a period of 
time, including changes in pay levels, participation, and 
job content, productivity rose by 35% whilst ’worker attitudes 
to the job’ remained unchanged. And finally, in a study in 
the Netherlands, a group of clerical workers was formed into 
an ’autonomous group* and allowed to distribute several clerical 
functions amongst themselves as they wished. Y/hilst productivity 
rose by 14% job satisfaction increased only slightly 
(unfortunately we do not have information on the way satisfaction 
was measured). More generally v/e can also examine productivity 
improvements in a range of cases as a function of the number 
of Hackman-type job dimensions that were altered, viz. 
autonomy, task identity, variety, responsibility for quality, 
feedback, and participation in decision-making. The coding 
of case studies in this category was performed long before 
any alternative hypotheses were thought of, and it is
""o ■ unlikely that the coding has been retrospectively
-303“
influenced by a desire to refute certain other hypotheses. 
’ — : the codin;~ of each individual case study proceeded in 
such a way that the .job dimensions were noted before the 
results, thus again helping to eliminate bias. Of course 
the information in the studies may be incomplete, and in 
addition, it is difficult to assess, from the studies, to 
what degree any particular dimension has been affected. 
Bearing these problems in mind we can look at the figures:
TABLE 18 Median productivity increases in cases of
flexible work groups as a function of 
number of job dimensions altered. 7
Job dimensions altered
2 - 3  22.0% 18 U - 71
4 - 5  28.0% 10 ns
It would seem that a job redesign hypothesis of the Hackman 
et al., Herzberg or sociotechnical theory type could not be 
supported by these figures.
There are, of course, studies in which job satisfaction 
and job perceptions changed in the directions predicted by 
job redesign theories, - • for example, in the cases of N0BO 
an I Norsk -ydro, reported by Emery Sc Thorsrud, and the case 
at Philips, described by van Vliet^1^ '. In all of these
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cesses employee output per man-hour and/or product quality 
improved simultaneously, but the fact that attitudes and 
behaviours have been shown to change independently of each 
other, indicates that attitude change is not an inevitable, 
or a necessary component in successful (economically 
speaking) job redesign. And it further reinforces the view 
that there may be separate mechanisms implicated in changing 
these two items.
Quality improvements
In discussing quality improvements in reorganisation of 
flow lines it was observed that the difference, in outcome, 
between cases where workers were assigned responsibility for 
quality and those where they were not, was less significant 
than the fact that substantial improvements in quality were 
found even in the latter type of case. To what extent can 
the theories of job redesign account for variations v/ithin 
this third category of job redesign? If we divide those 
cases for which quality data is available into those 
involving major and minor changes in job content, we can then 
compare the quality improvements in the two sets of cases.
The procedure for making this division is the same as that 
used above in relation to productivity increases.
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I ' Jedian quality imorov-^nents an a function of 
number of .job di mentions altered 8
Job dimensions 
altered
2 - 3
4 - 5
40.0% 
31.33
a u ^ 19
ns.
5
There are, of course, problems in interpreting data of this 
sort - for instance, we would need to know about the differences, 
if any, in quality standards between companies, and about the 
accuracy with which quality levels were assessed. Equally, 
we would need to consider, in any particular case, not only 
the actual degree of improvement, but also the degree of 
improvement that was possible. Nevertheless the data are 
suggestive, and indicate that job content changes do not 
appear to have a significant effect on quality improvements. 
Unlike flow line reorganisation, where worker visibility and 
accountability was increased, it is possible that the opposite 
process occurs in category III redesign since one man:one job 
allocations are replaced by a more diffuse assignment of 
responsibility to the group as a whole. Nevertheless 
substantial improvements in quality were obtained in both 
categories.
There is again insufficient information on the majority 
of these cases of flexible work groups tc enable any reasonable
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aooreciation of the factors which might be operating, but we
do know that in four cases, wage incentives were extended so
as to make them dependent on product quality as well as 
g
quantity. Three of these cases involved textile plants, 
where product quality is a variable subject to a large 
number of influences. Operator responsibility for quality 
was thus initiated, or perhaps extended, via the mechanism 
of financial incentives. The fourth case was at the Hunsfos 
paper processing plant in Norway, which was operated on a 
continuous basis. The effects of operator interventions 
were thus chiefly concerned with controlling variations in 
product quality, although interruptions in processing could 
also be influenced to some degree by the operators. The paid 
bonus however reflected only the latter degree of influence, 
and with its experimental extension to several indices of 
product quality, these same indices showed dramatic improve­
ments.
Scientific management and flexible work groups
The principles and practices of scientific management 
were developed under industrial conditions in which advance 
planning and allocation of work was possible, and where large 
and irregular variations in work volume, v/ere infrequent.
These industries included the .jobs of labouring, machining, and 
bricklaying, all of which allowed considerable operator control 
over production volume. If however we compare the industries
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which have employed flow line ^eorganisafcion (analysed as a 
C u - i a p p l i c a t i o n  of Taylorism) as opposed to flexible 
.v o ,--‘oups, we can discern a striking difference:
T ‘ 1 Til 20 Incidence of job redesign techniques, by
industry groups. 10
Industry groups Category Category
II III
Electrical engineering 27 7
Insurance et al. 9 5
Vehicles 2 5
Transport/communications 3 2
Clothing/f oo tv/ear 2 1
Metal manufacture 0 2
Mining 0 3
Textiles 0 7
Chemicals 0 9
Furniture 0 1
Retail 0 1
Food 0 5
Glass 1 1
Paper etc. 0 1
Mechanical engineering 1 4
Instrument engineering 0 0
Other 5 4
Don't know 4 7
54 65
The use of category II redesign has been concentrated in a 
relatively small number of industries (or groups of industries) 
electrical engineering alone accounts for jurt 50?$ of the cases, 
Within this industry group, job redesign has been further 
concentrated in assembly, or final assembly departments, that 
is, in situations where work volume is fairly predictable, and 
’ 'o, on non-powered conveyor • 1 no?, ? t ' a bject to operator
o o111 yo 1 . The indus t ri a 1 di soersion of '• a te :ory III reaesi gn
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first sight much ^r^afcer since no particular 
~roup dominates the figures* But the type of 
. - ;roups in which it has been used is quite different:
metal manufacture, raining, textiles, chemicals, food, glass 
and paper comprise 42$ of the total number of cases. These 
industries are highly capitalised, unlike the more labour 
intensive electrical engineering industry. In many of them 
production takes place on a continuous, or semi-continuous 
process basis, in which the role of the operator is rather 
different from that of his counterpart in product assembly. 
Work in the former industries more frequently involves machine 
monitoring, and attempts to reduce machine downtime, with 
the overall pace of production under a much smaller degree 
of operator control as compared to product assembly.
The work conditions are therefore rather different in 
many of these cases from those which furnished Taylor with 
the basis of his theory of scientific management. These 
differences - in machine control, process variability, and 
operator functions - require rather different techniques in 
order to achieve the Taylorian goals. Precise allocation of 
duties, and of workloads is rendered difficult by irregular 
variations in production volume, quality, machine functioning 
etc. Thus on certain occasions operators may be overworked, 
on others underworked. As we have argued elsewhere (Chapter 
4) the significance of socio-t^chnical theory and of type Ilf 
re-; osi.gn, to which it gives sc is that it has, if only 
Licitly, da see a :d the Limiting conditions beyond which 
•ecise allocation ol work on indi • uni basis becomes
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increasingly difficult. lienee the recommendation that work 
groups take responsibility for a series of duties. Of course, 
there will be variations in workload even at the group level, 
but it can be shown mathematically that these will constitute 
a smaller proportion of total man-hours, than would be the 
case were duties allocated individually. In general then, 
we may suggest, at this stage that category III redesign has 
abandoned certain features of scientific management - 
individual allocation of work, accountability, and payment - 
but has done so to the extent that it has encountered limiting 
industrial conditions beyond which scientific management 
principles become less effective in achieving their stated 
goals.
There are, however, two immediate objections which may 
be raised against this argument: firstly, it could be pointed
out that socio-technical theorists have recognised the limits 
of applicability of their own work, but have conceptualised 
this in terms of large task size, rather than product/process 
variability; secondly, it could also be pointed out that the 
brief discussion (above) of industrial variability and 
category III redesign referred only to 42% of the cases 
listed - what about the other 58fj?
Both Engelstad, and Emery Sc Thorsrud have argued that 
’job enlargement1 (approximately equivalent to category II 
redesign) may be used successfully (to improve productivity, 
quality, worker attitudes etc.) where the average size of
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tar. ;s is sach that tniey can be carried out by indivi 7 nils.
P::'•'r■ m.ably, therefor ;, they have in mind the assembly of 
small preducts, for instance, where a ’whole' job may be carried 
out by a single worker. In capitalised, process industries, 
on the other hand, group working may be more effective since 
’whole* jobs are so large as to be beyond the capacity of 
individuals, and frequently transcend shift boundaries, as 
in coal mining for instance.
It is difficult to effect a direct confrontation between 
these two ideas - variability and task size - for appreciating 
the sphere of effectiveness of category III redesign, since, 
to some degree the tv/o features empirically coincide.
Product or process variability tends to be associated with 
continuous or semi-continuous process industries, such as 
chemicals, where ’whole’ jobs tend to be difficult to accomodate 
within the orbit of an individual. And conversely, where 
’whole* jobs are possible for individuals, this tends to be in 
more labour intensive, and routine, processes such as assembly.
Nevertheless, it has been shown why flexible work groups 
are theoretically necessary under these conditions, and the 
way in which their functioning can explain changes in 
productivity size, Merely to observe that group working is 
required in order to span a large task does not explain why, 
or how, it is able to increase productivity.
On the second objection, it is true that many of* the 
c, *ory 113 jvc •• rj gn cases were conducted in situations where 
- " v  not have seen conside 'able variations in pr : Lon,
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and hsnce inequalities in workloads, such as furniture 
manufacture, vehicles, insurance, and electrical engineering. 
However, there is often insufficient data to make a judgement 
on this issue. In other cases it is possible to suggest 
that flexibility of labour was not a major factor in raising 
productivity. For instance, in the study by Bryan of the 
Cummins Engine Company, productivity of labour on a new 
production line was raised ’theoretically' by collapsing 
several jobs into individual roles, and thereby reducing total 
labour requirements. In addition, labour was flexible betv/een 
jobs, but the major increase in output per man hour had already 
been achieved. In the study at N03O, reported by Emery & 
Thorsrud, it has already been observed that output was only 
raised when the workforce were induced to cease restriction of 
output. The productivity rise in this case, again, was not 
predicated chiefly on labour flexibility. In the Philips 
study, reported by van Vliet, method study was used to 
reduce unit production time, but over and above this 
productivity rose only a few per cent.
To sum up then, we may simply re-iterate the conclusions 
reached earlier, in Chapter 4. Insofar as category III 
redesign may be seen as a new ’best way’ of organising work 
under conditions of product and/or process uncertainty, it 
may be said to have preserved the form, though not the content, 
of Taylor's ’one best v/ay.' At the same time one should also 
notice the predominance of pay incentives and pay rises in 
this category of job redesign. Nevertheless the emphasis
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on :;roup working and on flexible work assignments serve to 
differentiate this form of redesign from classical scientific
management.
Summary of conclusions
(a) The elimination of labour was said to be crucial 
in raising labour productivity where workers had 
little impact on the production system, and where 
the system was operating close to its technical 
capacity. Productivity increases resulted from
a two-phase process in which, firstly, workloads 
were theoretically averaged, and secondly, after 
elimination of labour, they were generally raised.
(b) Although the second phase was not always found, 
productivity could still be raised through the 
use of pay rises and incentives in production 
systems where workers’ efforts could increase 
output, and where the systems were functioning 
some way below capacity.
(c) Both the sociotechnical and the task design 
theories were said to be inadequate in interpreting 
variations in productivity increase either v/ithin, 
or between, cases.
(d) Once again cases were found in which job 
performance increased, whilst attitudes were 
unchanged, and in which attitudes improved whilst
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job performance worsened. These cases were said 
to support the dual-mechanism theory of job 
attitudes and performance advanced earlier.
(e) Data on quality improvements was not available 
in many cases, and was difficult to interpret, 
but it was noted that in at least four cases, 
bonuses or incentives were introduced for quality 
improvements.
(f) Category III redesign was analysed as a form of 
job redesign which had implicitly discovered the 
limiting conditions - product and/or process 
uncertainty - beyond which certain Taylorist 
principles, e.g. individualisation of work roles, 
enhanced individual accountability, ceased to be 
the most effective (economically) form of work 
organisation.
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Introduction to the cars
The examination of a large number of cases, in the 
form of a literature review, can suggest hypotheses and 
mechanisms, which must then be explored in detail in 
individual cases. Gonversly, the individual case may 
illustrate the operation of certain mechanisms, but to 
discover the generality of their operation we must examine 
a wide range of cases. The two approaches - the literature 
review and the case study approach - are therefore both 
necessary and complementary, although both of them have 
problems.
The case study method is limited to the extent that 
the applicability of any findings is unknown, because of 
doubts about the representativeness of the particular case 
in question. One may find for instance that changes in 
payment and control systems adequately account for changes 
in job performance in a particular instance of job redesign. 
But all this would show is that such factors can explain 
job redesign outcomes: it wo hid not show that they do in
• • explain these outcomes, generally speaking. And until 
one has tested such an account in a large number of cases 
remain ;ibi lity t1 fc t he i p t c'ises t re
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in some way special, or deviant. The aim of this chapter 
cannot then be to show that the theory of job redesign 
offered in this thesis does explain job redesign outcomes: 
it can only have the more limited aim of showing that, in 
a number of cases, this theory could explain the events of 
interest.
Ideally, a case study in job redesign would allow one 
to compare the classical and the present theories of job 
redesign in terms of the four central, classical, propositions. 
In other words, one would be able to conduct a before - and - 
after study, using control groups, and to partial out the 
effects of changes in job content, payment, control, methods 
changes and labour elimination, either empirically, by 
creating different experimental conditions, or analytically, 
by means of statistical techniques. For reasons advanced in 
Chapter One, this ideal was impossible to attain, and none 
of the three cases in this Chapter approximates very closely 
to it. In no case was it possible to obtain before - and - 
after data, as all of the changes had been introduced prior 
to my arrival, or, in one case, had not been introduced at 
the time of my departure. In none of the cases was it 
possible to obtain attitudinal data, and only one of the 
cases employed something resembling a control group whose 
performance was to be monitored. In addition to these 
deficiencies must be added the author's own biasses. At 
the time when the data reported here was in the process of 
collection, I had not yet developed the theory of job
-321-
redesign as presented in this thesis, although elements 
of it were clearly beginnin ; to form, an! take shape. It 
must be borne in mind therefore that my own predilections 
may have biassed (in some v/ay) the collection of data in 
these cases, and thus resulted in misleading accounts.
Paced with these deficiencies it vyould be tempting to 
dismiss the cases as being worthless, but needless to say
I would not consider this to be a justifiable or a wise
course of action. The material in these cases is short of 
ideal (in some cases by a long way), but it is still of 
interest because of its novelty. This applies particularly 
to the Meccano case, where there were observed variations 
in job performance that were independent of job content, 
but associated with changes in pay systems. In other words 
the situation was one in which (a) job content was changed, 
and (b) after a period of time, the pay system was changed.
This is not an ideal test of the classical and the current
theories of job redesign, but it is certainly a great 
improvement on cases with simultaneous variations in job 
content and systems of pay, which are only too common in 
the literature. The case also illustrates the Taylorist 
logic inherent in reorganisation of flow lines.
The relation between scientific management and job 
redesign has been treated in this thesis mainly in historical 
and theoretic'..1 terms, an! T have inquired whether changes 
in job content end their ovtcorner may be seen as compatible 
■•v; ~h tenets of scientific mar" ; it. Part of the argument
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that job redesign has 'abandoned* scientific management, rests 
on the identification of the latter with labour specialisation, 
which I have shown to be erroneous (Chapter 2). But one can 
still ask about the relationship between job redesign and 
specialisation, and ask, in particular, about their alleged 
incompatibility. By focussing on the attitudes of managers 
in a job redesign exercise, the United Glass case explores 
the job redesign - specialisation relationship in a very 
concrete manner. But more importantly, it also sheds light 
on a neglected party, and a neglected phase, in the imple­
mentation of job redesign. The author attended many meetings, 
and held many discussions with managers in the United Glass 
company, and was thus able to collect information on the 
preparations by the management for an exercise in job redesign.
The remaining case was selected for inclusion, in part, 
for the same reason: it had been introduced without the
formal accompaniment of job redesign theory, seminars on 
motivation, visits from consultants etc. It was interesting 
therefore to see how it compared with those based more 
explicitly on contemporary theories of motivation and to 
consider its economic bases. Apart from that, the case was 
of some relevance to one of the four central propositions 
id ratified above, regarding the mutual interests of workers 
and employers. In addition this case is of some relevance 
to discussions about the future of job redesign. Although 
none of the cases relates to the third proposition - on 
job performance, and job attitudes - this was deemed to
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ha v .• received sufficient attention (empirically) in the 
previous chapters.
Each of the three case.; also fits into the categories 
of job redesign employed in the previous chapters. The 
United Glass study is an instance of category I, vertical 
role integration; the Meccano case, of category II, 
reorganisation of flow lines; whilst the Dairy case 
belongs to category III, flexible work groups.
A number of additional case studies and investigations 
were carried out, and the project at British Rail for instance, 
has been referred to elsewhere. But these cases are either 
inadequate, and/or merely duplicate some of the points which 
emerge from the three main cases.
~124~
CASE 1 - MECCANO LTD.
The Study
The data on which this case study is based are derived 
from three principal sources. Firstly, I have drawn heavily 
on three of the reports produced by the firm of consultants 
which recommended, and supervised, the introduction of unit 
assembly. The first report outlines their analysis of the 
assembly-line and its deficiencies, and contains a list of 
recommendations for change. The second report describes the 
results of the first experimental trial of unit assembly, 
and the final report evaluates the unit assembly one year 
after its introduction into a v/hole shop. Secondly, I have 
consulted company records for data on performance and pay 
levels, absenteeism, and certain parameters of production. 
Thirdly, I conducted interviews with representatives of both 
management and unions, including three interviews with the 
Works Manager, and one interview each with the Training 
Manager, Work Study Officer, Unit Assembly Superintendent,
Unit Assembly* Foreman, and the Chief GMWU Shop Steward.
In addition I participated in a discussion about UA involving 
the Works, and Training Managers, and the Work Study Officer, 
and spent some time observing both the assembly line and UA 
in operation. Unfortunately it proved impossible to conduct 
interviews with, or administer questionnaires to, the employees 
themselves. This means that direct statements about employee 
altitudes and motivation cannot be made, but we do have data 
or: changes in employee behaviour in response to changes in
* hereafter abbreviated tr> 'JA.
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their work situation. Since the princ.i oal concern of 
this thesis has been with explanations of employee 
behaviour, i.e. job performance, the absence of attitudinal 
data is not critical, although it does weaken, somewhat, 
the conclusions drawn from the case. In addition I have 
also examined a number of independent reports of the 
Meccano exercise.^
~3 26~
Tie Comoany and the 'tin 8:
In 1971, when the work reorganisation project began, 
Meccano Ltd. was registered as an independent company, and 
existed as such, but the same problems which led the manage­
ment to hire consultants to examine their production processes 
simultaneously resulted in the Company being taken over by 
Airfix Ltd. Although the takeover has affected the autonomy 
of Meccano management, the work reorganisation continued 
without interference.
The plant itself is situated in an industrial complex 
which is itself located in a working class suburb of 
Liverpool. In 1971 the plant employed 1200 workers, but with 
the onset of the world economic recession, the Company saw 
its sales fall, and resorted therefore to redundancies and 
non-recruitment of staff. By 1976 the workforce had fallen 
below 1000, and no recruitment had taken place for at least 
twelve months. During this period a certain proportion of 
the workforce quit their jobs, or were dismissed, thus 
contributing further (by so-called natural wastage) to the 
reduction of the labour force.
The company manufactures toy cars at its Liverpool 
plant, whilst Meccano sets themselves are produced elsewhere. 
The products are aimed at the uoper end of the toy market, 
and in 1976, a. single toy could cost between £2 and £5.
Live market itself i b o t h  competitive and unstable, and the 
two features are interlinked. tlthougn. there are few other
-3 27~
producers of scale model cere etc., selling in the British 
market, there are numerous companies producing cheaper toys 
made, for instance, from thermoplastic. Empirically, the 
company has discovered that during economic recessions, 
sales of its own products slump as consumers divert their 
spending to cheaper products. During certain periocfe therefore 
the company does compete with manufacturers at the lower(price) 
end of the market. In addition to this competition and 
instability enforced by the business cycle, these also exists 
an instability intimately connected with the product itself.
It has been found that sales of a new model are very high 
during the first months of its life, but fall off rapidly 
thereafter, eventually stabilising at a much lower level.
This phenomenon is, in all probability both cause and effect 
of the way toys are marketed by the majority of world 
manufacturers. They are intended to sell over a relatively 
short period, thereafter to be replaced by a new model, and 
as sales of the new model rise, those of older models fall.
By means of this continuous replacement of models, the 
manufacturers are able to maintain their sales at a higher 
level than would otherwise be the case. This continual 
transformation of the product is a phenomenon which has 
considerable repercussions on the production process within 
the plant, as we shall now see.
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"'iv: production orocc. s •
The process of producing toy cars comprises, from the 
standpoint of labour, a series of quite simple processes.
The final product typically contains no more than about 
10-12 separate pieces, and of these only the major ones az*e 
actually produced at the Liverpool plant. The base of the 
cars is made from an aluminium alloy which, after melting, 
is run into a mould and rapidly cooled, before being 
released into a hopper. This process is repeated at (a 
maximum of) sixteen machines arranged in a row along one side 
of a rectangular room, with an aisle on the other. The body 
of the vehicle in made from thermoplastic: tiny pellets are
melted down, run into moulds, and released into hoppers, and 
again each process is repeated on a series of identical 
machines. These two operations are paid at a higher rate 
than the final assembly work, and are conducted almost entirely 
by men.
The remaining parts that go to make up the complete 
model are manufactured elsewhere, and delivered to the 
Liverpool plant for final assembly. Before reorganisation 
the assembly work was divided into major assembly and sub- 
assembly, and, in addition, there were a number of ancillary 
operations performed at indiva wop 'laces. The assembly
operation before reorgauioation, was carried out by two 
teams, each of 10-12 workers, ted either sice of a moving 
conveyor. Service *..<era . >ul : feed >arts • . the metal
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ch~G-’-is, onto one end of the conveyor, and each worker in 
turn would pic•: it off the moving conveyor, add their piece, 
and replace the product on the conveyor, whence it would pass 
to the next worker. In general there were between nine and 
twelve workers on each side of the belt, and each one would 
be kept supplied with their particular piece of the model 
by one of the service workers. Again, as with the individual 
ancillary operations, cycle times are short, between 5 and 
10 seconds on average, with a complete product usually taking 
just over a minute to be fully assembled.
The ancillary operations consisted for example of 
punching holes in the metal base of the car using a simple 
hand press; another operation involved placing 'transfers' 
onto the body of the car. Each of these ancillary operations 
was performed by a number of individuals arranged in rows of 
tables and chairs. At each workplace would be a tray into 
which parts were placed by a service worker, and a tray into 
which the parts were dropped after whatever operation had 
been performed on them. The work does not require the 
development of any fresh skills, but simply the co-ordination 
of hands and eyes in order to maintain a high rate of 
production. The cycle time is often less than five seconds 
so that the same operation may be repeated as often as 500 - 
600 times each hour. Typically, the workers on these jobs 
are young, unmarried girls, and the rate of pay is lower 
than most jobs in the factory.
In addition to the workers described hitherto, there 
were numerous other workers engaged in internal and external
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t.rannoortation, in storage an ; load ins, maintenance, repair, 
catering, clerical and administrative work, management and 
its specialisms, such as finance, sales, personnel, work 
study, supervision, etc. and in general labouring throughout 
the plant. When asked about industrial relations in the 
plant, most of those interviewed claimed that in general they 
were very good, v/ith the exception of one or two 'black spots.' 
At the time of this study, and indeed, for the past few years, 
management had been engaged in negotiations with some of the 
'skilled' workmen over grading and regrading, but there 
seemed no reason to disbelieve their general assertion that 
industrial relations were generally quite peaceful. The 
majority of the assembly, and ancillary workers, belonged to 
the GMWTJ, whilst the 'skilled' workers, such as the repair and 
maintenance workers, and the toolroom v/orkers, belonged to 
the AUEW, engineering section.
The workers with whom this case study will be concerned,
namely the assembly workers, were paid according to a mixed
time rate and output incentive scheme. All received a basic
rate of pay for forty hours (or thirty hours in the case of
the 9-3 shift, of whom more later) which amounted in the
early 1970s to approximately 6733 of earnings for 100,o
p
Standard Performance.
background to the work reorganisation
Unemployment in the Liverpool area, although it remained 
high throughout the 1960s, was a rather different problem
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r'rom the situation today. ->r -duction was expanding in the 
late 1960s and early ’70s, arid at the lower end of the 
labour market there were a considerable number of jobs.
Demand for Meccano's products was rising, and production was 
sufficiently profitable to justify expansion, so in the late 
19o0s, the labour force was swelled by the recruitment of 
almost one hundred young married women. Because the majority 
of them had children they were employed for six hours each 
day, instead of eight, from 9 o'clock until 3 p.m. This 
expansion of production however, although an inevitable and a 
necessary response to rising demand, nevertheless served to 
expose a number of deficiencies in the production process, 
viewed from the standpoint of distribution in the market.
We have already explained the basis on which the 
production and distribution of toys is maintained at a high 
level, that is through rapid model changes. In the late 
1960s and '70s, this process was intensified, and the 
number of new models produced each year increased. This 
increased turnover of models placed considerable strains on 
a production system which was designed primarily for medium 
and long term mass production. Although an assembly line 
can quite easily cope with small product changes, it does 
have the drawback that during the changeover all of its 
workers are idle (unless, of course, they can be employed 
elsewhere). The increase, frequency of new products thus 
had the effect of increasing the oroportion of working time 
during which the workers were 'idle.' waiting for fresh 
suoplies of parts in order to begin the assembly of a new
3 3?-
oroduct. But there is also a cumulative effect to be 
considered. As the ran^e of the company's products grew 
in size, the number of products that could be re-ordered 
by a wholesaler or retailer grew likewise and once again 
the effect on the production system was the same. It had 
to bear an increased number of product cnangeovers, and 
hence produced an increased amount of.idle time (or waiting 
time) on the part of the workforce. To some degree these 
greater demands could be, and indeed were, handled by 
rationalisation of incoming orders. The Production Manager 
would hold up orders for a particular product until he had 
a sufficient number to provide a production run of at least 
one day’s duration or more. But however satisfactory this 
may have proved as an interim measure, it failed to tackle 
the root of the problem, which was the production system 
itself.
There were, of course, a range of alternative solutions
open to the company: it might for instance have attempted to
3
standardise its products. Or it might perhaps have tried to 
reorganise the system of distribution to wholesalers so that
they held both a greater volume and a greater range of products
in stock. The decision to tackle the organisation of
production was taken however, because of a conjuncture of
problems and circumstances, as a result of which it appeared
at the time that such a decision might help solve several
emblems simultaneously. Firstly., with the continued exnansion
of local production throughout the late 1960s, the turnover
of labour increased substantially, .'caching an annual rate
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o] 50-60.o in one year. Al thouas this turnover was confined 
to approximately one third of the workforce, the other two- 
thirds being more long term employees, it nevertheless 
represented a degree of disruption to assembly line working. 
V/orkers who quit did not always give the required notice 
(usually this was one week) or indeed give any notice at all, 
and their departure, as well as entailing recruitment and 
training costs had an effect on production similar to that 
of absenteeism. The effect of absenteeism, the second 
problem confronting management, was altogether more serious, 
for two reasons: firstly, it was, by definition, unpredictable.
Although the management knew that it generally experienced a 
weekly absenteeism rate of 10-15%, it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to tell with any accuracy which section of the 
workforce, and hence of the production process, would be 
affected. But absenteeism was particularly costly where 
production was so organised that the v/orkers were highly 
interdependent, as was the case with the assembly line.
The third, and the final, reason predisposing management 
to examine the organisation of production, was not, as 
Harvey suggested, that an assembly line necessarily functions 
at the pace of its slowest member. The effect of the slower 
operatives depends to a considerable degree on their location 
within the line: if they are at the start of the assembly
process, then th . line wii." unction at their pace, whereas 
if chey are placed towards Uue end of the line their effect 
on the overall speed v/i I much reduced. The third reason
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for the management's 'n oo :• ;a* derive:* from the composition
of the capital invested, in production. The amount of 
machinery was small compared to the volume of labour 
employed, and the assembly lines in particular were highly 
labour intensive. With labour comprising such a high 
proportion of the costs of production, it was not surprising 
that management's thoughts turned to labour when it seriously 
began to consider the necessity for improvements in efficiency. 
A firm of consultants was therefore invited to study the 
production system and prepare an initial :~eport outlining 
possible ways of reducing costs and/or improving efficiency.
The consultants' report
4
The report, produced in 1971, made two chief proposals: 
firstly, that assembly line working should be abolished and 
replaced by individual assembly; and secondly, that the 
requisite re-assessment of payment schemes, standard 
performances etc., should be carried out on the basis of 
MTM 2 analyses of the production process. The results of 
implementing the proposals would be method improvements, 
and a reduction in labour and overhead costs per unit of 
output. As it was anticipated that earnings per operator 
would rise under the new work scheme, what the consultants 
were in fact proposing was a signif'ic"!V,t increase in the 
productivity of labour. The current assembly lines were 
soon as being subject to two major problom.s: it was
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difficult to balance out the total workload, so tout some 
operations took longer (or shorter) to perform than others 
with the result that some of the total labour time went 
unused. And secondly, because some operators had occasionally 
to work faster than others, and also because there were times 
when all the operators had to work fast, there was a tendency 
for product quality to be rather low. Consequently a not 
inconsiderable number of workers had to be engaged on checking 
and adjusting the assembled products as they came off the line. 
These, and other considerations led the consultants to propose 
eight criteria which ought to be satisfied by any proposed 
changes in the organisation of work, and they were as follows:
i. provision of facilities for identification 
and quantification of methods improvements
and for ways of "making these acceptable to 
labour".
ii. provision of means for more accurate assembly 
balancing and for reducing the frequency of 
component handling.
iii provision of simple work data for use in
preliminary costing of operations.
iv. simplification of wage calculations.
v. provision of a basis for sound labour cost 
control which allows supervision to take 
remedial action.
vi. an increase in the pr porti >n of operatic 
covered by measured standards.
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vii. reduction in ihe e.'tect of lateness and 
absenteeism by Increasing flexibility 
while minimising the need for standby 
operatives.
viii. "Give employees a wider responsibility, 
thus providing JOB ENRICHMENT." (1971,
Capitals in original).
Of course not all of these objectives were attained in 
practice: for instance, the payment system was left sub­
stantially unaltered. And indeed some objectives, such as 
item i., may best be regarded purely as selling points, as 
there seems no & priori reason why the progressive assembly 
system could not result in methods improvements. Neverthe­
less, there is one crucial point to be noticed about these 
recommendations, and it is one of v/hich we shall have more 
to say later. The provision of 'Job Enrichment,' ostensibly 
a restructuring of work to enhance v/orkers' motivation to 
perform 'well,' was accompanied by a series of other proposals 
for achieving much the same purpose. The productivity of 
labour was to be raised in various v/ays, including for 
example, the elimination of non-productive work, such as 
handling and rectification. This seemingly comprehensive 
strategy was no mere case of 'overkill,' and nor, can it be 
understood as an integrated approach to the problem of 
raising productivity, For as we shall see, in practice, 
although there wore undoubtedly elements of job * enrich lent* 
in the consultants' proposals, the r osn1 •. ■- that were actually
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attained, owed far more to the traditional methods of labour 
intensification, methods improvements, and pay increases, 
than to any changes in 1 intrinsic motivation* '
But before turning to examine the recommendations in 
practice, it is worth dwelling on some of the theoretical 
assumptions underlying them, for it then will become clearer 
that the use of the terra 'job enrichment,' is to say the 
least, somewhat ambiguous. One of the chief proposals, as 
we said, was that the production process should be reorganised 
with the aid of MTM.2 a technique of work measurement. The 
whole series of MTM techniques - Methods Time Measurement - 
differ from more conventional work study in one crucial 
respect. Whereas in the latter, a particular operation is 
assessed by first analysing it into its constituent elementary 
motions and then timing each motion in turn, with MTM one 
already has a series of elementary motion times ready to 
hand. For MTM assumes,
"  that manual work in industrial conditions can
be regarded as consisting of different combinations 
of a relatively small number of basic motions." 5
and MTM practitioners have therefore spent a considerable
amount of time and energy in developing catalogues of the
times required to perform these "basic motions." In theory,
one can then provide an accurate assessment of the time
that would be required fo" any piece of work, regardless
of whether it has ever before been performed. The members
of work study departments, again in theory, would thus be
relieved of the necessity eve" to apoear on the shop floor,
watch in hand. MT. .2, a development of ’ .1, is a system
--n.q-
: :i which times are produced and recorded not only .for "basic
[notions” but also for combinations of these motions. Those
with some historical perspective on their subject may well
wonder where they have heard such ideas before, and if they
were to pursue their suspicions to the pages of Frederick
Taylor's 'Piece Rate System,' or 'Shop Management,'^they
would have them confirmed. On pages 177-178 of the latter,
Taylor expressed his long felt wish to see the compilation
of a book in which the times for all of the elementary
motions in a number of trades, would be clearly set out, for
use by employers. Now although Taylor recognised that people
worked at different rates, he eventually came to deny that
variability in working methods was compatible with the demand
for efficiency. For this goal to be attained it was essential
to combine those elementary motions which together constituted
7
"the one best way" of performing a particular operation.
This 'one best way' was to be determined by scientific 
analysis of elementary motions and by synthesis of "the
quickest and the best movements ". It was then the task
of the management to train workers in the 'one best way' of 
working, and to transfer, or otherwise eliminate, v/orkers 
who were revealed as other than first-class in this particular 
'trade.’
MTM.2, as we have already said, is based on a 
remarkably similar philosophy. The numerous critiques by 
psychologists of the idea chat ~he re is 'one best way' of 
working for all v/orkers, and tneir assertions that patterns
-339-
of movements must be allowed to vary in order for efficiency
to be achieved - these points have apparently made little
g
impact on the consultants in our present study. Under 
MTM.2, v/orkers are trained to perform the series of move­
ments which, according to the analysis using MTM.2, are the 
most efficient and effective for task performance. Any 
notion of the existence, or value, of individual variation 
in preferred working methods is excluded, or so it would 
seem. But we then come to the curious contradiction - for 
having advocated the use of MTM.2, the consultants also 
advocated '.job enrichment,1 a concept which is generally 
taken to refer, at the most abstract level, to the maximum 
development of the individual through his/her work. To 
achieve this purpose, jobs are redesigned, according to 
Herzberg for instance, so as to provide the employee with 
responsibility, a sense of achievement, the chance to learn, 
and to 'grow,' and with recognition for their efforts. And 
Hackman et al., argued that job redesign was to involve the 
delegation of authority, and the enhancement of the employee's 
freedom and discretion to v/ork at his own pace, using his 
own methods, ideas which also figure prominently in the work
10of sociotechnical theorists such as Trist, Emery and Gulowsen.
The use of i.lTM.2 would seem therefore to conflict with 
at least one of the prescriptions generally featured in a 
programme of job redesign, as v/ell as with the principle of 
individual development. It is of course true that employees 
in this case study were to be given control over their work
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pace, to be assigned, more responsibility for product quality, 
and were to assemble a whole product instead of only part 
of the product, all of which are prescriptions strongly 
recommended by job redesign practitioners. We will see 
however that the use of I'TM.2 in a certain way does not 
merely violate a particular job redesign prescription, i.e. 
choice of working method, but more importantly, it signifies 
a profound contradiction in the way job redesign was under- 
stqod in this context. Having pointed out some of these 
contradictions in theory, let us look and see how they 
manifested themselves in practice^, and how they were ultimately 
resolved.
—  34-1 —
The crmgeover to unit assembly
Both consultants and management were confident that 
their scheme would be accepted by the unions and the 
workforce, not only because it promised more interesting 
work and relief from the continual grind of the assembly line, 
but because of the extra pay. The transition to unit assembly 
(UA), began in late 1971 with a series of observations on an 
assembly line team. These were done to establish a base 
line against which changes in work methods and organisation 
could be assessed, and they included measures of total output, 
number of hours actually worked, the amount of time spent on 
rectification and in waiting, and the total payroll for the 
operation. It was then possible to calculate the total time 
taken to produce a toy, and the labour cost per toy. This 
team of workers, in addition to a number of foremen and 
supervisors was then transferred to a unit assembly area 
where they were trained for two months on the new operation. 
Each v/orker on main assembly now sat at a specially designed 
work station, which consisted of a work surface and a series 
of trays, stacked on top of one another, in which were laid 
out the various pieces to be assembled. The operator sat 
facing this cluster of trays, assembled the product on the 
work surface and then placed it on the conveyor line beside 
her. Each operator was now responsible for the quality of 
her product, as well as for bookin : her total daily output.
At the end of this time observ tlons were made, on the
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erlteria mentioned above, for p. period of nine days, and the
fi ;ures for unit production time and labour cost recalculated,
11
Both sets of figures are shown below:
TABLE 21 Results of Trial Aoolication of Unit Assembly
As a %age
Assembly Unit of total
line assembly Reduction reduction
Clock mins. on
measured work* 4.44 4.13 0.31 17.6%
Waiting time* 0.43 0.27 0.16 8.9%
Rectification
time* 1.46 0.39 1.07 60.8%
Packing time* 0.51 0.29 0.22 12.7%
Total Clock mins.
per unit. 6.84 5.08 1.76 100.0%
Labour cost
per unit. 3.85p. 3.05p.
Performance
as %age of SP* 58% 54.5%
SP, standard
mins. oer unit 2.59 2.25
* These figures have all been calculated from those in the 
consultants’ renort.
It thus appeared from the results that a number of the
objectives of UA had been achieved. Both unit production 
time and unit laoour costs had been reduced, and this under 
cond:: tions in which no financial Inc mtives had been paid. 
Ooe' a tors ware h o we v e r r a rn u n ■ on t°d a '.cording to t h e I r
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average earnings over the few months previous to the trial. 
At the same time the amount of time spent on product 
inspection and rectification showed a dramatic decline.
The changeover then seemed successful, although the overall 
performance of the operators was still below 60% SP.
The question posed at the beginning of this Chapter
was how one should explain these findings, and it is to
this question we now turn. As we saw in the analysis of the
consultants' report there was a certain ambiguity in the
way future changes were described, and the ’languages' of
both work study and job redesign were employed. The first
point which strikes us about the results is that there was
very little change in the performance levels of employees
on the line, and on UA. Level of performance, expressed in
terms of standard performance, is a measure of the quantity
of work performed in a given period. If one assumes the
operators are trained and capable of working at 100^5 SP, it 
is in fact a measure of the intensity of labour, of the
amount of the working day devoted to working, rather than 
to waiting, 'idling* etc. Mow many job redesign theorists 
would argue that a variety of changes in a job, such as 
increased responsibility, seLf-control of pace, 'wholeness,' 
feedback etc. would lead to an equivalent variety of changes 
in worker behaviour such as reduced absenteeism, increased 
output, better work quality etc. Although we do not have 
the precise figures, absenteeism for the experimental group 
di.; not differ significantly from that in the control group.
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As regards output, we have seen that the intensity of 
working was no higher on UA than on the line. In part 
this was attributed to machine breakdown on UA, but the 
duration of machine inactivity - hrs. - was a very 
small proportion of total working time (only 1.4) and 
hardly stands as an adequate explanation of the low level 
of production. But some of the .job changes recommended 
by redesign theorists were definitely introduced - job 
'wholeness^ 1 responsibility for quality and self-control 
of pace. And when one also considers that there could 
well be an argument for the operation of Hawthorne effects 
in this case, the low level of output becomes all the more 
surprising.
It might be argued that the task changes themselves
were hardly" of momentous significance: the operators
continued to perform an essentially simple and repetitive
task many times each day. Why should one therefore expect
any radical improvement in motivation from such an
unpromising set of changes? Also, there are theorists who
would argue that an increase in production should not be
expected, and does not generally arise, from job changes
of this sort. What does happen is that product quality
improves, because this is the way in which employees obtain
1 2a sense of achievement.
Such validity as these points possess, however, is 
somewhat limited. One must agree that the jobs on UA still 
require little skill, nnJ wri 11 be repeated several hundred
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-.imes each day. But what we are examining here is not the
apparent plausibility or otherwise of job redesign propositions,
but whether or not those propositions have been satisfied by
the conditions of this study. Granted, the changes in question
were perhaps minor, but as Y/alker & Guest pointed out long
ago, what appears minor to an outside observer may hold a
1 3completely different meaning for the workers involved.
There has been a transition from machine-control to self 
control of pace; responsibility for product quality, and for 
the booking of work has been introduced; and the operators 
on main assembly no longer perform only part of the final 
assembly, but perform all of it. And, one could add, the 
variety of work has, to a degree been increased, and new 
skills have been acquired during the period of training.
These changes, if seen relatively, do conform to the proposals 
of many job redesign theorists, and for this reason constitute 
an adequate test of them. And Lawler’s point about, expected 
outcomes from job redesign has already been dealt with above, 
and
worker, it is true nevertheless that unit production time, 
fell by 35/S, whilst unit labour costs dropped by 21$*
A pain we must ask about the causes of these phenomena.
If we turn back to Table 21 we can see that unit
Production time was reduced by an average of 1.76 minutes.
Of this reduction, 1.07 minutes (or 60$) was due to the
will not be repeated here.
Given there has been no increase in wopx oujb-put per
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savings made in rectification and inspection of the product. 
With the pacing effect of the line removed, operators were 
thus able to devote more time to the quality of their work, 
and since product quality was now their responsibility, 
they were compelled to devote this time to it. It should 
also be pointed out that on UA it was much easier for 
supervision to trace faults in the product to the operator 
responsible, than was the case on the assembly line and in 
this enhancement of social control one can see yet another 
tendency pushing in the direction of better quality work.
A further 0.31 minutes was saved on each product through a 
simple reduction in the amount of time actually spent 
working on it. If we turn to the consultants’ report we 
find a ready explanation of this occurence. Firstly in 
moving from the line to UA, a certain amount of unproductive 
time inherent in assembly line work was automatically 
eliminated, such as handling time for instance. Secondly, 
during the two months of training which they received prior 
to the experimental results being recorded, operators were 
taught systematically to work with two hands. Trainee 
operators had been taught two-handed work in preparation 
for assembly line work, but on UA this method of working 
was enforced much more rigorously than on the line. Thirdly, 
a certain reduction in work time had been achieved by the 
simple expedient of designing the individual work station 
in such a way as to make it both easier and quicker for 
operators to reach out and pick up their parts.
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In view of the'inefficiencies1 eliminated by the 
abolition of the assembly line, it was perhaps surprising 
that unit production time did not fall even more dramatically* 
And in view of the element of 'job enrichment' it is 
surprising that worker performance did not rise above 60% S. P. 
Management too was surprised at these findings, if not 
actually disappointed, but in order to explain them we must 
resort to a discussion of motivation. The creation of a 
production system in which various forms of unproductive 
movements are actually eliminated means that with an 
approximately constant rate of performance, output will be 
higher as these movements are replaced by 'productive' 
movements, as happened in this case. But it doe3 not mean 
that the free time now made available, stemming from balance- 
delay, and waiting time, will also be used 'productively.1 
Having released this free time from the constraints of the 
assembly line, management was now faced with the problem of 
ensuring that it was used 'productively' and not merely 
consumed by the workers in relaxation, social intercourse 
etc. It was faced, in fact, with the necessity to intensify 
the production process precisely because it had succeeded 
in raising its productivity. The restructuration of tasks, 
in addition to the provision of a guaranteed wage, had failed 
to achieve the required degree of intensification. Instead 
of there being more pro notion and. more working time,
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management found the workers were turning out more production, 
but in the same time. Output then was increased, as was 
productivity, but these increases were due to methods 
improvements which cut unit production time. The consultants 
however pointed out that their results had been obtained 
without financial incentives, and that with their re-introduction, 
once the new payment system and payment levels had been 
devised, unit production time would fall further and total 
output would rise.
It has already been observed that the first report of 
the consultants contained a contradiction between its 
advocacy of job redesign and its stress on the use of MTM.2 
in order to raise productivity. MTM.2 was said to reflect 
a Taylorist theory of work organisation in which methods 
of working were predetermined and specified for the v/orker.
In contrast, job redesign theories have emphasised the 
importance of worker autonomy, over pace, methods etc.
With the suggestion that worker performance could be raised 
by the use of financial incentives, the consultants apparently 
took a further step towards scientific management and away 
from job redesign.
In discussing category II job redesign, of which the 
present case is an example, it was suggested that productivity 
v/»r increased by the operation of two mechanisms: methods
improvements and pay rises and incentives. In the few cases 
on whirr data was available these mechanisms were empirically
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conflated, but in the present case they were temporally 
separated. In the experimental trial, the performance of 
the workers remained below 60fS SP, but output rose because 
of methods improvements. In the extension of UA to the 
whole shop the second mechanism, pay incentives, was brought 
into operation.
The extension of UA
\7hen UA was transferred into the body of the shop, 
out of its experimental area, it was accompanied by revised 
payment levels. Basic rates were raised by an average of 
approximately 8%, and the incentive component was increased 
from 33$ to 4-0% of the total wage, at 100?5 SP. This 
upward revision of the incentive component was designed to 
ensure that high performance was attained in the absence of 
machine pacing. At the same time the potential productivity 
increases arising out of the improved work methods, and the 
elimination of unproductive time were consolidated by 
management through an upward revision of the output required 
to achieve standard performance. Since the incentive 
component of the wage was tied to output, this meant in 
effect that the operators had to turn out more goods for 
the same earnings. It was anticipated by the consultants
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that once, the scheme was fully operational, productivity 
could be increased 75 $ and unit labour costs reduced by 
32f$, whilst earnings would rise only 13%. The results
for the period Dec. '72 - Apr. '73 were remarkably close to
1 4-
these predictions. With the extension of UA, and the 
introduction of the revised payment levels, productivity 
was increased by 70$, unit labour costs reduced 40;$, and 
earnings increased by 15?$.1  ^ Operator performance, which 
averaged 54.5$ during the trial period, reached an average 
of 81 fo during these five months, an improvement attributed 
to the better supply of materials,and to the use of 
incentives.
The various features of job redesign, present in the 
UA trials, such as control of pace, responsibility for 
quality etc., had apparently failed to result in any 
significant increase in motivation, as judged by time 
spent working. What increased productivity there was, 
resulted almost wholly from methods improvements, such as the 
elimination of excess checking, and of handling time. Yet 
the same task, when performed under a regimen of financial 
incentives, and with improved materials supply, yielded an 
increase in performance from 54.5$ to 81 j SP.
The transition from flat rate payment to incentives 
war experienced only by those who had participated in the 
expe-i mental trial. There were other workers in the shop,
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apart from these 12, whose first contact with unit assembly 
involved no such dramatic change in payment system. In 
short they continued to receive financial incentives, on 
UA. Can we therefore say that the improved performance of 
these workers was due to financial incentives, or might it 
perhaps owe something to enhanced motivation derived from 
improved job content? I would argue that perhaps the 
significant factor in helping to raise performance levels 
of these workers was not so much the provision of incentives 
per se, as their transformation from a group to an individual 
basis, thus tying individual rewards much more closely to 
performance. This experience was common to both the
experimental group, and those who later switched to UA. It
should also be remembered that the improved job content did 
not raise performance levels of the experimental group, and 
it is therefore not very likely that it would have acted in 
a radically different manner when extended beyond this group.
The fact remained however that the performance level 
of 81^ had often been exceeded on the assembly lines, 
particularly by the 9-3 shift of married women. Even in
the most recent period, early 1976, when UA has been in
existence for almost four years, and many of the ’teething 
troubles’ have supposedly been overcome, management remained 
dissatisfied with the results. The .scheme itself, they 
argued was successful insofar as it created surplus time
“352-
within the working day, but they themselves have yet to 
succeed in taking full advantage of this. The use of 
traditional rewards - financial incentives - had apparently 
not worked entirely; and the use of job redesign to enhance 
employee motivation appeared to have been even less effective, 
except perhaps insofar as it may have resulted in a slight 
improvement in product quality. Understandably, in this 
situation, the ’problem1 was reconceptualised: it was not
the workers who required motivation, but the supervisors.
The raising of output was now seen to revolve not so much 
around the activity of the workers, but around that of their 
superiors. Supervisors and foremen, it was said, needed to 
play a more active role in stimulating performance, and 
incentives - both material and psychological - had to be 
described, and explained, to the workforce; those who lacked 
sufficient motivation to perform well had to be ’encouraged;’ 
slacking had to be eliminated; and the pacing effects of the 
conveyor replaced, in part, by the actions of the supervisor; 
and, finally, materials supply had to be more effectively 
managed.
This perspective was echoed by the supervisors themselves. 
One of them suggested that the absence of pacing on UA rendered 
the supervisors* job more difficult, as the workers were able, 
and did, take more time off to go for a chat or a quick smoke. 
Since the base rate for wages was higher than on the assembly 
line, that too constituted a certain disincentive to work.
And finally, since part of the ’self-control’ on UA involved 
booking one's own output, it was suggested there was a tendency
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to overbook. The general idea that UI was 'hardoc to control' 
was also supported by the foreman in charge of the assembly 
section, who also pointed to the necessity to compensate 
for the absence of the conveyors pacing effect. «7hat was 
significant about this new 'perspective' was that it marked 
a complete break with the traditional .job redesign ideas of 
worker autonomy, self-control etc. as integral to increasing 
productivity. In their place was substituted a further 
component of the Taylorist theory of management. 77e have 
already observed the way in which the disappointing results 
obtained during the UA trials were attributed to an absence 
of financial incentives, and it was remarked that this stress 
on financial rewards, as opposed to those inherent in task 
performance was a characteristic feature of Taylorism. With 
the 'shift' to an emphasis on the necessity for supervisory 
control, yet another feature of Taylorism made its appearance. 
The significance of these moves is an issue we shall take up 
in the conclusions to this case.
The labour force and work output
The problem of UA was not generalised throughout the 
whole of the workforce, and it was claimed, on the basis 
of weekly performance figures, that whilst a proportion of 
UA workers produced a high level of output, rather more workers 
used tneir new found freedom to engage in conversation etc.
This division of the workforce Leads us iclusioas,
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neither of v;Vj eh appeals to be compatible with two of the 
a j or job red >sign the or 3 ;. The g *o ip which performed
we] on UA t> J to be mo ;t y older married women, that
is married women in their late 20s and 30s. It was noted 
at the beginning of this report that the most productive 
shift in the factory - the 9 - 3 shift - v/as composed of 
precisely these sorts of people. Although the husbands 
of the majority were also working, their motivation to 
perform at a high level chiefly reflected their economic 
situation, in which, with a house and children, and with 
rising prices, their need for money was strong. Y/omen in 
this category then worked hard whatever their work, whether 
it was sub-assembly, assembly or unit assembly and we need 
have no recourse to theories of job redesign and intrinsic 
motivation to account for their behaviour on UA.
The second group consisted of younger girls, some of 
whom were married, but many of whom were not. Although 
management, and supervisors, suggested their ’need’ for 
money v/as that much less because of their domestic situation 
(that is, being without children), the situation was not quite 
so simple. There was certainly no compulsion to earn money 
of the sort which resulted in the high performance levels 
among the married women, but there may well have been a desire 
to earn money in order to support an extensive social life. 
Performance levels among such girls on UA varied between 
60 and 80, and it was assumed this wage-effort trade-off was 
adequate so fa" as the girls themselves were concerned. Y/hat
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apo»>-:.v,ed to concern them far more than the 'intrinsic 
satisfaction to be derived from task performance,' v/as the 
satisfactions to be derived from social intercourse. 
Unfortunately, for management, the unit assembly stations 
had been designed and located in such a way that it was 
difficult to talk and work simultaneously. In order to do 
the former, it was necessary to turn away from the assembly 
station, and away from one's work. Contrast this situation 
with the assembly line, where, as it was generally observed, 
the workers appeared to be part of a social group, and 
regularly talked among themselves at the same time as they 
worked.
It would appear therefore that the management had 
abandoned, or forgotten, not only some of the ideas of job 
redesign, but those of Mayo, and the Hawthorne studies, as 
well and the 'social needs' of the workforce seem to have 
been sub-ordinated to the demands of production.
Conclusions 
Category II redesign
In Chapter 7 it was suggested that in category II redesign 
there was, in addition to direct intensification, the use of 
methods improvements, in order to raise productivity. Indeed, 
on the basis of a number of studies, methods improvements 
were seen as the major element in this category of redesign 
since they appeared to account for r. r- -.t proportion of
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inor vised productivity, but, more importantly, because they 
derived directly from despecialisation oi labour, the hallmark 
of redesign. Direct intensification was seen as a separate 
process, in no way connected with redesign per se, and 
attributed to the operation of financial incentives. In the 
present study we have been able to observe these processes 
separately, and it can be seen that they are indeed quite 
distinct. In the experimental phase of UA, productivity 
was raised by means of method improvements, some, though not 
ail, of which derived from the abolition of progressive 
assembly, e.g. the elimination of handling time. At the end 
of this phase productivity had been raised by 35% although 
employee performance, measured against standard, remained 
unchanged.
The second attempt to further increase output and 
productivity had nothing to do with rjob enrichment,1 strictly 
speaking, but simply involved raising the basic rate of pay, 
and increasing the incentive component of earnings. As a 
result of this change, productivity was increased by the 
same amount again, as in the UA experiment. The total 
productivity increase, measured against pre-UA performance 
was 70%, but it should be noted that this pre-UA level was 
unusually low. Compared with the more usual assembly line 
levels of output, of the order of 75 - 90% SP, the use of 
UA with incentives raised output by approximately 35-4-0%.
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Unit assembly and scientific management
In Chapter 7 it was argued that category II redesign 
constituted "the most thorough and consistent application 
of Taylorism," "because of its individualisation of the 
work process, its attempt to increase control and account­
ability of the worker, its use of work and method study, and 
of financial incentives. The ambiguous usage of the term 
"job enrichment" was made clear at the very beginning of 
this chapter when we examined the consultants’ first report 
to the company on work reorganisation. It was noticed 
that in a report which addressed itself to traditional 
work study problems (excess indirect labour, excess 
unproductive time etc.) using traditional work study methods 
(MTM.2, intensification of labour), the idea of 'job 
enrichment* sat rather uneasily. In assessing the results 
of the UA trial, we indicated that the various benefits 
which accrued, reduced unit production time, higher 
productivity, and reduced labour costs, could all be 
accounted for without reference to the theories of motivation 
underlying job redesign.
Subsequent performance improvements materialised in 
response to the re-intro ruction of financial incentives, 
raising of the basic rate of pay, and tightening of 
supervision.
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This final decision however did not mark a sudden 
break with the theory and language of job redesign but 
represented a consummation of tendencies inherent in the 
project from its inception. Firstly, the initial report 
spoke both of work study problems and techniques, and 
of 'job enrichment,' a contradiction which might have 
allowed movement towards either of these poles; secondly, 
the productivity increases during the UA trial could in 
fact be accounted for in terms of method improvements 
arising out of the application of work study; thirdly, 
the absence of any change in performance level was attributed 
to the corresponding absence of financial incentives, and 
indeed, when these were reintroduced (in conjunction with 
improved materials supply) performance levels did risej 
finally, having individualised the work process, employed 
work and method study, and utilised financial incentives, 
it was but a small step to complete the Taylorist trend 
and call for the tightening of supervisory control. It 
can be seen then that this final move was consistent both 
with the initial project, and with its subsequent 
development.
This argument may be objected to on at least three 
grounds: first of all it ecu Id be said that the management
v/rs not strongly committed to the ideas of job redesign and
thu ' failed to create 3 fertile climate for its existence;
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secondly, it could be said that the workers themselves were 
not sufficiently interested in job redesign, and did not 
therefore respond to improved job content as would be 
predicted; and thirdly, it could be argued that since the 
project did ’shift' towards Taylorism, that the element, and 
the significance, of job redesign in the initial, report was 
largely 'cosmetic.' So let us examine each argument in 
turn.
Management and job redesign
It was undoubtedly true that the Meccano management did 
not elaborate their programme of job redesign into a "new" 
managerial philosophy, as v/as done at Shell, Philips or ICI. 
But then cases such as these are the exception and not the 
rule, for the overwhelming majority of job redesign changes 
have also been initiated without benefit of a revised 
philosophy on the part of the organisational leaders. The 
cumulative experience of these cases, reviewed in Chapters
6 - 8 ,  lends no support to the view of writers such as
16 1T
Y/ilkinson, and Klein, ' that top management support for,
and commitment to, job redesign is an integral, and a
necessary feature of a successful innovation of this type.
In the present case commitment to the ideas of job redesign
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v/as weak, and in retrospect the manarers who were interviewed 
considered the redesign element of the work reorganisation 
to have been only a minor feature. But the progressive 
introduction of scientific management mechanisms, and the 
underfulfillment of management’s expectations were no^ t the 
results of a lack of commitment to the philosophy of job 
redesign. Rather, it was the relative ineffectiveness of 
job redesign that was responsible for the decline in commit­
ment, and for the introduction of further elements of 
scientific management.
Naturally, this argument only has the character of an 
assertion, but in the light of the results of the UA trial 
and extension, it seems a plausible assertion nonetheless.
Worker attitudes and job redesign
A recent journalistic investigation of Meccano's unit
assembly system reported that the workers were 'surprisingly
enthusiastic about it' considering the scheme had been
1 8introduced four years previously. According to the report 
they particularly liked the individual payment system, but 
no other views were mentioned. According to the managers, 
and particularly, the shop steward, interviewed in the 
present case, the major grievance about unit assembly
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concerned the absence of opportunities for interaction, and 
we have noted that the layout of the assembly stations makes 
it difficult to talk and work simultaneously. This complaint 
about interaction opportunities echoes similar complaints
made in other cases of category II redesign, reported by
19 20
Conant & Kilbridge, and Thornely & Valentine for instance.
7/e must however separate employee attitudes and behaviour, at
least analytically, for in these other cases of category II
redesign, productivity and output both increased despite
employees’ reservations about social restrictions. A similar
phenomenon seems to have occurred in this case amongst the
two groups of employees, married and unmarried, whom we
discussed earlier. The older, married women tended to work
hard, whatever the organisation of work, and their behaviour
on unit assembly would not seem to require reference to their
specific attitudes to job content on the assembly line and
unit assembly. This is not to say they had no preferences
between the two modes of work organisation, but only that
such preferences as they may have had were not critical in
accounting for their work behaviour.
All we know about the younger, and unmarried workers is 
that they tended, more than the older co-workers, to complain 
about the isolation of unit assembly. Nevertheless this did 
not prevent them from reaching levels of performance above 
those previously obtained on the assembly line.
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The use of "job enrichment*1 lan,-;ua^ e
If, as has been argued, the exercise reported here 
consisted of a ’thorough application of Taylorism,’ and 
that its ’.job enrichment1 content v/as gradually dissipated 
in favour of an explicit resort to Taylorist principles, 
what role, if any, did the terminology, of ’job enrichment’ 
actually play in the consultants’ first report? One could 
say it v/as merely a piece of ’window-dressing,1 designed to 
appeal to modern management, and to secure the support of 
the trade unions. The latter objective had of course been 
mentioned by the consultants as a criterion which any 
proposed reorganisation would have to meet if it were to be 
successful. Whilst there may have been some element of 
intended legitimation, of an activity that may otherwise 
have been perceived as a straightforward ’productivity 
deal,’ one cannot dismiss the changes as window dressing for 
the changes made in job content were quite definite, and in 
accordance with the job redesign criteria of various 
theorists. Its use may also represent the development of a 
certain theory of motivation, and a corresponding specialist 
language, within the circle of management consultants and 
theorists, and in this sense the consultants merely reflected, 
and partoak of, this general theoretical development.
Similar developments may not have taken place inside the 
company management and it appears that their response to the 
first report focussed largely around the use methods 
changes, and MTM.2 analyses rather than •: ■ elements of
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' job enrichment.’ Nevertheless, a process of job redesign 
did take place within the company regardless of whether it 
v/as seen as such by the managers involved.
This discrepancy between managerial attitudes and the 
objects of those attitudes should occasion no surprise, 
certainly in the present case, for two reasons: first of
all, category II redesign (flow line reorganisation) has 
been analysed as a consistent application of Taylorism, 
and the development of an explicitly Taylorist practice in 
the present case (with regard to supervision for instance) 
was an expression of this fact. But over and above the 
specific features of flow line reorganisation, different 
functional types of manager may not have the same interests, 
or the same understanding, of interventions in the production 
process. Thus, as we shall see in a later case, the 
interests, perceptions, and more importantly, the assumptions, 
of personnel and industrial engineering may be quite discrepant, 
and the overall policy emerging from a management group quite 
contradictory.
Theories of job redesign
The Meccano case provides us with a rough approximation 
to a controlled comparison of the ’classical1 job redesign 
theories (Herzberg, socriotechnical theory, and task design)
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wit h the theory offered in the present thesis (Chapter 5).
In the UA trial, pay levels were held at the average for 
the preceding months, whilst job content was enhanced in 
the directions of increased variety, autonomy, responsibility 
and 'wholeness.' At the end of this period productivity 
had increased by approximately 35%, but we saw that the 
majority of this improvement could be attributed to the 
rectification of structural defects in flow line organisation 
(see Chapter 5 )*
In the second phase, job content remained as before, 
but pay levels were raised, and individual incentives 
introduced* Again, productivity rose by 35%. Of the 
total productivity increase therefore, the overwhelming 
majority can be attributed to the operation of two mechanisms 
central to the theory advanced in this thesis: pay rises
and incentives, and work methods improvements.
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CASH 2 - T9H DAIRY
The South Suburban Co-operative Dairy serves a large 
area of South London. It consists of a processing plant, 
a bottling section, and the organisational centre of a wide 
distribution network. The management of the dairy has not 
undertaken, in a formal sense, a job redesign project, but 
over the past 15 years it has been economically compelled 
to adopt forms of job redesign, and its recent history is 
interesting as an illustration of these pressures. Information 
on the dairy was obtained from two interviews with the Dairy 
Manager, and one with the Chief Foreman. On the dairy 
industry in general interviews were also held v/ith dairy 
managers in West Nottingham and Manchester. Finally, 
information on the 1971 and 1973 productivity agreements was 
obtained from company files, which contain minutes of meetings, 
proposals and recommendations submitted to negotiation, and 
correspondence between the dairy management, and the union 
officials (USDAW).
The dairy industry, in common with many other industries, 
has initiated a series of large scale capital investment 
programmes since the war, and the trend, in this industry 
as elsewhere, is for the capital-labour ratio to increase.
Apart from the necessity to raise productivity, and hence 
profitability, the dairy industry has also been subjected to 
Government restriction. In return for large subsidies to the 
industry the Government has insista- on the power to regulate 
the maximum retail price of mil''. r,1ous, where many manufacturers
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rniyht raise prices, and extend credit, to offset declining 
profit rates, this avenue has been closed off to the dairy 
industry. The option pursued has been that of a drive to 
raise productivity, chiefly, though not exclusively, by the 
introduction of machinery. The processing phase of 
production is already capital intensive, the distribution 
network, labour intensive. The latter however seems 
unamenable to capital investment or technological transformation, 
and over the past 15 years change has been concentrated in 
bottling. Let us therefore briefly describe the stages in 
this process, at its present technological level, before 
proceeding to consider some of the recent changes.
There are two entry points to the bottling section - 
at one there enter returned bottles, and at the other crates. 
These proceed independently along motorised conveyors into 
washing machines, out of which both emerge washed and dried.
In addition of course, the bottles are sterilised. From 
there the bottles proceed along more motorised conveyors to a 
filling machine, which is fed with milk from the processing 
plant on the floor above. The bottles pass beneath the 
filler, and having been filled, are moved along the conveyor 
to the capping machine. They pass on a circular conveyor 
around the capper, and then proceed to the crater. This 
machine takes bottles, and drops them into the crates, which 
are fed by conveyor into its rear. The filled crates then 
pass on towards the loading bay, ready for dr r:tribution. 
Traditionally* that is in the 1960s, workers were assigned 
to separate jobs on bottle washing, crate washing, filling,
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capping, crating, and a number of other ancillary processes,
such as maintenance, inspection of lines, pipe cleaning etc,
Y/ith increased capital investment throughout this period,
there began a drive by management to raise labour productivity
by cutting the labour force. The two peaks of the investment
programme occurred in the early 1960s and early 1970s, and
the following figures give the total number of v/orkers
employed in the bottling department, including supervision
21
and maintenance, and excluding clerical staff.
TABL5 22 Labour in the bottling department, 1963 - 74
1963 1970 1971 1972 1974
77 62 53 48 42
During this period production volume had increased considerably 
and shift working had been stopped. In the early 1960s there 
were two shifts in the department, 6-2 p.m. and 2 - 1 0  p.m., 
but after extensive mechanisation in 1963-64, this v/as 
stopped, and the department went over to daywork.
The reduction of the labour force was however only one 
pole of what was in fact a dual ’strategy,' the other pole 
being concerned with the labour force that remained in 
production. Prom 1970 to 1 ° 3 negotiations between management 
and unions concerned both the reduction o^ the labour force, 
as well as the intensification of the labour process. This
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intensification v/a • t - be conducted by means of ’flexibility
agreements.' According to the minutes of a meeting on
30 Oct. 1970, the union was told that,
"Staff would be completely interchangeable including 
occasional Creamery work and where applicable would 
receive additional payments." 2 2
and "Emphasis was put on the necessity of training Dairy
23
Staff in different jobs, ". And. the point was re­
iterated more forcefully in a letter from the Dairy Manager:
"The habit of restrictive practice among sections 
of the staff must end. in future Management 
reserve the right to interchange staff for any 
reason, " 24
And the Group Personnel Manager repeated the assertion the
following year:
"Flexibility of working is a key to the Dairy's 
success and men must be prepared to gain additional 
skills and give assistance where it is required." 25
Finally, in 1973 a productivity agreement was drawn up which
included cancellation of overtime payments, reduction of
grades to a single grade, reduction of manning, and flexibility
of labour.
"(c) (c) That all inside Dairy Operatives are fully
interchangeable to do such jobs as directed.....
(e) Finishing time will be such time as the
Foreman in Charge indicates and will be such 
time as he considers the Dairy to be clean 
and ready for the next day’s work." 26
Prior to the early 1960s mechanisation, a separate night 
shift had been employed solely for cleaning, but following 
mechanisation the shift was abolished. Some of the cleaning 
v/as rendered unnecessary by the changed machinery, whilst 
the remainder was taken over by machine minders (Dairy 
Operatives) and performed, usually at the end of the day.
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In a statement summarising tie advantages and benefits 
o f the 197 3 scheme, the Dairy , .onager once again observed 
that an essential component v/as,
"An understanding that flexibility is necessary, 
where practical." 27
In practice, flexibility involved deputising for workers 
who were absent, or moving from bottle intake onto cleaning 
once the former process was completed. In addition, manage­
ment had succeeded in replacing traditional one machine - 
one man assignments with arrangements in v/hich two men looked 
after three machines, the filler, capper and crater, an 
arrangement facilitated by the juxta position of the 
machinery and the provision of fixed mirrors.
Summary and conclusions
This case has a number of features in common with 
category III redesign. To begin with, the 1973 agreement 
occurred in a continuous and semi-continuous process 
industry, and it was in this type of industrial situation 
that we found a predominance of flexible work groups. 
Conversly, of all the cases of category III redesign, 42;j 
were found to have occurred in this sort of industrial 
situation. Another characteristic feature of these industries 
is their high capital-labour ratio, and a correspondingly 
low volume of labour. The low volume of labour places a 
premium on its efficient utilisation, but why should this 
take the form of flexible work groups, or of flexibility
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agreements? Part of the answer may be that the nature of 
the work to be performed in these industries is such that 
operators spend long periods of the day simply monitoring 
machinery, or being on stand-by in case of breakdowns. This 
type of activity profile is common in sectors of the chemical
r
industry and has been documented by several research workers. 
Management then was faced with a group- of 'fractional v/ork 
roles' as a consequence, in part of mechanisation, and they 
took the opportunity to try and economise on labour costs 
by combining some of these roles and reducing the size of 
the labour force.
In the present case the redesign of roles which occurred 
did not take place under the aegis of a 'job redesign' scheme. 
That is to say, the theoretical, or perhaps ideological, form 
of the activity did not draw from the tradition of job 
redesign. But despite this, the activity itself, however 
conceptualised, did correspond to a category of job redesign 
labelled as flexible work groups. The case may then be 
taken as illustrative of a possible economic basis for the 
content, though perhaps not the form of job redesign in 
highly mechanised industries. The degree of redesign should 
not be overstated: management proposed to introduce labour
flexibility as an emergency measure to cope with labour 
shortages or production fluctuations. Under ’normal' 
conditions an extensive division of labour would continue 
with workers distributed between the different machines, 
and the various loading and unloading areas. The recent 
introduction of job rotation among the machine operatives
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reflected an attempt to reduce labour turnover, rather than 
to restructure division of labour, as well as being part of 
the training requirements necessary for flexibility.
The absence of the theoretical concepts of job redesign 
had a number of consequences for the form of job redesign 
that was actually introduced. The cases examined in the 
previous chapter (8) frequently, though not always, involved 
worker control over the allocation of labour between different 
functions. But in the present case, where no theoretical 
value was attached to such notions as ’autonomy,’ allocation 
of labour remained under the control of supervisory staff. 
Nevertheless, in terms of the means by which productivity 
v/as raised and costs reduced - intensification through 
flexibility, and labour elimination- the present case is 
clearly an instance of category III redesign.
Finally, it should be noted that in this production 
system, where output was largely under machine, rather than 
worker, control, the introduction of flexibility so as to 
raise productivity, necessitated the elimination of labour. 
This case then illustrates one of the major economic losses 
suffered by workers as a result of job redesign, namely 
loss of jobs.
-lid'
CASH 3- UUIT5D GLASS LTD
United Glass, like Meccano in the earlier study, is
another company which conducted an exercise where the
concept of 'job enrichment• played a somewhat ambiguous
role. Ambiguous in this case because conjointly with a
process of job redesign the company had also initiated
some specialisation of labour. The case is also of interest
because it illustrates a point made by Donaldson on the
differing interests of various sections of management, here,
? 9
the industrial engineers, and the personnel department. That 
these groups held very different attitudes to fjob enrichment1 
will become clear as the case unfolds. The final point of 
significance about the case is that in the new plant v/here 
there occurred both processes of specialisation and despecial­
isation, the former was in some measure a reaction against 
an earlier recombination of jobs in the older plants. This 
recombination was considered to have had a deleterious effect 
on product quality, the reasons for which will be examined 
in some detail.
Data on United Glass was obtained from many sources:
firstly, from a report on the Castleford plant prepared by
30
the Work Research Group at Henley; secondly, from interviews 
with managers, shop stewards, foremen and workers, conducted 
over a three day period at the same plant by myself; thirdly, 
from personnel records at the same plant; fourthly, from 
four interviev/s with the Group Personnel Officer for 
Industrial Relations; fifthly, from interviews, and observations
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at the new Alloa plant: the interviews were conducted with
the Factory Manager, Chief Industrial Engineer, Personnel 
Officer, and Work Study Officer; sixth, from notes taken 
at a Divisional meeting of Factory Managers, Industrial 
Engineering and Personnel, to discuss new modes of work 
organisation; seventh, from internal company reports, 
documents, and memoranda connected v/ith the above meeting, 
and other discussions of a similar nature; eight, from 
written job descriptions at the Castleford and Alloa plants.
The company produces glass containers, as well as moulds, 
plastics and ornamental glass, but all of the changes to be 
described in this report took place in the main manufacturing 
section, the glass container division. The company is 
jointly owned by Owen-Illinois of America, manufacturers of 
glass packaging, and by Distillers, although it appears to 
enjoy almost as much autonomy as before its takeover. The 
administrative centre is located at Staines, and major plants 
are at Harlow, Castleford, Peasley, Alloa,and Glasgow. Each 
plant has its own factory manager, to whom all specialist 
management functions are accountable, as for example, industrial 
engineering, production, personnel etc. Each specialist 
function in a plant is also accountable to its own superiors 
in Head Office (at Staines), and the factory manager is 
accountable to the Manufacturing Director, also at Head Office. 
In practice, the factory managers were allowed to exercise 
considerable discretion over> a variety of less important 
issues, although whether central eont -’o I might have been 
reasserted in the event of a major if sa ;reement is a possibility
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Vo out which we can only speculate. Certainly, when the 
Harlow plant was encountering industrial relations problems 
in the late 1960s, directives were issued from Head Office on 
ways of dealing with these problems.
The production process in these plants must now be 
described if we are to understand the proposals for work 
reorganisation that were discussed within the company. The 
production of bottles, or other glass containers, is 
conventionally divided into two phases, the hot end, and the 
cold end. The hot end consists firstly of the production of 
glass by mixing and heating silica, sand, limestone and cullet. 
The molten glass is then poured into moulds, a process 
supervised by the moulding machine operator, and from there 
proceeds through the phase of annealing. This is a process 
of controlled cooling, in an oven, known as a lehr. At the 
end of this process the containers emerge on a conveyor belt 
and proceed through the ’cold end,’ where they are inspected, 
both automatically and manually, and packed. Hot end work 
is paid at a higher rate than that in the cold end, and is 
regarded as skilled. Cold end work requires several weeks 
or sometimes months of training before the operators are able 
to detect all of the 100 or more possible faults in a container. 
Nevertheless, the work at the cold end is considered to be 
only ’semi-skilled.’
I',.anageme nt and ;i o b red esign
According to Donaldson,
"Discussions at a distance from job enlargement 
exercises tend to portray the motives as simple,
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unarabiguous and being the straightforward 
projection of some purpose by 'the management.' "31
But the situation is actually more complex:
"In reality the various parties in the change 
process may include several different disciplines
and interest groups ....... forming a more or less
integrated coalition in order to pursue their 
multifarious goals." 32
This was certainly the situation at United Glass, and the
re-emergence of a behavioural science aspect to the discussion
around the new Alloa plant owed much to the Henley report,
33mentioned earlier.
This report set out to examine the effects of job 
rotation in one shop at the Castleford plant, through use 
of the Turner & Lawrence Requisite Task Attributes Index, 
and to offer suggestions for work reorganisation so as to 
enhance both worker motivation and satisfaction, as well as 
productivity and product quality. These included recommend­
ations for increased job rotation, enhanced worker responsibility, 
and the establishment of semi-autonomous work groups. After 
lying dormant for nine months the report was reactivated by 
the Group Personnel Officer for Industrial Relations, who 
subsequently obtained the support of the Manufactuning 
Director for the idea of increased behavioural science 
involvement in the company.^ Coincidentally with these 
developments, I first approached the company and became 
involved in the attempts of Personnel to extend the job 
redesign aspects of the ITLO programme. This was an integral 
part of work changes being introduced at the new Alloa plant.
This plant opened in 1976, ana represented a high de Tee of
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investment, that was itself highly capital intensive. The 
changes in work organisation provisionally known as the 
’New Look Operative' (hereafter, NLO) combined certain 
quality control duties with responsibility for machine 
running and a measure of former, supervisory control over 
labour allocation. At the same time adjacent work roles, 
such as that of the packaging machine minder embodied a 
degree of specialisation as compared to the older technology 
and organisation. Discussion v/ithin the company reached its 
peak at a meeting on 5 November attended by Factory Managers, 
Divisional Personnel and Industrial Engineering and plant 
representatives of these specialist functions.
The discussion was centred around a specially prepared 
document, and we must therefore give some idea of its content. 
There were two principles underlying the document:
"New look type systems have developed by extending 
the principle that all mould cavities should be 
inspected at regular intervals at the cold end, 
together with the principle that, wherever possible, 
sorting should be divorced from packing operations.” 35
The advantages of the system were said to be improved quality, 
optimal manning levels, stock reduction, and "job enrichment 
of the personnel employed.” The 'New Look Operative* was 
also said to be "the key man in the new system.” There can 
be no doubt that this role was enriched as compared with 
the older organisation of work. Under the old system bottles 
emerging from the lehr passed along a motorised conveyor, 
through a small quantity of inspection machinery, finally
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to be inspected visually, and packed in cartons, by the 
sorters at the end of the line. During their progress along 
the line, an operative called a Cavity Sampler, or Quality 
Checker, would take regular samples of bottles and check 
them for certain standard faults. Any relevant information 
was then fed back to the hot end. In addition this operative 
was responsible for ensuring the continued functioning of the 
automatic inspection machinery, and for notifying faults to 
the foreman. These duties were now subsumed under the role 
of NLO, who was responsible in fact, for far more machinery 
than the Cavity Sampler, and he was also assigned authority 
to requisition labour as required. The former sorter had 
the majority of his inspection duties removed, and was 
assigned to machine minding on the automatic packager.
The discussion document then gave summary descriptions 
of the main work roles required in the Alloa plant, and the 
Appendices provided comparative data on manning levels and 
line speeds from several UG plants, as well as from a parent 
company plant in the U.S.A. Also in the Appendices was a 
sheet headed 'Flexibility and Job Enrichment,' which discussed 
the possibilities for labour flexibility, and indicated, as 
its chief advantage, the reduction of line manning levels.
The Personnel function, as we have said, reactivated 
a discussion on behavioural science within the company. At 
the Nov. 5 meeting the contributions of the Personnel Officer 
and myself focussed on the element of 'job enrichment1 in the 
NLO document and tried to argue for -its extension to other 
operatives. In particular the question of th : specialisation,
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or impoverishment, of the packaging machine minder was raised 
as incompatible with a stress on 'job enrichment.' The 
argument for job 'enrichment* offered by Personnel was the 
standard argument used in the literature: improved job
content will result in more satisfaction and motivation, and 
thus lead to higher productivity and quality of work. It 
also presupposed a certain theory of motivation, in which 
workers were seen as willing to increase effort, given the 
chance, and which, to some extent, downgraded the role of 
pay and external controls (the carrot and stick approach).
The strongest attack on these views came from Industrial 
Engineering, who supported the granting of more job complexity 
and authority to the NLO, but who wished, nevertheless to 
divorce sorting and packing operations. It was said that 
workers could not reliably inspect their own work, and that 
the compulsory union of sorting and packing on the single- 
line conveyors in the cold end had led to a deterioration 
in quality. Before the use of the single-line conveyor, 
sorter/packers had worked at the very end of the lehr, alongside 
a very wide conveyor. Although nominally responsible for 
sorting and packing, the group of 5-6 men sometimes divided 
the work - half sorted, whilst the others packed.
At a more general level, it emerged that Personnel was 
opposed to specialisation of labour, and was arguing for an 
extension of despecialisation. Industrial Engineering on the 
other hand held no principled view on specialisation, but 
argued pragmatically for specialisation, or .101 , on the merits 
of each particular case. The over-riding concern of IE was to
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maintain quality standards (production volume being chiefly 
a function of activity at the hot end) and the argument 
against the combination of sorting and packaging reflected 
both their experience and their assumptions about the work­
force. Figures were produced to demonstrate that with the 
transition from sorting on the lehr conveyor to sorting on the 
single-line conveyor (inline sorting), quality had deteriorated,
i.e. customer complaints had increased and sorter effectiveness 
decreased. This result was attributed by IE to the process of 
despecialisation, enforced by the inline system, although the 
workers themselves, when interviewed at Castleford, universally-
felt it was due to insufficient manning and increased pace of
3owork, which made proper working difficult. '//hatever the 
truth, IE in any case assumed that workers were motivated by 
a desire to maximise the wage-effort bargain in their own 
favour. This assumption was held both by Divisional, and by 
factory industrial engineers, and clearly set them apart from 
the assumptions underlying job 1 enrichment.’
Finally, there was disagreement amongst management over 
the nature of job 'enrichment1 in the NLO document - was it an 
end in its own right, or only a means to an end? The arguments 
of Personnel implied that it was an end in itself, although the 
alleged benefits of 'job enrichment' were stressed, in terras 
of productivity and product quality. No answer was made 
however to the claim by IE,regarding the deleterious effects 
of the combination of sorting and packaging. For IS, the 
element of 'enrichment' was seen as a rnear.s to an end, although
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the posited ends differed between different members of I.E.
7/hy then did I.E. support the concept of the NLO at all?
The answer, in part, is that they saw the enhanced authority 
of the NLO as necessary for the effective performance of his 
job. In the new Alloa plant, there would, at any one time 
be relatively few workers in the region of the cold end, and 
the foremen would often be occupied with other duties, 
possibly elsewhere in the plant. The crucial importance of 
product quality in the glass container market made it 
imperative that decisions affecting quality be taken as 
quickly as possible before too much 'damage* had occurred.
In addition, any delay in fetching extra labour, or mechanics, 
could result in the stopping of the line, and in view of the 
large amount of capital invested in the Alloa plant, this was 
seen to be a wholly undesirable eventuality.
Apart from considerations of capital investment and 
product quality, there was also an argument, shared by 
Personnel and I.E. on the importance of eliminating labour 
from the production process. Under the section headed 
'Elexibility and Job Enrichment’ appeared the view of 
Personnel. The cold end production line ought to be staffed 
permanently only by the NLO. Additional duties, such as 
visual inspection or machine-minding, would be performed 
by members of a labour pool, who, when not working on the 
conveyor line, would be engaged in resorting returned 
containers or covering far workers absent from other ancillary 
functions. They would, in short, be flexible, perform a
-381 -
variety of jobs, and thus experience 'job enrichment.' The 
objective of this proposal was identical to that of I.E. 
namely to reduce labour on the production line and avoid 
rigid manning levels. In a document written after the 
Nov. 5 discussion, a Divisional Industrial Engineer proposed 
a modified NLO scheme, the precise details of which need not 
concern us at present. The object of this proposal was to 
ensure control over labour costs and product quality, and 
it finished on the following note:
"An effective monitoring control will be necessary 
to prevent full manning of the lines becoming the 
norm." 37
Meanwhile, the behavioural science support continued to
organise its activity. In late November, after a visit by
the Group Personnel Officer and myself, the management at
Alloa received a proposal from us outlining a social
psychological study of the opening and early functioning of the
new plant. The concern expressed during the visit at the
amount of time such a project might consume crystallised
into severe doubt on their receipt of the detailed proposal,
38
and the project was cancelled. Shortly beforehand the 
Group Personnel Officer had organised a day school at the 
company H.Q, addressed by Gilbert Jessup, and others from 
the V/ork Research Unit, to which senior divisional managers 
were invited. Whilst many were impressed by the speakers, 
and their contributions, there remained a feeling that the 
company was not yet ready for a major project of the sort 
vaguely hinted at in the day school. When the rejection 
of the research proposal reached the manufacturing director
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from Alloa, he acceded to their wishes, and perhaps also 
to the feelings of some of his senior managers, despite 
his guarded support for the use of behavioural science, 
expressed at the 5 Nov. meeting.
Clearly, there may well have been more to management's
decision than was expressed in letters and memos and at
meetings, and this account must therefore be seen as
tentative. It does nevertheless illustrate concretely, some
of the notions which Donaldson discussed in his own paper
on the subject. In that paper he described job enlargement
as a ’’vehicle" through which different management specialists
39>sought to achieve their particular aims. In the light of 
our own report we could perhaps modify this instrumental
idea of ’the vehicle.’ For in our case the consequence of
IE's instrumental attitude to job 'enrichment' was that in
an adjacent situation - that of sorting/ packaging - they
were prepared to abandon 'enrichment' when another 'vehicle'
proved more suitable for their ends. In the case of Personnel
on the other hand, there was an altogether more intimate
link between the vehicle and their ends, a link which
compelled a commitment to the vehicle in and of itself. This
link between means and ends was much more tenuous in the
case of I.E. and hence more vulnerable to modification, or
even abandonment.
The nearing of 'dob Enrichment1
We have already seen that whilst both I. hi. and Personnel 
supported the creation of the 'enriched' NLO role, Personnel
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wished to extend 'enrichment' to other o>e raters and, by 
implication, argued that the NLO was inadequate as a 
programme of 'enrichment.' Paradoxically, the proposed 
extension of redesign by proponents of the theory and 
practice of redesign, involved simply an increase in job 
variety. It was not proposed to grant workers additional 
authority, as had been done to the NLO by Divisional IS.
One might even say then that the IE understanding of job 
redesign appeared to be more sophisticated than that of its 
proponents, insofar as it did not restrict the term to 'variety* 
but covered responsibility and decision-making as well.
There was certainly little clear understanding of job 
redesign theory or practice either by IS or Personnel. The 
former arrived at their redesign scheme via the route of 
efficiency in decision-making, v/hilst Personnel advanced the 
limited notion of variety for three reasons.^ Firstly, it 
reflected, as in the case of their IE colleagues, a limited 
understanding of redesign concepts, and what little under­
standing did exist was introduced by the author, and later, 
by the Work Research Unit at the day school organised by 
Personnel. Secondly, it reflected the view that within the 
constraints of the work and technology that v/as available, 
an increase in work variety was as much as could be hoped 
for. Thirdly, it reflected the appreciation that if any 
more radical change were to be made in the job content of 
the semi-skilled workers, this could only be at the expense 
of the NLO, whose authority might have to bo eroded in order 
that the authority of semi-skilled workers might be increased.
-334-
A1though IE treated job redesign as an exercise that could 
be conducted in isolation from the rest of the organisation, 
it was possibly the perception of some of its far-reaching 
ramifications which was partly responsible for the onset of 
cold feet in the company in early December,
Job redesign and specialisation of labour
As the previous sections implied, it was the Divisional
IE view of job redesign that prevailed within the organisation.
One of its components was a pragmatic approach to the issue of
labour specialisation, a pragmatism illustrated clearly in its
proposals for the Alloa plant. On the one hand, the old role
of Cavity Sampler was to be invested with almost supervisory
authority, whilst on the other, the functions of sorting and
packaging were to be separated. It has been argued by a
41number of writers, e.g. Wilkinson, Klein, that the support 
and commitment of top management is essential for a successful 
job redesign programme. In the light of the present case, 
it might be more correct to say that top management support 
for job redesign theory and practice is essential for its 
comprehensive and consistent application, although not 
necessarily for its success. Had top management been committed 
in the present case to job redesign it may have objected to 
the specialisation of the sorting/packaging function but it 
is difficult to see how its attitude on this issue would have 
affected the success of the NLO redesign.
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If the literature of job redesign is taken at face 
value it appears that very few companies have transformed 
job redesign from a mere strategy, useful oil occasion, into 
a principle and a philosophy. Shell, ICI, Volvo and Philips 
are the few examples which immediately spring to mind, but 
it will be found that to try and appreciably extend this list 
is an extremely difficult task. Companies such as United 
Glass, which used job redesign at the same time as speciali­
sation of labour, may therefore be regarded as, at the very 
least, not unusual, and perhaps even as the norm. Of course 
the close juxta position of the two opposed processes in the 
Alloa plant was perhaps unusual, but since it resulted from 
no firm commitment to one process or the other, per se, it 
was the sort of coincidence that might well occur in the 
plant of any company using job redesign in a strategic, rather 
than a principled, way.
Conclusions
What does this situation - the reversal of despecialisation 
accompanied by the despecialisation of other roles - tell us 
about the practice, and about the future of job redesign?
The case indicates, in very striking form the consequence of
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a pragmatic orientation to job despecinlisation, namely the
co-e...istence of labour specialisation. The presence, and
use of the former, by no means excludes the use of the
latter, and the apparent contradiction between the two
processes, and their underlying philosophies is resolved at
a higher level, that of objectives.
Secondly, if we consider this consequence over an
extended period of time, then we may conclude that the increased
use of job redesign, or despecialisation, in no way presupposes,
indicates, or results in, the declining use of specialisation
of labour. A number of writers on job redesign, notably, for
example, Davis, have made the error of discussing job redesign
and labour specialisation as incompatible and exclusive
philosophies of management, entailing in their turn radically
42
different views of human motivation. On the assumption
that management is a more or less unitary entity, with a
coherent philosophy, the authors then proceed to draw the
conclusion that environmental and other pressures are pushing
management away from a Theory X philosophy and towards a
43Theory Y type view. The present case serves to question 
this chain of argument at several key points. Firstly, it 
shows that whatever the philosophical incompatibilities, 
job redesign can be used alongside labour specialisation. 
Practically speaking, the apparent contradiction here is 
resolved at the level of company objectives. This fact should 
indicate both the erroneousness of o n-..mining management 
practice largely at the philosophical, or theoretical level,
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as well as the falsity of the assumption that from such a 
philosophical standpoint, management does, or must, have a 
unified theory. In the present case management employed a 
redesign strategy, which itself rested on differing 
philosophical views, embodied in the positions of Divisional IE 
and Personnel. And this fact in turn demonstrates the 
invalidity of treating management as a homogeneous social 
category.
Thirdly, the case indicates at least one of the 
contradictions between managerial objectives and job 
despecialisation, as a result of which despecialisation may 
be reversed. In its desire to reduce labour costs, and what 
it defined as over-manning, the company succeeded at the 
same time in reducing the efficiency of quality inspection.
For the despecialised role of sorter-packer to have functioned 
effectively on inline sorting, it may have been necessary to 
leave manning levels unchanged, or to effect only a small 
reduction. In practice the company went to the other extreme, 
and made significant savings on costs, at the price of poorer 
quality of finished goods.
* -* *
The conclusions from this chapter, and from the 
literature review will be elaborated in the ensuing chapter.
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The original proponent of these philosophical views, 
Douglas MacGregor, be it noted never adhered to such 
a crude theory of the determinants of managerial 
philosophy. In 1960 he wrote that:
"The recession of 1957-58 ended a decade of 
experimentation with the "soft" managerial 
approach, and this assumption (theory X - JK) 
(which was never really abandoned) is being 
openly espoused once more.”
This is a simple, yet remarkable observation into 
the bases of managerial ideology, and we shall 
explore its validity later in the thesis.
MacGregor, D. 1960, p. 34.
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CHAPTER 10 THE MUTUAL INTERESTS QE WORKERS
AND EMPLOYERS
In the Preface to Motivation to 7/ork, Herzberg et al. 
wrote about the benefits of studying job attitudes:
”To industry, the pay off for a study of job 
attitudes would be in increased productivity, 
decreased turnover, decreased absenteeism,
and smoother working relations..............
To the individual, an understanding of the 
forces that lead to improved morale would 
bring greater happiness and greater self- 
realisation.” 1
In other words, as we have observed elsewhere (Chapters 1,
3» 4, 5) there is an asymmetry in the treatment of employer
and worker benefits - the former derive economic benefits,
the latter psychological. The asymmetry was underlined in
a study of such a practice by Paul & Robertson. Writing
of the job * enrichment' studies at ICI, they posed the
following question:
"Can you enrich jobs without inevitably facing 
demands for higher pay or better conditions to 
match the new responsibilities?”
and answered unequivocally, ”Yes,” although they added a
2
cautionary note against ‘exploitation* by management.
Equally Hackman et al. have suggested that the 'personal and 
work outcomes' of job redesign would include motivation,
reduced absenteeism and turnover, and better quality
3
performance. They did not mention economic benefits that 
might accrue to employees, although their model was explicitly 
limited to the direct consequences of redesign of jobs, and 
little has been said by them about the context in which this
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oecuvs. Finally, we noted thet reports of case studies in
job redesign often separated ’economic’ and 'human' outcomes,
and tended, then, to equate the former with employer interests,
and the latter with those of employees. The quotation from
Herzberg illustrates the widely-held view among job redesign
theorists and practitioners that in cases of job redesign,
benefits accrue to both parties. In the introduction to the
7/ork Research Unit report on British case studies, the authors
actually listed the benefits which were said to have accrued
4
to those involved.
The roo>t of the argument that both parties benefit from 
job redesign is to be found in the process of despecialisation 
of labour. This process is said to increase worker satisfaction 
and motivation and in addition, or as a consequence, worker 
performance. Now it is true that many case studies have 
reported improved employee attitudes, and improved performance, 
measured in terms of employee absenteeism, labour productivity, 
or unit costs. But we cannot assess what we might call the 
’mutual benefits’ thesis, the fourth proposition of job 
redesign theory discussed in the Introduction, unless we also 
consider the costs that are involved for both parties in 
securing their benefits. In addition we would also need to 
consider the duration of benefits and, if possible, to try 
and compare them against a common yardstick. And finally 
we would need to incorporate mu teri a t on *-* ttitudin.nl changes, 
e.g. in job satisfaction (but se-> above Chapter 5). Because 
of the limitations of the available Literature these latter
two tasks cannot be a c h i e v e 1, so we shell concentrate here 
on the costs of job redesign, firstly for workers.
(1) Job losses and employee displacement
'.Then discussing the outcomes of job redesign, many 
authors of case studies have written from the standpoint 
of the workers whose jobs have been redesigned. They have 
frequently ignored however the consequences of ’enrichment’ 
for other groups of workers both in the same plant, and 
elsewhere, yet these consequences are both real and 
significant. As we showed in the literature review two 
forms of job redesign, categories I and III,were particularly 
dependent on the elimination of labour in order to obtain 
productivity increases. Of all the known cases in the 
literature, where data was available on the displacement or 
elimination of workers, such displacement occurred in 68fo 
of cases (see Table 1, Chapter 5)- The displacement, or 
elimination of labour can thus be seen to be a significant 
phenomenon in job redesign, and as we saw in the literature 
review there was a relationship between the elimination of 
labour and the magnitude of productivity rises. The elimi­
nation of labour nay take the form either of a reduction in 
the number of workers occupying a particular role, or roles, 
or the complete elimination both of a group of workers and 
of the roles they occupy. Po * example, >-1 the study by 
McDavid, two clerical off:ic-'v'r, were eliminated, although 
the position of C .0. remain'd. *' In the study by Talker,
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. set tors and checkers were displaced, end their roles
b
amalgamated with that of machine operative. In a case
reported by Ford three management personnel were eliminated
7
after their duties had been delegated to sub-ordinates.
Rush described a case in which the job of frame cleaner 
in a textile mill was amalgamated with that of the operative, 
and 28 frame cleaners eliminated.^ In the famous study by 
7/eed at Texas Instruments, the cleaning force was cut from 
120 to 71, whilst the volume of work remained approximately
9
constant. In a study by Emery & Thorsrud, the application of
sociotechnical theory to the design of a new plant saved 38
10
jobs out of a projected 94. The case study in the non-
11automatic weaving shed described by Rice saved 11 jobs.
The list could be extended much further than this, but 
the point has been made that labour elimination is indeed 
a pervasive, and, as was argued in Chapter 4, a necessary 
feature of job redesign. Y/hat, however is the magnitude 
of the phenomenon? How many jobs have been lost, and 
workers displaced in cases of job redesign? The following 
table shows both the numbers of jobs redesigned, and the 
numbers lost in cases of job redesign, divided by category.
1 2TABLE 23 Job losses in cases of job redesign
Ca.tegory
I
Category
II
' Category! 
| III I
Mixed 
Categories ,
Total
jJobs
jredesigned 34b ' 223 1060 297 1929
Jobs lost 100 33 3 0 0 88
' r I
152o j
|N ( -^number 
iof cases) 1 3 1 o 1 5 32
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Before discussing these figures, three general points 
must he made: firstly, the data have been combined from
a series of studies carried out at different points in 
time, in different countries, and under different circum­
stances, such that the final figures take no account of 
variations in these or other factors. Secondly, cases 
where the numbers involved were unclear have been excluded, 
and thirdly, job losses due to simultaneous known mechani­
sation (which occurred in six cases) have also been excluded.
What the figures show, roughly speaking, is that for
every 80 jobs redesigned, 20 have been lost. If the figures
are correct this is certainly a 'cost1 of some magnitude
for workers as a whole. Let me now consider a number of
possible objections to this evidence. Firstly, it could be
argued that these job losses might have occurred in companies
which were expanding, or in local labour markets where there
was no shortage of alternative employment, so that the 'real'
costs of job redesign may have been minimal. In some cases
1 3this was certainly the case, e.g. Walker, but in others
it seems unlikely, because of the numbers involved and the
scope of the programme, that redundancies could have been
1 4-avoided, e.g. Hepworth & Osbaldeston, with presumably at 
least some of the problems which that process entails. But 
viewed from the standpoint of the economy as a whole, such 
an apparently effective eliminator of jobs, can hardly be 
considered a ’social benefit' unless countervailing mechanisms 
exist for the creation of an eguivaL-nt number and type of 
jobs in accessible labour markets.
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Secondly, it might be argued that the data conflate 
losses due to job redesign : those due to other factors, 
e.g. mechanisation, declining markets etc. In other words, 
the data merely show a correlation between job redesign and 
job loss, not a causal relationship. The counter to this 
argument was presented, and illustrated, in Chapters 4, 6,
7 and 8 where it was shown theoretically, why job redesign 
necessitated elimination of labour (and hence of jobs, 
although the converse equation does not follow), and that we 
were not dealing therefore simpiy with a relationship of 
empirical association or contingency. I would, however, accept 
that the data may conceal some extraneous loss of jobs, and 
so the ratio of job redesign to job loss of 4 : 1, quoted 
above, should be taken as approximate, and subject to error.
Thirdly, it might be said that the kinds of job 
eliminated involved no costs for workers, but benefits, as 
many of them were supervisory or other authority roles whose 
elimination allowed workers to exercise more skill and 
autonomy. Whilst this may be the case in vertical role 
integration, it is very much less so in the other two types 
of redesign. In any case, whilst there may be benefits in 
some job elimination, this could arguably be mitigated if 
the process were associated with displacement of labour 
from the firm.
It is not part of my argument the t job redesign always 
involves 1c w of jobs, and w ■ of the tasks of future 
research in this area v/ojld r>e to lav--tignte the conditions 
under which job losses do and do rnt - '.our. It was suggested,
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for instance, they were less common- in category II redesign 
(as the data above show), and that within category III redesign 
job loss was affected by the type of technology, and by the 
proximity of its output to operating capacity. Doubtless 
more hypotheses will be advanced in the future.
The number of workers displaced is lower than the number 
of jobs eliminated because in the latter category has been 
included three cases where jobs were ’saved,* but no labour 
displaced as none was then employed. These savings were 
calculated against theoretical manning levels predicated 
on traditional divisions of labour and systems o>f control.
The revised operating levels were set on the basis of 
flexible work groups. As noted already we have very little 
information on the fate of displaced workers, although we 
know that in some cases they were found jobs elsewhere in 
the factory. Unfortunately again, this information has 
rarely been accompanied by more precise data on the types 
of alternative work found.
It may also be of interest to notice that the rate 
of elimination of jobs appears to have been greater in the 
U.S.A. than in the U.K., as the following figures show:
T/ySLI 24 Job redesign ani job .losses in the UK and USA  ^^
USA
Jobs redesigned 569
Jobs eliminated °20
7 ( = number of cases '.
UK 
354 
10 
1 6
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v»e?» sons ar this nte'/"n■.~ira re noe are unclear
although one o m " I suggest oln .icibie hypotheses, such as 
differential unio- densities, which it would be fruitful 
to examine more carefully.
It should be said that the phenomenon and the scale 
of job loss may be peculiar to an economy, or an industry, 
in which labour is regarded as an economic cost that ought, 
where possible, to be minimised. Under different economic 
and political arrangements, it is therefore conceivable 
that job redesign (if it were practised) would not be 
accompanied by job losses, as reported above.
A number of writers have suggested displacement of 
workers may be a consequence of job redesign (see Chapter 5) 
but although this suggestion has now been vindicated there 
was before now very little direct and systematic evidence 
available.
( 2) 7 a ge/salary rises
It has been argued in Chapter 5 that the withholding 
of wage and salary increases from employees experiencing 
job redesign was not a necessary, but a contingent, feature 
of job redesign. It would, in other words, be possible for 
wage and salary increases to be granted without any violation 
of the principl of iy j >b re : ?sign 1 iories. The 
• ' : ■ nee of ’ ' v ri • was b 1 1 (Chapter 5 ' to
b-‘ approximately 6-0- n  t o f • c- a '• ; of/ j o b redesign. C-:ses
'.•/here workers did nat • - • -- -:--s are we ■ 1 known, and
/
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inc.lude some of the Philips studies, e reported in
Rush, the IGI studies, and the case of AT f, described 
by Ford. In these cases the wage-effort ratio has been 
tipped in favour of management as wage costs per unit 
output have been reduced.
We can also consider the question of wages from the
standpoint of the relation between labour and capital in
a particular plant as a whole, for although wages might
rise, so too does productivity. It is therefore possible,
as happened in one of the earliest job redesign exercises
1 6at IBM, for wages to rise, and labour costs to fall. In 
other words the total share of the wealth produced in the 
plant which went to labour showed a decline, whilst that 
accruing to other parties - landowners, bankers, retailers, 
employers, shareholders etc. - shov/ed an increase. Even if 
employees do_ receive wage increases then, they may not be 
commensurate with the increased profits accruing to the 
employers, and others, as a result of improved productivity.
(3) Labour intensification
It was established in Chapters 6,7, and 8, that two forms 
of job redesign involved the performance of additional duties 
during the working day, either as part o / an expanded 
individual role (category I ) or as r of a flexible work 
group (category III). Prom the stand point of raising labour 
productivity this strategy was evaiu i negative se ise
-400-
compared to the use of ho re efficient methods of working cr 
the installation of no-' machinery• heither of these latter 
methods need involve an increase in human effort (see Chapter 
11),
But from the standpoint of the individual, matters
may appear differently: an objective increase in daily
effort expenditure may be perceived or experienced as effort
reduction, or less dramatically, as comprising no effort
increase at all. On the other hand, it may be perceived as
effort increase, but accepted nevertheless, for a variety
of reasons. One should also bear in mind the phenomenon of 
17habituation. This phenomenon indeed was evidenced in the 
study by Rice, of the reorganisation of an Indian textile 
mill:
"At the first conference there were many complaints 
of tiredness caused by so much extra walking. By 
the second, there were reluctant admissions by 
some workers that they were getting used to it. By 
the third, they showed a preference for the new 
methods of work. At all conferences they said that 
they worked much harder than in the other sheds." 18
So on the one hand we find the phenomenon of habituation,
on the other a continued, cognitive, appreciation of
increased effort expenditure. In a case of category I
redesign, described by Guest, it was noted that,
"When the change was made, the girls at first thought
they couldn't do half of the work After a while
not only did they find they could handle the work 
load but there was even some idle time,........." 19
One factor which may cent cioute to a changed perception 
of increased effort expen di Pur'-- is the perceived locus of 
■rol. Work at an inli vidua 1 »rk station may be felt 
to require less effort, • • increased physical output.
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because the worker can pace himself and no longer has to 
suffer the strain of assembly line pacing. Unfortunately 
this issue is by no means as simple as might at first 
appear. For one thing it is far from self-evident that 
paced assembly line work is ipso facto stressful, but more 
likely that this depends on the pace of the line and the 
operator's ability to adhere to the pace. The complexity 
of the issue can be illustrated empirically:
"7/hen operators in straight-line assembly switch 
places with pre-assembly operatives, it is felt 
that the pre-assembly .jobs are better because 
they are freer. Even though the balance of task 
cycles is the same, and the work therefore requires 
the same overall pace in pre-assembly as in main 
assembly, the pre-assembly jobs lack the close 
link to the process created by the transport carriers 
in the main assembly." 20
This observation came from a report on the Volvo-Xalmar
plant, in Sweden, and a similar comment was made by many
employees involved in a transition to individual assembly-
21in the Philips Company, in Holland.
On the other hand another case of category II redesign,
again within the Philips Company, yielded a rather different
finding. After the introduction of unit (individual) assembly,
workers were asked a series of questions, one of which
concerned the felt pressure of work and whether this bothered
the workers. 23-’ of assembly line workers said they were
bothered by too much pressure, but the figure for unit
22assembly workers was 40>! ’he ii f f *•> ronce however was 
statistic j.lly non-significant. y ' • , : : a similar case,
reported by Conant 1 Xilbrid ;e, 4B out of ■ ■ 1 workers express-? •: 
a liking for individual (bench) w?r;: o- ; : • grounds that it
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- lio.ved self-pacing, but at trie so ~.r tine, 24 of these
.70 •;*leers also expressed a Liking ior- paced assembly line 
23rk. In other words, at I :>" 1 1 workers 1 both
self pacing and mechanised pacing.
One explanation for these 'contradictory1 attitudes
may lie, as already suggested, in the actual pace of
assembly line work. In other words the onerousness of
external pacing may come into being only when the pace
itself is intensive. This was probably the case at the
Kalmar plant, where workloads were set at 111% of standard,
24
as determined by the use of MTM. It should also be borne
in mind that individual working and ’self pacing* may be
coercive, and that mechanised pacing on -assembly lines is
not the only source of strain at work. Workers in the
Conant & Kilbridge study for instance complained about the
wage-effort ratioi on bench work, alleging that the piece
rates were tight and that it was easier to make one’s
earnings level on the line. Finally, the pacing of assembly
2 *5line work may have its ovm. satisfactions, as Baldamus, '
2 6
and Turner & Miclette, have demonstrated, so that even 
highly-paced work may be tolerated beca.use of its properties 
of 'traction.'
Increased intensity of work may thus be counteracted 
psychologically in at least two ways, both of which might 
reduce the element of cost wi thin :« ' . The first way requires 
*ecognition of fch > f? ;.t i nav * trade-off ’
higher intensity levels for groe f•>•-= control over work,
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th : second is that more intense work may simultaneously 
involve greater elements of 1 traction* (as was in fact 
suggested in Chapter 9).
In summary then, we may say that perceptions of labour 
intensification need not correlate with actual increases 
in intensity, for the reasons indicated above. Labour 
intensification, although objectively a feature of at least 
two categories of job redesign, may not be experienced as 
such, or may be recognised but not felt as onerous because 
of the results of habituation or traction.
(4) Managerial control and worker accountability
In several cases of category I and II redesign the 
authors reported improvements in product quality, which they 
attributed to the concession of responsibility for quality, 
and sometimes quality testing to directly productive workers.
It was indicated however that the effect of category II redesign 
was to isolate employees and render worker accountability much 
easier. As Guest wrote of one case,
"When quality errors were made it became much 
easier to identify who made the error." 27
and more generally, Sirota argued thud this individualisation
of work roles, with its consequent a u g m e n t a t i o n  of accountability,
was an objective, a featu ’ of Litional, *h a r d 1 manage—
, . 28 -r .. i_- • . , , ,meat practice. la a numo ,v* '• s - - e gntoned account­
ability of workers was both fo r n . n l intensified by 
means of the device of p.-rso:^ i wo ’e>r ' natures on products.
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Since it is difficult to measure accountability, and 
■corker control over pno j and quality, in any meaningful 
way, it is difficult to compare these two aspects of 
category II redesign (and some cases of category I) and 
arrive at an overall assessment of the net degree of control 
(or autonomy, perhaps) acquired or lost by workers in these 
cases. All one can say therefore is that workers may pay 
a price for their 'autonomy* in the form of increased control 
over and accountability of their performance by management, 
as has also been argued by certain other writers (see Chapter
Costs to management
The costs to management of job redesign are much harder 
to specify because their role and presence in job redesign 
is more peripheral than that of the workers directly affected. 
Any overall assessment of these costs must therefore be only 
tentative and provisional. Economically, the costs would 
seem to be minimal, since no maj or investment is typically 
required. Even if consultants' fees and management time are 
costed, these will generally be weighed against, and paid out 
of, the long run increase in labour productivity which the 
consultants and management have jointly engineered. Thus the 
authors of case studies at Philips., Meccano, 33C and ICI 
estimated that this cost /ould be recuperated wi thin a few 
y n r s  of the project’s Ini t.ir tion. " ' Inc re;-son, in wages have 
often accompanied job redesign, out with corresponding inorea 
in labour productivity, the r.e •; effect has invariably been to
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reduce either total labour costs per c-mum or unit costs 
of production or both, as. several writers have pointed out.
On the other hand, there may be significant costs
associated with particular forms of job design. Reorganisation
of flow lines may entail the construction of individual work
stations, and result in higher levels of stock to cope with
improved materials supplies. Figures for these and other
30
costs were provided by Persson in an assessment of job 
redesign at Saab-Scania, but he concluded that they were 
balanced by the estimated savings due to reductions in 
absenteeism, labour turnover and other costs.
If there are any significant costs of job redesign for 
management they are likely to be found in the social, or 
political, sphere. In category II redesign, a typical 
innovation is the transition from a progressive flow line 
to individual assembly. On the flow line the pace of work 
may be at the discretion of management and mediated via the 
speed of the mechanised line. Alternatively, on non­
mechanised lines, faster workers may be placed at the head, 
and slower workers at the rear of the line, to facilitate 
maximum production. These mechanisms of control disappear 
under individual assembly, and although alternative systems 
may be brought into play, e.g. use of individual cash 
incentives, ov' greater responsibilities assigned to supervisors, 
they may not be as effective. Tr.es-? •;' t amative s a opeared 
to be effective in the c. se of Hec-vr.o, discussed in Chapter 
'9 , but other situations may viola ! Ifei-ont outcomes. Again,
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'r cases of category III redesign, workers are often assigned 
' )ntrol over labour allocation within a delimited area.
.Vhilst there is no evidence that this concession of control 
has ever seriously backfired against management, the fact 
that control over this issue formally rests with the workers 
indicates that such an eventuality is a theoretical possibility.
Such data as we have included here was derived from 
cases defined as successful, but in those where expected 
results did not materialise, then the costs of management and 
consultants' time, etc., may not be recouped. The bias of 
the literature towards successful studies prevents any serious 
evaluation of failures, and hence, of the net costs to manage­
ment of such schemes. What is also not clear from the fore­
going is why job redesign has not been conducted more extensively 
if the benefits are so good, and the costs so low. Whilst one 
can point to a number of factors here - lack of opportunity, 
workers' disinterest, union opposition, managerial conservatism 
etc., there is no satisfactory explanation of the assumed 
indifference to job redesign on the part of British, and 
perhaps to a lesser degree, US managers.
All we can say in summary is that the economic costs of 
job redesign for management appear to be minima.1, compared 
to their usual incomes, and that the political costs constitute 
a theoretical possibility but one not yet realised.
oionmry a . cone Luo: ins
five noin conclusions may be drawn from the analysis in 
this Chaoter, bearing in rind the caveats noted above. firstly,
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it seemo fchere are several economic costs of job redesign 
b >th for the workers directly aff ectc-b, as well as for 
workers in ancillary and nearby work roles. Secondly, the 
costs of redesign for management would appear relatively 
speaking, to be much less. Thirdly, when one combines 
these first two conclusions, and bears in mind also the fact 
that managements have benefitted economically from job 
redesign more often than workers have benefitted economically, 
or psychologically, then we are justified in concluding that 
the overall costs and benefits of job redesign have been 
unequally distributed to the benefit of employers and to the 
detriment of their workers. Fourthly, in arriving at this 
conclusion we have had to effect a methodological innovation 
and consider job redesign not only from the point of view 
of those whose jobs are 'enriched,1 but also from the stand­
point of those v/hose jobs have been eliminated. Fifthly, we 
may regard the sixth proposition of our theory, on the non­
mutuality of interest satisfaction in job redesign, as having 
been vindicated (insofar as that is possible given the strict, 
non-comparability of psychological and economic data.)
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CHAPTER 11 PROBLEMS 0 TdC'
Status of the new theory of job redesign
Having examined the new theory of job redesign in the 
light of each of the three categories of job redesign and 
of the case studies, we must now consider the status of 
the theory as a whole, and the relations between its 
constituent parts. It will be recalled that the theory 
contained six main postulates, viz.
(i) job redesign could be seen generally, as a form 
of intensification of labour,
(ii) it emerged partly in response to inefficiencies 
in production,
(iii) it cannot be said to have ’abandoned* scientific 
management,
(iv) performance improvements could be attributed to 
the operation of - pay rises and incentives, 
work methods improvements, labour elimination, 
and enhanced accountability, although a minority 
of cases might be accounted for by the clasical 
theories of job redesign,
(v) employee performance and attitudes were analytically 
dissociated,
(vi) it entails, for wor^-;;. the costs of increased 
effort expenditure and loss of jobs.
Let us examine each of these postulates Ir turn.
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(i) The characterisation of i oh .redesign as intensification 
of labour depends in part on the concept of ’labour intensity,’ 
and this will be discussed in more depth in a later section.
1’or the moment however let us confine our attention to the 
literature review and the case studies and to the definition 
of the term as the degree of effort expenditure in the working 
day. Our question then becomes, "Does successful job redesign 
necessarily entail increased expenditure of effort?" The 
prefix ’successful’ is needed only to ensure that we are 
discussing cases of actual job changes, in which there have 
been actual improvements in job performance.
Three forms of evidence were adduced in support of this 
postulate: the first was evidence on the elimination of
labour from a production process. The argument here was that 
if the same volume of output was produced by fewer workers 
after job redesign then, ceteris paribus, each individual 
worker must be producing a greater output, and doing so by 
means of increased effort expenditure. The argument turns 
of course, on the validity of the ’other things equal’ clause. 
In a very small number of cases, perhaps 5-6, new machinery, 
or plant, was involved, and it is possible this alone might 
have accounted for most or ever, all of the improvements in 
job performance. In cases of flow line reorganisation, 
improvements in work methods, in the form of reduced or 
eliminated non-productive time, were an integral feature, 
ar I again it was docslb o tl at ’rw n re iprovements
occurred here in the absence of increased effort expenditure• 
Rmnlricelly however this was found not t"1 be the case. In
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those oases where detailed information was availaoie, 
methods improvements alone accounted lor up to 70-3, but no 
more, of productivity increases. Equally, we saw in the 
Meccano case study that increased effort expenditure 
occurred over and above the improvements in working methods.
Secondly, it was argued that in vertical role 
integration, workers took on additional work roles which 
supplemented their existing jobs. Again, so long as 
performance of the old job role remained at least constant, 
job redesign here entailed enhanced effort expenditure.
Thirdly, evidence was adduced directly from workers 
themselves, about levels of effort. In the cases reviewed 
in Chapter 4, as part of the analysis of sociotechnical 
systems theory, many comments about increased effort levels 
were noted. And again, in cases of category II redesign, 
similar attitude findings were reported.
These three sets of data, taken together, provide 
confirmation for the view of job redesign as intensification
of labour, and we shall say more on this concept in a
subsequent section of this chapter.
(ii) The origins of job redesign exercises were treated most 
extensively in Chapter 5, where it was argued that surveys 
of firms had shown a prependerance of production problems in 
the genesis of redesign. However, as the United Glass case 
indicated very clearly there are problems of interpretation 
with these findings. The domir.ance of ’production' problems 
might simply reflect the particular views of the managers
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v/ho responded to the questionnaires in the surveys, such 
that a selection of different managerial specialists would 
generate different results. Equally, it cannot be assumed 
that because different people label problems in a different 
way, that they are talking about different phenomena. The 
fact that people quit their jobs at a high rate may variously 
be construed as a problem of low morale, of unstable 
production, or of high training and labour costs. Conversly, 
the use of the same term, e.g. rising labour costs, may 
indicate quite different problems in different cases, e.g. 
poor organisation and allocation of work, strong trade unions, 
or bad pricing policy.
Although the evidence from surveys, principally, as well 
as from the cases in the previous chapter, suggests the 
preponderance of inefficiencies in production rather than 
absenteeism or turnover, as linked with job redesign exercises, 
the problems cited above must be borne in mind, and such a 
conclusion regarded as tentative.
It should also be noticed that we have written only of
a tendency, albeit a strong one, and that certain cases may 
be initiated for more conventional ’personnel* reasons, such 
as absenteeism. Equally, it should be noted that a small 
number of companies, such as have ostensibly initiated
experiments in job redesign for purely ’experimental’ reasons. 
Whilst there is no reason to believe cases of this type to 
bo widespread, they do require further investigation, to
discover whether there were in fact or: -'ns in certain
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problems, or if not, to assess the conditions under which 
such initiatives might occur.
(iii) It was argued that job redesign had not abandoned 
scientific management to the extent that it employed 
financial incentives, improvements in work methods, individua­
lisation of work roles and enhanced accountability. There 
would seem to be no doubt about the actual use of any of 
these mechanisms, and so the argument here hinges on two 
points: firstly, on the assumption that these mechanisms
are in fact pertinent, and not extraneous, to job redesign; 
and secondly, that the conception of scientific management 
advanced in Chapter 2 is a valid one. The first point 
will be dealt with under item (iv) below, so let us turn 
to the second point. Many of the conceivable objections 
to my account of Taylorism were considered in the relevant 
chapter, and it would be out of place to repeat them here.
One of the principal themes however was that Taylorism did 
not entail enhanced division of labour, an argument which 
would seem at the very least to be contentious. That the 
mechanisms itemised above were historically part of 
Taylorist practice would, on the other hand, appear to be 
undoubtedly correct. Again the point of contention is 
whether their use today signifies the continuation of 
Taylorist practice, or whether Taylorism has perhaps been 
defined too broadly in the earlier chapter.
(iv) Much of the analysis or' cases, the literature 
review, and in the previous chapter, was devoted to an
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examination of the utility of the theory of job redesign 
advanced in the thesis, and in particular to the mechanisms 
of performance improvement which it postulates. How 
adequately then do these mechanisms account for the 
performance improvements? The theory would seem to have 
more applicability to categories II and III than to category I. 
In category II we found evidence for the efficacy of work 
methods improvements, and a reasonably widespread provision 
of pay rises and incentives, although in a number of cases 
data was unavailable on pay levels and systems. And for 
improvements in product quality, it was noted that this 
category of redesign individualised work roles and hence 
increased the ease with which workers could be held 
accountable for their efforts.
In category III, elimination of labour and provision 
of pay rises and incentives were widespread and seemed to 
offer at least part (and probably a large one) of the 
explanation for productivity improvements. In the case of 
quality improvements, the absence of reliable data rendered 
explanation difficult, but the use of quality bonuses was 
noted in several cases.
Evidence for the existence of these four mechanisms 
v/as much less in category I, although they did exist, especially 
in cases involving blue collar workers. Eor white collar 
workers however, it would seem that one or more of the 
classical theories of job redesign could offer a more 
adequate account.
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The literature review anr the case studies suggested 
however that these mechanisms ■’ ■ themselves may not be 
adequate. The relationship, for instance* between pay 
and performance may not be so direct as I have suggested 
and may be affected by a range of individual differences in 
attitude and personality. The available data did not however 
permit any examination of these kinds of issues, but merely 
pointed in their direction. The findings on the efficacy 
of pay rises were not totally convincing, at a general level, 
despite their plausibility in particular cases. One explan­
ation for this may be that more intrinsically- motivated 
employees tend not to receive pay rises, but still to- improve 
their performance as much as those receiving extrinsic 
rewards in other cases, thereby masking the general effects 
of pay. Equally, it was not clear from the cases and 
literature review precisely how labour elimination succeeded 
in raising productivity. Its empirical association with pay 
rises would tend to suggest that employers may ’buy out' jobs 
in many cases. But It is also passible to draw on the work
of Umstot et al. and suggest that after labour elimination
1
workers may be assigned higher goals of performance. In 
other v/ords some of the insights of Locke’s goal setting 
theory may need to be utilised here.
There is also some evidence to suggest that these 
mechanisms may not be empirically independent,as an 
association was found between labour elimination and provision 
of pay rises. One possible explanation for this is that
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workers may accept reductions in the labour force only if 
those remaining are compensated with wage rises. Equally, 
there was found a (lesser) empirical association between 
the use of methods improvements (in category II redesign) 
and the provision of pay rises via financial incentives, and 
an explanation for this association was suggested in the 
Meccano case study. The use of improved work methods 
resulted in the more efficient use of existing levels of 
effort expenditure such that higher output was obtained.
But the rate of performance remained approximately constant, 
and the Meccano management was not satisfied with the 
resultant level of output. They wanted both to increase 
the efficiency of effort expenditure as well as its absolute 
level, and for the latter objective pay rises and incentives 
were deemed essential. In cases however where performance 
levels are already high, pay rises and incentives may play 
a minor, even a negligible role, in the genesis of productivity 
increases.
The fourth mechanism postulated - enhanced accountability 
- would appear to operate independently of labour elimination 
and pay, but to be related, at least theoretically, to work 
methods improvements. This is because such improvements were 
analysed as being a consequence of the reduction of work role 
interdependencies, or to put it another way, of increased 
individualisation of roles. This strategy served to reduce,
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or eliminate, time spent in product handling, as v/ell as 
some portion of waiting time. But by the same token it 
rendered more visible, and more accountable, the activities 
and efforts of any particular worker - hence the theoretical 
relationship between these two mechanisms.
(v) In all three categories of job redesign we found 
examples of job performance - job attitude dissociations. 
There were cases where attitudes improved, whilst performance 
was constant; of performance improvements with attitudes 
constant; and even of attitude improvements with performance 
decrements. The fact that such dissociations occurred in all 
three categories suggests that the phenomenon is not specific 
to a particular type of change, or of industry, but is more 
pervasive and more general in character. And it may be seen 
as confirming the view that the normal attitude-performance 
association masks the equally normal operation of twin 
mechanisms. As argued above this view is also in accordance 
with the generally low attitude-performance correlations 
found in non-change situations.
There is however one difficulty with this argument, 
which should be addressed, and that is the generic use of 
the term 1 job attitudes.1 In practice, I have used this 
term in three, conceptually very distinct ways. The first 
was to refer to satisfaction with one's job, and this has 
been, in fact, the most common usage. Job redesign theorists 
have argued that one of the personal outcomes of the 
performance of intrinsically-motivating jobs is increased
-420-
satisfaction with one’s .job. -It has been shown however 
that this is not a necessary consequence of successful 
job redesign, and that it cannot therefore be seen as 
conceptually related to job performance, either as a 
consequence, or as its cause. If one assumes (for the 
moment) that job performance is a function of job motivation, 
then what is being suggested here also is that job motivation 
and satisfaction are conceptually and empirically distinct.
High motivation need not result in satisfaction and vica 
versa. But insofar as performance is not exclusively a 
function of motivation, but also of ability, opportunity, 
control systems and so on,then this motivation-satisfaction 
distinction should be treated with more circumspection than 
the performance-satisfaction difference.
The second usage of the term ’job attitudes' has been 
to denote perceptions of one’s job, and in particular of 
job content. The task design theory of Hackman et al., 
assigns a crucial role to perceptions of job content in the 
genesis of motivated job performance, and to the extent 
that performance changes may occur in the absence of perceptual
changes, then the Hackman et al. theory is in difficulties.
2
Several studies of job redesign, e.g. Archer, Paul &
3
Robertson, have emploj^ed the Job Reaction Survey to measure 
employee perceptions of job content, and of its psychological 
implications. This survey was designed, to test Herzberg’s 
theory of job ’enrichment,' but sono of the items refer to 
features of jobs, such as feedback, task significance and
- 4  2 1 -
autonomy, which were also cited as relevant by Hackman et al. 
The results showed that performance increments occurred in 
the absence of .job perception changes in some cases. Since 
the J.R.S. does not measure all five dimensions specified 
by Hackman et al. these findings cannot be taken as incisively 
refuting their model. But Hackman et al. have also suggested 
that changes are necessary on each of the three ma:j or clusters 
- autonomy/feedback/skill variety, task identity and 
significance - and that being so then the results of these
4
cases certainly raise doubts about the validity of the model.
The third usage of the term 'job attitudes' has been 
to refer to 'intrinsic motivation,' i.e. motivation to perform 
arising out of the intrinsic features of a job such as variety,
autonomy and responsibility. This was assessed directly in
5 6 only two studies, those by van Gils, and by Rush, both of
which involved white collar workers. Unfortunately no data
was available on the content of the Questionnaires used in
\
these studies so comments cannot easily be passed on the 
results obtained. All that should be said is that the results 
were in fact more pertinent to the third proposition in our 
theory, on the significance of what has been called extrinsic 
motivation.
If we take them at face value then they do suggest 
that performance improvements onn be obtained in the absence 
of changes in intrinsic motivation (a. in the Rush study), 
but the absence of information relating t pay levels and 
systems prohibits any more positive conclusions on this 
point.
In summary then, it should be said that although the 
empirical occurence of attitude-behaviour discrepancies 
has been reasonably shown, the dual-mechanisms hypothesis 
put forward to account for them has not, in fact, been 
tested.
(vi) On the basis of the evidence and arguments in support 
of propositions (ii), and (iii) above, the sixth and final 
proposition follows as a matter of course. In other words, 
if labour elimination i_s one mechanism of job redesign, 
then the result of this must be loss of jobs on the one
hand, and higher effort levels on the other, again, other
#
things being equal. The previous chapter explored some of 
the negative consequences for workers of job redesign in 
detail and did indeed confirm the existence and pervasiveness 
of job losses as a consequence of job redesign.
In categories I and III in particular, both the 
empirical incidence of labour elimination as well as its 
theoretical necessity, under certain conditions, would 
incline the author to the view that this phenomenon is 
indeed an integral feature of job redesign generally speaking, 
as the theory posits.
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Let me now turn to consider some of the more general 
problems and limitations of the theory that has been 
advanced. There are two major limitations to the theory 
which should be noted initially. Firstly, whereas the 
conventional theories of job redesign seek to explain 
changes in job performance, job attitudes, turnover, 
absenteeism, and (sometimes) strikes, the present theory 
has embarked on a far less ambitious project, and confined 
itself to job performance, and to a much lesser degree, job 
attitudes. It has not, in other words, addressed itself to; 
the phenomena of absenteeism and turnover, and insofar as 
these may be regarded as indices of morale, then the reader 
is entitled to an explanation for such omissions. The 
reasons for them are threefold: a) the complexity of 
performance, and attitudes, seemed a sufficient challenge 
in its own right and there was literally neither time nor 
space to accomodate these other phenomena; b) it seemed 
to me that the phenomena of performance and attitudes were 
more central to theories of job redesign than those which I 
omitted (although some people might disagree with this); but, 
c) there is evidence to suggest that the link between turn­
over and absence on the one hand, and morale on the other,
7
may not be as close as has commonly been thought. Indeed
it has been suggested that turnover and absence may themselves 
not be closely related under all conditions.
Nevertheless I v/ould accept that since changes in 
absence and turnover levels have been reported in some cases
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of job redesign, any theory of this field must offer some 
explanation of why this has occurred. And since the present 
theory does not offer such an account it must therefore be 
regarded as limited in its scope.
Its second limitation pertains to the conditions under 
which the theory holds, and to the circumstances or contin­
gencies whose variation may affect the theory’s applicability. 
Some limitations and contingencies were suggested, as for 
example, that intrinsically-motivated employees may fall 
outside of the ambit of the theory, or in the argument that 
the necessity of labour elimination under category III redesign 
may vary with the type of technology, and the degree of 
influence on production afforded to labour. The fact remains 
hov/ever that no systematic attempt was undertaken to assess 
the influence of product and labour markets, technology,
industry, industrial relations, organisation size, and the many
0
other variables which might be thought worthy of exploration.
In part again this was a problem of time limits, but also, 
and more seriously, of weaknesses inherent in the existing 
data, and it may well be that the theory’s applicability 
is both more limited in its scope and contingent in character 
than I have suggested.
The next problem is methodological in character and 
properly belongs in the next section, although it will be 
mentioned briefly here. The thrust of the argument in the 
literature review v/as that the new theory of job redesign
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offered a more plausible and a more adequate account of 
case study outcomes than the conventional theories, and 
that, in addition, it was able to cope with problems such 
as attitude-performance discrepancies. Nevertheless, apart 
from the Meccano case study (with which there were numerous 
problems), no direct test of the theory, was available in 
the literature. The alleged validity of the new theory 
rested on its plausibility as much as on any experimental 
’proof,* and this is clearly a weakness in the overall thesis.
The next issue for consideration is the question of 
attitudes. The fifth postulate of the new theory stated 
there would be empirical dissociations between job attitudes 
and behaviours, and that these were due to the operation o:f 
dual mechanisms: one governing attitudes, the other
behaviours (although some overlap was recognised). The 
data presented in the previous chapters amply confirmed 
't^ ie empirical aspect of the postulate, but they did not 
provide much evidence on the nature of the respective 
mechanisms (if they do indeed exist).
Theoretically, the principal reason for this omission 
lay in the fact that the new theory failed to indicate, 
in detail, the mechanisms * controlling' attitudes (as it 
did with job behaviour), other than to suggest they were 
broader in scope than those governing behaviour. Clearly 
this is an area requiring considerably more theoretical 
and empirical work if the dual-mechanism thesis is to be
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tested, and if the new theory of job redesign as a whole 
is to be evaluated.
Finally, we must discuss a number of conceptual and 
theoretical problems, the first of which concerns the 
usage of the category ’white collar employee.’ It was 
argued that the theory advanced here enjoyed less 
applicability to white collar as compared with blue 
collar workers. Yet it is surely the case that the category 
of ’white collar’ workers is extremely misleading, and 
conducive to oversimplification, if it is taken to imply 
some not Inconsiderable degree of homogeneity. For 'white 
collar* work may embrace anything from filing letters all 
day through to decision-making at the highest levels of 
an international corporation. And white collar workers may 
receive anywhere between a few hours and eight years 
training, and have qualifications (in England) from 
"nothing" up to two or more degrees. In terms of job 
attitudes, lower grade white collars with few qualifications 
may be much closer to blue collar workers than to their 
more senior counterparts, but this remark raises another 
problem.
The 'blue collar' worker is also very far from being 
a simple, and a single type. There is an enormous range 
of 'blue collar' occupations from floor sweeping through 
to tool making, and there Is no a priori reason to suppose 
a striking similarity of attitudes to work among such 
groups. Future research in this field would therefore need
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to specify the applicability of the theory in terras of 
patterns of job attitudes, qualifications, and .job content 
(and perhaps other variables) and thus move av/ay from a 
simplistic blue-white collar dichotomy as employed here.
The second conceptual problem with the thesis concerns
the sharp distinction drawn between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivational mechanisms. It should perhaps be pointed out
that we did not distinguish two such forms of job attitude,
or orientation to work, for it was argued that job performance
and job attitudes were analytically separate. This implies
that any combination of job attitudes (in intrinsic-extrinsic
terms) is possible. Nevertheless the possibility that
intrinsic motivation (in response to 'enriched’ job content)
may co-exist with, or indeed conceal, a concern for economic
g
rewards was not seriously considered. Conversely, the idea 
that pay rises may be valued for symbolic, or intrinsic, 
reasons, was accorded equally scant treatment. These 
omissions were justified, I feel, insofar as they allowed 
some simplification of the issues, and thus permitted more 
incisive analyses to be conducted. But the price of these 
explanatory advances was a degree of theoretical crudity. 
Certainly, such issues as the above require investigation 
if the validity of the new theory is to be properly tested, 
but such tests could not be conducted on the basis of the 
existing data, which would be wholly inadequate for such 
purposes. Fresh, and more rigorous studies would need to 
be conducted.
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Finally, we should mention the concept of accountability, 
as used in our theory. Evidence for enhanced accountability, 
particularly in category II redesign, was presented in two 
forms: firstly, it was argued that work role individualisation
created the possibility of increased accountability, which 
it was assumed management v/ould exercise (and that assumption 
may not, of course, be universally valid); and secondly, 
it was shown in the Thornely & Valentine case that workers 
actually perceived this to be the case, and felt that errors 
in their work could more easily be d e t e c t e d . W o  other 
empirical evidence was available on workers’ perceptions, 
although interpretations of the sort advanced above were 
also to be found in other writers. Nevertheless it would 
be desirable, as well as necessary, to conduct more detailed 
investigations into this issue.
Some of the problems raised in this section have serious 
implications for the validity of the theory, and indeed for 
the utility of the 'tests’ to which it has been subjected 
in this thesis. Before passing some final comments on the 
theory, I shall therefore consider three areas of difficulty 
in more detail in the ensuing sections. The first covers 
what may broadly be termed methodological problems, some 
of which have been raised indirectly in earlier discussions of 
the limitations of the current literature and of the case 
studies described in the previous chapter. Such problems 
m u s b e  articulated more precisely if a balanced assessment
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of the new theory is to be reached. The second area is that 
of motivation. This term has barely been defined, let alone 
discussed throughout the thesis, and I have concentrated 
instead on testing the utility of a quasi-Taylorist conception, 
of the term. There has, however, been a considerable volume 
of debate within industrial psychology on the nature, and 
meaning, of this concept, and some of these issues and themes 
must now be confronted.
The final area relates, again, to a conceptual lacuna 
in the thesis. The concept in question is that of effort, 
and the corollary notions of ’intensity* and 1 intensification' 
of effort. Very cursory definitions of these terms have 
been employed throughout, but their unsatisfactoriness must 
surely be apparent. The final section, therefore, explores 
in more detail the precise meanings of each of these terms.
Methodological problems
The first section of Chapter 6 examined, and tried to 
assess the impact of, a variety of methodological deficiencies 
in the job redesign literature. Some of these must be 
restated and their implications re-eraphasised here, and we 
must also consider some of the problems attendant on the 
alternative interpretations that were proposed.
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In concentrating on Taylorist theory, as contained in 
Taylor's major publications, we ran the risk of painting a 
rather one-sided picture of scientific management, as some of 
Taylor's works were written to placate and to reassure hostile 
audiences. Whilst I do not believe that a misreading of his 
work has been presented in this thesis, further research, 
would be required to confirm or disconfirm such a possibility.
The next main problem concerns the theory of job redesign 
proposed in Chapter 5. Two of the main postulates of this 
theory were that job attitudes and job performance, were 
influenced, to a considerable degree, by different mechanisms; 
and that the mechanisms involved in the improvement of 
productivity and product quality under job redesign were pay 
incentives, labour elimination, work methods improvements and 
accountability and control. For the purposes of testing 
these notions against the literature it was sufficient to> 
provide 'working definitions,' but more profound problems 
must now be examined. It can be stated quite firmly that 
both of these postulates are tremendous over-simplifications 
of what are, undoubtedly, very complex phenomena. As Lawler ^  
has pointed out, there is a consistent, though small, corre­
lation between job satisfaction and job performance and he 
has chosen to stress this consistency, rather than the small 
magnitude of the correlations. Squally, it has been demon­
strated by Marriott that the effectiveness of incentive 
payments is both difficult to assess, and nay be situation-
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spscific. I chase, in the literaure review to ignore 
many of these problems, and to assume the effectiveness of 
incentives whenever a correlation between pay rises and 
productivity increases was shown to exist. The justification 
for this apparent theoretical naivete was in fact methodo­
logical, for the aim of the review was, as far as that was 
possible, to test null hypotheses against the available data, 
and to explore the explanatory power of the postulated theory. 
A review of that sort could logically show only, for instance, 
that certain alternative theoretica.l interpretations of the 
available cases were more plausible; than those offered by 
classical job redesign theory. This type of argument is 
admittedly weak, but this weakness reflects, to a large 
degree, the deficiencies in the current and available 
literature that were noted at the beginning of Chapter 6.
It might be objected that a thorough and well conducted 
case study could surely overcome many of these deficiencies 
and allow one to draw much firmer conclusions. But this 
would not be so, for although the Meccano case study did 
offer some interesting insights into the operation of a 
particular scheme of job redesign, it is always difficult 
to judge how far such insights can be generalised beyond 
their origin, or how far they are limited and peculiar to 
that particular situation. Any one of a whole number of 
features - of the labour force, the management, payment 
system, technology, local vulture etc., could seriously 
curtail the generalisabilitv of any conclusions drawn, no
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matter how firm. A literature review, with all its 
deficiencies, therefore played an important role in this 
thesis.
Of course, many of the cases used in the literature
review contained serious shortcomings, noted already. There
may have been simultaneous changes within the company that
went entirely unreported, or indeed even unnoticed. King
has shown for example that managerial expectations of
higher performance, transmitted to supervisors, may be more
potent determinants of productivity increases than actual
changes in job content.^ In other words the mechanisms
of job * enlargement’ (as he called it) may not be employee
motivation, but supervisor motivation. Marriott has argued a
similar point with regard to incentive; pay systems: although
they can be shown to be effective, in raising output,
reducing costs etc., this tells us nothing about the
14mechanisms involved. The idea that they operate via 
employee needs, as incentives, is one possible theory, but 
that is all. It may equally be the case that insofar as 
incentive schemes tend to raise total labour costs they 
act as an incentive to management to organise production 
more efficiently. Because of the deficiencies in the 
literature we cannot say, generally, how important may be 
the expectations of management, but we can, and did, show 
in a particular case (Meccano) that managerial expectations 
did result in a strengthening of supervisory interventions
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in production, and thus in an increase in productivity.
The operation of such expectations, and their translation 
into action, may therefore be an important variable for 
understanding job redesign as may the effects of other 
'extraneous1 variables. And Cummings et al. have suggested that 
a more careful examination of cases in .the literature reveals 
several 'threats to validity,1 especially for findings on 
attitude changes.^ Some of these threats have been mentioned 
and discussed in Chapter 6, and we commented throughout 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 on the incidence of. cases with performance 
improvements in the absence of attitudinal changes. These 
findings are not encouraging and the possibility does of 
course remain that productivity and quality improvements 
may be due to factors other than those postulated either in 
job redesign theories or in our own theory. This possibility 
could only be explored however by an examination of a large 
number of well documented and researched case studies, and. 
these simply do not exist. For the present all that can be 
done is to place question marks beside job redesign theory 
and practice and to offer a number of suggestions for 
alternative explanations.
Proceeding onwards through Chapters 6, 7 and 8, we 
should consider the method of analysis employed in the 
literature review. Within each category of job redesign 
a number of case studies were discussed and the outcomes eval­
uated in terras of job red sign theories, and our own theory.
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The method of argument in each case consisted in showing the 
effects, for productivity rises, and quality improvements 
where possible, of certain factors, such as labour elimination, 
pay rises, and methods improvements. The theory advanced in 
this thesis was argued for, (a) on the grounds that it offered 
more plausible explanations of the phenomena at issue, and 
(b) that changes in job attitudes and perceptions, posited 
as important by job redesign theorists, had often been shown 
not to have occurred in economically successful cases. The 
next step was to explain 'deviant' cases. It might be 
objected that this whole procedure is both inadequate and 
adhoc - inadequate because not all available case studies 
were discussed in depth, and ad hoc, because of the sorts of 
explanations offered for deviant cases.
Whilst a more detailed analysis of a larger number of 
cases might have been desirable, the fact is that there are 
far more cases worthy of discussion than space available in 
which to discuss them. Such a discussion would also have 
been somewhat repetitious. It is, however, true that some of 
the explanations offered for deviant cases in each of the 
three categories, i.e. cases with productivity improvements, 
but no pay rises, labour elimination etc., do have a rather ad hoc 
character. For instance, it was suggested that in the absence 
of labour elimination in cate jory III redesign, productivity 
increases might still accrue if the production systems in 
question were operating well below their technical capacity.
This suggestion was simply advanced as an hypothesis, although
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supporting evidence was sparse. Tnilst this sorr. of argument 
does have an ad hoc character, there is at present, in view 
of the limitations of the literature, no alternative to the 
production of hypotheses of this sort. And given the obvious 
complexity of the phenomena under discussion, I would suggest 
that an attempt to produce an adequate theory must proceed 
here by the production and revision of hypotheses. To reject 
them simply because they appear unable to account for the 
results of certain cases would in my view be premature.
Finally, it should also be noticed that many of the 
arguments advanced in the literature review are based on 
correlations, between labour elimination, and productivity 
increases for instance. V/hilst some of the arguments were 
expanded upon in Chapter 9 which examined case studies, this 
was not true for all of them. It was thus unclear, for 
instance, whether in certain cases the elimination of labour 
was cause or effect of a productivity rise. This was 
particularly true in situations where other factors, such 
as pay incentives had been operative. It may sometimes be 
possible to show that a particular set of job changes 
resulted in no increase in total output, but only in its 
redistribution among the workforce, and here one would be 
justified in saying output per man hour could not have 
increased without the elimination of labour. In many cases 
however, figures were only provided on increases in productivity, 
not production, and it v/ould therefore be impossible to say
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in these cases what role was played by labour elimination.
Some of the above problems might have been partially 
resolved by means of a thorough case study, combining data 
on employee and managerial attitudes and behaviour, as well 
as technological and production data. All of the cases in 
Chapter 9 fell short of this ideal and are in some respects 
unsatisfactory. Part of the reason for this lacuna is the 
traditional problem of securing access to an industrial 
organisation in order to carry out research, but the problems 
are compounded in the present situation by three factors.
First of all research in this field, as in any other area of 
industrial change, can only be conducted in the small pro­
portion of companies engaged in the relevant change processes. 
This fact greatly reduces the potential number of organisations 
that may be approached for access. Secondly, there is some 
evidence that formal job redesign projects, that is, moves 
to despecialise labour conducted as job redesign, may have 
declined slightly in number over the past few years. The 
following table shows the starting dates for projects 
reported by the Work Research Unit in its comprehensive 
British Survey, published in August, 1975•1^
TABLE 23 Starting dates for job redesign projects 
reported by the .'/ork Research Unit in 1973
1930s 1960-64 1963 1966 1967 1963 1969 1970
1 2 0 5 8 7 11 17
1971 1972 197 3 1974 1975 Don’t know
13 5 7 3 0 33
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Thirdly, those few recent projects, i.e. 1974 or afterwards, 
that have been started, have been 1 monopolised1 by research 
centres or university departments in liaison with the Work 
Research Unit, or by independent research teams, e.g. The 
Henley Work Research Group, or, perhaps, by consultants.
The field left available for independent researchers is 
thus small indeed.
I don’t believe however that an all-or-none type of 
argument should be applied to case studies: it is too easy
to dismiss, or ignore, cases that are less than adequate, 
methodologically. A more fruitful, and a more difficult, 
approach is to draw whatever conclusions one can from the 
data that is available, and to state clearly their 
limitations, and this is v/hat I have tried to do.
The questions of motivation and satisfaction
As a number of recent reviews have indicated, the field
of motivation is exceedingly complex and has given rise to
an enormous literature spanning both empirical studies
testing single hypotheses as well as broad theoretical 
1 17formulations. 1 I make this point as a way of stating the 
impossibility of doing justice to the complexity of the 
field in a short section such as this. Rather than try to 
review, compare and contrast several theories of motivation, 
especially motivation at work, a task which has been 
adequately performed elsewhere, I shall instead focus on a
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number of specific issues that are important in our under­
standing of both job redesign and industrial behaviour more 
generally. These issues are as follows: i) the concepts of
motivation and satisfaction, ii) the role of pay, iii) process
and content theories of motivation, iv) social factors in 
motivation and satisfaction, v) individual differences,
vi) intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.
i) It has been argued in this thesis that these concepts 
should be separated analytically, and should be seen as 
having different ’causes,' on the whole. The term 'motivation' 
was used rather loosely to denote an inclination to perform 
one's job, whilst ’satisfaction' was used, again rather 
loosely, to refer to feelings associated with the job.
At a conceptual level, the distinction between
motivation to perform and satisfaction (with performance,
with pay, co-workers etc.) seems intuitively reasonable.
The difficulties arise when one starts to think in more
detail about the meaning of the terms satisfaction and
motivation, and some of the mechanisms involved in their 
1 8causation. In the present work I have sought only to> 
separate out these two concepts, and to argue they are 
related (principally) to different features of the work 
situation. And insofar as this work rests on possibly 
dubious assumptions about the precise nature of each of 
these terms, it must to that degree be regarded as provisional 
in character.
ii) The argument advanced in this thesis was that the
data available from case i of job redesign reoo.rted in the
\... ...
literature did not fit the theory that certain changes in
job content were principal causes of enhanced motivation,
and consequently of performance improvements and attitude
changes, and it was suggested that changes in performance
could be attributed in part to the operation of more
traditional control systems, such as payment, and to labour
displacement and methods changes. Given the ambiguity of
the evidence it was not possible to opt unambiguously for
one theory or the other, or to specify in detail conditions
under which each may be appropriate as an explanatory device.
It may legitimately be asked however whether the role of
traditional * carrot and stick’ methods has not been overstated.
After all, there is much evidence on the negative consequences
of such methods, and recent theories and researches have
attempted to cope with some of the problems raised by the
19
traditional theories and their associated methods.
Some of the recent evidence, and summaries of evidence,
on pay as a motivator, were presented in Chapter 5 where it
was shown that the evidence tended to support the efficacy
of financial incentives, especially when paid individually,
20and of pay rises under a regime of incentives.
In the case studies reviewed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8,
43 contained information on payment systems, and of these 26 
involved either a group or individual inc - itivo. Clearly 
we cannot say definitely that pay incentives were effective 
in all of these cases, bur, the evidence on pay incentives 
generally tends to support such a conclusion. There remain
17 cases which involved flat rate (or time rate) payment
systems, and about these we can unfortunately say very little.
In some of these cases, other mechanisms may have been
involved, whilst in others, productivity improvements v/ere
of small magnitude.
The evidence on the importance of pay as a factor in
job attitudes and/or job satisfaction has also been studied
21by a large number of authors, and summarised by Lawler.
Whilst pointing out the methodological deficiencies of much
of the research in this area, he nevertheless concluded
that pay tended on average, to be rated about the third
most important factor in choosing or liking a job. On the
other hand, the classic study by Morse & Weiss appeared to
22show that people worked for more than just money. When 
asked if they would continue working after having been 
granted a guaranteed income, over 80% of blue collar,
American workers said they would. It is not clear whether 
this shows that people do actually have non-monetary motives 
at work, or whether, under different conditions, they could 
have such motivations.
Nevertheless, both the motivational character, and the 
importance of pay in our society, seem well established.
There are of course, many negative consequences of pay 
incentives, and of the forms of managerial control with which 
they are often associated. Perhaps the most widely discussed 
of these effects is 'restriction1 of output. The phenomenon
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is hardly new, and was certainly familiar to Taylor, but
with the extension of pay incentive systems after the 1920s,
the phenomenon naturally became more widespread, and was
're-discovered' in the 1940s and '50s by Dalton, Roy, Whyte
23
and others in their now classic researches. Whatever the
pervasiveness of output restriction, and however serious
the phenomenon, knowledge of it spread and played a part in
the declining popularity of such schemes in the 1960s. In
the U.K., payment by results, as they were collectively
known, came to be replaced in some companies by a fixed wage-
performance contract scheme, such as Measured Day-Work, an
24indication of the growing disenchantment with incentives. 
Nevertheless, Lawler's review of the evidence up to 1970 gave 
no grounds for thinking these industrial changes were wholly 
justified, although he acknowledged the existence of output 
restriction. Just as one cannot say that pay incentives 
will be effective under all circumstances, so equally it 
cannot be argued that restriction of output will be found 
under all conditions (leaving aside for the moment the 
problems in defining a normal, or fair day's work that are 
necessarily entailed in the idea of output restriction).
iii) It must be acknowledged however that the so-called
rational economic man theory of motivation does have problems 
and limitations, and some of these have been explored by 
contemporary theories. It is customary when discussing such 
work to distinguish process and content theories of motivation.
The former specify the social, cognitive and/or affective
processes involved in motivation, whilst the latter attempt
to specify individual needs or wants and the classes of object
or reward that can satisfy them. Expectancy theory would be
an example of the former, and Maslow’s need-hierarchy, an
example of the latter.
It should be said at the outset that the material
presented in this thesis allows no statement to be made about
motivational processes. It cannot therefore be used to judge
the validity of expectancy theory for instance since none of
the pertinent variables have been measured, or indeed even
examined, although it is always possible that some of the
findings in the thesis might be interpreted in expectancy 
25
theory terms. It has sought simply to examine a number
of content theories of motivation, centred around a group
of task dimensions (autonomy, variety, etc.,). Indeed,
we cannot comment systematically on other content theories
of motivation, such as Adam’s equity theory (which is actually
26
a combined content-process theory), or McClelland’s need-
27
achievement theory. Whilst it may appear that the evidence 
of a number of cases where workers called for wage rises 
after job redesign lends support to equity theory, it is 
also possible that workers were simply using the changes in 
job content as a basis, or pretext, for wage demands that 
actually derived from another desire, e.g. to protect falling 
living standards in the face of inflation.
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j_v) The next issue to reside red I "ha question of
social factors in motivation. ihe "human relations" critique
of Taylorism, i.e. that it ignored workers’ social needs, is
well known and requires no repetition, although some of the
evidence used to support the critique against ’rational-
economic man,’ such as output restriction in response to
group pressure, can be given a rational-economic interpre- 
23tation. Schein has recently argued that a proper under­
standing of worker motivation must consider economic, social, 
and 'self-actualising’ aspects of motivation, as advanced by
Taylor, Mayo and Mas 1-ow respectively, in a formulation he
29
called 'complex man.' It may be objected against job 
redesign, particularly category II, and to some degree, 
category I, that it ignores or underplays the social needs 
of the workforce, sacrificing them to production.
We must be careful, in evaluating this critique, to 
make two sets of distinctions: firstly, we must distinguish
its moral and empirical features, and secondly, we must be 
clear as to whether we are discussing job satisfaction and 
job attitudes, or performance and motivation, as our principal 
dependent variables. (See below/). In the Meccano case study 
(an example of category II redesign) many of the workers 
complained about the isolation which they experienced in 
comparison with the progressive a s s e m b l y  lines, but despite 
this grievance, performance levels we^o M g h ,  approaching 
100.’ -31, because of the combined o ' . h h s  of pay incentives 
and supervisory control. ’ sib ation, the comp a n y
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could be morally condemned for failing to satisfy the social
needs of its workforce, and it could also be argued that
overall job satisfaction might have been improved had more
appropriate social arrangements been made. But motivation,
as evidenced in levels of performance, did not appear to be
so adversely affected. In other words we need to examine
not only the expressed wishes and grievances of the workforce,
but their priority as well - in the Meccano case, workers
complained about social dissatisfaction, but gave priority
to their economic needs (or interests). In other situations
the outcome may be different but the point is that the
consequences of relative isolation and restricted interaction
opportunities cannot be assumed, following Hawthorne, but
must be investigated and determined in each particular case.
v) Next, we must consider individual differences in
motivation and satisfaction. It has been pointed out that
one of the benefits of expectancy theory is that it does not
impose a universal theory of human needs or preferences.
Lawler, indeed, in supplying expectancy theory with some
content, has also made no such assumption, acknowledging
30
again that individuals differ. Individual differences in
job attitudes and job satisfaction were evident in a number
of cases of job redesign, and one v/ould also expect to find
differences in employee behaviours after job redesign, i.e.
in terms of productivity, etc. What I tried to establish
were the factors responsible for the general efficacy of job 
redesign, an endeavour that in no way denies, or conflicts
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with, the existence of individual psychological differences. 
Indeed such differences in job attitudes were suggested as 
a crucial factor demarcating the spheres of applicability 
of the classical, and the new theory of job redesign. But 
further research into such differences could only enrich 
our understanding of this whole area.
vi) Finally, let us consider the question of intrinsic
and extrinsic rewards. Conventionally intrinsic rewards 
are seen as those internal to the individual, which he 'gives 
to himself,' such as feelings of self-esteem, pride etc., 
whilst extrinsic rewards are those provided from external 
sources by other agents (usually), such as pay, promotion 
etc. In the present work, behaviour was seen largely as a 
response to extrinsic rewards, whilst the role of intrinsic 
rewards was to provide satisfaction, or to change attitudes. 
Might not this distinction be overdrawn? After all, extrinsic 
rewards such as pay may have intrinsic components, such as 
self-esteem, or personal status, whilst intrinsic rewards 
may be valued solely for their connection with extrinsic 
rewards, such as power, or salary. Equally, it is possible 
that employees may respond to job redesign for both extrinsic 
e.g. pay, and intrinsic e.g. competence, self esteem, reasons. 
Again, it is possible that a change in job content initially 
valued for its extrinsic rewards, such as higher pay, may 
come to be valued eventually for the intrinsic rewards 
arising out of the performance of a 'meaningful' task. And
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final ly , there may well be cases of the opposite phenomenon 
occurring: university graduates may take up particular
appointments for their intrinsic interest, job content etc., 
but find that before long they have grown accustomed to a 
much higher standard of living, and have begun to 'develop1 
an extrinsic or instrumental orientation to work.
On the first two points (the intermingling of intrinsic 
and extrinsic factors), it should be noted that in the thesis 
I was simply concerned to identify those factors - pay, job 
content, control - which seemed to be correlated with 
increases in performance. I was not exploring the reasons why 
people might be motivated by pay, for example, and indeed it 
is quite possible that there exists a variety of reasons for 
this. On the next question, that of changes in motivation 
arising out of work experiences, this is indeed a possibility 
in a number of cases. But there were several cases of 
attitude-behaviour discrepancy, i.e. cases in which there 
appeared to be no intrinsic orientation to work reflected in 
changed attitudes, where it seemed plausible to dissociate 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. On the basis of these 
'deviant' cases it was then argued that the dissociation in 
empirical and analytical terms, between attitudes and 
behaviour was a more general phenomenon and of course 
such a view was more parsimonious than supposing that there 
were two sets of relationships between the mechanisms 
controlling attitudes and behaviour. Consequently, it was 
suggested that to explain improvements in job performance
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r e q u i r e d  a f o c u s  o n  the ’e x t r i n s i c *  m e c h a n i s m s  s u g g e s t e d  i n  
o u r  t h e o r y .
A n y  s u b s e q u e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  w o r k e r s ’ a t t i t u d e s ,  a s
a  r e s u l t  o f  j o b  r e d e s i g n ,  s u c h  a s  a n  i n c r e a s e d  i n t e r e s t  i n
i n t r i n s i c  r e w a r d s ,  a r e  c l e a r l y  p h e n o m e n a  o f  s o m e  i n t e r e s t
f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  b u t  i t  i s  u n c l e a r  h o w
s u c h  d e v e l o p m e n t s  m i g h t  a l t e r  o n e ' s  p r e d i c t i o n s  a b o u t  w o r k e r
r e s p o n s e s  t o  f u t u r e  j o b  r e d e s i g n  s c h e m e s .  V/ould t h e y  be
m o r e  w i l l i n g  to p e r f o r m  ’e n r i c h e d ’ j o b s  w i t h o u t  p a y  r i s e s ?
O r  w o u l d  pay ,  c o n t r o l  e tc .  c o n t i n u e  to b e  t h e  d o m i n a n t  f a c t o r s
i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e i r  w o r k  b e h a v i o u r ? W i t h o u t  m o r e  l o n g i t u d i n a l
s t u d i e s  o n  j o b  r e d e s i g n  s c h e m e s ,  w e  c a n n o t  s a y  w h i c h ,  i f  a n y ,
o f  t h e s e  p r e d i c t i o n s  m i g h t  b e  c o n f i r m e d .  E q u a l l y  i t  i s  u n c l e a r
h o w  s u c h  d e v e l o p m e n t s  w o u l d  a f f e c t  t h e  e x p l a n a t o r y  p o w e r  o f
t h e  t h e o r y  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  e x c e p t  i n s o f a r  a s  t h e y
p o i n t  to t h e  a b s e n c e  of  a n y  c o h e r e n t  n o t i o n s  o f  d e v e l o p m e n t s
o f  j o b  a t t i t u d e s  a n d  o r i e n t a t i o n s ,  a n  o m i s s i o n  w h i c h  o u g h t ,
i d e a l l y ,  t o  b e  r e c t i f i e d .
T h e  r e c e n t  w o r k  o f  D e c i  a n d  h i s  a s s o c i a t e s  is  a l s o  o f
31p a r t i c u l a r  r e l e v a n c e  to o u r  p r e s e n t  t h e m e .  T h e s e  s t u d i e s  
h a v e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  the i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r ew ar ds  
i n t o  e x p e r i m e n t a l  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  s u b j e c t s  w e r e  p e r f o r m i n g  
t a s k s ,  a n d  w e r e ,  p r e s u m a b l y ,  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  m o t i v a t e d ,  h a s
the effect of reducing measured intrinsic motivation. It is 
difficult to assess the practical relevance of this work
b e c a u s e  m a n y  o f  t h e  s t u d i e s  h a v e  e m p l o y e d  s t u d e n t s  o n  s h o r t
term tasks in laboratory situations. In real life income
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from work is generally essential, and not just supplementary, 
as in the Deci studies, and is not ’introduced’ into a 
situation, but is there from the beginning, and is expected 
to be there (see also Chapter 5,above). In the light of 
these remarks it is, therefore, difficult to appreciate the 
practical relevance of these studies for employing organisations.
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Effort, intensity and intensification of labour
It has been argued in this thesis that job redesign
can be understood as a form of intensification of labour,
that is, as a process in which either, or both, the rate
of working, and the time spent working, are increased. It
was assumed that this process would correspond with the
exertion of effort, a concept that remained undefined. In
this section some of the problems with these various terms
will be explored, and we shall investigate in more detail
the justification for treating job redesign as a form of
labour intensification.
Effort is often understood simply in terms of energy
expenditure. That is to say, it is seen as a process of
32
muscular exertion, oxygen consumption etc. Alternatively,
it has been conceptualised as a function of the relation
between information input and processing capacity, so that
33effort arises from over or under-stimulation.
The intensity of working can be defined in at least
two ways. Owen-Smith, for instance, appears to use the
term synonymously with rate of working, that is with the
34rate of effort or performance. There is, however, a 
second meaning which can be assigned to the concept, and 
that is a measure of the intensity of the working day,i.e. 
the proportion of the working day spent in working as opposed 
to non-working."^ The greater this ratio, the greater -would 
be the intensity of the work performed. Increased intensity
of labour may be brought about therefore in two ways,
corresponding to these two definitions. Firstly, the rate,
or pace, of working may be increased, and where this
phenomenon occurs on mechanised conveyors or tracks, it is
colloquially known as "speed up." But intensification of
labour may also be seen in an increased proportion of working,
as opposed to non-working time within the working day. Of
course, these two processes may not be separated empirically
in this way, and it is possible, for instance, that a strategy
for raising working time, such as the assignment of more
t a s k s  m a y  s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e s u l t  i n  a f a s t e r  r a t e  of  w o r k i n g .
Analytically, however, the phenomena can be distinguished.
The way in which one measures effort and intensity
w i l l  d e p e n d  o n  t h e  w a y  i n  w h i c h  t h e y  a r e  d e f i n e d .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,
it was impossible to measure effort in any of the case studies
reported in this thesis, although such data can be found
sporadically, throughout the job redesign literature, and
3 6
will be referred to later, (see also Chapter 4)*
It is somewhat easier to assess changes in labour
intensity, since there are many cases where the same volume
of work has been performed by fewer workers, or by the same
37number of workers in less time. In certain cases these 
productivity improvements have been brought about by methods 
improvements, such as the elimination of superfluous motions 
or activities, but the majorit3'- of cases have involved no 
such changes in methods, and may be regarded as instances
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of intensification. This, in the majority of cases, is
simply an inference, but its validity can be confirmed by
considering that of the two other methods available for
raising productivity - extension of working hours, and
introduction of capital equipment - neither has occurred to
33
any significant degree in job redesign.
Only reorganisation of flow lines involved methods 
improvements as here defined - the other categories of job 
redesign therefore raised productivity by means of intensi­
fication of labour. Does this mean however that effort 
expenditure was also increased in these cases? To answer 
this question brings us back to the earlier discussion of 
definitions of effort and it also raises two other issues. 
Firstly, it may be argued that intensity of working is not 
synonymous with effort expenditure, since the latter depends, 
at least in part, on whether work is self-controlled or 
externally-controlled. In the former situation increased 
output may materialise, but effort expenditure fall because 
of the reduction of external constraint. The second issue 
concerns the rather pejorative use of the term intensification 
throughout this work, and the implication that enhanced effort 
expenditure is a ’’bad thing.” Let us deal with each issue 
in turn, although as v/e shall see they are in fact related.
On intensity and effort it is sufficient to observe 
that there need be no correlation between the objective and 
subjective aspects of intensity. A greatly increased work
load may not be experienced as such because of the simultaneous
removal of other sources of strain, such as mechanical pacing.
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The Inct would remain, however, that : » terms o the ratio 
oi wording to non-working time, intensity of labour had 
increased no matter what the mitigating factors. It should 
also be noticed that the'equation of pacing with, strain, and 
self pacing with reduced strain, does not always stand up to 
empirical test, as will be shown in Chapter 12. All we can 
say here is that different indices of effort - duration and 
pace of working on the one hand, and perceived effort on the 
other - rpa.y move in opposite directions. There would thus 
appear to be no more .justification for saying effort 
expenditure increases than for saying it decreases, although 
we can say that the intensity of labour, as defined here, 
does increase. V/e must, for the moment then, divorce effort 
expenditure and intensity of labour, at least theoretically 
and present our overall argument, generally, in terms of the 
latter concept, but use the former only where concrete 
evidence would justify this.
If, however, there need be no correlation between actual 
intensity and perceived effort, are we justified in writing 
of intensification of labour in a somewhat pejorative and 
critical manner? In order to answer this question and 
comment also on the previous one, I think we must distinguish 
two broad conceptions of, or approaches to, the term 'effort.* 
On the one hand, there is the psychological view, which we 
■ ■ vo already encountered accord ing to whi oh perceived effort 
expenditure may decrease nn.: r job redesign. But on the other 
hand there is an economic view associat id with Baldamus, in
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particular, wh.lch t.r ■■* effort i / • very differont 
manner, ana which locates it I., the context oT worker— 
employer r e l a t i o n s F o r  Baldamus such relations are 
inherently antagonistic since wages are rewards for the 
workers, but costs for the employer. The basic exchange 
between the worker and employer is that of wages for 
labour: workers "give” their labour or effort, and receive
wages; the employer gives wages and receives labour, under­
stood as productive activity. Within this wage-effort 
exchange both parties seek to maximise their own interests, 
and for the workers, this according to Baldamus, means 
maintaining or reducing effort, whilst increasing or 
maintaining wages, respectively.
According to this conception, therefore, increased 
productive activity, or effort will benefit the employer 
primarily, unless workers can also increase wages proport­
ionately (at least) and hence maintain the given wage- 
effort ratio. Economically, therefore, it would be 
legitimate to adopt a critical stance towards managerial 
schemes for the enhancement of effort, or the intensification 
of labour, within the working day. Though from a psychological 
perspective, one might well arrive at different conclusions.
More broadly, productivity can be raised in four ways 
(us indicated above), 1 v > c l which increase, and two which 
tend to decrease, • -t >;•: --er iiture per unit output or
in tot o. If o n e arvu • • mt hi ■ ric? Lly nor a recent mefchods- 
mechanisation, and me the •>•/ manta - t to reduce
effort expenditure, and tend to be more effective means 
for raising productivity in the long term, then from this 
standpoint, intensification of labour may be criticised for 
tending to be historically regressive.
Summary and conclusions
It would be fruitless to reiterate here the methodo­
logical and conceptual problems identified in the thesis, 
so I shall confine myself to a few observations. The 
theory of job redesign advanced here appears to have held 
up fairly well, although there are concepts - motivation, 
satisfaction, white collar worker, effort - which require 
more thorough analysis if the validity of the theory is 
to be fully appreciated. This type of analysis may, of 
course, throw up insuperable problems for the theory, but 
the need for it does not in itself seem to me sufficient 
grounds for rejecting the theory.
Some modifications can undoubtedly be made even at 
this stage, e.g. it may be necessary to present the theory 
as being, at a general level, concerned with labour intensity 
where this, at present, is to be understood as conceptually 
separate from effort intensity and expenditure.
It would, however, be going too far to claim the theory 
offered a wholly adequate account of job redesign. There 
are cases and phenomena which it may be difficult, at present, 
to explain, and it is to be hoped that future research will
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introduce suitable modifications, perasos along some of 
the lines indicated in the previous sections. Equally, 
there are many methodological problems which must be 
overcome in future studies if a proper evaluation of the 
theory is to be produced. It may, however, legitimately 
serve as an alternative to the ’classical' theories, and 
one that would seem, in the light of the material in this 
thesis, to merit further testing, and refinement..
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CHAPTER 12 SOME IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
This penultimate chapter seeks to extend some of the 
previous discussions by drawing out a number of the 
implications of the arguments and the theory advanced in 
the thesis.
In the first section we take a more abstract look at 
the present and the classical theories of job redesign, in 
terms of their assumptions about work and workers. Under­
lying many theories of work motivation, job attitudes etc. 
can often be found a series of unarticulated assumptions 
about work and its meaning and possibilities and about the 
social and economic constraints which affect them. In some 
cases assumptions of this kind may be absent, and that in 
itself may be a problem. But taking an overall view, it 
is possible to see the new theory as part of a more 
pessimistic’ tradition of theorising, and classical job 
redesign as belonging to a more optimistic vein. This 
section will explore these images of work and the worker 
and discuss the implications of the theory offered in this 
thesis.
The next section deals, historically, with the concept 
of labour intensification and seeks to challenge a prevailing 
view within job redesign theory which posits a fundamental
discontinuity in managerial practice sometime in the post­
war period. The section tries to show the existence of an 
even more fundamental continuity of practice, and can thus 
be seen as an exercise in historiography.
The conclusions from this section are carried over into 
a discussion of the future of job redesign and used to inform 
ideas about the forms which this phenomenon might take in 
the future. *
Finally, the implications of the theory for research 
are described and a number of possible investigations 
suggested.
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The new and the classical theories of job redesign: 
images of work and the worker
The classical theories of job redesign argued that the 
principal mechanism responsible for attitudinal and 
behavioural,outcomes was 'intrinsic' or task-motivation- 
workers were thought to display an increased motivation to 
perform as a result of the improved content of their jobs, 
which were now richer in responsibility, autonomy, variety 
etc. In contrast, the new theory argued that the principal 
mechanisms of productivity and quality improvements were 
extrinsic to the job itself, and included the traditional, 
organisational mechanisms of pay rises and incentives, labour 
elimination and raised workloads, improved work methods, and 
increased accountability and control. (It was also argued 
that the classical theories could be applied to a small minority 
of the workforce).
As well as offering quite different explanations for 
the same phenomena, these two theories would also seem to 
entail different assumptions and images about work, and 
the worker, and it is these which I now want to articulate, 
and then examine and comment upon.
Classical theories of job redesign have been associated 
with what MacGregor called 'Theory Y . '  ^ Y/hereas Theory X 
suggested man had an inherent dislike of work, had to be 
punished, and threatened to perform it, and preferred to be 
directed and controlled, craving little apart from security,
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Theory Y was very different. The assumptions of this theory 
were that man had a hierarchy of needs - physiological, 
social, self-esteem and self-actualisation, - (i.e. Ivlaslow's 
hierarchy), that work was natural, that man would perform 
in the service of objectives to which he was committed, 
committment being a function of rewards, and that he learns 
and seeks responsibility. Different combinations of these 
latter assumptions can be seen to have underpinned the 
different theories of job redesign discussed earlier in the 
thesis.
At the same time the division of labour, a feature of 
industrial life treated as unproblematic by Taylor, was 
elevated to the status of a major problem by the theorists of 
job redesign. It was seen as responsible for absenteeism, 
turnover, dissatisfaction, high labour costs, restriction
2
of output, strikes, and poor quality work and performance.
Work in industrial society is thus seen to entail a 
fundamental conflict between the needs, wishes, and capacities 
of the individual, and the constraints of the division of 
labour, itself a product of outmoded organisational philosophies. 
The individual is seen in a much richer and more complex 
manner, and also perceived as more willing to contribute to 
organisational objectives, under the appropriate circumstances.
At the same time features of work which for Taylor were 
problematic, such as the economic basis of co-operation, 
or the form of wage payment, have, generally speaking, been 
regarded as much less problematic by theorists of job redesign, 
who have focussed their attention on the conflict mentioned above.
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?•-. > new theory of job redesign advanced in this thesis 
would seer- at fi rst sight to entail some of the assumptions 
about work and w 'rkers more commonly associated v/ith 
Taylorism. In other words, it would appear to suggest that 
insofar as performance improvements were allied to pay rises and 
the use of incentives, that pay remains an important source 
of motivation in contemporary industrial organisations. Equally, 
the stress on enhanced control and accountability could be 
taken as indicative of a lack of faith in the capacities of 
workers to control and monitor their own activities, and as 
supporting the need for systems of authority and control in 
organisations. Whilst the scepticism regarding the mutuality 
of interest satisfaction under job redesign, and the suggestion 
that the costs for workers are higher than hitherto realised, 
would seem to entail an antagonistic view of worker-employer 
relations. Surely it might be argued these assumptions are 
both simplistic and inaccurate?
Before reviewing some of the problems inherent in the 
assumptions of both theories, one important point should be 
made about those underlying the new theory. A stress on 
pay systems, control and differential interest satisfaction 
in an explanatory theory of a given phenomenon (here, job 
redesign) does not in and of itself entail a particular 
system of v-lues (as noted briefly in Chapter 1). Indeed, 
at least two such systems, broadly spending, would seem to 
be possible ac c o d i n g  to the oerceived origins of the 
necessity for f i via noia 1 motivation, control etc.
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Under one system workers are seen as inherently lazy, 
desirous of material wellbeing, and averse to taking on 
responsibility. Motivation of workers to perform well 
at their jobs thus takes the form it does because of the 
inherent characteristics of the workforce, which are 
difficult, if not impossible, to change. Co-operation 
between workers and employers is partly coerced, and partly 
built on the economic basis of high wages and low labour 
costs. This view is close to Taylor1s,although it is not 
identical with it, as writers such as MacGregor,-^ and to 
a lesser degree, Schein,^ have falsely suggested.
But there is an alternative perspective, stretching
back to Marx, in which the current stress on pay and control
in organisations is seen to reflect the economic antagonism
in the employment relationship. In Marxist theory this
antagonism takes the form of class exploitation, and
extraction of surplus value from the working class; in
more recent industrial sociology, e.g. Baldamus,^ it has
been presented in terms of the wage being simultaneously
a cost for the employer and a reward for the worker. At
the same time, however, it has been argued by Marxists in
industrial sociology that economic antagonism is not
inevitable and eternal, but is bound up with a particular
mode of production. One can thus conceive of circumstances
under which pay incentives and external control would
7
become much reduced m  significance.
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Let us now turn to examine some of the problems with 
the two sets of assumptions, articulated above, starting 
with those of the classical theories. Some of the problems 
of these theories derive from their inadequate treatment of 
the role of wages and the presence of conflict in employment 
relations.
Emery & Thorsrud, for instance, wrote of the Norwegian 
projects that,
"We had overestimated the extent to which men 
thought critically about the limitations of 
their present jobs, and we underestimated their 
fearful suspicions of management." 8
An admission such as this is rare indeed in the literature 
of job redesign, but it is by no means the only example.
"Wages are the only negative aspects, although 
prospects of an upgrading were held out: "We
are not being paid for the job we do." " 9
That observation was made by den Hertog, about one of the
Philip*s case studies, whilst employees in case studies
10 11 12 by Walton, Locke et al., and Hill, two of which are
often cited success stories, also began placing demands for,
and expressing dissatisfaction with, pay levels. Changes
in job content have not been seen universally as an
'enrichment1: in the ICI studies, considerable improvements
in performance resulted from the five white collar studies,
but with the blue collar workers, matters were a little
different:
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” ... the calculations needed for working out the 
efficiencies were interpreted as an extra cho^e 
rather than an attempt to give the men some real 
control over plant operation.” 13
Such attitudes to work and to management have even been
observed in the famous Volvo-Kalmar plant, as a recent
report has indicated.
”... there is a feeling that changes made by the 
workers, (assemblers - JK) in order to facilitate 
the work and reduce assembly time, results in an 
increase in the so-called ’’undistributed time”...
In the interviews it was explained that this 
was something that could be exploited by the 
company when the product line is being changed 
- that is, the company could add new assembly 
tasks in order to use up this undistributed time." 14
These quotations and comments illustrate three aspects 
of employment relations that have received little attention 
in the literature of job redesign:
i) the perception of work as labour, that is, as an
undesirable activity; as a worker at IGI expressed
it, when talking about job rotation,
”You move from one boring, dirty, monotonous job
to another boring, dirty, monotonous job.......
...And somehow youfre supposed to come out of 
it all "enriched.” But I never feel "enriched,”
- I just feel knackered.” 15
ii) The consequent instruraentalisation of labour seen in 
its exchange for wages, and concern over the wage 
effort bargain;
i i i ) suspicion of managerial intentions, evidenced in the 
belief for example that methods imnroverrents may 
simply p.r 1are the way f ; it -: fd cr< td or of labour.
I ne of this is to say that workers   r not like, orsfer,
appreciate the chang ; nr fch>ir jobs, for they certainly
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did in a number of the cases cited earlier as the attitude
surveys and/or interviews showed. But at the same time
they also preserved a concern for issues that we might
label under the heading of ’exploitation. 1 The existence
of these two aspects of workers' consciousness (as evidenced
in some cases, at least) has been argued for by Daniel,
although he attempted to relate them to separate contexts,
the bargaining situation, and the daily work situation. 1 ^
17His data has been rightly criticised by Whelan, and the
data reported in the studies from which the above quotations
were taken did not suggest that intrinsic and extrinsic
18'orientations' (to use Goldthorpe et al's term) were 
context specific. The mutual existence of these attitudes 
is important in the present context because it has a bearing 
on the arguments advanced by job redesign theorists for the 
possibilities of employer-worker co-operation and mutual 
interest.
Such co-operation is seen to be related to the 
satisfaction of the psychological needs of workers (and the 
economic interests of employers), but there has been little 
attempt to cope theoretically, with the economic interests 
of workers and their attitudes to employment and managers 
(as illustrated above). Herzberg did try to conceptualise 
'the hygiene-seeker' as a psychologically-sick individual 
with a very strong interest in wages. And in recent years 
a number of job redesign theorists have argued for the 
importance of pay in an overall package of job and organisational
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19 20redesign. Writers such as Herrick & Maccoby, Walton,
21
and Hill, have all advanced the idea that pay eouities 
must be maintained in job redesign schemes. Squally, one 
can find reference in the works of the sociotechnical 
theorists to the use, and salience;, of pay incentives, but 
this question has not occupied a major position in their 
theoretical formulations.
Taylor, of course, moved in the opposite direction, as 
we saw in Chapter 2, i.e. beginning with an emphasis on 
financial motivation and incentives, he eventually came 
to develop an awareness of the need for changes in work 
attitudes of a more fundamental nature, summed up in his 
phrase 'the mental revolution.’
The theory presented in this thesis has attempted to 
cope with the economic and psychological aspects of worker- 
employer relations by positing a dual-mechanism thesis, 
according to which job performance is under the control of 
mechanisms such as pay, work methods, accountability, whilst 
job attitudes are influenced both by these and by a wider 
range of aspects of the work situation. Thus, associated 
with the wage-effort nexus is a series of attitudes (again, 
as illustrated above) which seem incompatible with more 
positive attitudes to job content. Yet this duality seems 
to be a feature of some work situations, and as such requires 
explanation within any theory of job redesign. Although the 
classical theories have endeavoured to theorise about this 
issue, they have done so in an ad hoc or* nn otherwise 
unsatisfactory manner, in o ->ntrast w? t;> the more systematic
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theory offered in the nresent v/ork.
There are, of course, ambiguities surrounding the 
assumptions of this new theory. For instance, it has been 
left unclear so far whether the theory is predicated on a 
Marxist view of employment relations, or on some other 
contemporary view, such as that of Baldamus, or perhaps 
Goldthorpe et al. Arguments about these issues would however 
in the present context be speculative, despite their importance. 
Equally, the relationship between worker concerns about wages 
and effort on the one hand, and general job satisfaction, on 
the other has been left unclear. These two themes would need 
to be clarified in some detail if further use were to be made 
of this theory.
What I have tried to show in this section is that the 
classical theories of job redesign are one-sided and partial 
in their understanding of the nature of work, of contemporary 
employment relations, and of the importance of pay. The new 
theory, although potentially more ambiguous in some of its 
assumptions, does nevertheless try to recognise both the 
importance of wage-effort and control issues for understanding 
behaviour at work, as well as the more intangible concerns 
with job satisfaction and with other features of the work 
environment. Whilst this theory hopefully corrects some of 
the one-sidedness and inadequacies of the classical theories, 
it is still in need of further development and. modification.
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The history of management practice
Many of the theoreticians and practitioners of job 
redesign have not only sought to advance certain ideas 
about job redesign and work organisation, but have also 
tried to evaluate their relationship with earlier theories 
and practices. In short, they have begun to write their 
own history. A recurrent theme in these nascent efforts 
is the idea of a rupture, or break, in managerial theory 
and practice, a phenomenon signified by the rejection of 
certain Taylorist principles, and particularly, special­
isation of labour. In the case of Davis, for instance, such 
views are related to the notion of an impending transition 
from industrial to post-industrial society:
"The papers (in Part 3 of his book with J.C. Taylor-JK) 
indicate that we are in the midst of an evolution, 
with discontinuities, in the development of man- 
made or designed jobs. Each development reflects 
the culture, including technology, of this era.
The discontinuities reflect the very large changes 
under way in the social environment." 22
The industrial era is characterised by bureaucracy and
scientific management, whereas the post-industrial era will
2 3usher in new values and new organisational designs. A 
similar view is held by Eric Trist:
"...the more complex, fast-changing, interdependent 
but uncertain world growing up in the wake of the 
second industrial revolution is rapidly rendering 
obsolete and maladaptive many of the values, 
organisational structures and work practices 
brought about by the first." 24
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Frederick Herzberg has also discussed what he calls 
'philosophies of personnel management,' and in so doing 
has pointed to the radical contrast between job 'enrichment* 
theory and industrial engineering:
"Rather than rationalising the work to increase 
efficiency, the theory suggests that work be 
enriched to bring about effective utilisation
of personnel .....  The term job enrichment
describes this embryonic movement." 25
A rather more grandoise formulation has been advanced by
Joe Roeber in his account of the Manpower Utilisation Plan
and Weekly Staff Agreement at ICI, both of which drew, to
some degree, on Herzberg's theory of job 'enrichment:*
"The old social contract based, pace Thomas Hobbes, 
on many kinas of coercion is breaking down as the 
balance of power in society is changing. A new 
social contract must emerge from this period of
transition YfSA is a small step in the
direction of that new social contract, a contract 
in which coercion will be replaced by ownership." 26
And it was twenty years ago when Robert Guest wrote about
'A Revolution in Job Design,' namely job enlargement. This
was,
"....  an attempt to reverse the trend begun many
years ago with the spread of mass production, 
increased specialisation of labour, the growth 
of more complex business organisations and the 
influence of the theory of scientific management 
begun a half century ago by Frederick Taylor..." 27
Running through all of these comments and quotations is the 
notion of a rupture in managerial theory and practice, or, 
as Davis put it less dramatically, a "discontinuity." In 
place of specialisation of labour and other features of
Taylorism there is to be despecialisation and workers'
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autonomy and responsibility, the treatment of workers as 
humans rather than machines. In Chapters 5 - 10 it has 
been shown that the notion of an abandonment, or reversal 
of Taylorism must itself be abandoned if we are to understand 
the relationship between job redesign and scientific manage­
ment, and that the different categories of job redesign have 
each preserved major elements of Taylorism, to varying 
degrees.
There are, of course, some discontinuities in current 
practices (as well as in ideologies). There are genuine 
reversals of labour specialisation; shifts from individualised 
to group job assignments and payment systems; and some 
blurring of the distinction between ’doing1 and ’planning/ 
controlling.*
But beneath these genuine discontinuities in practice
lies a much more fundamental continuity, a continuity
embodied in the idea of, and striving after, labour
intensification. Job redesign has been analysed in this
thesis as a form of intensification of labour, and it is
time now to draw out one of the implications of this analysis,
an implication for the history of managerial practice. The
intensification of labour (increased volume, or rate of
working, during the working day) has a long history, stretching
back to the legal limitations introduced in Britain in the
281840s, on the length of the working day. The practice has 
taken various forms, according to local conditions, and to 
other factors, but the essence of the forms remains the same —
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an attempt to increase working time, or the pace of work,
within the working day. To demonstrate the various forms
of this practice, for the present in a rather sketchy form,
up to the present day, is to assert the existence of a
fundamental continuity of managerial practice as a complement
29
to t h e  o n e - s i d e d  j o b  r e d e s i g n  t h e s i s  o f  d i s c o n t i n u i t y .
Marx was the first to draw attention to the phenomenon 
of labour intensification, that is,
"  increased expenditure of labour in a given
time, heightened tension of labour power, and 
closer filling up of the pores of the working 
day, ” 30
This practice increased output and productivity (measured 
against cost, and man hours) by the reduction of fatigue, 
effects of pay incentives, and in connection with machinery, 
by increased speed of the machine, or the assignment of more 
machines to each worker. ^  Here is an example, again taken 
from Marx:
" T h i r t y  y e a r s  a g o  (1841) o n e  s p i n n e r  w i t h  t h r e e  
p i e c e r s  w a s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  to a t t e n d  to  m o r e  t h a n  
one p a i r  of m u l e s  w i t h  3 0 0 - 3 2 4  s p i n d l e s .  At 
t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e  ( 1 8 7 1 )  h e  h a s  to m i n d  w i t h  t h e  
h e l p  of 5 p i e c e r s ,  2 , 2 0 0  s p i n d l e s ,  a n d  p r o d u c e s  
n o t  l e s s  t h a n  s e v e n  t i m e s  a s  m u c h  yarn a s  i n  
1841.” 32
Shortly after this period, in America, Frederick 
Taylor began to develop his theory of scientific manage­
ment, one of whose objectives was to intensify labour.
This was done, in the case of machining, for example, by 
increasing the speed at which the tools cut their steel,
and in other instances, yard labour for example, by assigning
33"...a full day's work"... Throughout the late nineteenth
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and early twentieth centuries there is evidence to show that
employers continued their drive for increased intensity of
labour. In Britain, Phelps-Brown observed that employers
both introduced new machinery, and also tried to increase
the speed at which existing machines ran. This was combined
with "... a new drive by management for faster work on the
34part of the men too." Whilst in America, Henry Ford 
developed and introduced in 1914, a mechanical means for 
pacing, and hence for intensifying, simple repetitive work, 
in the form of the moving assembly line. This, when used 
in conjunction with Taylorist work study, proved to be an 
effective means of greatly intensifying the labour in 
automobile manufacture. Of course, there were a series of 
technical innovations introduced at more or less the same 
time, which also helped raise productivity, as well as a 
more pronounced division of labour, but nevertheless,
"The work was hard, the pace inexorable, the 
pressure for ever-better production insistent." 35
With the introduction of machine pacing in mass 
production, assembly line working, there emerged also the 
form of intensification known as ’speed-up,1 in which work 
pace was increased by the simple expedient of raising the 
track or line speed thus compelling faster working. With 
the expansion of mass production and flow line organisation 
in the new industries of light engineering, and domestic 
appliances, in the inter-war years, speed-up became an 
important phenomenon, although other forms of intensification 
persisted. The Reports of the Factory Inspectorate for the
raid - 1930s confirmed its persistence, as they had first 
drawn attention to the phenomenon in the 1860s:
’’Speed is the essence of present-day industry, as 
exemplified in the conveyor system, ” 36
And Branson and Heineman indicate some of the forms taken
by the concern for speed:
"In cotton, weavers were required to work six looms 
instead of four. In mining, piecework rates were 
cut, conveyors brought in, and the yardage of 
coal face each man had to clear was lengthened.
In light engineering, motor factories especially, 
the speed of the conveyor belt determined the 
time the worker had to complete his operation: 
by speeding up the belt the operative could be 
compelled to work faster.” 37
And in the textile industry an earlier form of intensification
-assignment of more looms to each weaver - also took place
during the Depression of the 1930s.^^
After the war, in the 1950s and '60s the drive for
intensification in the UK assumed the form of an attack on
job demarcations as a form of restrictive practice, and of
the ’overmanning* to which this gave rise. The effect of
overmanning was seen as the raising of labour costs and that
of demarcation as a restriction or curtailment of individual
workloads. According to Brown one of the major outcomes of
the restrictive practices and overmanning debate was the
phenomenon of productivity bargaining; a possible solution
39to the 'problem' of ’restrictive’ practices.
These productivity agreements took various forms, but the most 
well known agreements, at ICI and Shell, involved substantial 
reductions in the work force whilst output remained constant.40
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There were no technical improvements in these cases, although 
there were some methods improvements, i.e. more efficient 
working methods. These nevertheless could not wholly account 
for the productivity rises that were obtained, and to see 
what factors were responsible we need to examine some of those 
cases more clearly.
The Weekly Staff Agreement at ICI was introduced conjointly 
as productivity bargain and job Enrichment,’ the latter 
appellation reflecting the enhanced variety and responsibility 
in work implied by several clauses in the Agreement. Thus 
for example,
’’Work should be organised so that each employee’s 
time, skills, and capacity to accept responsibility 
can be fully and effectively employed.... Signatory 
Unions agree (to) ... some flexibility between craft 
and non-craft employees The employment of crafts­
men on plant operation should the requirement be 
indicated..... ’’ 41
The connection between demarcation and productivity was
clearly present here, but what should also be noticed is the 
conceptualisation of internal labour mobility, ’’filling up
42
the gaps in the work day” as Marx put it, as ’flexibility.’
In the productivity agreement at the Steel Company of
Wales, reported by Owen-Sraith, new working practices were 
again an important feature, and were also described in terras 
of internal mobility:
’’For example, if the men were having an easy time 
on the furnace then possibly they would be put
to work in the scrap yard  It was not just
mobility among workers at Port Talbot that 
management proposed. Other branches of the 
South Wales 'Group, and even other firms, could 
be considered potential work places....Further 
several work roles would be amalgamated and 
assigned to an individual employee." 43
Again, it should be made clear these were not secondary, or 
ancillary components of the productivity agreement, for in 
Owen-Sraith's view,
nA ‘buying out' of all current forms of restrictive 
practices, in order to increase the mobility, 
flexibility and interchangeability of labour.”- 44
is one of the two defining features of such an agreement,
the other being the tying of wages to performance.
Finally, if we consider the National Power Loading 
Agreement in the coalmines, we find once more a stress on 
flexibility as an advantage accruing from the abandonment 
of piecework:
"Deployment of men can be more flexible than when 
earnings varied from face to face....... ” 45
The common feature of these three agreements, and indeed of
the Dairy case reported in Chapter 9, was that all occurred
in capital intensive industries - chemicals, oil, coal and
milk production - and it is in these industries that there
is a premium on maximum capital utilisation.
"The sophisticated nature of much modern plant 
and equipment has meant that continuous operation, 
and continuous manning has been increasingly 
necessary on technical grounds." 46
If we consider the three categories of job redesign 
analysed in this thesis it will become apparent that each 
of these has certain affinities with past forms of labour 
intensification. Several examples of vertical role 
integration in manufacturing industry involved the amalga­
mation of work roles, so that, in effect, fewer workers 
tended a given number of machines and performed the requisite 
functions. The earliest known study of 'job enlargement,'
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of category I redesign, was the case reported by Walker,
in which the jobs of operative, setter, and inspector were
collapsed into one. In this way, the labour performed by
the operative was intensified, as the 'gaps1 in her working
day were filled in with additional labour. In flexible
work groups we found a form of despecialisation of labour
through flexibility, in which we can detect one traditional
and one contemporary form of intensification. The traditional
form is the increased ratio of machines to workers: in the
case of category III redesign, of course, this is a group
of workers. The more contemporary form is that of labour
flexibility, observed in the three productivity bargains 
described above, and in the case of the dairy, discussed
i n  C h a p t e r  9. A s  r e g a r d s  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  of  f l o w  l i n e s ,
the intensification which may occur there consists simply
of an increase in effective working time, a phenomenon
induced by the payment of incentives, usually on an
individual basis.
As we said earlier there are of course differences 
in the forms of intensification over time, and between 
industries, but the fact remains nonetheless that we are 
dealing with forms of one and the same phenomenon. It 
should also be emphasised that we are dealing here with 
managerial practice (intensification of.labour) and not 
with ideology nor developments within industrial social 
science, where there have been several fundamental shifts 
of problematic - from payment systems and workload, to the
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operator's physical capacity and limitations, through to 
patterns of supervisory behaviour, to formsof job content 
- performance relations. Overall then it can be seen, even 
after such a brief and schematic review, that the notion 
of a discontinuity in managerial practice and theory is in 
need of serious revision, in the light of the general 
continuity which has been shown. We cannot as yet offer 
any more precise conclusion because the relative status 
of these different tendencies remains unknown.
The future of job redesign
A number of writers have recently questioned whether
job redesign is anything more than a transient fad in
managerial circles, destined to decline after its period 
47of popularity, although others suggest it will in fact
48increase in popularity in future years. Since this is a
question of some controversy, and also of some interest,
it v/ill be pursued here in some depth, so let us begin
with some evidence.
There is a certain amount of evidence to suggest that
job redesign is in decline. Academic criticisms of the
practice, v/hich began in 1968 with the critique by Hulin 
49& Blood, have increased in recent years. In 1972 there 
appeared an article by Reif & Luthans questioning the 
gains that could be derived from job r e d e s i g n . I n  
1973 there appeared articles or papers by Scott, 51
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Imberman, and Penzer, which raised questions about the 
duration of redesign effects and about the pervasiveness
of worker disinterest. The following year saw publications
54 55by Pein, and Schrank, which tried to reinterpret some
of the more well known cases of job redesign, an endeavour
continued in 1975 by Parke & Tausky."^ A number of failed
cases were published in the mid-1970s, notably by Prank
& Hackman (1975)^ and by Locke et al (1976),^ and major
theoretical and conceptual critiques continued to be
59written, including, most notably, those by Tausky & Parke,
Pein,^° Blackler & Brown,^ and Bat3tone.^?
In addition to all of these articles, trade union
journals, especially in America, carried a large number
of critical responses to the ’Work in America’ study,
65published in 1972. Whilst it is also true that there 
was an earlier phase of studies questioning the extent 
of dissatisfaction with repetitive work, from 1955 to 
1962, these studies may best be seen as marking a temporary 
decline of interest in what was known as job enlargement -
a specific form of job redesign - rather than any general
decline in redesign as such.
We could also point to the apparent decline in the
number of redesign projects started within the last seven 
or eight years, as noted in the WRU Report on such projects 
in the UK, described in Chapter 11. And Thackray has 
suggested that the recession is leading many US managers 
to think again about job redesign, and indeed about many
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behavioural science assumptions prevalent in the 1960s 
64
and early 1970s.
Taking these pieces of evidence together it would 
appear that job redesign is indeed on the brink of 
vanishing, despite the fairly recent flurry of activities 
and events, which included the establishment of national
65institutions throughout Europe. We should however
exercise considerable caution before arriving at such a
judgement, and take not of an earlier historical experience,
in some ways similar to the present one. In conventional
histories of industrial psychology and management,
Taylorism is commonly thought to have been superseded by
•human relations' theory, yet as Braverman has correctly
noted nothing could be further from the truth for,
" If Taylorism does not exist as a separate
school today, that is because, ......its
fundamental teachings have become the bedrock 
of all work design." 66
I would suggest that the same may be true of job redesign
and that the decline of the ideas of redesign v/ithin the
academic world, should be distinguished from the fate of
the practices to which these ideas refer.
There was an identifiable basis, or rationale, for
the persistence of Taylorism, insofar as it offered a
series of techniques, and an overall strategy for raising
productivity. It would be an overestiraation of the
significance of job redesign to say that it offered anything
comparable to time and motion study, or incentive pay systems,
but it could form one of a group of techniques adopted by 
management in order to increase labour productivity. This 
is particularly the case in the UK, where, as many writers 
have documented, the productivity of labour is, on the 
whole, considerably lower than in the rest of Europe, or 
in the USA.
A study reported in the ’Guardian1 noted that in the
West Midlands engineering firms that were examined, "neither
labour nor plant was employed on "directly productive work"
for more than an average of 50 per cent of the time available.
Jones has noted that whereas UK labour productivity was
15-40$ higher than that in France, West Germany and Italy,
in 1955, the position had dramatically reversed by 1973 and
labour productivity in France and Germany exceeded that in
the UK by 3 0 $ . On the criterion of value added per
worker (as opposed to physical output, the basis of labour
productivity measures), workers in five EEC countries, in
1970 added between 1l and 2£■ times as much value to their
products as their British counterparts. Two studies published
in 1976 yielded similar findings. In the first study it
was found that labour productivity in similar industries
in Sweden was significantly higher than that in the UK,^^
whilst in the second study, it was shown that in a
comparison between British and European subsidiaries of
the same company, labour productivity in the latter was
70often 15-30> higher than in the former. Numerous reasons
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were advanced to explain these differences, and they 
included management training and organisation, factory
71organisation, and worker attitudes. Also mentioned, by 
10$ of the 109 company plants, was 'restrictive labour 
practices' of indirect employees, or "inflexible division 
of work between operators and indirect employees." This 
was in addition to widespread demarcations commented on by
72other companies, and discussed also in the Donovan report.
In general, then, it has been widely accepted that British
labour productivity is often lower than in the rest of Europe,
or the USA, and to determine whether job redesign is likelyr
to play any significant role in raising productivity, we
need to look in more detail firstly, at specific industries,
and secondly, at the economy as a whole.
Two recent reports on the car industry suggested that
the various new forms of work organisation tried elsewhere
in the industry, notably at Volvo and Saab, were unlikely
to be utilised in the UK. The authors of the Rothschild,
'Think Tank* report on the car industry considered this to be
the case on the basis of discussions v/ith employers and union
officials, and because of the costs involved (the new Volvo—
7 3Kalmar plant cost 10$ more than traditional car plants).
A National Economic Development Office report was 
slightly more equivocal, merely observing that under job 
redesign labour costs per unit output could rise, and that 
the phenomenon required further study before any recommen-
fj
ations could be made. Finally, Rhys has pointed out that
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whereas Volvo produced cars in small volumes for the luxury
end of the market, with an average total production time
per car of 9 hours, British Leyland, for instance is engaged
in mass production of medium-priced cars, with an average
75product time of 2? hours. On this basis he concluded
that Leyland was not able to afford job 1 enrichment,* and
would be unlikely to benefit even if it were.
Against these equivocal and pessimistic accounts must
be set two reports produced from the trade union side.
Pontarollo compared differences in effective working time
between British and Italian car firms, that is, the length
7 6of the working day minus breaks, rest periods etc.
Increases in effective working time; and thus of productivity'
he argued, could provide one method of securing the shorter
working week, a stated objective of the T & GWU which
77organises the majority of British car workers. One method 
for increasing EVVT is to reduce break and rest times to a 
minimum, whilst another, recently embarked upon by FIAT, is 
to increase the flexibility of workers, and to reduce the 
length of the assembly lines in favour of small work group 
working. The latter initiative was welcomed by Pontarollo 
who urged unions to press for its introduction in other 
car firms.
Brown has described the struggles between labour and
management, particularly in British Leyland, which have
revolved around the production rate as determined by track 
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speeds. ~ According to the union stewards, Leyland
management had been trying for several years to raise 
labour productivity, by intensification of labour* This 
was achieved both by increases in track speeds, and also, 
less successfully, by the use of Measured Daywork in place 
of bonus payment systems. Since the productivity of British 
car workers in 1973 was between 35 and 75% of that of their 
major competitors, it can be seen that there is a strong,
economic necessity to raise labour productivity if the UK
79car industry is to compete on world markets. Job redesign 
could play a role here, though whether it will remains to 
be seen.
A recent study of the coal mining industry argued that
despite the widespread introduction of face mechanisation,
output per man shift was still lower than anticipated, and
part of the explanation lay in the poor rate of machine 
80
utilisation. According to the author it was not uncommon 
for the automatic face cutter to be operating for only of 
the 7+ hours on each shift. In order to increase machine 
utilisation the author recommended that some of the lessons 
of the Durham composite longwall experiments, reported by 
Trist et al., might be adopted and applied elsewhere, since 
in his view there could be "no substantial increase in 
productivity without the conscious co-operation of the men," 
and the composite work method was one means through which 
such co-operation might be achieved. He also noted that 
the National Power Loading Agreement, of 1965, under which
payment was changed from an incentive to a flat rate system,
appeared to have had the effect of reducing output, at least
when not accompanied by mechanisation, which otherwise masked
this reduction,
A study of the European chemicals industry, while
noting that UK labour productivity compared 'favourably* with
other European companies, nevertheless pointed out that in
some respects Dutch and German plants had advantages over
81their British rivals. One such advantage was increased 
flexibility of labour, whereby process workers might carry 
out minor maintenance duties, instead of having to await 
the arrival of trained maintenance workers. The report 
commented that,
"Employees on the continent did no't think their 
jobs were threatened by labour flexibility.
Rather, they found it increased job satisfaction 
and their scope for initiative," 82
Again, therefore, it can be seen that elements of job
redesign may appear in industries such as these.
More generally, Pratten, in a very recent article on
'The Efficiency of British Industry,' has focussed attention,
on low labour productivity in the UK, which he conceptualised 
8 3
as 'overmanning.' Some indices of this overmanning, or 
inefficient use of manpower, included the following:
"....  machine operators may not be responsible for
keeping their section of a factory clean (this 
work being done by cleaners); operators may not
be responsible for checking the quality of the 
products they make, and this may necessitate the 
employment of more inspectors; operators may 
not be allowed to put right, or attempt to put 
right, faults in a machine or to set up a 
machine; specialist personnel may themselves 
operate demarcation rules.............  84
The breaking down of these divisions, and the amalgamation 
of these work roles has been the distinguishing feature of 
two forms of job redesign - categories I and III. Insofar 
as demarcations limit the use of labour, and their corres­
ponding elimination may raise labour productivity, then to 
that extent, job redesign may be said to have a future.
Another recent report on British industry made a similar 
observation.
"The stage seems set for Phase Three of the Social 
Contract to include provision for a new round of
productivity deals....... which (will) include...
greater flexibility in the deployment of labour.. 
the gradual elimination of inter-trade barriers 
demarcation." 85
Such productivity deals' were extremely popular in the 19603,
but seemed to decline with the onset of recession and incomes
86
policies in the 1970s. Nevertheless there does appear to be 
a return to the concept, and the practice, as the above quote 
suggests. Chrysler UK, for example, recently announced a 
productivity agreement, one of whose provisions was to improve 
flexibility of labour within trades. A report by the 
employment agency 'Manpower,' published i n  July, 1 9 7 7 ,
suggested that few managers expected to increase production
by hiring more staff in the near future, but many more hoped
88
to achieve better utilisation of labour. Finally,
’ Personnel Management,’a major journal of British management,
recently carried an article describing a productivity bargain,
89
and extolling its merits.
Finally, it should be noticed that many examples of 
category III redesign occurred in highly capitalised industrie 
and although labour costs are only a small proportion of total 
costs in such industries, they are more immediately amenable 
to adjustment.
Overall, the evidence presented in these few scattered 
reports and articles does not conform wholly to the view that 
job redesign is in decline. There may, as we have indicated, 
be situations where different forms of job redesign are likely 
to play a significant, though perhaps not a major, role in 
raising the productivity of British labour. As far as other 
countries are concerned, the difficulty of securing reliable 
information renders any speculation quite useless.
Further research on job redesign
The arguments that have been advanced throughout this 
thesis have several implications for the pursuit of further 
research, and these will now b" outlined. Job redesign was 
conceptualised as a form of intensification of labour, a 
phenomenon in which labour productive ty was raised by means 
of a greater expenditure of effort on the pert of the workers
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affected. Some of the problems with these ideas, and with 
the definitions of effort and intensity have already been 
discussed, and it became clear at that point that further 
resolution was dependent on further research. Few studies 
of job redesign have actually considered employee perceptions 
of effort in any systematic fashion, although isolated 
comments and observations appear to confirm the idea of
90increased effort expenditure as a feature of job redesign. 
Future studies ought therefore to examine employee perceptions 
of effort, workloads, pace, and the effects of effort, such 
as tiredness, or fatigue. Employee evaluations of effort 
may no>t be found, empirically, to be isolated from evaluations 
of pay. In short, one may also need to assess perceptions 
of wage effort parity and disparity.
It has been suggested that perceptions of effort may 
depend on the actual and perceived origins of control over 
work pace, whether this be the group, the technology, or 
the worker himself and in certain forms of job redesign, 
especially category II, there are found transitions from 
paced assembly line working to individual working. On the 
other hand, it was argued that in these, and other situations, 
managerial control over the worker may be augmented because 
accounta.bility would be easier to enforce. These arguments 
were inferential in character, and it would be useful to 
examine (a) whether the ootertnal for better accountability 
v/ao actually exercised by supervisory staff, and (b) whether 
workers themselves felt subject to greater surveillance and 
control. Equally, it would be useful to discover whether
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the increased control over pace that i.s often a feature 
of job redesign,was recognised and value! by workers, and 
whether it was accompanied by, parallel, increases in other 
forms of control, for example, through the payment system or 
pay rates.
These suggestions would enable a more rigorous evaluation
of the idea of job redesign as intensification of labour,
although as indicated in earlier chapters there does already
exist supportive evidence from a number of studies.
It was also argued that the provision of pay rises and/
or pay incentives was a salient factor in worker motivation
under job redesign, and that the factors responsible for
motivation and performance were different from those
responsible for worker satisfaction and improved job attitudes.
Whilst evidence was adduced in support of both of these
contentions, it is true nevertheless that stronger evidence
would be desirable. On the relation between motivation and
satisfaction, it would be useful to compare these factors
amongst groups of workers which experienced job redesign
both with and without pay rises. The problem here is that
whilst there are countless, often sophisticated, measures
of job satisfaction and job attitudes, and many concepts of
satisfaction, the concept of motivation has received far less 
91
attention. It was recently observed that the whole field
of motivational theory was in a serious state of confusion,
92an! this is reflected in the m^asurr.ng :i t w ;r.ents. The
Hackman et al. questions on motivation •• ro useful, but there 
are f e * of them, and the concept has voh to be differentiated
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in the way that has occurred with ’.job satisfaction. * 
bore conceptual work may be ro ruired the.ro do re before 
adequate measuring instruments can be devised and utilised.
Since some degree of importance has been attached to 
pay as a factor in raising productivity, it would be 
particularly important to examine changes in motivation 
v/here there have been no pay increases, and also, perhaps, 
where labour has not been eliminated, as this tea was seen 
to be a potent factor in accounting for differences in 
productivity increases. And where labour was eliminated 
it would be necessary to examine the relationship between 
this process, and the increasing of productivity, to 
determine whether there was a causal connection, and if so, 
to specify its direction. Again it would be necessary to 
examine what mechanisms induced employees, under these 
conditions, to accept higher workloads as their co-workers 
were displaced. It may be that on this question, as well 
as on the issue of pay, one may need to introduce some 
notion of the perceived fairness of wages and v/orkloads as 
a factor mediating between job redesign mechanisms and 
performance changes.
Mention of labour elimination brings us to the next 
point on which further research is c - qu.1 red. In discussing 
the mutual interests of workers an I ,~b ••ye^ s it was suggested 
that the displacement or eli~v.r rion of -#orb * rs should be 
seen as a cost borne by the wo "*k fore bo 7 this may be 
oversimplified, and the iegre*' ' • ■ involved will dep id
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on whether displaced em . - • • • are ' ind alternative jobs,
and on the nature of -hose .jobs. .Mor- - search is needed 
to determine the fate of dis *k?rs. Th
weakness in the section on mutual interests concerned the 
costs incurred by management, it being argued there were 
very few. Again, more research would be needed to examine 
immediate economic costs, such as lost- production, or 
consultants' fees, as well as longer term costs, such as 
wage demands or labour turnover. In addition, there may 
be changes in the balance of power within a company following 
job redesign, and whilst it might be difficult to place a 
value on these changes, they ought at least to be taken 
note of. Finally, it would be useful to obtain more precise 
data on the distribution of benefits arising out of higher 
productivity, as between wages, profits, dividends etc.
The last point concerns management history. It was 
argued that job redesign could be seen as part of a continuous 
tradition of management attempts to raise the intensity of 
labour, but it v/as .accepted, nevertheless, that there were 
also discontinuities in these practices. A much more detailed 
analysis of past managerial efforts to raise productivity will 
be required before an overall assessment can be made of the 
place of job redesign in the history of management practice. 
Such an analysis would have + ^ocus on the various techniques 
used to raise productivity, •clu-’ing mechanisation, shift 
working, payment systems, method s tody to., and would have 
to assess very carefully ; whic? these involve
intensi fication of 1 bo" ■*. ’. '' ''inning had boon ma.de in this
4 9 2 -
Ji ~ection by Brown, v/ho has documented a number of productivity 
-raising strategies used by British employers since the last 
century. ^  Unfortunately, his work does not contain the 
mass of detail that would be required for the tasks set out 
above, and nor does it distinguish labour intensification 
with sufficient clarity from other productivity techniques 
such as method study. ^5
If research were to be pursued along the lines set out 
here, then we could begin to construct a much more accurate 
picture of the mechanisms, outcomes, and historical 
significance of job redesign, than has hitherto been available, 
and than is likely to emerge from within the current paradigms.
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Part Five
CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 13 SUMMARY OP CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions from the thesis may be stated 
as follows:
1. Taylor’s theory of scientific management was shown to 
consist not only of a rational-economic theory of motivation, 
but to entail a thorough-going reorganisation of work and 
work methods. Where possible work roles and pay levels were 
to be individualised in order to counteract collective 
organisation and Taylor was quite aware of individual 
variability. More importantly, it was shown that enhanced 
division of manual labour was not an integral feature of 
Taylorism.
2. In general, job redesign has devised, or involved, no 
new means of raising productivity without increased effort 
expenditure. It consists of, and may be characterised as, 
a form of intensification of labour, in which working time 
within the working day is increased.
3. Historically, job redesign was said to have emerged 
principally in response to inefficiencies in production, 
rather than to ’personnel problems,' such as absenteeism 
etc., viz. unoccupied time and overheads (category I) ;
non-productive and balance-delay time (category II) ; 
inflexibility of labour (category III).
4. The theory advanced in the thesis specified four 
mechanisms by which productivity and quality improvements 
could be obtained: pay rises and incentives, labour
elimination and raised workloads, work methods improvements, 
and enhanced control and accountability. These mechanisms, 
in different combinations, were shown to have considerable 
explanatory power in categories II and III (above) but 
rather less in category I, particularly for white collar 
workers. It was suggested that the classical theories of 
job redesign might be appropriate for this small minority 
of the workforce.
5. The relationship between job redesign practice and 
scientific management practice was fairly complex, and varied 
according to the category of redesign under examination.
Some instances of category I redesign, namely those which 
did not involve the work of decision-makers, supervisors etc. 
were analysed as consistent with the Taylorist search for
"a full day's work,” that is, for maximum intensity of 
labour. Other cases in category I, however, involved 
amalgamations of 'planning' and 'doing,' and thus went beyond 
Taylor's recommended divorce of these functions. Category II 
redesign was analysed as a pure form of scientific management 
since it involved the individualisation of work roles, an 
increase in accountability and managerial control, the use 
of method study to raise productivity, and the use of
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individual pay incentives. Category III redesign was analysed 
as a form of intensification of labour developed in conditions 
of product and/or process variability and uncertainty where 
it was difficult to assign regular, full workloads on an 
individual basis. Workloads were therefore assigned to a 
group, and productivity was raised by reduction of the work 
force or increase in work volume. This form of redesign 
was said to have discovered (by implication) the limiting 
conditions of applicability of certain Taylorist principles.
Theoretically, job redesign was said to have under­
emphasised the economic basis of employment, and of worker - 
employer co-operation and conflict. Herzberg's job enrich­
ment and task design theory also showed the individualism of 
scientific management.
6. These mechanisms were said to explain changes in job 
behaviour (productivity and quality changes) more than 
changes in attitudes. The latter were said to be responsive 
to a much wider range of features of the work environment, 
such as co-worker relations, supervision, physical conditions, 
pay, job content etc., and could, and did, therefore vary 
independently of changes in job behaviour. This distinction 
parallels the conceptual distinction between motivation 
(to perform) and job satisfaction. These distinctions 
enabled us to account for the many attitude-behaviour 
discrepancies found in the literature.
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7. The notion that job redesign acts to the mutual interests 
of workers and employers was examined, and the evidence 
available did not unequivocally support the conclusion that 
the parties derived equal, or nearly equal benefits. For
it appeared that the costs accruing to workers outweighed 
those borne by employers, e.g. loss of jobs, intensification 
of labour.
8 . In the light of our analysis of job redesign as a form 
of intensification of labour, and of its affinities with 
scientific management, it was argued that the notion of 
job redesign as constituting a rupture or discontinuity in 
management practice, must be seriously questioned. And at 
the same time the argument that job redesign had no future 
was also shown to be erroneous.
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Errata
p. 14 L.3, after 'In' insert 1955.
p. 97. next to bottom line, 'structures' should read 'strictures', 
p. 150, L.5, 'model' should read 'theory', 
p. 282, Chapter 6 should read Chapter 5.
p.345, para.2, L.l, 'work output' should read 'effort expenditure'.
